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FROM SARDIS TO MARATHON. GRECO-PERSIAN RELATIONS 499-490 BC: A REVIEW

Part two: The Battle of Marathon and Its Implications

Andrew v. H., *09/27/2018:
vivat, crescat, floreat!

Jan P. Stronk

The Battle of Marathon in 490 BC, according to Plutarch fought on 6 Boedromiôn *(in that year to be equated with September 12 in our calendar and at present still celebrated on that day at Athens), may be regarded as one of the defining moments in the history of the ancient* polis *of Athens. The battle was the culmination point of developments that started about the middle of the sixth century BC, but really took shape shortly after 500 BC. In this paper, of which the first part was published in Talanta 48-49 (= Stronk 2016-17), we follow(ed) various circumstances and actions involving the Achaemenid Empire (briefly described as Persia) and Greek* poleis *which ultimately led to the Battle of Marathon. As Persian sources remain largely silent on these occurrences, we shall scrutinise other sources available in order to try and draw a more comprehensive picture of the occurrences surrounding the Battle of Marathon than can be obtained from Herodotus' account alone, which remains to this day the main literary source for most people. Simultaneously, we will have to look into the matter of how reliable Herodotus' account really is. In this second part, we shall discuss the occurrences following the fall of Eretria, notably focusing on the Battle of Marathon and its implications*[1].

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[1] For this part, thanks are due to: Sarah E. Bond (University of Iowa), who kindly sent me a PDF of Bond 2016 that I found really inspirational; Jona Lendering (<www.livius.org>) for providing me, *inter alia*, with photos of the Brescia-sarcophagus – and many more benefits; Carl E. Koppeschaar of *Astronet* (<www.astronet.nl>) for his advice on an astronomical issue regarding the date of 'Marathon'; Nick Sekunda (amongst others University of Danzig) for pointing me to Kunze 1955 and providing me with a copy of it: the *Festschrift* in which this paper is published proved to be absent in the Netherlands; the National Museum of Scotland (Edinburgh) for their permission to reproduce the detail of a *kylix*, and – last but by no means least – Clio Stronk for drawing the maps of Attica, Marathon (general) and Marathon plain (north). Like in part 1, also in this part all three-digit years refer to years BC, unless indicated otherwise. Due to the complexity of the occurrences, I have attempted to present the information as structured as I saw fit. A consequence of this approach is that some situations had to be dealt with more than once. I apologise for the inconvenience this may cause as regards the ease of reading this paper. All translations in this paper are by the author, unless indicated otherwise. Regrettably, Pelling 2019

In the first of this two-part review (= Stronk 2016-17), we have discussed the Greco-Persian relations from the end of the sixth century BC onwards. In particular, attention has been paid to the so-called Ionian Revolt, which started in 499, notably the raid of the Ionians with support of the Eretrians and the Athenians on Sardis (allegedly resulting in setting fire to the city), and the counter-measures of the Achaemenid King Darius I the Great to restore divine order (that had been challenged by the killing of Persian ambassadors to Athens and Sparta as well: cf., e.g., Hdt. 6.48-49, 7.133-137; Stronk 2016-17, 158-159 and its note 53). First, Darius (made) suppress(ed) the revolt, followed by the recovery (through Mardonius) of *Skudra* (Thrace/northern Macedon) in 493/492, and finally he sent out the expedition of 490. In the summary as phrased by Aristotle:

Τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις; τίς αἰτία τοῦ πολεμεῖσθαι Ἀθηναίους; ὅτι εἰς Σάρδεις μετ᾽ Ἐρετριέων ἐνέβαλον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκίνησε πρῶτον. πόλεμος ἐφ᾽ οὗ Α, προτέρους εἰσβαλεῖν Β, Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ Γ. ὑπάρχει δὴ τὸ Β τῶι Γ, τὸ προτέροις ἐμβαλεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Α τῶι Β· πολεμοῦσι γὰρ τοῖς πρότερον ἀδικήσασιν. ὑπάρχει ἄρα τῶι μὲν Β τὸ Α, τὸ πολεμεῖσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἄρξασι· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ Β τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· πρότεροι γὰρ ἦρξαν. μέσον ἄρα καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ αἴτιον, τὸ πρῶτον κινῆσαν	Why did the Athenians become involved in the Persian war?' means 'What cause originated the waging of war against the Athenians?' and the answer is, 'Because they [i.e. the Athenians] raided Sardis together with the Eretrians', since this originated the war. Let A be war, B unprovoked raiding, C the Athenians. Then B, unprovoked raiding, is true of C, the Athenians, and A is true of B, since men make war on the unjust aggressor. So A, having war waged upon them, is true of B, the initial aggressors, and B is true of C, the Athenians, who were the aggressors. Hence here too the cause – in this case the efficient cause – is the middle term. (Arist. *APo*. 94a36-94b8).

As it is, the Persian reaction can hardly have come unexpected for the Greeks of Euboea and the mainland, as Aristotle's causality sequence indicates as well. Possibly, Prynichus' (now completely lost) play *Capture of Miletus* (performed somewhere between 493-491) already may have hinted at it at a much earlier date (cf. Rosenbloom 2006, 20). After stops at Naxos, Delos, and various Aegean islands,

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was published after concluding this paper and the views it entails could not be incorporated any more in this paper. Though Jona Lendering rightly remarks in a blog (in Dutch) of July 1, 2019 <https://mainzerbeobachter.com/2019/07/01/mom-je-leest-nooit-slechts-een-tekst/ > that Herodotus nowhere refers to the year (and specific day) of 'Marathon', I believe, based upon Plu. *Arist*. 5.7, Arist. *Ath*. 22.3, and the *Marmor Parium* (ed. Jacoby) *ad* 48 (62-3), referring to the fact that at the time 'Marathon' took place Phaenippus was the leading *archôn* in Athens, that the year 490 BC for that battle is sufficiently established (cf. Strothmann/Welwei 2004, 148 *ad* no. 66). Also see Rhodes 1993, 195, 262.

the Phoenician-Persian fleet *cum* army headed for the island of Euboea, notably the *polis* of Eretria. According to our literary sources, a brief siege followed, after which the city was taken (see, e.g., Stronk 2016-17, 162-178). Having accomplished that part of their assignment – still according to our literary sources – , the Persians – led by Datis the Mede[2] and Artaphernes the younger (the son of the satrap of Ionia and a nephew of King Darius) – re-embarked and set sail to Attica, landing in the Bay of Marathon. Here, we start with our research into this part of the occurrences.

Marathon

a. geography

Some general observations may serve as a necessary introduction (see also Figs. 1-6 and 16), though being mindful of Whatley's words that "[t]opography, then, is an essential Aid to military history, but we want much more knowledge than it can supply by itself. It gives good negative results: to positive results it can contribute, but only in a limited degree" (Whatley 1964, 124). The plain of Marathon lies along the bay of the same name on the north-eastern coast of Attica. The most significant settlement on the plain at present is the large village of Marathon (or Marathonas). In Antiquity the village was not situated at the place it is located now: its precise location is, however, still debated. Hammond (1988, 508-510 and fig. 43) believes there are strong indications ancient Marathon was situated slightly to the east of the chapel of St. Demetrios, SSE of Vrana (see below). The territory of Marathon was, in antiquity, divided among four *dêmoi*, sc. Marathon, Oinoe, Tricorythos, and Probalinthos, the first three part of the Aeantid-*phyle*, the latter of that of the Pandionis: together they formed a local union, the *Tetrapolis* (cf. Petrakos 1996, 1).

The plain of Marathon is shaped nearly in the form of a crescent, and about six miles in length. It is currently about two miles broad in the centre, where the space between the mountains and the sea is greatest, but it narrows toward either extremity, the mountains coming close down to the water at the horns of the plain. There is a valley trending inward from the middle of the plain, and a ravine comes down to it to the southward (at Vrana). Elsewhere, it is closely girt round on the land side by rugged limestone mountains, which are thickly studded with pines, olive-trees, and cedars. Moreover, it is overgrown with myrtle, arbutus, and other low odoriferous shrubs (these include, or at least in the past likely may have included, fennel: the name 'Marathon' (Μαραθών) is derived from that herb, called marathon (μάραθον) in Greek (cf. *LSJ*, s.vv. μᾰρᾰθον and Μᾰρᾰθών), but already attested in Mycenaean Greek as *ma-ra-tu-wo* (see, e.g., <http://www.palaeolexicon.

[2] Sekunda 2002, 15, though, believes that the phrase 'of Median origin' or simply 'the Mede' here "may be a Greek misunderstanding of the Achaemenid practice of naming eminent Persians after the provinces they governed": in short, Sekunda believes it feasible that Datis was a Persian, the satrap of Media.

Fig. 1. The Plain of Marathon looking south (before AD 2000) from the foothills of Mt Draconera. In the foreground part of what is left of the (former) Schinias Marsh. Original photo: <http://kneadtowrite.blogspot.nl/2014/04/ancient-greece-lives-on-in-london.html>.

com/Word/Show/16801>). The relation between herb and the name of the place is, moreover, underlined by the comic poet Hermippus, quoted by Athenaeus (Athen. 2.56C). Large parts of the plain were cultivated and Nonnus describes it as τέμενος βαθύδενδρον ἐλαιοκόμου Μαραθῶνος ("the deep woody borders of oliveplanted Marathon": Nonn. *D*. 13.184, transl. W.H.D. Rouse, Loeb Classical Library, vol. nr. 344). Aristophanes (*Av*. 246), however, speaks of λειμῶνά τ᾽ ἐρόεντα Μαραθῶνος ("charming meadows of Marathon"), perhaps suggesting there was (ample) room left for grazing as well, as also suggested by Hammond (1988, 507).

The level of the ground apparently was an unbroken plain at the time of the Persian invasion of 490. There were, for a period, marshes at both the north-eastern and south-eastern end, which are/were only partly dry in spring and summer and at those places then offer(ed) no (significant) obstruction to a horseman. Usually, the marshes were/are commonly flooded with rain and so rendered impracticable for cavalry (at least from the autumn on). The totality of the marshes, certainly the northerly one, appears – therefore – to have been treacherous. As it is, the Schol. Pl. *Mx*. 240C disqualifies Marathon as a suitable place for cavalry: τῇ φύσει τραχύς, δισίππασιος, ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ πηλούς, τενάγη, λίμνας ("in nature rugged, unsuitable for horses, full of mud, swamps, and lakes"). At the time of the Persian invasion, the marsh at the south-eastern end of the plain, the so-called Brexisa Marsh (drained in the 1930s), was – as it might seem – not-existent (though Hammond 1988, 510 appears to believe it did exist, a view he already expressed in Hammond 1973, 179). The larger part of the Schinias Marsh (which derives its name from the reeds of the Great Marsh inland: Ham-

Fig. 2. The Plain of Marathon at present, the 2004 Olympic rowing track showing prominently. Photo © Google Earth (https://www.google.com/maps/ggg@38.1327999,24.0246221,9464m/data=!3m1!1e3?hl=nl-NL).

mond 1988, 506), situated at the north-eastern part of the plain, was drained in the 19th century but definitely present around the time of the battle in 490. What still remains of this marsh, nowadays has been declared a National park and consists of a maze of small marshes and reedbeds, surrounded by wine orchards, olive groves, and rocky mountains with Mediterranean "makia" growth (which consists of lentisk, erica, anama, thyme, akisare, and astivi), bordered to the west by an Olympic rowing track, constructed for the 2004 Olympic Games, which were held at Athens (see Figs. 2, 6 and 16).

As Fromherz describes it in more detail: "[t]he Marathonian plain is bordered by the Agrieliki, Kotroni, Stavrokoraki, and Drakonera mountains. A narrow pass between the seashore and the Agrieliki connects the plain to southern Attica [and to the city of Athens: it opens to the longer but much easier coastal route between the city of Athens and the Marathon plain, JPS]; the Vrana Valley between Agrieliki and Kotroni branches into the Rapentosa gorge and the valley of Avlona [from Vrana another road leads to the city of Athens as well: it is the more direct but (much) harder route between Athens and the Marathon plain, JPS]; and a defile between Kotroni and Stavrokoraki leads to the Charadra Valley and modern Marathonas [and from there further WNW to Decelea, Boeotia, and N.

Euboea, JPS]. The western and central districts of the plain [largely, JPS] consist of deposits from the rivers Rapentosa and Charadra. In the eastern district, the coast is formed by a bay bar, the Schoinia [Schinias, JPS], which once separated a marsh from the sea before its drainage in the nineteenth century" (Fromherz 2011, 387). This description further details the main structures of the Marathonian plain, but not yet helps to follow the various descriptions of the battle in the ancient accounts of it (the same conclusion is valid for Hammond's analysis of the Marathonian geography in Hammond 1973, 172-190).

Our main problem for this issue is that our main source for the battle, Herodotus, is extremely vague both on the topography of the Marathonian plain itself and on the occurrences in relation with the topography and that other literary sources add little or nothing. If we look at Herodotus' account on the Battle of Marathon and compare it, e.g., with his stories on the Battles of Thermopylae (480; see, e.g., Stronk 2014-15) or Plataea (479), we find the Marathon-story to be (even more) sloppy, inaccurate, and inattentive to detail. Worse still, his description does insufficient justice both to the (alleged) importance of the battle and the actual surroundings it was fought in. As yet, Hammond (1988, 491) maintains that: "the facts related by Herodotus are very likely to be correct …". In 1973, he expressed himself even more poignantly: "I take it then that the salient facts in Herodotus' narrative are completely unimpeachable" (Hammond 1973, 194, also 227). Though Hammond has his reasons for this attitude – and explains them – I find his position in the end incomprehensible.

Herodotus appears not to have taken the trouble even to visit the Marathon plain and make himself familiar with the geography of the place[3]. Instead, Herodotus seems to have relied entirely upon the stories of his informers and turned such stories as he heard (relying more on ἀκοή than on ὄψις, we might say) into a more or, more frequent, less coherent account of the occurrences. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 242 *ad* 109-117) believe that "Hdt. is holding his fire for bks. 7-9: it is those battles, not this, that will decide the outcome [i.e. of the Greco-Persian conflict, JPS]".

In view "of Athenian pride which elevated Marathon to the same status as Salamis" (*ibidem*), a pride probably already well on its way in Herodotus' days (see also the comment by Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 243: "the battle was already legendary when Hdt. wrote"), I find this almost unimaginable (see, though, Raaflaub (2010, 223, 233-4), who holds the same view as Hornblower and Pelling). Without too much effort, however, and, more importantly, with-

[3] Cf., e.g., also the remarks of How/Wells 1928(2), 354; contra: Hammond [1968, 28, 47; he expressed his 1968 view also in his 1973 work] who found that Herodotus' description must be correct and considered "completely unimpeachable", a point of view, in different wording, repeated in 1988 as indicated above.

out giving up his intention to emphasise the occurrences he describes in books seven, eight, and nine, Herodotus – in my view – could (and should) have done more justice to the events described in book six, here in particular as regards the circumstances of 'Marathon'. With Raaflaub (2010, 223, 230), I firmly believe that it has been Herodotus' personal choice that directed his pen, rather than scarcity and nature of the evidence he encountered. It is *our* tragedy that – as yet – Herodotus' version of the occurrences is the main evidence we have, as our other sources for the event – if at all existing – are contradictory, incomplete, or clearly wrong and/or exaggerated (as well, I might add). Moreover, we even do not need Hall's caveats (see, e.g. Hall 2014, 207-211) to conclude that archaeological evidence is hardly, if at all, helpful either.

"In the southern part of the plain of Marathon there is an artificial mound, nine metres high, named <the> Soros[4]. In 1890 the Greek archaeologist Staïs found human remains and black-figured lekythoi in the interior of the Soros and ever since it has been assumed that the 192 Athenian casualties of the battle were buried here[5]. As a result, the Soros has become an important point in the topography of the battle" (Van der Veer 1982, 290; also see Fig. 3 and below *sub* Archaeology *ad Sôros*). As it seems, however, it is not the only place of importance in the Plain of Marathon, not even the only important point for the topography of the battle. I believe there are three to four important landmarks in the Marathonian plain that, next to the *Sôros*, really deserve attention within the research to the site of the battle. They are, respectively, (1) the place of the trophy; (2) the Schinias Marsh (*inter alia* Fromherz's Schoinia and Hammond's Skhoinia) and (3) Schinias Beach; and (4) the location of the *Heracleum*, the sanctuary of Heracles. Whereas the place of the first seems to be rather fixed (see Figs. 5 and 16), the place of the sanctuary of Heracles is much less certain and has caused several controversies. However, in a 2003 paper Matthaiou made a compelling case to locate the sanctuary of Heracles about 1 km SSW of the *Sôros* (see Matthaiou 2003)[6]. We shall discuss these places in greater detail further below, notably *sub* Archaeology. As for the marsh, and its dangers, we also have the account of Pausanias *Periêgetês* (see below as well).

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[4] At present, the *Sôros* can be found in the so-called Archaeological Tomb Area (Ἀρχαιολογικός Χώρος Τύμβος), which is to be found in Fig. 2 above directly west of Αγ. Παντελεημων (Ag. Panteleimon: in fact at the A of Αγ.), slightly to the north of the "Sanctuary of the Egyptian Gods" (which was part of the villa-complex of Herodes Atticus: see for the relevance of this complex further below, *sub* Archaeology …). See also Fig. 3.

[5] Nevertheless, the claim that the Athenian dead were buried in the *Sôros* is still disputed, e.g. by Mersch (1995) and Sojc (2011). See also below, *sub* Archaeology …

[6] Based, essentially, upon *IG* I^3 1015bis (= *CEG* no. 318). Based upon this very inscription also Hammond (1988, 510) opted for this place as the site of the *Heracleum*. To phrase it very tersely, however: if we take the title of Cline's 2017 book as a starting point, two inscribed stones may seem to be rather insufficient as a basis to postulate the presence of a sanctuary at a given site. Nevertheless, due to the lack of a *convincing* (my emphasis) alternative, that is how things stand, at present.



Fig. 3. The Plain of Marathon with some landmarks. Drawing © Clio Stronk.

As regards the north-eastern part of the Marathonian plain, Fromherz notes: "Pausanias (1.32.7) writes about the landscape of Marathon, 'There is at Marathon a lake which for the most part is marshy. Into this (lake) ignorance of the roads made the foreigners fall in their flight, and it is said that this accident was the cause of their great losses'. Pausanias (1.14.3) notes about the Marathon picture in the Stoa Poikile, the painted hall in Athens, 'The center of the fighting shows the foreigners in flight and pushing one another into the morass'. Apparently, Pausanias found the relationship between the battlefield and the marsh to be similar to the terrain in 490 BC as it was depicted in the Stoa Poikile" (Fromherz 2011, 387). Moreover, Fromherz remarks, the site was visited in the early nineteenth century by Colonel William Martin Leake, who found the description by Pausanias to be accurate and similar to the situation he encountered (cf. Leake 1829, 168-169). Fromherz continues: "[t]he observations of Leake and Pausanias are related to the eastern portion of the marsh; they indicate that the terrain had not significantly changed in 1650 years. It is then likely that there was no major change in the 650 years between the battle and Pausanias' visit" (Fromherz 2011, 387; Hammond 1988, 516 note 2 holds this view as well)[7]. As regards the eastern part of the marsh, Fromherz surmises at least, there seem to have been no major changes between the days of the battle and those of Pausanias since the geological transformation of the area was rather slow. There certainly "is no geological evidence that a navigable bay extended far inland at the time of the battle and that

[7] I believe such a thesis in its absoluteness cannot be substantiated at all. Moreover, it appears that geological research suggests the opposite, i.e. that, indeed, significant changes have occurred (see also below).



Fig. 4. Attica, with main roads. Drawing © Clio Stronk.

there was a sandy beach near Chani [viz. the Mesoporitissa Chapel, see above Fig. 3 and below, JPS] that would have been suitable for a landing", a suggestion brought forward by Themelis 1974 (cf. Fromherz 2011, 388 as well his note 20).

Fromherz's analysis (and Hammond's) differs in quite some important respects from both Evans's testimony (see notably Evans 1993, 291-293) and some available geological data. Evans, rightly in my view, observes that: "[t]he plain of Marathon has changed since 490 B.C., but thanks to recent research, the main points can be identified with some confidence, *though with less than complete certainty* [my emphasis, JPS]. In 490 B.C., the Charadra, which used to have a good flow of water … probably flowed along the foothills of Stavrokoraki into the 'Great Marsh.' Its course must have run a short distance north of the present Mesoporitissa chapel [an important landmark in the Marathonian plain and not to be confused with the *church* of Panagía Mesoporítissa, which is situated near Kalývia Thorikou, close by the road from Athens over Markopoulo to Lavrio, JPS], and neither the Persian nor the Greek army had to cross it as they advanced to meet each other[8]. The small

[8] As regards the course of the River Charadra and the need of either army to cross it, my view, however, is less outspoken than Evans's (also see Kromayer/Veith 2016, Sheet 1, maps 1 and 2). Views regarding the course of the Charadra in 490 happen to differ very widely, as is also reflected in the various maps (also see the description in Hammond 1973, 186). It has, moreover, been observed that the course of this river often shifts during its periodic flash floods (cf. Sekunda 2002, 49; also see Pritchett 1960, 157). Also the ancient descriptions, notably that of Paus. 1.32.7 (also see below), are far from equivalent: Pausanias tells that

marsh of Brexisa, between Mt. Agrieliki and the sea, now partially drained, did not exist [also referred to above; see also Pritchett 1960, 153, JPS]. … . The 'Miltiades monument' [referred to below as well; see also Fig. 16, JPS] stood near the Mesoporitissa chapel, fairly close to the 'Great Marsh' or marshy lake, which is what it must have been in 490 B.C" (Evans 1993, 291; contra: Hammond 1973, 187-189, who emphatically believes also the Brexisa existed at the date of the battle). And: "[t]he precinct of Herakles, where the Athenians camped, cannot have been at Vrana close by the chapel of St. Demetrios, where Soteriades [see Soteriades 1935, JPS] located it, but at the foot of Mt. Agrieliki, north of the Brexisa swamp, about a mile [south-southeast, JPS] from the *Soros*" (Evans 1993, 292; this appears to agree with the conclusion of Matthaiou 2003, also shared by Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 239 *ad* 108.1; also see below *sub* Archaeology *ad Heracleum*). The fact that there were – as it seems – some springs nearby the '*Heracleum*' (springs that later would feed the Brexisa swamp; they are shown on early maps as well) may have added to the attraction of this site for the Athenian army (cf. Sekunda 2002, 48).

Finally, we should pay some attention to where the Persians (may have) pitched (a) camp (we cannot even be sure whether they pitched a single camp, e.g., close to their ships, or had their force divided over two (or even three) different camps (as Hammond 1973 appears to believe), one of those serving as a headquarters). Notably Evans (1993) paid attention to the issue of where the Persians bivouacked: "[t]he Persian anchorage was off the Schinias in the lee of the promontory of Cynosoura, but the shoreline seems to have altered to some extent since 490 B.C. Themelis [i.e. Themelis 1974, 232: see below, JPS] places the fifth-century beach some 1500 metres north of its modern counterpart. We are here in an area of some uncertainty, for the ancient sea level was lower than the modern one by an estimated metre and a half. We cannot be sure exactly where the Persian army bivouacked: the discussions on that issue present different outcomes" (Evans 1993, 292). In view of the difference in sea level, Evans remains cautious. Baika (2008, 33, 34) even postulates a difference – due to a rise – in sea-level of *ca*. 2.50-2.80 m (± 0.30 m) since the classical period (500 BC), while Hammond (1988, 516 note 2) reckons – more or less like Evans – that the sea-level today is one to one and a half meters higher than in Antiquity (but nevertheless reckons shape and circumstances there have not altered significantly between 490 and the present day!).

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a river flows from the morass into the sea, but not from which point (or whether it affected the position of either army). In an attempt to engage the Greek force at or close to their (i.e. the Greeks') campsite, the Persian army therefore perhaps *may* well have had to cross the Charadra (or vice versa, obviously), in retreat to their ships they *might* have had to cross it again [my emphases, JPS]. Its course in agreement with Evans's view, however, could well have offered the best conditions for the Persians' plans, even though watercourses tend to be indifferent as regards human plans. Another possibility may have been that the river's bed has been dry (so Hammond 1973, 186) – or the water level at least very low – when the battle was fought. As may have become apparent, there are in my view far too many variables as regards the Charadra to draw solid conclusions for its course – and its role – before and after the battle.



Fig 5. Northern part of the Marathonian plain, based upon (Von) Eschenburg (*Karten von Attika*, XVIII). Drawing © Clio Stronk.

Van der Veer (1982, 298-299) provides us with a brief survey of views on the specific matter for the options of a Persian campsite. Evans, though, states: "[i]t was, however, probably as close as possible to the anchorage of the fleet, and hence to the south and south-east of the marshy lake which must have had a neck of land separating it from the sea. On the seaward side of this neck of land there was probably a sandy beach as there is today" (Evans 1993, 292). Even this suggestion, restrictive as it seems, leaves several options for potential campsites open, as a brief view on a detailed map of the region will show (see Fig. 5), *inter alia* depending on how close to the exit of "the neck" the Persians (Phoenicians) wanted to moor their ships. Accepting Evans's views as a feasible suggestion as a starting point (though emphatically not as a fact!), the Persians had, to reach the most likely site where the battle took place [viz. near the *Sôros*, JPS], to "advance at least two miles and probably more" (Evans 1993, 292), the Greeks about half that distance (Evans 1993, 293). Obviously, it (therefore) matters for our understanding of the battle where about the Persians camped (see also below, *sub* The Structure …), and whether all Persian soldiers camped at the same place. Hammond (1973, 213-214, 224) emphatically argued that Datis before the battle had moved his infantry

parallel to the coast (where they next stayed several days and nights), west of the River Charadra, having ordered his cavalry (who camped near a spring, known as the Macaria, see Fig. 5) to operate "in front of it in the wide plain between there and Mount Kotroni" (Hammond 1973, 213, on 224 as well). As will be discussed below, I think parts of Hammond's views (even though they could make sense) are based on wrong premises and should, therefore, be rejected.

Geological research, too, confirms that, in the 2500-odd years since the battle was fought, changes have occurred. First of all, it is obvious that the area has been affected by many fluctuations of the sea-level (cf. Baeteman 1985, 173). Baeteman conducted research on the plain, *inter alia* focusing on the Schinias (Shinias in her paper) Marsh or Great Marsh. Her soundings confirm that parts of the plain have been flooded at times by the sea, and equally that sea water could enter an estuarine area, but that on the landward side fresh water characterised the environment (in itself largely similar to how Pausanias *Periêgetês* would describe it, see below), thus creating a "heterogenuous facies" (Baeteman 1985, 176). However, especially her conclusion is relevant: "[i]t can be assumed that in 490 BC, when the Greeks and Persians were fighting in the Shinias area, the shoreline was located farther inland than today and the landscape was dominated by a densely vegetated muddy marsh" (Baeteman 1985, 185)[9]. Regrettably, she does not indicate how much further inland the shoreline was located. Petrakos (1996, 6) believes the subsoil reveals that the sea [at times? JPS] intruded more than a kilometre more inland then than it does now. As noted above, Themelis (1974, 232) places the fifth-century beach slightly less than a mile (*ca*. 1,500 metres) north of its modern counterpart. Contradicting these views, Sekunda believes that "[i]t would be reasonable to assume that the shore in the 5th century BC was in roughly the same position as it is now", if only due to the obvious tectonic activity in the region (Sekunda 2002, 50).

As regards the vegetation of the site, Van der Veer notices (apparently putting another emphasis than in Baeteman's view) that: "[p]lantation of the plain of Marathon cannot have been very thick in the fifth century B.C. because the hoplites were able to maintain their close order when the battle was joined (cf. Hdt. 6.112). Confirmation of this may be inferred from Nepos (*Miltiades* 5.3), according to whom the Marathonian battleground was very open on account of

[9] Sadly she does not reveal the extent of that 'densely vegetated muddy marsh', by which description she appears to intend the Schinias Marsh. As it seems, though, this marsh did not play a decisive part during the initial encounter between the Persian and Atheno-Plataean armies, even if it seems to have become of supreme importance in the final stages of the battle. Her conclusion that the shoreline was located further inland than today seems to be at odds with Evans's calculation (see above) that the sea level at the time of the battle was one and a half meter lower than today. Nevertheless, also Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 245 *ad* 109-117, following Krentz 2010a, 116-117, assert that "[i]n 490 BC the sea penetrated further inland at that point than it does today …". As it appears, even regarding basic questions no firm, uncontested answers are available.

Fig. 6. Wetlands of Schinias National Park, 2017. Photo ©from <https://justforonesummer.com/schinias-wetlands/>.

scattered trees" (cf. also Van der Veer 1982, 307). And: "[f]or the present it is safest to accept that the plain of Marathon in the fifth century B.C. mainly consisted of grainfields with scattered trees. On the day of the battle, whether this fell in August or September, there was no grain in the fields because the harvest fell earlier" (*ibidem*). As it seems, Van der Veer disregards the line by Nonnus referred to above altogether, even though he could have referred to it as 'poetical exaggeration'. As regards this issue as well we have to admit to have too little evidence to be able to draw solid conclusions.

In view of the observations on the Plain of Marathon discussed previously, however, I doubt Van der Veer's view (nor, for that matter, Fromherz's) can be therefore maintained in all its absoluteness. Not only the historical but also the archaeological and the geological evidence is at the same time both scarce and massive as well as conflicting (and worse, as the photos taken from Google-earth [Figs. 2 and 16] make clear, most of the material cannot be corroborated any more due to intensive agricultural practices and construction of both houses and leisure facilities that have taken place on the plain since about the 1880s (see the remarks by (Von) Eschenburg 1886; 1889; by Milchhöfer 1889; the observation in Van der Veer 1982, 295 regarding a find made by Vanderpool where "farmers weeded out the remnants almost immediately after the discovery"; and Buraselis 2010, 32). Such activities caused a (near complete) destruction of the upper soil archive and a very limited access, due to economic reasons, to that part of the soil archive that

still might yield *data*. Moreover, at places several feet of alluvial soil separate the current surface from the layer of *ca*. 490 (Pritchett 1960, 141 refers to three metres; emphatically contra: Hammond 1988, 516 note 2; Hammond 1973, 173 appears to be rather more ambivalent, Hammond 1973, 175 perhaps more cautious).

Reviewing the material, we see that so many differing views, which cannot all be correct at the same time, have been generated, that a comprehensive picture is hard to establish. Petrakos has summarised it as follows: "[c]ontinuous cultivation and ploughing in the Marathon area, the silting up of the plain and the drastic changes in recent years due to the transformation of large tracts of arable land into unplanned settlements, have inhibited the uncovering of remains of ancient monuments probably preserved there" (Petrakos 1996, 3; see also the remark by Livieratos *et al*. 2013, 2: "the area depicted [i.e. Attica] has changed dynamically and dramatically during the last century, especially from the land-use point of view." See also Buraselis 2010, 32). Only part of the Schinias-area has, to some (though minimal) extent, been preserved and is currently a national park (cf., e.g., Christos/Anastasios 2013, 97; Fig. 6). Therefore, regrettably, only a geographical main outline has been within my grasp. In itself, though, this outline should suffice to make clear that we can expect only a very limited amount of help, if any at all, from the site's geographical and archaeological *data*.

b. the literary account

The description and analysis of the Battle of Marathon is, as already indicated above, full of difficulties. I think Macan phrased the issue clearly, concisely, and relatively conclusively: "One point must be conceded before each and every fresh attempt at a final synthesis: there never has been, and there never can be, a theory which shall reconcile all the elements, even all the plausible elements, in the traditions, and hypotheses, of antiquity upon this subject. Probably entire agreement will never be attained in regard to the story as a whole, much less in regard to some of the subordinate problems involved: the legend of Marathon will remain for ever to delight and to perplex the generations of men" (Macan 1895(2), 234). With this comment in mind, I intend to first present my audience the relevant fragments of the (ancient and sometimes also modern) literary tradition. Anticipating the result of the presentation of accounts, however, I should stress that I find it to be regretted that much of the caution advocated by Macan and others has not been observed in many of the later accounts describing the Greco-Persian confrontation on Marathon's plain.

Only in a later stage (see below, *sub* The Structure …), I shall pay specific attention to the views of Maurice, notably those expressed in his 1932 paper (partly elucidated, or rather accentuated, in a brief note of 1934), which offer (in spite of Macan's pessimism, or realism) a glimpse – but probably not more than that – of hope to acquire a better understanding of the occurrences surrounding the Battle of Marathon, perhaps even a glimpse of a viable synthesis. Additionaly, I shall

share a few of my views on the occurrences with the reader, based upon Maurice's theory, upon sources, upon what the ancient accounts do *not* [my emphasis, JPS] report, and, obviously, upon a dose of conjecture in an attempt to create such a synthesis. Naturally, I am well aware of Whatley's justified cautions that "modern writers take up modern books on strategy and rewrite ancient wars in the light of them. The result is magnificent, but it is not ancient war" (Whatley 1964, 125; also see Meissner 2010, 276, who describes Herodotus' account of 'Marathon' as a list of 'firsts', even though not all the time accurate ones). Nevertheless, the least we can do is that we should try to find ourselves in the end the beginning of a road that runs out of the morass (some pun intended, admittedly) between these two – apparently – opposing views.

Preparations

As the Persians prepared to sail for Attica from Euboea[10], the Athenians sent a long-distance runner to Sparta, to ask for Spartan support. Herodotus (6.105-106) describes the Athenian *Stratêgoi* despatching a long-distance runner, by the name of Philippides[11] to Sparta, where he arrived the following day (in my view, Hdt. 6.105 resumes the story where 6.102 left off, meaning that Herodotus presents the situation in such a fashion that the runner was sent on his way as soon as the fall of Eretria became known in Athens). Turning ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ("to the magistrates": Hdt. 6.106.1), and (allegedly) referring to the fate of Eretria, he asked for immediate Spartan assistance to Athens. The Spartans agreed to help, but told Philippides that – according to their laws – the Spartan army could not set out before full moon, 6 days later (which firmly settles the day of the runner's arrival in Sparta at the ninth of that month, in the Spartan/Dorian calendar almost certainly the mouth of *Carneus*: see also below, *sub* The date …).

The story hides some particular features. The simplest of them is the analysis of the task of the 'day-runner' Philippides (Nep. *Milt*. 4.3 calls him Phidippides; Badian 1979 appears to be adamant that this is the correct name; Christensen/Nielsen/Schwartz 2009 follow Badian, like, e.g., Giessen 2010, Keaveney 2011, and Willekes 2017), sc. to bring a message from Athens to Sparta as a message-runner,

[10] Doenges 1998, 3 argues that the Athenians always had expected a frontal Persian attack on the city via Aegina by way of Phalerum. Athens' 'preemptive war' with Aegina (cf., e.g., Stronk 2016-17, 159-160) had eliminated that option for the Persians. In Maurices's view (see below), there was a much more practical goal – or even a necessity – for the Persians to land a force at Marathon.

[11] Most MSS for Herodotus of the so-called Roman family (**d** in the apparatus) agree that Φιλιππίδης (Philippides) is the correct spelling of the errand-runner's name, as it is in nearly all MSS of later authors, even though Ph(e)idippides occurs frequently in literature as well (also see below; also see Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 231 *ad* 105.1). The latter name appears to have been inspired by a character featuring in one of Aristophanes' plays (Ar. *Nu*. 67, 80). A problem is that both names occur in Attica (see *LGPN*, vol. IIA). Here, too, certainty is not to be achieved (cf. How/Wells 1926(2), 107 *sub* 105(1) (Φιλιππίδης): How/Wells partly paraphrase the observations of Macan 1895(1), 360 *sub* 105(2)). In this paper, I shall stick to Philippides.

asking for Lacedaemonian support to Athens against the invaders. The distance between the two *poleis*, as the crow flies, is about 153 kms, by road the distance is given by Isocrates (*Paneg*. 87; see also further below) as 1,200 *stadia* (*ca.* 222 kms), while Pliny (*Nat*. 7.20.84) counts 1,140 *stadia* (nearly *ca*. 211 kms), assuming an average of 185 meter for the *stadion* as the unit I reckoned with for both authors[12]. Both distances hover around that of the more or less direct motorway currently running between Athens and Sparta, sc. *ca*. 213 kms. Hammond 1988, 514 appears to believe the distance was 225 kms, while Christensen/Nielsen/Schwartz 2009, 151 assume that a distance of about 250 kms (also the distance according to Giessen 2010, 33) was covered by Philippides. For comparison's sake, the modern foot-race between Athens and Sparta, the so-called *Spartathlon*, goes over 246 kms (but, as it appears, follows a slightly adapted – and enlarged – parcours: cf. the comparing map in *Runners World* (UK) of 3 March, 2017). The still current course record of the *Spartathlon* was run by one Yiannis Kouros in 1984: Kouros covered the distance in 20 h and 25 min. Possibly the actual distance run by Philippides should be estimated, in my view, somewhere between that given by Pliny (AD 23-79) and that of the modern *Spartathlon*. Assuming that Herodotus got his data as regards the time of departure and arrival of the errand-runner more or less correct, Philippides – as it seems – must have covered the distance (at least relatively) probably only fractionally slower than Yiannis Kouros, but as it seems still running an amazing average (considering the difficult stretches he had to overcome *en route*, moreover some of them at night and without modern facilities) of *ca*. 9 km/h over a period of about 24 h[13].

A second matter is the fact that Herodotus describes the situation as if the *Stratêgoi* were in full command (a point of view, e.g., adopted by Hammond 1973, 224 and Hammond 1988, 507, where Hammond states that the generals "on their own initiative sent a runner"; also in this vein Hammond 1973, 204 and Shaw 1997, 55; contra: e.g., Scott 2005, 367), largely passing by the Athenian Council and/or the official army commander at that time in Athenian political

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[12] The *Suda* even reports a larger distance, sc. 1,500 stadia or *ca*. 277.5 kms: Φιλιππίδης, Ἀθηναῖος, ἡμεροδρόμος· ὃς χίλια πεντακόσια στάδια ἤνυσε διὰ μιᾶς νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ("Philippides, an Athenian, a day-runner; the man who accomplished [a run of] 1500 stadia in a single night and day": *Suda*, s.v. Philippides [*phi*,347]; idem *s.v.* Hippias 2 [*iota*,545]). It looks an inconceivable distance to run within 24-odd hours and if only therefore (largely) exaggerated.

[13] Also see Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 232 *ad* 106.1. They also wonder, understandably in my view, why Philippides was not allowed to use a horse – if only for part of the stretch. Their solution appears to make sense: "… the absence of nailed horseshoes and thus the risk of lameness must be borne in mind. On rough or mountainous terrain, two legs might be better and faster than four" (*ibidem*). Giessen 2010, 33 is, in my view, way too simple as well as incorrect to remark that "Pferde spielten bei den antiken Griechen keine Rolle": both a sufficient amount of archaeological and historical evidence is present to counter this argument. As Christensen/Nielsen/Schwartz 2009, 155-156, 161-165 argue, Philippides' accomplishment was not too exceptional to be doubted. Giessen 2010, 34 mentions a duration of 'clearly not more than 30 hours' for Philippides' run.

history. In 490, the official Athenian commander still was the πολέμαρχος ("*polemarch*"; see also below), one of a college of three *archontes* and as such at that moment as yet (see, however, below) the head of the *polis*' armed forces (the other *archontes* being the ἐπώνυμος ἄρχων ("*eponymos archôn*", serving as the chief magistrate) and the ἄρχων βασιλεύς ("*archôn basileus*", the one responsible for the civic religious arrangements): cf. Arist. *Ath.* 3.3). Herodotus' description of the state of affairs looks like an anachronism, rather grafted onto the situation (or worse, perhaps: the political interests of his source(s)) in his own days than the actual political set-up in 490. Moreover, I wonder whether – even if the *polis* was in such a tight corner – either the *polemarch* or the *Stratêgoi* would have had the authority and/or power to ask for outside help without consulting the *dêmos* in the *Boulê* (or Council). At least from the reforms of Cleisthenes onward, the Council was the leading body in Athenian political life. Normally, convening the Council would have been the *eponymos archôn*'s task, i.e. Phaenippus at that time (cf. Strothmann/Welwei 2004, 148). Herodotus' version, therefore, is perhaps a rather overly simplified account of the occurrences (albeit explainable because his prime audience was sufficiently knowledgeable as regards proper procedure, but yet).

Raaflaub (2010, 225) refers therefore rightly, from my perspective, to the absence of any form of debate on the matter in Athens at any moment before the Athenians set out to Marathon as one of the missing aspects in Herodotus' account. What I do not understand, in that very context, is Hammond's remark (Hammond 1973, 223) that "[a]ll ten generals were appointed [i.e. by the Assembly] to command the army on this campaign …" Obviously, here too Hammond first neglects the (position of the) *polemarch*, but moreover appears to blur the structure somewhat as well. To the best of my knowledge, the function of *stratêgos* assumed its most recognizable form with the reforms of Cleisthenes in 501. Cleisthenes instituted a board of ten *Stratêgoi*, who were elected annually (like, in fact, the *polemarch*), one from each tribe (*phylê*), a practice that remained unaltered at least up to *ca*. 440. The ten were of equal status, each basically appointed to specifically lead the men of *his* tribe into war. The annual election of the *Stratêgoi* (and the *Archontes*) was held in spring and their term of office coincided with the ordinary Athenian year, running therefore from midsummer to midsummer. Only if a *stratêgos* died, or was dismissed from office, a by-election might be held to replace him. In such a construction – and certainly in the circumstances of 490 – not allowing any of the *Stratêgoi* to lead their tribe to Marathon seems to me to have been no option, if only because of the matter of reputation-damage.

An even less straightforward problem is what Herodotus meant with the Spartan ἄρχοντες ("magistrates") in Hdt. 6.106.1. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, regrettably, remain silent on this issue. At the time, the position of King Cleomenes, after his action against Aegina and his conspiracy against his colleague Demaratus in favour of Leotychides, had become untenable, as already discussed in Stronk 2016-17, and he had gone in exile to be succeeded by Leonidas. Both

Cleomenes' behaviour and Leonidas' inexperience increased (temporarily certainly, at least) the power of the five *Ephors* (for a succinct review of their position: Andrewes 1966, 8-17) and, to a lesser extent, that of the γέροντες. Monthly, the *Ephors* swore "on behalf of the city" to honour the kings, at least as long as the king acted according to his (monthly) oath to abide by the established laws (X. *Lac*. 15.7). Moreover, the *Ephors* – at least at a later stage – chaired the *Gerousia* and the *Apella* (in historical times the institution in Sparta responsible for the formal declaration of peace or war: cf. Th. 1.87). In short: "[t]he Gerousia and the ephors constituted the most important boards of officials in Sparta. They shared the probouleutic power and checked the legality of the enactments of the Spartan Assembly, which ratified the proposals of the γέροντες and the ephors" (Esu 2017, 355), even though the precise balance of power is still debated (*ibidem*).

The kings, the *Ephors* (especially), and possibly even the members of the *Gerousia* could, therefore, have been intended here as 'magistrates' by Herodotus. I believe, though, that – probably before the kings as well as the γέροντες – the *Ephors* would first qualify here as the 'magistrates' intended, as, perhaps, also follows from Aristotle's remark that: ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ ... βασιλεία ..., οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων ("For in the Laconian constitution ... the kingship ... is not the supreme power in all matters": Arist. *Pol*. 3.1285a3-5)[14]. Only as generals at field and in religious matters the kings held supreme power and such a situation certainly was not at hand in these circumstances. Politically, the *Ephors* held (in spite of due reverence for the kings, some of these using that to further their position) the highest authority in Sparta and, as discussed, at that particular time more so than ever. In view of the urgency of Philippides' message, I believe that – in the prevailing situation – they were therefore key for his mission. The *Ephors*' position would further increase if the Athenian request required a formal decision of the *Apella*, but I am not at all sure whether such a formal declaration of war was needed to answer the Athenian plea for help (see, though, notes 14 and 15). As it is, also Macan 1895(1), 361 believes the message was not intended for the king, or kings, alone but was destined for a wider audience, leaving it aside what precisely he meant by that phrase.

As Hdt. 6.106.3 makes clear (and some other sources do as well, see below), the Spartans[15] stated that they certainly were willing to come to Athens to fight the

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[14] Andrewes 1966, 13 states that "[s]uch (sc. foreign) envoys to Sparta were certainly brought before the ephors in the first instance". Hammond 1988, 499 is even clearer: "the Ephors of the Spartan year September 491 to September 490 B.C. were instrumental in developing and implementing the politics of war with Persia, … … they rather than the kings and Gerousia reflected the will of the citizen body, the Spartiate warriors".

[15] Who precisely the Spartans were who decided to come to the Athenians' aid in Herodotus' phrase τοῖσι δὲ ἔαδε remains unclear. Andrewes 1966, 6 believes it likely was the *Apella*, sc. the Assembly – or *Ecclêsia*, as it is referrred to in other *poleis*, like Athens –, consisting of full citizens who had completed their thirteeth year ("…in a fair number of cases, where this

Persians, but were prohibited to do so immediately due to a law in vigour at Sparta (and, likely, other Dorian *poleis* as well). This particular law forbade them to go out on an expedition before it had been full moon, sc. basically the fifteenth of the (or rather: that specific) month (see below, especially *sub* The date …; Evans 1984, 6 mistakenly assumes the Spartans already arrived at Athens the twelfth of the month, having set out on the ninth, which he there assumes to have been the day of the full moon)[16]. Though, as How/Wells (1928(2), 108-109 *ad* 106.3) rightly observe, some of our classical sources appear to suggest that this rule applied to all months (most notably Plutarch in *De Herodoti malignitate* 861EF, suggesting Herodotus injustly blamed Sparta), it rather looks that this law was only valid for the month of *Carneus*. Between the seventh and the fifteenth of that month, the *Carnea*, in honour of Apollo *Carneus*, were celebrated and all Dorians abstained from warfare[17]. To assume the law might have applied every month throughout the year would have impaired the Spartan military potential unnecessarily (would, in fact, have made any military policy of the Lacedaemonians virtually impossible), which is why I believe How/Wells – and others – are certainly right in their view.

The issue of the precise date the occurrences took place – and its implications – shall be discussed later on (*sub* The date …). The only task left for Philippides was to run back to Athens and convey the message that the Spartans were ready to join the Athenians as soon as their laws allowed them to set out to Athens. This he did (contra: Giessen 2010, 34, who appears to vastly underestimate the importance of the Spartan message for Athens). As it appears, Philippides met with the god Pan,

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unspecific 'the Spartans' occurs, the assembly was the forum where the formal decision was made"), but as Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 233 *ad* 106.3 observe "the actual call-up was the responsability of the ephors"; also see Andrewes 1966, 10; X. *Lac*. 11.2. The situation in 490 might be mirrored by the, admittedly much later, situation in 383, described by Xenophon (X. *HG* 5.2.11, 20): εξ Ἀκάνθου δὲ καὶ Ἀπολλωνίας, αἵπερ μέγισται τῶν περὶ Ὄλυνθον πόλεων, πρέσβεις ἀφίκοντο εἰς Λακεδαίμονα. ἀκούσαντες δ' οἱ ἔφοροι ὧν ἕνεκα ἦκον, προσήγαγον αὐτοὺς πρός τε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ("There came ambassadors to Lacedaemon from Acanthus and Apollônia, which are the largest of the *poleis* nearby Olynthus. When the *ephors* heard because of what they had come, they brought them both before the Lacedaemonian Assembly and the allies": X. *HG* 5.2.11).

[16] Also see Pl. *Lg*. 3.698E, who mentions other reasons for the late arrival of the Spartans at Marathon: οὗτοι δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ πρὸς Μεσσήνην ὄντος τότε πολέμου καὶ εἰ δή τι διεκώλυεν ἄλλο αὐτούς -οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον ("They were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messêne, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information"). Apparently, the *Carnea* have completely disappeared in Plato's account. Hammond 1988, 514 note 41, points out that Plato surely must have been wrong, as "great numbers of Helots served at Thermopylae and Plataea": contra: Wallace 1954. It is, to state the least, remarkable to see how Plutarch contorted Herodotus' account on this issue, *inter alia* remarking the battle took place on 6 *Boedromiôn* (he does so several times in different works) and confusing Lacedaemonian and Athenian calendars (also see below *sub* The date …): Plu. *Mor*. 861E-862C (= *De Her. Malign*. 26). Also see Popp 1957, 82-87; Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 234-235 (*ad* 106.3).

[17] Cf. also Hdt. 7.206; Th. 5.54.2, 75.2, 75.6; also see Macan 1895(1), 362 *sub* 11; Popp 1957, 76-81; Hornblower/Pelling 233-235 *ad* 106.3.

likely on his way home (not on his way out as Herodotus presents it: Hdt. 6.105.1-2; cf. also *Suda*, *s.v.* Hippias 2 [*iota*,545]), who promised to – continue to – support Athens (cf., e.g., Sekunda 2002, 37, who believes it may have been a hallunication caused by exhaustion, like Giessen 2010, 34 does as well; Keaveney 2011, 30 is less outspoken). After the war, Pan was given his long-awaited niche or cave on the northwest slope of the Acropolis in recognition of his support as well as a statue at Marathon, dedicated by Miltiades (see: *Anthologia Palatina* 16.232). Sekunda (*l.c.*) also believes that a phrase in Plutarch refers to Philippides, i.e. that he, having returned in Athens: δέκα τάλαντα δωρεὰν ἔλαβεν ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν Ἀνύτου τὸ ψήφισμα γράψαντος, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος οὐ τῶν παρημελημένων ἐν ἱστορίᾳ, Δίυλλος, εἴρηκεν ("He received a present of ten *talents* from Athens, Anytus proposing the decree, as Diyllus the Athenian states, none of the most contemptible as an historian": Plu. *Mor*. 862B (= *De Herod. Malign*. 26)).

However, this text of Plutarch certainly is far from unequivocal. Indeed, it might mean that Philippides received the reward. It is in the context, though, equally possible that this reward was assigned to Herodotus for reading (parts of) the *Histories* in public as, *inter alia*, Craig Cooper (*BNJ* 73 (T 5/F 3)) has it. I find the latter solution ultimately somewhat more plausible, even more because it seems to be corroborated by a reference in Eusebius (*Chron. Can.*, Pars II), referring to the fourth year of Olympiad 83, i.e. 445/444. Additionally, it makes Herodotus' work more susceptible for suspicions of various kinds, which was what Plutarch had set out to do. In the end, moreover, it just looks to me more natural to assign such a reward for a public performance to an (Athenophile) outsider than to a citizen doing his day-job, no matter how outstandingly a specific part of it had been executed. For Herodotus' distinct Athenophile tendencies – especially towards the Alcmaeonids – see notably Fowler 2003.

Several actions had taken place in the meantime. First of all, the Athenians were (or were about to be) joined by the Plataeans, commanded by Arimnestus (cf., e.g., Paus. 9.4.2; Nep. *Milt*. 5.1). Hdt. 6.108.1 tells us: Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένεϊ Ἡρακλέος ἐπῆλθον βοηθέοντες Πλαταιέες πανδημεί. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐδεδώκεσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι οἱ Πλαταιέες ("The Plataeans came in full force to help the Athenians, who were arrayed in the precinct of Heracles. They did so, because the Plataeans had put themselves under the protection of the Athenians" (cf. also Plu. *Mor*. 861DE (= *De Her. Malign*. 25); according to Th. 3.68 the Plataeans had joined up with Athens in 519 and had been loyal allies ever since; also see Hammond 1992, 143-145, 150). According to Just. 2.9 and Nep. *Milt*. 5.1, the Plataeans came to the aid of the Athenians with 1,000 men[18]. Though

[18] Though Hdt. 6.108.1 states the Plataeans appeared πανδημεί ("in full force"), he omits to indicate their actual strength. How/Wells 1928(2) remain here tacit on this issue (though commenting on 6.117 (1928(2), 114) they refer to 1,000 Plataeans as a good round exaggeration, referring to a remark on Hdt. 9.28.6), as does Macan 1895(1) and do Hornblower/

Hammond (1988, 507) accepts the number of 1,000 Plataeans, Hammond (1992, 150) believes that the number of 1,000 Plataeans is too high and appears to prefer there a number of 600 Plataeans, the very number Willekes (2017, 42) mentions. The number (1,000 men) as given by Justin, Hammond (1992) ascribes to the latter's source being a 'highly rhetorical Hellenistic writer', that by Nepos because the latter followed Dino "who reported the local Attic tradition" (also see Hammond 1973, 234-239). What prompted Hammond's position in 1988 remains unclear.

The Plataean assistance is also memorated by [Ps-] Demosthenes **59**.94 (addressing Athenian jurors and in the process referring to a painting in the *Stoa Poikilê*[19]). It is noteworthy to bear in mind Herodotus' statement that the Plataean army joined that of the Athenians ἐν τεμένεϊ Ἡρακλέος ("in the precinct of Heracles", i.e. on the Plain of Marathon) and not in the ἄστυ, the *city* of Athens, itself, as Cornelius Nepos has it. Herodotus' statement may indicate the Athenians did not wait for reinforcements before setting out, but set out as soon as possible (or deemed necessary) and anticipated reinforcements where they had pitched camp.

Pelling 2017. C. Nepos' words implicate that the Plateaean force (*manvs mirabilia flagrabat pvgnandi cvpiditate* ("a band inflamed with a marvellous desire to do battle": Nep. *Milt*. 5.2)) arrived shortly before the Athenians went to Marathon, in fact tipped the balance to set out, thereby contradicting Herodotus. Sekunda 2002, 13 believes it is feasible that Arimnestus, the Plataean commander, was among Herodotus' sources for 'Marathon'. Regrettably, I have seen no evidence for this suggestion.

[19] The *Stoa Poikilê* or Painted Porch, originally referred to as the Porch of Peisianax, was erected during the fifth century BC and situated on the north side of the ancient *agora* of Athens. The *Stoa Poikilê* was counted among the most famous sites in ancient Athens, owing its fame to the paintings and the loot from wars displayed in it. The *Stoa Poikilê* was decorated by fresco painter and sculptor Mico of Athens, in collaboration with Polygnotus of Thasos, both artists flourishing around the mid-fifth century BC. The paintings were most probably hung on (or applied to) the inner wall of the Stoa. See, e.g., Lucy Shoe Meritt 1970; Francis/Vickers 1985; De Angelis 1996. Also see: <http://agora.ascsa.net/id/agora/monument/stoa%20poikile>. For a description of the paintings also Paus. 1.15.1-4, for the Battle of Marathon most specifically 1.15.3. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 4 and note 8 believe the *Stoa* (and its paintings) may well date to the 460s, i.e. before Herodotus started his writing. Hammond 1973, 190 does believe so as well, adding that "it is certain that this record of the battle was correct in its facts", if only because participants in the battle were still alive. I find that too optimistic a view. By Pliny the name of the artist who painted the Battle of Marathon in the *Stoa Poikilê* is given as Panaenus: *Panaenvs qvidem frater Phidiae etiam proelivm Atheniensivm adversvs Persas apvd Marathona factvm pinxit. adeo iam colorvm vsvs increbrverat adeoqve ars perfecta erat, vt in eo proelio iconicos dvces pinxisse tradatvr, Atheniensivm Miltiadem, Callimachvm, Cynaegirvm, Barbarorvm Datim, Artaphernen* ("Panænus, too, the brother of Phidias, even executed a painting of the battle fought by the Athenians with the Persians at Marathon: so common, indeed, had the employment of colours become, and to such a state of perfection had the art arrived, that he was able to represent, it is said, the portraits of the various generals who commanded at that battle, Miltiades, Callimachus, and Cynægirus on the side of the Athenians, and, on that of the Persians, Datis and Artaphernes": Pli. *Nat*. 35.34.57).

The final noteworthy action to refer to, in the context of the battle, was that the Persians, guided by Hippias, landed at Marathon and disembarked there. Together with the Bay of Loutsa (suggested by Hodge 2001) near the modern village of Artemis, Marathon, more precisely (modern) Schinias Beach, was the place where the Persian forces – including their main arm, the cavalry, as far as present at all (see, e.g., below, *sub* Structure …) – could be disembarked safely without imminent risk of opposition (cf. Whatley 1964, 138; Hammond 1973, 218-219; Hammond 1988, 506; also notably Lazenby 1993, 48-50)[20]. At the same time, it could serve to draw (part of) the Athenian army out of the city (cf. How/Wells 1928(2), 359), enabling Hippias' partisans (and/or supporters of the Persians) – and the outcome of the Ionian Revolt had shown there still were in Athens (see Stronk 2016-17, 148-149; Keaveney 2011, 28; also see How/Wells 1928(2), 359-360 § 6, even though I disagree with them as regards the shield incident; see also McCulloch 1982, 38, 45-47; Garland 2017, 16-17) – to help them from within. If the Persians proceeded as they did for the latter reason, it seems they were unaware that the Athenians probably had set out already, more or less anticipating the Persian arrival (see below). Moreover, as Evans (1984, 2) rightly observes, the Pisistratids had once before regained their power under command of Hippias setting off from Eretria and landing at Marathon (cf. also Hdt. 1.62.1). Finally, καὶ ἦν γὰρ ὁ Μαραθὼν ἐπιτηδεότατον χωρίον τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐνιππεῦσαι … ("Marathon was, indeed, the place in Attica most suitable to use cavalry …": Hdt. 6.102; Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 225 *ad* 102 (cont.); contra: Schol. Pl. *Mx*. 240C, see above).

An additional bonus to the location – whether with or without cavalry – was the presence of a spring (the Macaria: see Fig. 5), and moreover a lake (or rather a marsh) at the north-east end of the beach, enabling the Persians access to water,

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[20] Sekunda 2002, 34, 43 *ad* 1, surmises that disembarking the cavalry must have taken a long time ("several days"), the more so because – as Hdt. 6.107.2 indicates – the Persian ships were not beached, but anchored in the bay. Assuming the Persian cavalry counted somewhere between 800-1000 horses (see below), I believe about two days' time might well have been needed at most to disembark all horses. Hammond 1973, 219 argues that notably the warships were not beached but that the transports – especially for the horses – were, which could have shortened the time to disembark the horses considerably. As regards supporters for Hippias (or, for that matter, Persia) inside Athens, Berthold (1976, 87) believes they may have been few in number, though acknowledging that: "it does not take many hands to betray a gate or a weak spot in the defenses, and the sight of Persian troops and the thought of Persian gold could turn many a head". I refer to the cavalry as the Persians' main arm because, as it seems, their infantry in man-to-man combat was generally proven to be inferior to (attacks by) a hoplite phalanx. The nicest illustration for that suggestion may come from Xenophon (*An*. 1.2.17-18), relating a mock attack of 10,600 hoplites serving Cyrus the Younger, during a review in front of Epyaxa, the Cilician queen. The hoplites' superiority also showed itself at Cunaxa. Against horsemen, however, hoplites *possibly* [my emphasis] stood a much less good chance (also see below). However, Tuplin 2010b appears to argue that – at least in a military context and in its iconography – cavalry played a (much) smaller part than often believed in Persian armies.

also for their horses (still with the reservation that cavalry was present) without much effort (cf. also Paus. 1.32.7; Hammond 1988, 507; Sekunda 2002, 35; Maurice 1932, 18-20 believes the plain could host a force of about 16,000 Persians, which seems to me to be quite a fair estimate). Allegedly the Persians also introduced alfalfa (lucerne) to Greece (as fodder for their horses? Cf. Ar. *Eq*. 606), at least according to Pliny, who apparently believed that cavalry had been present at Marathon: *medica externa etiam Graeciae est, vt a Medis advecta per bella Persarvm qvae Darivs intvlit* ("Lucerne is foreign even to Greece, where it was imported by the Persians [lit.: Medes] during the Persian Wars which Darius started": Plin. *Nat*. 18.43(.144)). In view of the time of the year the expedition to Marathon took place (also see below, *sub* The Date…), Pliny's suggestion seems highly unlikely (at least if he, indeed, intended to state that lucerne would have been introduced in 490), unless the seeding of lucerne was accidental as Evans (1987, 103) suggests. As it is, Sekunda (2002, 83) refers to the wreck of the Persian fleet off Athos in 492 as a likelier date for the arrival of lucerne in Europe, at the same time as white doves (referring to Pearson 1975, 147-148; also see Charon of Lampsacus, *BNJ* 262 F 3a/3b = Athen. 9.394E/Ael. *VH* 1.15). Hammond 1988, 506 mentions that the site of the landing was "totally undefended", which obviously facilitated the landing. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 225 *ad* 102 (cont.)) finally add as additional reason for the Persians *cum* Hippias to opt for a landing at Marathon that this part of Attica was a Pisistratid stronghold.

Maurice (1932), though, gives a completely different reason for the Persians to opt for a landing at Marathon, but we intend to discuss that later (*sub* The Structure …). Raaflaub (2010, 225-226) finds the absence in Herodotus' account of any reason for the Persians to opt for a landing at Marathon a remarkable omission. In fact, however, it is not merely Herodotus' omission. All of our sources are so extremely focused on the Greek – or more specifically Athenian – vicissitudes that they fail to present a wider picture, making it thereby (near) impossible to precisely assess the particular Persian objectives. As general objectives I already referred to both the Persian imperial aspirations, expressed in the Persian royal inscriptions (Stronk 2016-17, 138-9 and its notes 11-12), and the need to restore proper order ('*arta*': cf. Kent 1953, 170 *s.v.*) after its disruption by the Greeks' actions at, notably, Sardis (Stronk 2016-17, 154-155). Largely though – apart from Aristotle's remark that started this part and one reference in Plutarch (see below) – certainly Persian considerations to act – whether or not in a particular manner – are a rarity.

The Athenian line of command

Much is still unclear as regards the precise structure of Athenian military leadership in the early part of the fifth century BC. Firstly, and mainly, this is due to the fact it was (still) constantly evolving after the Cleisthenic reforms of the late sixth century BC, but also because our sources look (once more) to be conflicting or insecure. For the situation in 490, too, we have to admit there ultimately may

be more doubts than certainties. In this position it might perhaps well be safest to look first and foremost to Aristotle's remarks in his *Athenian Constitution*. Aristotle notes:

[22.2] … ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος. **[3]** ἔτει δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ νικήσαντες τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην, …	**[22.2]** ... Next, they [sc. the Athenians] began to elect the *Stratêgoi* [≈ 'generals'] by tribes, one from each tribe [i.e. ten *Stratêgoi* in total], while the whole army was under the command of the *polemarch*. **[3]** Eleven years later came their victory in the Battle of Marathon. ... (Arist. *Ath*. 22.2-3).

Earlier, Aristotle indicates that the office of *polemarch* had been created as the second oldest Athenian institution – as an *elected* [my emphasis, JPS] functionary – "because some of the Kings proved to be cowards in warfare" (Arist. *Ath*. 3.2). For Aristotle matters are, therefore, clear: the supreme command rested with the, elected, *polemarch*, aided by ten, equally elected, *Stratêgoi*, each leading his own tribal regiment. This structure at least stood as such already eleven years before the Battle of Marathon, i.e. since 501/500 (cf., e.g., Sekunda 2002, 10).

So far, so good. Herodotus, however, infers some noise in the communication by stating (Hdt. 6.109.2) that the *polemarch* had been selected by lot and not elected. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 246 *ad* 109.2), too, appear to support the idea that the *polemarch* had been appointed by sortition (through a white bean, hence the reference by Herodotus ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν πολεμαρχέειν ("he who had been appointed by the bean to be *polemarch*"): also see Hammond 1973, 232-233, defending Herodotus). It may look like a minor detail, but for the position of the *polemarch* it mattered much, in fact it was vital for his status. Against **elected** *Stratêgoi* a **selected** *polemarch* was in view of authority essentially in the disadvantage (Hornblower/Pelling, *loc. cit.*, very much describe the situation as if the *polemarch* were a mere background figure), even more so because he "still had many duties aside from his religious functions" (so Sekunda 2002, 10). As yet Sekunda concedes that it is possible that "contrary to the impression created by Herodotus, the Polemarch still retained overall command over the board of *strategoi*" (*ibidem*), and as such (still) was a (more or less) unquestioned commander-in-chief. Notably Hammond (1973, 201, e.g.), however, holds that the Athenian victory reveals "the tactical insight of one man, not Callimachus but Miltiades", apparently discarding the fact that later testimonies (be it by Herodotus or from paintings in the *Stoa Poikilê*, see below) *could* be – or have been – influenced and therefore present a picture that *could* deviate from actual occurrences. It is not a necessity, but at least something modern historians *should* take into account.

Aristotle looks to be resolute when he declares that only from 487 onwards (i.e. the year Telesinus was the *archôn eponymos*) the *Archontes*, including therefore the *polemarch*, were selected by lot[21]. Like Sekunda (*ibidem*), I see no cause to discredit Aristotle's precise data, partly due to the further absence of firm data, believing moreover that Herodotus' version may well have been intended to extol Miltiades (and by implication his heirs) at the expense of the (in 490) acting *polemarch*, Callimachus of Aphidna (modern Afidnes; ancient Aphidna was one of the twelve ancient towns of Attica, situated in the eastern part of the region, some 10 km NW of Marathon in the hills). Admittedly, my choice, too (like, e.g., Hammond's), is biased, mine being guided by some mistrust as regards both Herodotus' accuracy as well as his interests (see below *sub* Conclusion note 146). In this respect I shall confine myself now referring to, e.g., Sekunda's (in my view justified) remark: "[t]he picture we have of the relative roles played by Kallimachos and Miltiades may have been seriously distorted by the propaganda campaign mounted by Miltiades' son Kimon in the 460s to glorify the memory of his father" (Sekunda 2002, 11; cf. also Doenges 1998, 9 note 17)[22]. Cimon's campaign was at a height when Herodotus collected the material for his work or possibly already had started the first drafts of it (Hammond 1973, 174 puts that, with some caution, in the period of 455-445). The fact that Herodotus could well have been to some extent influenced by information provided by Cimon should be taken into account in another respect, too, viz. because of Cimon's negative attitude towards Persia (cf., e.g., Francis 1990, 2), which may have influenced Herodotus' presentation of their side of the occurrences as well – at least whenever or wherever he does so.

Callimachus, indeed, was the acting *polemarch* during the Battle of Marathon and, perhaps, the "architect of the Athenian victory at Marathon", as Garland 2017, 68, has it (even though Garland credits Miltiades with this feat on his p. 111). This becomes evident not only from Herodotus' account, but also from the so-called stele of Callimachus, currently housed at the Athens Epigraphical Museum (inv. no. 6339) and recently re-investigated after restauration (cf. Keesling 2010). The text consists of 5 badly damaged hexameters, which Catherine Keesling reconstructs as follows:

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[21] After the function of *polemarch* had become one for selection by lot, indeed "the role of the polemarch diminished and he was soon relegated primarily to religious functions necessary for the army" (Sekunda 2002, 10). See also the remarks on this issue by Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 246-247 *ad* 109.2, 2nd paragraph *sub* (b), offering an elegant solution to reconcile Herodotus' account with that by Aristotle. Perhaps, though, their solution is guided by a wish not to discredit Herodotus too much. Meissner (2010, 282) believes that Herodotus "actually describes … a command structure in transition".

[22] My distrust is augmented because the whole episode of the stand-off in the vote and Miltiades' active attitude clearly resembles the situation as Herodotus describes it preceding the Battle of Salamis, Themistocles addressing Eurybiades (cf. Hdt. 8.58-60). It creates the impression Herodotus uses a structured *topos* for such episodes.

[Καλλιμάχος μ᾽ἀν]έθεκεν Ἀφιδναῖο[ς] τ᾽Ἀθηναίαι | ἀγ[γελον ἀθ]ανάτων οἱ Ὀ[λύμπια δώματα] ἔχουσιν | [Καλλιμάχος πολέ]μαρχος Ἀθηναίων τὸν ἀγῶνα | τὸν Μα[ραθῶνι πρὸ] Ἑλλήνων, ο[-----] | παισὶν Ἀθηναίων μν[ῆμα -------]	Callimachus of Aphidna dedicated me to Athena | messenger of the immortals who dwell in Olympian homes | Callimachus, polemarch of the Athenians, the contest, | the one at Marathon on behalf of the Greeks, [?] | [for? by?] the sons of the Athenians, a memorial [. . .]: Keesling 2010, 109 [text and translation]).

The original monument showed the statue of a winged woman, representing either Nike or Iris, supported by an Ionic column of Pentelic marble (see photo in Keesling 2010, 120; drawing and suggested completions of Callimachus' epigram in Petrakos 1996, 49). Keesling believes the woman was Nike, but Petrakos believes the statue represented Iris (Petrakos 1996, 47). The statue and the column, both destroyed during the Persian sack of Athens in 480/479, were reunited from the surviving fragments by Raubitschek (1940, 53-56 and his fig. 1) during a study of Archaic Era inscribed bases found on the Acropolis. According to Raubitschek's reconstruction, the statue and the column together must have been about four metres (twelve feet) tall and had been set up on the Acropolis as a dedication to Athena. As regards the statue of the winged woman, many scholars believe – like Keesling – that the goddess Nike might well be the most likely candidate. However, I support the opinion of, e.g., Petrakos (1996, 47) and Sekunda (2002, 11) that the figure displayed more likely was the goddess Iris, especially because of the combination of her function (messenger) and the (reconstructed) text of the inscription. The ambiguity of the figure may well have been, though, a preconceived idea or even purpose of the dedicators.

Of the ten *Stratêgoi*, especially Miltiades, a member of the powerful – and as it seems wealthy – Philaid family and the Oeneis *phylê*, stands out (cf., e.g., Davies 1971, s.v. 8429, 293-312, esp. 302 *ad* IX, 310-311 *ad* XVI; also see Meidani 2013; Keaveney 2011, 29 and Giessen 2010, 49 both assign to Miltiades the leading position). After his escape from the Thracian Chersonese to Athens in 493, referred to in Stronk 2016-17 (e.g., note 50), he first succeeded to survive a trial at Athens for tyranny in the Chersonese (not over the native Dolonci but over the Greek settlers there: Hdt. 6.39.2; Hammond 1988, 500). As a former tyrant in the Chersonese with ties to Athens, he might – moreover – pose a threat to the newly established constitution in Athens (see McCulloch Jr. 1982, 39-40; for the trial also see Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 229 *ad* 104.2 and Meidani 2013, 173-176). Having been acquitted, Miltiades the Younger re-entered Athenian political life after the trial.

To this period of, relative, insecurity for Miltiades (the Younger) we – perhaps – may date a Corinthian helmet, dedicated to Zeus (found in the stadium of

Olympia, currently in the National Museum at Athens, inv. no. 15189: see Kunze 1955, 8-11). The helmet carries the text Ἀθεναῖοι [τ]ον ἐγ Λέμν[ο(υ), as it seems referring to the capture of the island of Lêmnos, probably during the Ionian Revolt, and subsequent establishment of Athenian settlers there. Uncertain is whether or not capture and establishment took place on the orders of the Athenian *polis* or on Miltiades' own initiative. It appears, however, a fact that his supporters used this feat in defense of Miltiades during the trial after Miltiades' failure to take Paros in 489 (cf. Hdt. 6.136.2; Kunze 1955, 20-21; below note 24). Having been in Athens a mere year or two at the time of the Battle of Marathon, it would – as Sekunda (2002, 12), in my view rightly, stipulates – "be wrong to see him [i.e. Miltiades] as a passionate defender either of liberty or democracy, as many ancient authors imply. Miltiades had no choice but to return and fight for Athens"[23].

One of the main assets Miltiades could add to the Athenian force, was his knowledge of Persian methods of operation, having been one of Darius' companions (though likely not in the later meaning of a ἑταῖρος or φίλος proper, let alone that of a συγγενής: cf., e.g. Stronk 2017, 53 note 41, 55 note 46, 269 note 289; also see notably Jacobs 1996) during Darius' expedition against the Scythians. Though Sekunda's judgement on Miltiades' motives (e.g., that he partook in the Athenian force "to save his own skin if nothing else") looks harsh, it seems not to be wholly unrealistic (cf. Sekunda 2002, 12)[24]. As it (now) seems to me, How/

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[23] Add to this the fact that he served as an (eponymous) *archôn* for the year 524/523 (strongly suggesting a close cooperation with the Pisistratid rulers; cf. also Meidani 2013, 167-169) and that he was first married to a relative of Hippias (whom he divorced when Hippias gave his daughter, Archedice, in marriage to the ruler of Lampsacus – situated opposite the Thracian Chersonese and its staunch rival – in an effort to ingratiate himself with King Darius (cf. Th. 6.59.3)), before Miltiades took Hegesipyle, the daughter of the Thracian King Olorus, as his second wife. She was the mother of Miltiades' son and heir Cimon, who was born *ca.* 510. Background and personal history therefore do not position Miltiades as an obvious and/or typical 'democrat' at all. Also see McCulloch Jr. 1982, 39. As a matter of fact, however: at the time of him being elected *stratêgos*, it was not (yet) absolutely certain Miltiades had to fight for Athens. The *Stratêgoi* took office at the start of the Athenian year (in the month of *Hecatombaeôn,* the day of election being earlier, at a propituous day selected by sooth-sayers (cf. Arist. *Ath.* 44.4)) and not (only) when the troubles were at hand, as Nep. *Milt*. 4.4 appears to suggest. However, in view of what we shall discuss later (see *sub* The date ...), it is feasible (or even likely) that the term of office of the *Stratêgoi* (and for that matter, that of the *archontes* as well) of 490/89 had started not long before the Persians landed at Marathon: in this particular case the coïncidence might explain Nepos' remark.

[24] The year after the Battle of Marathon, Miltiades was given command of the Athenian forces which, *inter alia*, besieged the island of Paros, one of the islands that had given earth and water to Darius' emissaries (though not necessarily for that reason, even though – according to Herodotus 6.133.1 – Miltiades used as pretext for his expedition that the Parians had sent *triereis* with the Persian fleet to Marathon). However, the 489 expedition was ill-fated. Miltiades failed to capture the city of Paros and fell off a wall during the operations, returning to Athens with a gangrened leg. The debacle of the expedition led Miltiades' enemies – notably one Xanthippus, member of the Alcmaeonid family (also see below, *sub* Aftermath) – to renew their attacks on Miltiades in court.

Wells (1928(2), 355) are, based upon the literary evidence we have at our disposal, likely wrong to connect Miltiades' proposed decrees (the ψηφισμάτα) to the Athenian *dêmos*, referred to by Aristotle and Demosthenes (see Stronk 2016-17, 164 *sub* Eretria), with a proposal to meet the Persian army in the field (contra: McCulloch Jr. 1982, 43), unless – perhaps – some connection can be claimed with the view as expressed by Maurice and discussed below (*sub* Structure). Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 226 *ad* 103.1), too, are sceptical as regards the effect of Miltiades' alleged decree. Neither passage can be used with any certainty to even remotely suggest such a relation in view of the evidentiary situation at the moment.

The position for Miltiades as the leader of the Athenian army at Marathon is also suggested by the *rhetor* Aeschines (389-314). Referring to the painting in the *Stoa Poikilê* as described by Livy and Pausanias *Periêgetês*, Aeschines remarks:

ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη γέγραπται. τίς οὖν ἦν ὁ στρατηγός; οὐτωσὶ μὲν ἐρωτηθέντες ἅπαντες ἀποκρίναισθε ἄν, ὅτι Μιλτιάδης· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιγέγραπται. πῶς; οὐκ ᾔτησε ταύτην τὴν δωρεάν; ᾔτησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δῆμος οὐκ ἔδωκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος συνεχώρησεν αὐτῷ γραφῆναι πρώτῳ παρακαλοῦντι τοὺς στρατιώτας	… The battle of Marathon is pictured there. Who then was the general? If you were asked this question you would all answer: 'Miltiades.' But his name is not written there. Why? Did he not ask for that reward? He did ask, but the people refused it, but instead of his name they permitted him to be depicted in the front rank, urging on his men: Aeschin. **3**.186;
also see Schol. Aristid. **46**.174: ὁ Μιλτιάδης ἐκτείνων τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ὑποδεικνὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοὺς βαρβάρους, λέγων ὁρμᾶν κατ᾽ αὐτῶν	Miltiades, stretching out his hand and pointing out to the Greeks the Persians and telling them to launch themselves against them.

Whether the description by Aeschines and Aristides (and/or his scholiast) is entirely correct or coloured by later (political) machinations cannot be determined, however. We have to accept them as they are. What is obvious, though, is that more than Callimachus' name that of Miltiades appears to have been directly linked to 'Marathon' from at least about the thirties of the fourth century BC, when Aeschines' speech was delivered – or (very likely in my view, considering Herodotus' version of the occurrences) even earlier.

In the end, Miltiades was fined 50 *talents* after being accused of treason. As Miltiades was unable to pay this amount (in itself remarkable in view of the family's wealth, see, e.g. Davies 1971, 311, referred to above; Miltiades' son Cimon eventually paid the fine), he was put in gaol, where he died still in 489, probably from his infected leg (cf., e.g., Hdt. 6.132-136; Plu. *Cim*. 4.1-3; Nep. *Milt*. 7.1-6). See also McCulloch Jr. 1982, 47- 48; Meidani 2013, 176-181.

Fig. 7. Looking down on Marathon Bay and Plain from the south, from Mt Agrieliki.

A completely different picture than the one presented so far emerges (or at least may emerge) from the *Philippica* by Theopompus of Chios (fourth century BC). His work is lost, but fragments of it have been preserved in the works of other authors. The following fragment, *FGrH*/*BNJ* 115 F 153, is taken from the *Progymnasmata* (2.66-67) by Aelius Theon (probably first century AD (see Kennedy 2003, 1)):

παρὰ δὲ Θεοπόμπου ἐκ τῆς πέμπτης καὶ εἰκοστῆς τῶν Φιλιππικῶν, ὅτι <ὁ> Ἑλληνικὸς ὅρκος καταψεύδεται, ὃν Ἀθηναῖοί φασιν ὀμόσαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸ τῆς μάχης τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ αἱ πρὸς βασιλέα [Δαρεῖον] Ἀθηναίων [πρὸς Ἕλληνας] συνθῆκαι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην οὐχ οἵαν ἅπαντες ὑμνοῦσι γεγενημένην, ‘καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα’ φησίν ‘ἡ Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἀλαζονεύεται καὶ παρακρούεται τοὺς Ἕλληνας’	(“According to Theopompus in the twenty-fifth (book) of the *Philippica*, (he [sc. Theopompus] says) that <the> Hellenic oath, which the Athenians say the Greeks swore before the battle at Plataea against the barbarians, and the treaties of the Athenians with King [Darius] [with the Greeks] were fabricated. In addition, the Battle of Marathon did not happen such as everyone mythologises, ‘and with respect to everything else’, he [= Theopompus] says, ‘the *polis* of the Athenians brags about and cheats the Greeks’”: text and translation based upon the entry in *BNJ* 115, prepared by William S. Morison).

Though also other remarks are interesting, the nature of this paper makes it relevant to only focus on Theopompus' (alleged?) remarks regarding the Battle of Marathon. Connor pays attention to this relatively brief remark: "The allusions to Marathon among the orators of the age [i.e. the fourth century BC, JPS] fall into two main groups. The first of these cites the battle as Miltiades' great exploit and discusses the Athenians' subsequent treatment of Miltiades. In this way the restraint of the fifth-century Athenians can be contrasted with the extravagant hero-worship of their descendants. … But the other group of references to Marathon is even more interesting. Here Marathon is used as a reminder that the Athenians fought single-handed on behalf of all the Greeks. … The battle thus often plays an important role in Athenian propaganda and seems implicitly to justify Athenian hegemony among the Greeks. … Yet the wording of the fragment may suggest that Theopompus was more concerned about the details of the account of the battle than the use to which it was put" (Connor 1968, 87-88). Connor believes that Theopompus turns himself against exaggerated claims – implicitly present in both strands of fourth-century views – for Athens' fifth-century accomplishments, if only by his choice of words, bringing to the fore, as Connor phrases it: "two of the most unpleasant figures of the agora, the braggart (ἀλάζων) who boasts of exaggerated accomplishments and the cheat, especially the clever orator or debater who 'puts something over' (παρακρούεται) by fallacious or deceptive argument" (Connor 1968, 89). What image *precisely* [my emphasis] Theopompus wants to convey instead, regrettably, eludes us. What is certain is that in the literary evidence we have to date, the position Theopompus holds is a very notable exception.

Though Krentz pays elsewhere sufficient attention to the Battle of Marathon (see below), he does not so in his 2009-paper, entirely devoted to this fragment, even though the battle figures relatively prominently in it. The most remarkable addition, relevant for the context of this paper, is Krentz's view that the Athenian treaty with Darius the fragment of Theopompus may refer to concerns an agreement Athenian ambassadors struck under pressure by the satrap of Ionia, Artaphernes, to offer 'earth and water' to Darius I in 507/506 (cf. Krentz 2009, 235-237; also see below, note 56). Only after Artaphernes, some years later, refused to heed Athenian requests not to listen to Hippias and his partisans and instead instructed the Athenians to take Hippias back if they wanted to be safe, the Athenians decided to be – or become – the Persians' enemies (cf. Hdt. 5.96). Kuhrt (1988, 93) argues that this is an Athenian excuse (or invention), fabricated *post eventum*, to justify the Athenians' decision to help the Ionians during their revolt.

Next to Miltiades, another *stratêgos* stands out as well in the (preserved) accounts on 'Marathon', sc. Aristides (obviously not the *rhetor* referred to above), nicknamed 'the Just' (born *ca.* 530). Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, was a member of a family of moderate fortune. Of his early life, it is only told that he became a follower of the statesman Cleisthenes and sided with the aristocratic party in Athenian politics. He first acquired fame – as it seems – as *stratêgos* in

command of his native tribe Antiochis at the Battle of Marathon. It was possibly in consequence of the distinction he then aquired that Aristides secured an election as an *archôn eponymos* for the ensuing year (489-488)[25]. In Herodotus' account, Aristides features only from 8.79 onwards, but he is unmistakeably referred to as an Athenian *stratêgos*, who sided with Miltiades' views, at and around 'Marathon', in Plutarch's *Life of Aristides* (cf. Plu. *Arist*. 5.1-6)[26].

In those paragraphs, also another Athenian is prominently present, sc. Themistocles (born *ca.* 524: Sekunda 2002, 57 believes he was born some years earlier, *ca.* 528), the son of Neocles, who belonged to the *phylê* of the Leontids. Regrettably, Plutarch omits to mention Themistocles' rank (if he had any at all) during the Battle of Marathon. However, as Plutarch does not refer to it in his *Life of Themistocles* either (there he only refers to him as νέος ὢν ἔτι ("still a young man": Plu. *Them*. 3.3) at the time of the Battle of Marathon, even though he had already been elected as an *archôn* in 493 and was, at the time of the battle, at least about 34 years of age), I believe that I may infer as an *argumentum e silentio* that he did not serve as a *stratêgos* at Marathon. Plutarch's self-confessed first aim is to contradict and, wherever and whenever possible, to discredit Herodotus (cf. Plu. 854F). For that reason, Plutarch's data in such contexts cannot be accepted at face value. Nevertheless, I believe we have few other options here than to accept the names brought forward by Plutarch, viz. Aristides and Demosthenes, as participants in the Battle of Marathon in their assigned roles.

Each of the ten *Stratêgoi* led the soldiers[27] belonging to his *phylê*, "tribe", as it seems from the reports available to us exclusively equipped as hoplites, heavy armed(?) infantrymen (cf., though, Krentz 2013). In practice, however, some (archers and) light armed (or lighter armed) men may well have been positioned among those (largely) armed as hoplites (also see further below). Each force of these tribes consisted of the men of three *trittyes*, "thirds" (cf. Arist. *Ath*. 21.3), at the strength of – nominally – 300 men (i.e. citizens), together forming a *lochos*, "company", led by a *lochagos*, "captain". In its turn, the company usually was formed by the men – basically all able-bodied men up to the age of fifty, if need be also those older than fifty – belonging to one of the (three) *dêmoi* ("parishes", "districts") that generally constituted a *trittys*. The men of a *dêmê* (or *dêmos*) were headed by a *dêmarchos*, perhaps in the military structure or context here best compared with a lieutenant, but in daily life the title of the chief official of a δῆμος. If the number of citizens available in a *dêmos* and/or *trittys*

[25] Cf. Strothmann/Welwei 2004, 148; Davies 1971, 48-50.

[26] For Aristides' qualities as a leader also see Pl. *Grg*. 526AB, *Men*. 94A1. I have no compelling cause to discredit Plutarch's data regarding Aristides' position – and qualities –, even though his exploits may have been exaggerated somewhat by Plutarch because of compositorial purposes.

[27] This paragraph largely rests upon the observations of Sekunda 2002, 18-19.

was insufficient to make up a full complement, free foreigners residing in Attica and/or freed slaves could be enrolled to achieve a total strength – nominally at least – of 9,000 men for the whole Athenian army.

Pausanias *Periêgetês* writes that: ἐς Μαραθῶνα γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι σὺν ἡλικίᾳ τε τῇ ἀχρείῳ καὶ δούλοις ἐνακισχιλίων ἀφίκοντο οὐ πλείους ("For not more than nine thousand Athenians came to Marathon, including those unfit for war through age [i.e. probably those aged over fifty years: cf. Th. 2.44.4, JPS] and slaves": Paus. 10.20.2). Hammond (1973, 206) believes that: "[a]s the numbers may have been reduced for rhetorical effect, it is best to accept 10,000 men as the minimum figure, armed mainly as hoplites and unsupported by cavalry or archers". I fail to understand why 'rhetorics' make Hammond on this issue all of a sudden less dogmatic in dealing with the ancient data than he shows himself in general regarding Herodotus. It is, anyway, a number that is considerably higher than the one assumed by Willekes (2017, 42). She assumes that (next to the 600 Plataeans she adopts as *their* number, see above and *ad* note 18) only 6,000 Athenians marched to Marathon. In view of the fact that, just before the actual battle started, the length of the line of the Atheno-Plataean force was equal to that of the Persians (see below), I believe that the number Willekes presents is far too low (if she excludes *metoeci* and liberated slaves from the number of 'Athenians', she fails to mention that). Though there is further no solid evidence either way available, I think that to assume a total of about 10,000 men for the Atheno-Plataean force looks – in view of what data we do have – to be fair.

Already earlier in his account (sc. in Paus. 7.15.7), Pausanias informed his audience that, *preceding* [my emphasis, JPS] the Battle of Marathon (or more likely, in my view, prior to the march to Marathon to counter the Persians), the Athenians set free a number of slaves to complement the army, regrettably without specifying a number. Whether the former slaves (now emancipated but as it seems not yet enrolled as full citizens[28]: cf. Notopoulos 1941, 354), (other) *metoeci*, and possibly also poor citizens, unable to afford themselves hoplite armour, really served as hoplites may seem dubious (if only in view of the training full hoplite warfare may well have required). If not, it is open to discussion what role had been envisioned for them. There is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence that can elucidate this issue (see, e.g., also the observations of Notopoulos 1941; Hans van Wees merely remarks that "within a generation these non-hoplites [sc. former slaves, *metoeci*, and possibly poor citizens, JPS] had been written out of the picture": Van Wees 2004, 180, 297 note 45). A possibility, in my view, is that they were positioned in between the hoplites and that, instead of a pure hoplite phalanx, the Atheno-Plataean phalanx of 490 essentially formed a mixed

[28] I do not follow Hammond's suggestion (Hammond 1992, 150) that the (former) slaves were given Plataean citizenship. I cannot recall any situation where a *polis* had the power, let alone the authority, to bestow to its own (former) inhabitants the citizenship of another *polis*.

phalanx, though with a distinct (if only already from the literary point of view) emphasis on the hoplite element (cf., e.g., Krentz 2013, 149; Sekunda 2002, 19; contra: Hammond 1992, 147-150, who suggests the (former) slaves fought in a separate unit).

Admitting that Krentz, on the very page just referred to, also states that Miltiades introduced the all-hoplite phalanx at Marathon, I believe the shortage of citizens used to fight as such (and therefore the need to enlist *metoeci* and freed slaves to make up the complement) may well have been a forbidding factor for this to have actually been the case – even though probably not for the conceptualization to be conveyed. Accepting the number of Plataeans to have been 1,000 men (in spite of the doubts expressed above), the combined Atheno-Plataean force that was about to confront the Persian force, which was ready to land (see below) or barely had landed at Marathon, therefore, as it seems, consisted – as discussed above – of about 10,000 men (cf. Nep. *Milt*. 5.1; see also Pausanias *Periêgetês*: τό τε Ἀθηναίων ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἔργον ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο, ὡς μυριάδες τριάκοντα ἐφθάρησαν τῶν Μήδων ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ ἐς μυρίους ἀριθμόν ("they recalled the feat of the Athenians at Marathon, that 300,000 Persians had been annihilated [or: defeated] by men less than 10,000 in number": Paus. 4.25.5; also see below note 110).

As discussed earlier (see in this respect, e.g., Stronk 2016-17, 160 note 54), the number of Persians given by various ancient (but also modern) authors varied widely, ranging from about 80,000 to about 600,000 – though not all of our (modern *and* ancient) sources clearly distinguish between the totality of participants of the expedition and the actual force destined to do the fighting. As discussed as well, many of the numbers produced appear to have been (hugely) exaggerated, the actual Persian fighting force likely having been somewhere between 18,000 and 24,000 men at most, possibly even somewhat less (also see Sekunda 2002, 23; Lazenby 1993, 46), potentially slightly more (Hammond 1968, 32). Even the number of 77,000 to 80,000 for the whole expedition (i.e. including the ships' crews) as produced by Hammond (1973, 203, 222) seems to me to be, though much more realistic, relatively high.

The Battle of Marathon

Having learned that the Persian army (probably consisting of battalions of 1,000 men, each commanded by a *hazārapatiš* or in Greek "*chiliarch*": cf. Sekunda 1988, 71 (who refers to them as 'regiments'); see for a possible composition of the Persian army and its equipment Sekunda 2002, 25-6; a general review is presented in Sekunda 1992; for the division of the army also see X. *Cyr*. 2.1.22 and Miller's explanatory note 1 (vol. 1, 149)) was about to land – or barely had landed – at Marathon (see below), the Athenian army *cum* former slaves and *metoeci* set out into the direction of Marathon. As it appears (see below), it did so even before the Athenians had been informed that the Lacedaemonians were intent to come to assist them, but could not assist them immediately. As Philippides arrived at

Sparta on the ninth of *Carneus*, he cannot have arrived back into Athens before early in the eleventh of that month at the soonest (Hammond 1988, 507 even refers that Philippides "sped back to Athens on the 11th" and that the news from Sparta was relayed to Marathon later that day). That is, therefore, the earliest moment the Athenian army can have been informed that Spartan help was not to be expected sooner than some days after the sixteenth at best (see also below, *sub* The date …). Whether the Athenian army was, at the moment the news about Sparta arrived, indeed already at Marathon is a matter of discussion, even though (like Hammond and Fromherz) I personally believe it probably was (though I cannot adduce evidence, but my belief is based both on Herodotus' text and Maurice's observations: for the latter see below).

I initially found the view as expressed by, e.g., Fromherz (2011, 401), that the Athenians (and perhaps the Plataeans as well) already were on the spot (i.e. at Marathon) when the Persian army landed there, hard to accept, even though it *appears* [my emphasis] to be supported by Herodotus' words. My reserve was guided by the fact that, even if Marathon was a sound (and probably the prime) option to expect the Persians to land in Attica, there were too many realistic alternatives for the Persians to choose from for an invasion to allow the Athenian commanders (with their relatively small army) to put "all their eggs in one basket" and opt for a potential landing-ground on beforehand. Nevertheless, I must admit that especially Herodotus' account (Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένεϊ Ἡρακλέος ἐπῆλθον βοηθέοντες Πλαταιέες πανδημεί ("The Plataeans came in full force to help the Athenians, who were arrayed in the precinct of Heracles": Hdt. 6.108.1, already referred to above)) *in combination with the sequence of events* [my emphasis, JPS] in his story are an extremely complicating factor to uphold my doubts to Fromherz's idea.

The words of Herodotus, certainly at first sight, seem to favour Fromherz's position. Perhaps the Athenian commanders had received information through spies, revealing the Persians' plans, but if so, Herodotus (as well as our other sources) remain(s) silent on this issue[29]. An element to take into account, though, is that the Athenians had some room at their disposal because – as Sekunda 2002, 34, 43 *ad* 1, remarks – disembarking will have taken the Persians quite some time (certainly in view of the disembarkation of the horses – still assuming they were present – as related above), possibly even "several days". This may have presented the Athenians the time they needed to react if Hammond's solution (1988, 507) holds true, i.e. that the Athenians were warned for the Persians' landing by means of a

[29] Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 243 rightly point out that Herodotus' "narrative is told from a Greek viewpoint, and little is said of Persian movements or decisions". This observation is not only valid for Herodotus, but also applies to all of our other textual sources. Also see Raaflaub 2010, 126-127. It is Maurice's merit (see below on Maurice 1932; 1934) that he introduces a Persian oriented strategic model into the deliberations.

fire-signal (Hammond 1973, 204 merely speaks of a signal that alerted the Athenians within the hour after landing). It may well reconcile Herodotus' text with the developments as one might expect to have taken place. As it is, however, we only can try to interpret the Athenian command's motives to act as they did to the best of our abilities[30]. After all, as Macan correctly put it: "[t]he text of Herodotus must be taken as the primary and most authoritative description of the battle, and all the operations connected therewith" (Macan 1895(2), 236).

Nevertheless, Macan concedes as well that: "[t]he Herodotean record is not the oldest evidence on all points, it is not the only evidence, and it is not consistent or clear in itself" (*ibidem*). Slightly further, he remarks that, compared with alternatives, like Nepos (perhaps based upon Ephorus), Herodotus must, on the whole, prevail, albeit not always and on everything. As regards the issue under scrutiny, however, I believe we have, in spite of (I presume justified) doubts, no alternative but to largely accept Herodotus' version as the truest reflection of the occurrences from a Greek point of view[31]. The only alternative I can think of, on the basis of the textual evidence alone (though as it seems unsubstantiated by our sources) is that small advance groups watched all landing spots suited to the Persians' needs and/or aims and warned the rest of the Athenian army with some signal the very moment the Persians' actual landing started, in fact very much according to Hammond's suggestion. In doing so, the Athenian reaction time could be reduced to an absolute minimum, a necessity to thwart Persian plans for a speedy full deployment of their force (the Persians moreover hindered by the time-consuming task of disembarking their cavalry, even if that force – again: if present at all – was dramatically smaller than classical sources suggest), at least if the Persian commander intended to deploy his force already (see Maurice's view below). Shortly after the Athenian army had pitched camp "on the southern side of the plain at a shrine to Heracles" (Keaveney 2011, 29), the Plataean force joined them. I believe that only thus both logic and sources can be served

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[30] A prime aim may well have been to avoid Eretria's fate and risk betrayal from within (assuming – as our ancient literary sources do – the events at Marathon followed upon those at Eretria; see, though, below Maurice's view for (some) simultaneity). Obviously, *stasis* (revolt) was a recurring issue in many – if not most – Greek *poleis* (see, e.g., Hansen 2004). The presence of the Athenian force in (or near) the Marathonian plain before the Persians had deployed would solve Berthold's (1976, 92) dilemma how the Athenian force had been able to move unhindered from the southern entrance to the plain to the Vrana Valley (even though I myself am not at all convinced the Athenians had pitched camp there, even on the contrary -see below).

[31] Berthold (1976, 86 note 16), though, rightly wonders what had happened with the so-called Chalcidian *clêruchoi* (see Stronk 2016-17, 163-165), irrelevant whether they actually were 4,000, 2,000, or even less in number. Their manifest absence (in all accounts!) in this (ultimate) hour of need in the defence of Athens strengthens the suspicions regarding Herodotus' reliability as to his story of (alleged?) Athenian aid to Eretria. Hammond 1973, 204 believes they were part of the Athenian army that set out to Marathon, though without adducing evidence.

at the same time – still only thinking from a Greek point of view, not taking into account whatever considerations the Persians might have held (*ibidem*).

The occurrences that followed have been described by various classical authors, most prominently – of course – by Herodotus (Hdt. 6.109-117). I shall follow (most) of his account and confront it with that of other classical sources as well as with the observations of modern authors. Herodotus starts his version of the occurrences with the observation that the opinions within the Athenian command were divided. Five *Stratêgoi* (had) favoured a decision to (stay in the city and) abstain from a confrontation with the Persians (perhaps temporarily, waiting for the Spartans to arrive: cf. *Suda*, s.v. Hippias 2 [*iota*,545]), five *Stratêgoi*, among them Miltiades (and – as referred to above – Aristides), favoured to fight (Hdt. 6.109.1; cf. also Nep. *Milt*. 4.4). In view of the deadlock, the decisive vote lay with the *polemarch*, Callimachus (Hdt. 6.109.2; also see the just remarks of Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 246 *ad* 109.2 regarding the word ἐνίκα). To prevent the outcome he did not want, Miltiades allegedly approached the *polemarch* and convinced Callimachus to opt to fight the Persian force (Hdt. 6.109.3-110; see, e.g., also Keaveney 2011, 30). Even believing this presentation rather rests upon a Herodotean *topos* than upon facts (as already indicated above, also cf. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 247 *ad* 109.3), we have to accept it as a *datum*. Herodotus' presentation not merely seems to resemble a *topos* in his work, it seems to reveal also another recurring feature, sc. a likeness with the Homeric tradition: that such a likeness is no coincidence is suggested by the statement by Herodotus (1.5) that (specifically) the Greco-Persian feud [my emphasis, JPS] started with the Trojan War.. In this case, it looks to have traits of Thetis' intervention with Zeus, preceding a council of the Olympian gods (cf. Hom. *Il*. 1.494-516). As it was, though, the decision having been made, the Athenians (nevertheless) did not deploy for combat until the day Miltiades himself officially held the command[32], at least allegedly.

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[32] Herodotus appears to suggest that each of the ten *Stratêgoi* in turn held the supreme command of the army for a day (cf. Hdt. 6.110: πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῦ πρυτανηίη [sc. ἡμέρη] ἐγένετο ("before his [day of] leadership had come"). Macan 1895(1), 367 note *ad* 110.3 rightly observes that, "[t]o attack without waiting for the Spartans – unless some special circumstance arose to make an immediate attack advisable – might well have seemed an act of folly". As we shall discuss later, such a special circumstance may well have occurred on the day of Miltiades' (alleged) command (Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 249-250 *ad* 110 do accept that leadership rotated on a daily basis). Herodotus' story is, however (as Macan 1895(2), 158-159 rightly points out), an anachronism. At the time of the Battle of Marathon, the *polemarch* still was the (undisputed?) commander-in-chief of any Athenian army: in spite of the potential importance of the *Stratêgoi*, an alternating *supreme* [my emphasis] command seems out of the question at the time. Sekunda 2002, 41 is, obviously, absolutely right that logic expects that the conversation between the *Stratêgoi* whether to set out or not would have taken place before the army set out at all, but the context strongly suggests that Herodotus places the discussion in the camp the Athenians had pitched at the *Heracleum*.

As regards the battle line, Herodotus rightly positions Callimachus as commander of the right wing (the place of honour in the Athenian army, as it seems, and as such the only one suitable for the *polemarch*), then: ἐξεδέκοντο ὡς ἀριθμέοντο αἱ φυλαὶ ἐχόμεναι ἀλληλέων ("followed by the *phylae* one after the other according to their number": Hdt. 6.111.1)[33]. According to Plu. *Mor*. 628DE (= *Quaestiones Conviviales* 1.10.3), allegedly based upon an elegiac poem by Aeschylus, the *phylê* of the Aeantids had been assigned the right wing as well (as probably might be expected, as Callimachus' *dêmê* of Aphidna belonged to the *phylê* of the Aeantids: cf. How/Wells *ad* 6.109.2; McCulloch Jr. 1982, 42).

For the names of the *phylae* in the Athenian centre we have a reference from Plutarch's *Life of Aristides* (Plu. *Arist*. 5.3), stating that (at least) the tribes of the Leontids (the *phylê* of Themistocles) and the Antiochids (the *phylê* Aristides belonged to) were positioned there. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 250-251 *ad* 111.1) are, however, sceptical regarding this *datum*, if only because – they think – these tribes normally would fight either four or six positions apart (*ibidem*). The latter may have been true from about 224/223, when the *phylê* Ptolemais was formed (Woodhead 1981, 114). Woodhead (1981, 113), however, makes clear there were – according to him – five tribes between Leontids and Antiochids at the time of 'Marathon'. As it seems, therefore, Plutarch might have been guided more by his wish to present his main characters as prominently as possible in his *Aristides* than by the actual situation, unless the process of rotation or lots (see note 33) also could affect the order in which the *phylae* were deployed (which might well be feasible). Herodotus also informs us that, following the Athenian *phylae*, the Plataeans were arrayed on the (far) left wing: this seems to be acceptable. Moreover, as Lendon (2005, 69) observes: "[s]econd in honor was [the position of] the extreme left wing". To attribute that position to helping (and allegedly eager) allies seems to be a proper tribute. A suggestion for the line-up of the Atheno-Plataean force is presented by Sekunda 2002, 43, frame: 'Greek forces'.

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[33] From Herodotus' description one gets the impression that the 'tribes' were positioned in a fixed official order, while Plutarch's account (notably in his *Life of Aristides*) appears to suggest that the positioning of the different *phylae* was determined by the specific tactic that was followed on the day of a fight. The difference in approach led the editor/translator of Herodotus for the Loeb Classical Library, A.D. Godley, to surmise that the battle-order [before an encounter] was ultimately determined by lot (Godley 1922, 267 note 2). Macan 1895(1), 397 note *ad* 110.4 remarks that, "[i]t is not in itself improbable that there was a daily change in the order of the Phyles in battle-array, or some rotation of *primacy*, or *dignity*, among the phylic regiments, and their commanders, the supreme lead and command of the polemarch remaining unaffected". We simply do not know for certain how some arrangements were functioning. Cf. also Böckh 1855, 68, who argues for a combination of a general fixed order, yearly adapted by lot to determine the rightmost position. For the usual order "by number" see, e.g., Poll. 8.110; Woodhead 1981, 113. As regards the order at the beginning of the fifth century, Raubitschek 1956, 281 made a suggestion that, with all customary reservations, was followed by Sekunda 2002, 54, 57-58.

Herodotus further informs us that: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ [i.e. στρατόπεδου[34]] μέσον ἐγίνετο ἐπὶ τάξιας ὀλίγας, καὶ ταύτῃ ἦν ἀσθενέστατον τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὸ δὲ κέρας ἑκάτερον ἔρρωτο πλήθεϊ ("the middle part of it [i.e. the line of battle] only was a few ranks deep, and there the line of battle was weakest, but both wings were strong in numbers": Hdt. 6.111.3)[35]. Herodotus does not tell us how deep the lines were, neither as regards the wings nor as regards the centre. The only additional, but extremely relevant, bit of information he provides here is that the Persian line (for its composition, see Sekunda 2002, 43, frame 'Persian forces', listing 12,000 men) and that of the Atheno-Plataean force were equal in length (my emphasis, JPS). Sekunda 2002, 42 *ad* 7, (therefore) surmises the Greek wings were eight men deep, the usual depth, while the centre was four men deep. As I shall detail below (*sub* Structure), especially the latter number is not absolutely certain. In view of the strength of the Persian army as discussed above (see the numbers given in Stronk 2016-17, 160 note 54), this might suggest that, on the basis of our literary sources, either part of the Persian infantry was still (or already: see the following paragraphs) embarked – or at least not present in the battle – or that the Persian line was relatively exceptionally deep. It leads me to accept a relatively more reduced number of Persian troops to be present on the Marathonian plain at the time of the battle (e.g. no more than 12,000 at most).

Hdt. 6.111.3 is remarkable from another point of view as well. Instead of preparing to fight a – more or less static – linear hoplite battle to block the Persians, the Greeks seem to have anticipated the Persian attack at their centre (perhaps Miltiades' input?) and prepared countering it with a two-pronged circular movement. Regrettably, Herodotus does not make clear whether this wheeling movement to bring both flanks together (συναγαγόντες τὰ κέρεα ἀμφότερα ἐμάχοντο, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι ("bringing the wings together they fought, and the Athenians were victorious": Hdt 6.113.2)) was an element of spontaneous military creativity, a foreseen tactical innovation, or already had been practiced somewhere before. At least Hammond (1973, 196) believes it was a preconcerted move, instigated by Miltiades.

Nowhere in the following chapters Herodotus presents us with a good reason for the Athenians and Plataeans to opt to attack the Persians at the moment they did, allegedly having waited several days (in view of the number of *Stratêgoi* and the alleged succession of their 'command' nine at most), apart from the fact that

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[34] In this chapter (as also elsewhere), Herodotus uses στρατόπεδον in the sense of army: cf. *LSJ s.v.* στρατόπεδον *ad* II. Perhaps we may translate it here best as "line of battle": I have opted for this solution.

[35] Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 251-252 *ad* 111.3 remark that "[Herodotus] writes as if it just turned out that way, presumably as a result of stretching the line to match the Persians' width, and gives no indication that the weakening of the centre was a conscious tactical decision … Perhaps he was right: so Lazenby 1993: 64, though most scholars think the tactic was deliberate".

Miltiades 'held the command' as well as that the omens were favourable (Hdt. 6.112.1; Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 252 *ad* 112.1 on (the difference between) σφάγια and ἱερά; see also below, note 95), even before the Spartan army had arrived. Only because of what he does not tell us we may surmise that reason, regrettably again a reason resulting from an *argumentum e silentio* and, admittedly, a quite questionable one at that (even though it, perhaps, might be supported by an entry in the *Suda*: see further below, note 42), sc. an absence in the Persian formation of (a) cavalry detachment(s). Nowhere in Herodotus' account of the battle he refers to either Artaphernes or the Persian cavalry (as it thus seems the part of the Persian force commanded by Artaphernes[36]).

The Persian cavalry typically might well have been the part of the army capable to severely harm the Greek hoplite line, as both Miltiades from experience and the Athenians from memory knew[37]. As it *seems* [my emphasis; see however below for suggestions for the contrary], however, the (larger part of the) cavalry might well already have been re-embarked on the Persian transports, possibly destined to be deployed in the following part of the Persian plan of attack (assuming there was one – as I believe we may, even if it is not referred to: in fact, references to a Greek strategy in our sources are well hidden, too). I find Hammond's solution for the cavalry – during and/or at the end of the battle –, in view of the raging consternation and the time it will have taken to embark the horses to name a few reasons, not realistic, which is why I opt for a previous embarkation of the Persian cavalry as well (cf. Hammond 1973, 209). In this context, the truth hidden in the frequent complaint of Lacey (2013, *passim*), sc. that our ancient sources apparently did not care about military knowledge but that (apart from Maurice, Lacey himself, and to some extent Hanson) few – if any – modern authors show much insight in military affairs either, becomes, regrettably, all too evident.

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[36] This suggestion is based upon the remark by Pausanias *Periêgetês* that: ὑπὲρ δὲ τὴν λίμνην φάτναι εἰσὶ λίθου τῶν ἵππων τῶν Ἀρταφέρνους καὶ σημεῖα ἐν πέτραις σκηνῆς ("Above the lake are the stone mangers of Artaphernes' horses as well as marks of his tent in the rocks": Paus. 1.32.7). Macan (1895(2), 226) believes there were, indeed, stone troughs above the lake "which were regarded as the mangers from which the horses of Artaphrenes [*sic*!] had been fed" (Macan uses the form one also encounters in, e.g., Hude's Oxford edition of Herodotus (now replaced by that by Wilson), based upon the rendering of the name in some MSS: in the edition by Wilson the better form Artaphernes has been adopted; Hornblower/Pelling 2017, though, continue to use Artaphrenes as well).

[37] Cf. Berthold 1976, 87 and his note 20; Hammond 1973, 207-208; Hammond 1988, 510-511; Hignett 1963, 69, on the other hand, believes cavalry was no match for hoplites fighting in formation; likewise: Shrimpton 1980, 20; Evans 1987, 100 and its note 34; also see the view of Tuplin 2010c, 270 that, though Greeks *were* impressed by Persian horsemen, the Persian military machine was not (yet?) as dependent on cavalry as some suppose; Raaflaub 2010, 226 note 17 remarks that "Persian cavalry was generally reluctant to engage with Greek hoplites in dense formation", though without adducing evidence for this statement; likewise Hammond 1973, 208.

The presence of Persian cavalry (and if so, in what role) is one of the main issues of concern of Whatley (1964, 131, 133, 135-136). Especially the casualness with which an absence of Persian cavalry on the battlefield is taken for granted in modern comments on the battle worries him (different from, e.g., Maurice, see below, even though both share some views, like on the problems of horse-transport by ship). In the end, however, Whatly is convinced: "I cannot see any serious difficulty in supposing that the cavalry was present at the battle" (Whatley 1964, 136). Tuplin (2010c, 267-268) also emphatically believes (like Hammond 1973, 1988) in the presence of Persian cavalry at Marathon, but thinks "they made no crucial difference" perhaps simply because "there were not enough to make a difference" (Tuplin 2010c, 268). Personally, I cannot believe (though I have no evidence to adduce, substantiating my view) that the commander of the Persian force, Datis, would not have been on horseback (also see Evans 1987, 105; equally Hammond 1973, 199 records that Datis – and Artaphernes, but he is not referred to at all by Herodotus with respect to the battle – were mounted). That could, in my view, only be a realistic situation if part of his companions, his guard, also was mounted. In its turn, that means that at least a small force of horsemen was present in the Persian force fighting at Marathon, as Lazenby 1993, 46 indicates (Lazenby believes in a cavalry within this Persian army consisting of 800-1,000 men). Also Evans (1987) is, thus, convinced of the presence of Persian cavalry at Marathon.

Making the (larger part of the) cavalry embark before the bulk of the infantry as it *seems* [my emphasis; contra, e.g., Whatley 1964, 136] implicated by Herodotus[38] – *could* look like an error of judgement by the Persian command, an error, moreover, that invited the Greeks to act. Shrimpton (1980), however, has a completely different view on the encounter. He believes Persian cavalry was present (as, indeed, might be expected in view of Herodotus' remark of 6.102 referred to above), notably consisting of Scythians (cf. Shrimpton 1980, 29-30; for their quality (at Plataea) also see Hdt. 9.71.1; Tuplin 2013, 231), but that it was unable to deploy itself – or to be deployed – due to both the speed of the Athenian attack and the time needed to properly line up (see, however, also below, where at least a kind of Persian initiative can be surmised)[39]. Watching the battle unfold, the Persian cavalry retreated to the transports (moored at the very end of Schinias

[38] Cf., however, below the depictions and description of the so-called Brescia-sarcophagus, which as well suggests that at least some Persian cavalry partook in the battle.

[39] I am not sure how Shrimpton visioned Persian/Scythian cavalry tactics. Even assuming the cavalry had (too) little time to line up properly, this need have been no impediment to act before the actual skirmish started. A proven tactic of Persian/Scythian cavalry, armed with bows, was to shoot their arrows at the enemy line, retreat a bit, and repeat the action (also in this vein Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 253 *ad* 112.2**n3**). Only when the infantries of both sides had engaged in hand to hand fighting this tactic became largely useless. However, against a fleeing enemy cavalry regained importance, 'mopping up' adversaries; only in view of pending defeat they would need to save themselves. Hammond 1988, 510 believes Persian cavalry was a formidable weapon.



Fig. 8. Early Hellenistic terracotta statuette from Cyprus, showing a horseman in Persian dress. New York. Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Cesnola Collection. Accession no.: 74.51.1665. Public Domain Program of the MMA.

Beach) and started to embark. Though conceding that Shrimpton presents several valuable observations, I fail to comprehend how the Persian cavalry would have managed to board the ships, even in the manner he suggests, in the hectic of the battle and the ensuing Persian flight within the time available to do so (cf. Shrimpton 1980, 37 and the continuation of his note 43; see also in this vein Hammond 1973, 209). As it is, the questions phrased by Berthold (1976, 94 note 61) still make it hard to believe that (the entire) Persian cavalry was present during the battle, in spite of the available evidence – and as we shall see there is (also see note 37 above) – there may have been present at least some horsemen at the Persian side (as might be expected, like I suggested above).

Returning to my argument. It seems feasible on the one hand that the Persians believed that the strength of their infantry was utterly sufficient to prevent the Greeks from even contemplating to attack them. The Persians were as yet largely unaccustomed to hoplite tactics – even though they may have had some experience during the Ionian Revolt – and possibly the more confident because the Greeks had not yet attacked during several days. Perhaps the Persians also believed that the Athenians waited for their Lacedaemonian allies to arrive before joining battle. This combination might have caused the Persians to think, therefore, that they could permit themselves to let (part of) the cavalry board first because the infantry did not need added protection. Equally feasible is, on the other hand, that the part of the Persian army now left on the beaches of Marathon was a smaller portion of the entire force[40], destined to embark last – [or ,] only after either the bulk or at least a significant part of the infantry (first) and the cavalry (second) already had embarked for alternative – or the planned – actions against Athens[41]. Hammond

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[40] If so, "[i]t was ... not in Athenian interests to suggest that they had only beaten part of the Persian army and, even if accusations of Medism helped to fuel contemporary Athenian political disputes, the notion that treachery was a major danger in this bastion of Greek resistance was not something to be remembered in the longer run. Herodotus, in particular, may have helped in this direction by the interests of some sources, since he preserved material connected with the Alcmeonids, one of the families strongly suspected of Medizing [Cf. Hdt. 6.121-4]" (Whitby 2007, 70). The remark by Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 244 (*ad* 109-117) that "[Herodotus] would be expected to … mention it", in this matter, surprises me: if it was not in the Athenians' interest to mention they only had beaten part of the Persian army, it certainly was not in Herodotus' interest either, depending – as he did – on Athenian *stipendia*, or funding, goodwill, and – to some extent – sources. Whitby is, in this matter, much more realistic.

[41] This appears also to be suggested by Macan 1895(1), 372, when he remarks *ad* 115.1 "... that only seven ships were taken is an argument for the hypothesis that a good part of the Persian forces were already on board". See also Macan 1895(2), 241-242 (Appendix X, § 34). The same seems to be suggested in an entry in the *Suda*: Χωρὶς ἱππεῖς· Δάτιδος ἐκβαλόντος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, τοὺς Ἴωνας φασίν, ἀναχωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ, ἀνελθόντας ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα σημαίνειν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς εἶεν χωρὶς οἱ ἱππεῖς· καὶ Μιλτιάδην συνιέντα τὴν ἀποχώρησιν αὐτῶν, συμβαλεῖν οὕτως καὶ νικῆσαι. ὅθεν καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν λεχθῆναι ἐπὶ τῶν τάξεις διαλυόντων ("Cavalry away: when Datis had invaded Attica, they say that the Ionians, after his withdrawal, went up into the trees and signalled to the Athenians that the cavalry were away; and on learning that they had gone Miltiades charged and so won a victory. Hence the proverb is said in reference to those breaking ranks": *Suda*, s.v. Χωρὶς ἱππεῖς, *chi*,444; Shrimpton 1980 is, quite justly, critical as regards the value of this entry, which he believes to be a falsification; Tuplin 2010c, 270 equally doubts it is a genuine tradition "with which we can do anything"). Evans 1987, 104, rightly in my view, points at the possibility that (part of) the Persian cavalry had been despatched on a separate mission. According to Adler, the phrase was based upon the Atthidographer Demon of Athens (*ca.* 330-*ca.* 260; *FGrH*/*BNJ* 327), even though it does not fit one of his preserved fragments. Williams 1986, 76, links a cup by the Antiphon Painter(?) in the Faina-collection in Orvieto (showing a mounted archer in barbarian costume: inv.no. Orvieto, Faina 65 = *ARV*[2] 1595) to the Battle of Marathon through its inscription (Williams believes he can read the letters *XOPI[.]*), which he interprets as part of the proverb χωρίς ἱππεῖς, "cavalry apart", the information the Greeks needed to engage the Persian force at Marathon. Hignett 1963, 65-66, believes the story in the *Suda* is absurd; others believe that, like the account of Nep. *Milt*. 5.3, it may, indeed, indicate the Persians were re-embarking, in-

(1968, 39-40) believes that this is the case, as well as the cause for the Ionians to go 'up to the trees', viz. inland, to the sacred grove of Heracles, to notify the Atheno-Plataean force of Datis' intentions (I find this a bit far-fetched).

On the other hand, it might be (and already has been!) suggested, like I shall do, that the Persian army fighting at Marathon was not at all unprepared but, in fact, had advanced, ready to meet the Atheno-Plataean force (see also below). The Greek sources remain silent on this issue (as they remain silent on most Persian manœuvres), but this suggestion might be supported by Herodotus' remark that the lines of Persians and Greeks were of equal length (cf. Hdt. 6.111.3). In view of the number of Persians discussed before, this looks hardly feasible if all Persians had been deployed, unless – as already stated – the Persian line was very deep indeed, viz. at least twice as deep as the Greek one. The usual depth of the Persian infantry was ten men, according to Sekunda (2002, 54, 68), while, as stated already before as well, the depth of the Greek centre is (speculatively) assumed to have been four (up to six at most, see below), that of the wings eight men (cf. Sekunda 2002, 42 *ad* 7, 54; Lazenby 1993, 64). On the other hand, Herodotus nowhere gives even the faintest hint that Datis had split up his force. As it is, what should strike us considering all this is that all of our sources, emphatically including Herodotus, leave us utterly and completely in the dark regarding any Persian movements, actions, or potential considerations in the days preceding the battle. In view of the composition of his account, this too is a serious omission of Herodotus, in my view, certainly if we compare it with his treatment of Persian behaviour prior to the Battle of Plataea in 479 in his ninth book.

There is, finally, one detail – correctly observed by Sekunda (2002, 52) – that clearly – and convincingly to me – suggests that, prior to the battle, the Persians indeed had broken camp(s) and had re-embarked part of their army (as it appears including their tents). That detail is that neither Herodotus nor any (!) other of our classical sources, either openly or indirectly, suggests – let alone claims – that the Greek army captured the Persian camp (I can find no corroboration at all in the sources for Hammond's remark (1988, 512) that "[t]he Persian camp was in Greek hands"!). Even though Nepos (*Milt*. 5.5) states that 'the Persians fled not to their camp but to their ships', he does nowhere refer to a Greek capture of a Persian camp, during or, more importantly, after the battle. The alleged find of a huge treasure, recorded by Plutarch (*Arist*. 5.5-6) and referred to in Stronk 2016-17 (177 and its note 73), also as regards its wording, certainly cannot be viewed as the result of 'taking a camp' either, still apart from the fact that this

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tending to attack the Athenians in the back: cf. Rhodes 2013. If, however, we accept Maurice's view (see below *sub* Structure), the Persian bivouac may well have been originally intended to keep an Athenian relieve-force for Eretria in check and only after the taking of that *polis*, the bivouac no longer needed at Marathon, the actual plans for the attack on Athens could be put in motion (see also below).

piece of information is highly contested and further remains uncorroborated in every respect[42]. The absence of that piece of information (viz. taking the camp) – moreover an obvious source for triumphalism (even though Herodotus may have believed Marathon less prominent than the 480/479 battles), as displayed in the aftermath of the Battle of Plataea (cf., e.g., Hdt. 9.82) – leads me to believe that Datis indeed had split his army.

I strongly believe (and shall return to that issue below) that part of the Persian force (possibly also including a [small] part of the cavalry for added protection: see also below), likely under Datis' own command, was due to march from Marathon to the city proper of Athens (likely along the coastal route, but, as Keaveney 2011, 29 explains, the inland route may well have been an option, too, for the Persians, who were accustomed to mountain warfare). The remaining part (including the equipment needed for a camp and the remaining part of the cavalry) was charged to sail aboard the ships for a landing elsewhere in Attica, for example near Phalerum. Having started their march to Athens, the somewhat reduced force was countered by the Atheno-Plataean force that – as matters stood – at that moment had no realistic option left than to accept the challenge (no matter "who had the command that day"). As Sekunda phrases it (*ibidem*): "[w]hen it became clear that the Greeks would offer battle, the Persian fleet remained anchored in the bay. It is unlikely that any of the Persian commanders expected defeat".

The battle itself is described in Herodotus 6.112-113. In 6.112.1 Herodotus tells that: ἦσαν δὲ στάδιοι οὐκ ἐλάσσονες τὸ μεταίχμιον αὐτῶν ἢ ὀκτώ ("The space between the armies was no less than eight *stadia*") and that the Athenians charged the Persians δρόμῳ ("at the double [lit.: in a run]")[43], without support

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[42] Pausanias *Periêgetês*, however, refers a few times (e.g., 9.4.1, 10.10.1, 10.11.5, 10.19.4) to (the, apparently lavish, proceeds of) spoils taken from the Persians at Marathon by the Athenians, though he provides no further information how the Athenians obtained these spoils.

[43] How/Wells 1928(2), 112 *ad* 6.112.1 surmise that the total distance between the Greek camp and the place where they charged the Persians was about 8 *stadia* (*ca.* 1.5 km or about a mile) but that the distance covered 'at the double' probably was no more than *ca.* 200 m ("when within bowshot"), because to cover the whole distance in that manner "would be beyond the power of any large body of soldiers, however well trained". They might be right. McLeod (1970, 197) suggests a distance of at least 160 metres to about 400 metres as the range for the Persian bowshot (the maximum, more or less, appears to be the distance of the so-called *hoplitodromos*, the run in armour over two stades [*ca.* 370 m], in the Olympics first run in 520), Hammond (1968) however a distance that is much less, about 150 metres at most. For McLeod's set of data: see McLeod 1965, 1972. Krentz (2010a and 2013, see below) suggests that hoplite battles were less formal and compact than often upheld, as he also makes clear that hoplite armour may well have been much less heavy than assumed. If so, it perhaps was the *distance* [my emphasis] that became part of the 'Marathon-myth' (cf. also Van Wees 2004, 180). I very much like the suggestion in Meissner (2010, 277) that the intention of going at the double was "to get them [i.e. the Athenians] into close combat against an enemy who was skilled in fighting at some distance using arrows, … they succeeded in forcing the Persians into a static battle …". In combination with the two-pronged attack described above, this

of either archers or cavalry (Hdt. 6.112.2). Allegedly, this amazed the Persians (who were not at all used to these fighting techniques: cf. Sekunda 2002, 65; also see Krentz 2010a, 27-31, 45-50, 143-152, *inter alia* arguing that hoplite armour was less heavy than (normally or usually) assumed, which – in turn – made a trot of about a mile not wholly unrealistic). The Persians readied themselves to receive the, in their view, small force that ran up so fast at them. Herodotus also informs us that the tactic of running at the enemy had never been employed before by Greeks (Hdt. 6.116.3)[44], that the Athenians were πρῶτοι δὲ ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρέοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι ("They were, moreover, also the first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it. Indeed, up until then just hearing the name of the Medes caused fear to the Greeks[45]": *ibidem*). Summarising what becomes clear from Herodotus' account (Hdt. 6.113) is that, after an initial success of the Persian centre, composed of Persians and Scythians (lit.: Sacae), against the Greek centre, the Greek wings proved to be superior to their counterparts. Instead of finishing these adversaries, the Greek wings (immediately) turned against the Persian centre and started a great slaughter there. Those who could, both from the Persian centre and the Persian wings, fled towards the ships still moored at Schinias, pursued by the Greeks. φεύγουσι δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι εἵποντο κόπτοντες, ἐς ὃ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπικόμενοι πῦρ τε αἴτεον καὶ ἐπελαμβάνοντο τῶν νεῶν ("They then started to follow the fleeing Persians, striking them down. When they had reached the sea, they demanded

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movement may have surprised the Persians and have given the Greeks the upper hand (though we are, obviously, unable to check – let alone prove – such remarks any more). It seems an appropriate method to follow on occasions – but certainly not all the time – in a so-called asymmetric warfare, as discussed by Michael Sommer (2010, 297, 301-306). While playing a clever play with the verb διώκω, Ar. *Ach*. 696-700 makes the *chorus* affirm that the Greeks ran at Marathon. Ar. *Eq*. 781 suggests that at least part of the fight occurred using swords, probably after the contestants' spears had been broken (cf. also the image of Fig. 12, which, however, not necessarily reflects on 'Marathon').

[44] Tuplin 2013, 237 remarks that Herodotus here "overdid it just a little", in accordance with Van Wees's observation that "running into battle had long been common practice" (Van Wees 2004, 180); however, not the running itself, but the distance may have distinguished previous runs from this one, being "almost a mile instead of a 200-yard dash" (*ibidem*). As it appears, Hans van Wees assumes, therefore, the Atheno-Plataean force covered the whole distance 'at the double', contrary to How/Wells (see also the remarks above, note 42).

[45] According to Charles 2012, 262, referring to Hdt. 1.135.1, Persian soldiers (usually) wore Median dress. In the paragraph under scrutiny, too, Herodotus exaggerates, obviously omitting, *inter alia*, occurrences during the Ionian Revolt when Greek soldiers also faced Persian troops. Moreover, in a previous book, Herodotus had referred to a dismissive description of Persian fighting and dress by Aristagoras: οὔτε γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἄλκιμοι εἰσί, ὑμεῖς τε τὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκετε ἀρετῆς πέρι, ἥ τε μάχη αὐτῶν [sc. βάρβαρων] ἐστὶ τοιήδε, τόξα καὶ αἰχμὴ βραχέα· ἀναξυρίδας δὲ ἔχοντες ἔρχονται ἐς τὰς μάχας καὶ κυρβασίας ἐπὶ τῇσι κεφαλῇσι ("For they [i.e. the Persians] are not valiant men, while your *aretê* in war is preeminent. As for their manner of fighting, they carry bows and short spears, and they go to battle with trousers on their legs and turbans on their heads": Hdt. 5.49.3). Now, though, Herodotus tries to make us believe both the Persians and their dress were fearsome.

fire and attacked the [Persian] ships": Hdt. 6.113.2[46]). Those of the Persian army surviving the ordeal, having embarked, took off. In 6.114, Herodotus tells us next that Callimachus was killed during the fight near the ships, just like one of the *Stratêgoi*, Stesilaus, the son of Thrasyllus, and one Cynegirus, the son of Euphorion (and the brother of the poet Aeschylus[47]). Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 255 *ad* 113.2, e.g.) emphasise several times that Herodotus evokes with the description of Cynegirus the image in Homer's *Ilias* of Hector trying to set fire to the Greeks' ships (cf. Hom. *Il*. 15.713-718; likewise: Sekunda 2002, 71-72, who points out that asking for fire was, under the circumstances, a futile question; also: Grant 1969, 264).

In the sequel to his account of the battle proper, Herodotus tells that, after a stopover at Aeglea, situated directly opposite Marathon near the town of Styrea (to fetch the prisoners from Eretria; cf., though, Nep. *Milt*. 4.2 referred to above and Plu. *Arist*. 5.4), the Persian fleet finally reached Phalerum (situated somewhat to the SE of the city of Athens, a journey of, perhaps, at least up to some 12-14 hours – the most popular estimate: see Hodge 1975a, 156 – or, more likely, even up to 30-45 hours: cf. Hodge 1975a, 168; Hodge 1975b, 170[48]; Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 256 *ad* 115). For this episode as well (and the remarkable twists that sometimes emerge – see below on the so-called shield incident), Herodotus is still our main guide. Plutarch, however (Plu. *Mor*. 862C (= *De Her. Malign*. 27), presents us with a version that provides an 'alternative truth', rather distorting Herodotus' account. Herodotus himself next mentions that the army of Athenians (and Plataeans?) immediately set out to Athens after the battle, to prevent a Persian landing near Athens (Fron. *Str*. 2.9.8 reports Miltiades halted Greek rejoicing at Marathon, warning the Greeks that dangers still lurked, and led the army back towards the ἄστυ, the city proper). The Greek army thus arrived in

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[46] Herodotus mentions (Hdt. 6.115.1) that the Greeks (Herodotus here only refers to Athenians) took 7 ships before the Persians succeeded to push off from the shore, first heading to the island of Aeglea (cf. Hdt. 6.107.2) to collect the captured Eretrians. Next the Persians rounded Cape Sunium, finally dropping their anchors off Phalerum, at the time – according to Herodotus – the Athenians' arsenal (Hdt. 6.116).

[47] As it seems, the poet himself also fought at Marathon: cf. Paus. 1.21.2. Also see *Suda* s.v. Αἰσχύλος, *alphaiota*,357. Cynegirus was, as referred to above, depicted prominently in the *Stoa Poikilê*.

[48] I find this estimate very high, as I find the estimate of Hammond 1968, 43, i.e. a duration of 9 hours and perhaps even 8, excessively low. Lazenby 1993, 74 believes that a single *trierês* could cover the distance from Schinias to Phalerum in about 10 hours under optimal conditions. I think, therefore, that a duration of the voyage of about 20 hours *for a fleet* seems feasible at least, although depending on specific wind conditions. In the period the battle took place, these winds often were the so-called *Meltemi* (the Etesian winds), blowing from northerly directions but causing a very choppy sea as well (Hodge 1975b, 169). It makes the circumstances much less favourable than Hammond 1973, 226 makes believe (he refers to a "fast run"). As details on the composition of the Persian fleet are absent, however, the time the Persian fleet needed for the Marathon-Phalerum journey only can be 'an educated guess' at best.

the outskirts of Athens, according to Plutarch even the same day[49]. According to some – not Herodotus! – the army was preceded by an errand-runner to announce the victory at Marathon[50]. As it seems, the Greek army returned near the city itself well in time to prevent a Persian invasion. A brief standoff ensued (Herodotus uses the verb ὑπεραιωρηθῆναι ("lie off", sc. Phalerum: Hdt. 6.116)[51], represented by Godley as "lay a while off Phalerum") before the Persians sailed back to Asia Minor.

Cornelius Nepos' (*ca.* 99-25? BC) story fundamentally differs from Herodotus' account (cf. Hammond's judgement on this source: Hammond 1973, 235-237). I therefore render it in full. It reads as follows:

C. Nepos *Miltiades* 5.3-5:

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[49] Plu. *Arist*. 5.4 explicitly states the 9 *phylae* (the Antiochid tribe remained at Marathon to guard the plain) reached Athens αὐθημερόν ("that very day": sc. of the battle). Hammond 1973, 226 even suggests the army already arrived at Cynosarges at 5.30 p.m. Though such a feat may seem to be exceptional, it largely depends on the time the battle started and how long it lasted: the forty-odd kilometers separating Marathon and Athens will have required at least an eight to nine hours' march. If Plu. *Arist*. 5.4 does record the facts correctly, it suggests battle probably started at – or briefly after – daybreak (Hammond 1973, 211, 225 suggests 5.30 a.m), probably ending before noon (Hammond 1973, 210-211, 226 suggests the battle ended about 9 a.m.), even though Hdt. 6.113.1 remarks that the fight took a long time (χρόνος πολλός). That, however, is a relative notion and may be caused by the fact that battles usually lasted no more than one hour, at least according to Hanson 1989, 35.

[50] Plutarch refers to the errand-runner as probably Eucles or else Thersippus of Eroeadae, based upon Heraclides Ponticus (*ca.* 390-*ca.* 310), like he himself educated at the Athenian Academy: cf. Giessen 2010, 39. Heraclides' reliability as a source seems, though, questionable (also conceded by Giessen 2010, 41-42), though Giessen believes in the historicity of the run (*ibidem*). The runner, having covered the whole stretch from Marathon to Athens in full armour(?!), was only able to say χαίρετε· νικῶμεν ("Greetings! We have been victorious!") before he died (Plu. *Mor*. 347C). The same message ('χαίρετε· νικῶμεν') is ascribed by Lucian to Philippides (as it seems the very same man whom Herodotus informs us to have run shortly before to Sparta and back, even though Giessen 2010, 63 doubts this explicitly): Luc. *Laps*. 3. For the background of Lucian's story, e.g., Giessen 2010, 59-64. Frost 1979, suggests no messenger was sent at all, like Lazenby 1993, 53, 80; Keaveney 2011, 33.

[51] Macan 1895(1), 373 *ad* 116.5 believes the word has been used here metaphorically. Herodotus' version strikes me as odd. First he remarks that the Persians collected at Aeglea the prisoners taken at Eretria, then that they continued to Phalerum. Does it, however, make any sense at all to go to a city intending to attack it (at least allegedly), having prisoners on board, while you have the possibility to collect these later, once you have concluded your attack? If Herodotus is to be believed, however, it makes me wonder whether the Persians indeed did contemplate an all-out attack on Phalerum (and, for that matter, Athens) or that it was merely a feint or mock attack (e.g. to gauge the Pisistratids) or even a mere reconnaissance in force for future purposes (see below). If (with much emphasis) Pl. *Mx*. 240C is right, the Persians must have arrived before Phalerum about the time the Lacedaemonian force (2,000 odd men) also arrived at Athens. As it seems, though, the Greek force that had given battle at Marathon had already returned earlier in Athens. It may have been a perfect cause for a standoff.

[5.3] *dein postero die svb montis [sc. Agrielicis] radicibvs acie regione instrvcta non apertissima (namqve arbores mvltis locis erant rarae) proelivm commiservnt hoc consilio, vt et montivm altitvdine tegerentvr et arborvm tractv eqvitatvs hostivm impediretvr ne mvltitvdine clavderentvr*. **[4]** *Datis etsi non aeqvvm locvm videbat svis, tamen fretvs nvmero copiarvm svarvm confligere cvpiebat, eoqve magis, qvod, privsqvam Lacedaemonii svbsidio venirent, dimicare vtile arbitrabatvr. itaqve in aciem peditvm centvm, eqvitvm decem milia prodvxit proelivmqve commisit.* **[5]** *in qvo tanto plvs virtvte valvervnt Athenienses, vt decemplicem nvmervm hostivm profligarint, adeoqve eos perterrvervnt, vt Persae non castra, sed naves petierint. qva pvgna nihil adhvc exstitit nobilivs: nvlla enim vmqvam tam exigva manvs tantas opes prostravit.*	**[5.3]** Then, on the following day[52], the [Greek] army was deployed at the foot of Mt Agrieliki in a part of the plain that was not very open (there were isolated trees in many places) and they joined battle. Their intent was that they both would protect themselves by the height of the mountains and would hinder the cavalry of the enemies by abattis[53] [viz. felled trees], to prevent that they would be surrounded by their [sc. the enemies'] number. **[4]** Even though Datis recognised that the place did not look favourable for his men, he wished as yet to engage, confident by the number of his troops. He wished to engage even more so, because he deemed it useful to do battle before the Lacedaemonians would arrive in support. Therefore, he led out his 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse to the battle-array and started the battle. **[5]** In which battle the Athenians were so much more worth in *virtus*[54] that they routed a tenfold number of enemies and, moreover, terrified them to such an extent that the Persians did not flee to their camp but to their ships. A more glorious victory was won never before; indeed, never overthrew such a small band such a great power. (C. Nepos *Miltiades* 5.3-5:)

[52] As it seems the day after the arrival of the Athenians and Plataeans at Marathon, but I find Nepos' story not absolutely equivocal, here. Moreover, it seems to contradict Hdt. 6.108.1 (see above) as well.

[53] See for this interpretation Van der Veer 1982, 314 and his note 90; likewise Hammond 1973, 225; Hammond 1988, 508. Also Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 244 (*ad* 109-117) appear to suggest that the Greeks attempted to put obstacles in the Persians' cavalry way by "'dragging trees' (if this is what *arborum tractu* means, …)", moreover adding both the Brescia sarcophagus and Pausanias' testimony of 1.32.4 as arguments for the presence of Persian cavalry at (or at least close by) the battle.

[54] For *virtus* the same observation can be made as for *aretê* (see below, note 63), sc. that it is rather 'excellence' in many respects than simple 'valour'.

Among the striking differences, comparing Nepos' account with that by Herodotus, we may notice the even more prominent position of Miltiades (amongst others at the expense of the *polemarch* and also emphasised in the following *caput*, most notably in 6.3; obviously, it was Nepos' prime aim to extol Miltiades' achievements, but still), the fact that the battle was engaged almost immediately (as it appears the very day after the Atheno-Plataean army arrived at Marathon. Nepos, as it appears, believes the Plataeans joined the Athenian force in the city itself, before the combined force set off to Marathon, on this issue contradicting Herodotus as well), and the presence of the Persian cavalry, to present the most obvious features. Striking is that Nepos tells us *here* that Datis led out a force of 100,000, whereas he *previously* informed us that the Persian force numbered 200,000 men [my emphases]. It *could* [my emphasis], indeed, indicate that only part of the total Persian force was deployed at Marathon (as it seems *pace* Maurice 1932, see *sub* Structure), but Nepos does not mention such a circumstance explicitly.

As regards the presence of trees on the battlefield, one comment needs to be made. Even if there were trees on the battlefield – and we have seen above (*sub* Geography) there may have well been –, they likely were relatively few in number, if only to ensure the Atheno-Plataean line, the phalanx, could maintain its cohesion. Under the circumstances this was essential, not merely to face the Persians but above all to do what hoplites were intended to do, sc. to keep close order and fight at close range, relying on the thrust of the spear and, possibly, the push of the shield (cf., e.g., Van der Veer 1982, 299, 307; Hanson 1989, 173; also, though, Krentz 2013, 140-148), and/or use of the sword. Therefore, I believe Van der Veer is largely right to assume the primary function of the trees, be it as abattis (Van der Veer 1982, 300; Hammond 1988, 508) or still standing, was to protect (one of) the wing(s) of the Greek army.

Even though the outcome of the engagement does not differ enormously, I believe the tenor of the description by Nepos – in comparison with that of Herodotus – makes a world of differences. It would be easy – too easy in my view – to state that Herodotus lived closer to the occurrences described, that Herodotus – as he claimed – spoke with eye-witnesses (or possible even participants as Hammond stresses time and again, notably in his 1973 publication), and that, therefore, Herodotus' account necessarily must be more reliable than Nepos'. Apart from the fact that I do not believe, least of all within contexts like the one under scrutiny, in 'necessities', let alone in 'musts', I have to admit that, in this case, I tend to have somewhat more confidence in the story as related by Herodotus (if only because epigraphical evidence appears to support at least part of his story) than in that as presented by Nepos. Macan (1895(2), 236) believes that Nepos had based his story on the work of Ephorus, but Hammond 1973, 236-239 argues, on the contrary, that Nepos' source was an Atthidographer writing late in the fourth century BC, possibly Demon (*FGrH*/*BNJ* 327). If correct – and Hammond presents a good case –, it might make Nepos' version (even) less convincing. Nevertheless, at the

same time it remains as yet essential to present both views, moreover admitting that Nepos presents us with alternatives that are worthy to consider. Ultimately, though, both versions suffer from severe inconsistencies.

One or two of the elements of Nepos' story, for instance, could be corroborated by an object now lost (even though it has been described by Pausanias *Periêgetês* (Paus. 1.14.3) and referred to above), i.e. the painting in the *Stoa Poikilê* of the battle. As it is believed, one of the panels of the so-called Brescia-sarcophagus (see Fig. 9; Figs. 10 a/b), just like part of a sarcophagus now in Pula (Croatia), dating to the third century AD[55], is based upon the original painting in the *Stoa Poikilê* described by Pausanias. At the right, the depicted panel of the Brescia-sarcophagus shows one of the βάρβαροι wielding his axe to cut one of Polyzelus' hands. As it is, the βάρβαροι on the sarcophagus are looking very un-Persian if we compare them with the usual depiction of Persians in Greek iconography. One would, e.g., have expected the man who is carried to the ship to wear trousers, the normal way in which the Greeks represented Persians and also how they are described by Aristagoras in Hdt. 5.49.3.

More important for now, though, is what is depicted on the left[56]. There, one can see a horse. Moreover, looking at it carefully, one can see how a Greek, facing to the left, unsaddles the Persian rider, who is shown tumbling behind his horse (see Fig. 9). In Lendering's words: "This would suggest that there was indeed Persian cavalry on the battlefield, which in turn suggests that the horses were not on the ships, but were somewhere else and returned to the battlefield in the final stage of the fight. So, here we have additional evidence, and the main result is only the falsification of a hypothesis. It is not much, but it's something". I am as yet much less convinced of the cogency of the 'additional evidence' than he appears to be, but in its entirety the image we may gather, via the Brescia-sarcophagus, of the painting in the *Stoa Poikilê* (if, indeed, that is – as suggested – at the origin of the Brescia-sarcophagus) is that we certainly cannot allow ourselves to discard Nepos' story if only because it deviates (or seems to do so) from Herodotus' (or, indeed, from modern theories and/or views). Hammond (1973, 199, 204) clearly accepts the presence of Persian cavalrymen, as it seems on the basis of the Brescia sarcophagus, perhaps also out of habit. In fact, he reckons the Persians had a thousand horses (or more) at their disposal (Hammond 1973, 214; cf. also Lazenby 1993, 46, who believes Persian cavalry amounted to 800-1,000 men), though admitting that, basically, "[w]e have no clue to the number of Persian cavalry" (Hammond 1973, 214 note 2).

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[55] See <https://mainzerbeobachter.com/2017/10/17/marathon-athene-brescia-pula/ > [in Dutch]. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 4, 243-244 *ad* 109-117), too, discuss the Brescia sarcophagus as being based upon the painting in the *Stoa Poikilê*.

[56] I owe a great debt for the following observations to Jona Lendering, acquired through oral communication.

Fig. 9. Detail of the so-called Brescia-sarcophagus (also see Figs. 10 a/b, below). Photo: Jona Lendering (<www.livius.org>).

Regrettably, the part of Diodorus of Sicily's *Bibliotheca Historica* discussing the Battle of Marathon, as it seems for this era largely based upon the *History* of Ephorus of Cume (for the work's title see Str. 13.3.6/622), is for the larger part lost. What remains of D.S. 10.27.1-3 is a prequel to the battle, in which Datis, the Median commander of the Persian force, as it seems through (a) messenger(s) (though, as stated below (note 56), Datis could express himself in Greek), required Athenian surrender to the Persians. Datis argued that the Persians owned Athens by right of birth (the Persians were descendants of Medus, who had been deprived of his kingship by the Athenians) and moreover, that the Athenians had made a campaign against Sardis (sc. the one in 498/497). Datis added to his demands that if the Athenians would not surrender: πολὺ δεινότερα πείσεσθαι τῶν Ἐρετρέων ("they would suffer much worse than the Eretrians": D.S. 10.27.2; Pl. *Lg*. 3.698D confirms Datis sent a message to the Athenians)[57]. What follows, according to Diodorus, is that:

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[57] I find it remarkable that Datis would not have referred here to the fact – already alluded to above – that Athenian envoys, seeking Persian help against Cleomenes, the Spartan king, and Isagoras, a Spartan-supported tyrant of Athens (about 507/506, also see below), previously had offered, requested to do so by Artaphernes, the satrap of Ionia, 'earth and water' to Darius (unless, of course, that story was altogether based upon rumours): cf. Hdt. 5.73. As it seems, as far as we are able to judge, at least, a similar story was absent in Diodorus' account. Schmitt 2011 remarks however: "Diodorus' story (10.27.1-3) about a defiant message sent by Datis to the Athenians and Miltiades' reply is certainly pure fabrication". As regards Datis, Schmitt (*ibidem*) notices as well: "On the basis of an ostracon found in the Athenian agora, on which the Athenian nobleman and leader Aristeides is characterized as the 'fellow of Datis' (Raubitschek [1957], pp. 240-41), it has been argued that Datis had fairly close contacts with

ὁ δὲ Μιλτιάδης ἀπεκρίθη ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν δέκα στρατηγῶν γνώμης, διότι κατὰ τὸν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν λόγον μᾶλλον προσήκει τῆς Μήδων ἀρχῆς κυριεύειν Ἀθηναίους ἢ Δᾶτιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν Μήδων βασιλείαν Ἀθηναῖον ἄνδρα συστήσασθαι, τὰς δὲ Ἀθήνας μηδέποτε Μῆδον τὸ γένος ἄνδρα κατεσχηκέναι. ὁ δὲ [sc. Δᾶτις] πρὸς μάχην ἀκούσας ταῦτα παρεσκευάζετο	("Miltiades, answered based upon the decision reached by the ten *Stratêgoi*, that, according to the statement of the envoys, it was more appropriate for the Athenians to hold the mastery over the empire of the Medes [probably here not wholly to be equated with the Persians, in view of Datis' origin] than for Datis to hold it over the *polis* of the Athenians: it had been an Athenian who had established the kingdom of the Medes, whereas a man of Median race had never controlled Athens. He [sc. Datis] now, on hearing this reply, made ready for battle": D.S. 10.27.3; also see Stronk 2017, 155-156).

Here the recorded fragment breaks off[58].

Like in the account by Cornelius Nepos, also here the role of Callimachus is not recorded and makes Miltiades appear to operate at least as a *primus inter pares* of the ten *Stratêgoi* as the only leaders of the Greek army. The foreplay as presented here is absent in Herodotus' story. It rather looks like a romantic addition than a realistic presentation of occurrences, but we cannot be sure of this. In the totality of the descriptions of what (may have) happened, too many details have gone missing or have not been recorded or related at all. Nevertheless, the Persians appear to act here much more (pro)actively than in Herodotus' story, even more or less taking the initiative for the battle. To value Diodorus' account, it would be useful to compare it with that by Plutarch, if only because they appear as regards their versions of the occurrences at Thermopylae to have largely relied upon the same source, sc. Ephorus of Cume (see, e.g., Stronk 2014-15). However, as Hammond argues (see below), as regards 'Marathon', Plutarch seems to have relied primarily on another source than Ephorus.

Greek officials. Evidence from Herodotus and other sources that Datis showed respect for Greek deities, especially the Delian Apollo, may point in the same direction. It is certainly in harmony with Datis' apparent efforts to speak Greek, though rather haltingly, so that Greek *datismós* became a kind of synonym for 'barbarism.' A similar allusion is found in the proverbial expression 'Datis' song' (*tò Dátidos mélos*; Aristophanes, *Pax* 289; cf. Raubitschek [1957], pp. 234-237)."

[58] This fragment has been preserved in the *Excerpta Constantiniana* 4 (ed. Boissevain 1906), 298-301 (cf. Stronk 2017, 22-27).

Regrettably, though, a comprehensive and factual story of the occurrences at Marathon is largely absent in, for example, Plutarch's treatise *De Herodoti Malignitate* (Plu. *Mor*. 854D-874C). What Plutarch presents in this treatise regarding the issues surrounding the Battle of Marathon, apart from a really distorted representation of Herodotus' words, are predominantly matters of secondary importance, apart from – perhaps – the position of the Alcmaeonid family in Athens directly after the battle. In the *Life of Aristides* (5.1-5) and the *Greek and Roman Parallel Stories* (= *Mor*. 305BC), however, Plutarch expands somewhat more on the Battle of Marathon. Hammond presumes the Atthidographer Demon to have been (among) Plutarch's source(s) for notably his *Life of Aristides* (cf. Hammond 1973, 239-242).

In the *Life of Aristides* (5.1), Plutarch starts with the following observation: ἐπεὶ δὲ Δᾶτις ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεμφθεὶς λόγῳ μὲν ἐπιθεῖναι δίκην Ἀθηναίοις, ὅτι Σάρδεις ἐνέπρησαν, ἔργῳ δὲ καταστρέψασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰς Μαραθῶνα παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ κατέσχε καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐπόρθει ("Now when Datis, being sent by Darius in name to punish the Athenians for burning Sardis, but in fact to subdue all the Hellenes, he put in at Marathon with his whole army and started to ravage the country": for this plundering the countryside also see D. **59**.94). A problem for any translator is the correct interpretation for the word στόλος, used by Plutarch in 5.1. It can have diverse meanings, like "expedition", "voyage", "army", and "fleet". In this case, I opted to offer the option "army" as the most preferable one in the context at hand. The first noticeable observation by Plutarch in this *Life,* is the separation between Darius' prime aim and the pretext he used: a sensible distinction, in my view. Also remarkable is the phrase that, upon landing, "Datis started to ravage the country", a detail we have not encountered before, certainly not in Herodotus, but as a practice not at all out of the ordinary for invading armies to do (and as such a task excellently suited for horsemen, if at all present).

Plutarch then continues to record that Miltiades was the most reputed of the Athenian *Stratêgoi* who were appointed by the Athenians to conduct the war, Aristides, however, being second. In paragraph 5.2 of the *Aristides*, Plutarch informs his audience that καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμέραν ἑκάστου στρατηγοῦ τὸ κράτος ἔχοντος ("Whereas, now, each *stratêgos* held the chief command for a single day in turn"). When it was his turn to command the army, Aristides handed over his position to Miltiades, an example next followed by the other *Stratêgoi*. The account next relates the actual battle and its aftermath:

Plutarch *Life of Aristides* 5.3-5:

[5.3] ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ μάλιστα τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ μέσου πονήσαντος καὶ πλεῖστον ἐνταῦθα χρόνον τῶν βαρβάρων ἀντερεισάντων κατὰ τὴν Λεοντίδα καὶ τὴν Ἀντιοχίδα φυλήν,	**[5.3]** In the battle, the Athenian centre was hardest pressed, and it was there that the Persians held their ground the longest, over against the *phylae* of Leontis and Antiochis.

ἠγωνίσαντο λαμπρῶς τεταγμένοι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ὅ τε Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ ὁ Ἀριστείδης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Λεοντίδος ἦν, **[4]** ὁ δ᾽ Ἀντιοχίδος· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεψάμενοι τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὰς ναῦς καὶ πλέοντας οὐκ ἐπὶ νήσων ἑώρων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης εἴσω πρὸς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀποβιαζομένους, φοβηθέντες μὴ τὴν πόλιν ἔρημον λάβωσι τῶν ἀμυνομένων, ταῖς μὲν ἐννέα φυλαῖς ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ κατήνυσαν αὐθημερόν· **[5]** ἐν δὲ Μαραθῶνι μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φυλῆς Ἀριστείδης ἀπολειφθεὶς φύλαξ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων καὶ τῶν λαφύρων ...	There, then, Themistocles and Aristides fought brilliantly, ranged side by side; for one was a Leontid, **[4]** the other an Antiochid. When the Athenians had routed the foreigners, they drove them aboard their ships, and watching them sail away, not toward the islands, but into <the gulf> toward Attica under compulsion of wind and wave, fearing that the enemy would find Athens empty of defenders, they hastened homeward with nine *phylae*, and reached the city that very day. **[5]** Aristides was left behind at Marathon with his own *phylê*[59], as a guard of the captives and the booty ...

Like in Plutarch's treatise *De Herodoti Malignitate* (Plu. *Mor*. 854D-874C) and C. Nepos' account, the role of Callimachus has been completely overlooked in the *Life of Aristides*. However, whereas Miltiades is extolled in the *De Herodoti Malignitate*, here Aristides (as might be expected, naturally) is given almost as prominent a position (and is Themistocles referred to with honour heaped upon him as well, perhaps a prequel to the *Life of Themistocles*?). However, Plutarch appears to neglect here the fact that warriors were ranged according to *phyle* and that the usual order of *phylae* may well have been an obstacle to state that Aristides and Themistocles had been fighting in each other's vicinity. It would have been even less usual that Aristides and Themistocles had done battle one next to the other, unless – of course – the process of deployment by lot (also see note 33 above) could affect the traditional order of the *phylae*. Plutarch remains completely silent on this issue.

Looking at the structure of the Persian army, we see that usually in Persian armies the commander was positioned in the centre (cf. below, note 85), normally surrounded by his companions and the élite of his force. Therefore, it needs not wonder at all that, initially (as in Herodotus' version at least), the – reduced –

[59] Aristides' *phylê* was that of Antiochis. In itself, this reference connects perfectly with the story, referred to in Stronk 2016-17, 177 note 73, of the wealth of the Hipponicus/Callias family. One of the stories is that Callias found a treasure at Marathon while guarding the battlefield. The family belonged to the *deme* Alopece, which in its turn was part of the *phylê* Antiochis, as it seems indeed the *phylê* designed to guard the site. Above (note 33, especially), I already discussed that it is open to debate whether the *phylae* of Leontis and Antiochis could have been stationed next to one another.

Fig. 10 a/b. Side of the so-called Brescia sarcophagus, allegedly based upon the painting in the *Stoa Poikile* of the fight near the ships during the Battle of Marathon. 2nd-3rd century AD. Currently: Brescia, Santa Giulia Civic Museum, Inv. No. MR 1; for additional bibliography also see: <http://arachne.uni-koeln.de/item/objekt/224471>. Photos: © by Jona Lendering (<www.livius.org>).

Greek centre was no match for the Persian force. I find it, however, striking that in Plutarch's *Aristides* the Greek centre was not only not breached, but that, there, "the Persians held their ground the longest". It is something altogether different than in Herodotus' version of the events. Moreover, the prominent role played by both Greek wings is equally absent in Plutarch's account. In fact, the two versions are largely incompatible. Remarkable is, moreover, that in Plutarch's *Aristides* the Persian cavalry is completely absent (making it stand

off from Nepos' account) as well as that the detour to Aeglea has been omitted. Instead, Plutarch describes that "wind and wave" compelled the Persian fleet "into <the gulf> toward Attica".

As such, this is not unlike what might happen thanks to the prevailing Etesian winds, the modern *Meltemi*. Nevertheless, I find Plutarch's description remarkable (cf. also above, Fig. 4). The distance, as the crow flies, between Marathon and Sunium is about 58 kms (33 mi). This distance makes it, in my view, extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the Athenians at Marathon could see the Persian fleet sail into the Saronic Gulf heading for Athens (from Sunium another 52-odd kms (or 30-odd mi) further to the NW). Moreover, they probably could not allow themselves the time to wait for the Persians' moves, but would have wanted to return to Athens as soon as possible, certainly in view of Plutarch's assertion that they arrived there that very day. Even though Plutarch 'was no stranger to Athens', his description of the situation either suggests that he lost track here of his geography of Attica or that the *Marathônomachai* indeed did perform a huge feat.

In the *Greek and Roman Parallel Stories*, also known as the *Paralella Minora*, Plutarch relates that the Persians landed with 300,000 men (as it seems the same number as mentioned by Pausanias 4.25.5), which were met by 9,000 Athenians, a number considered to be sufficient "because the Athenians held the Persians in contempt". Plutarch then continues by stating that: **[305B]** "… The Athenians … appointed as *stratêgoi* Cynegirus, Polyzelus, **[C]** Callimachus, and Miltiades. When this force had engaged the enemy, Polyzelus, having seen a supernatural vision, lost his sight, and became blind. Callimachus being pierced with many spears remained standing though being dead[60]; Cynegirus, seizing hold of a Persian ship that was putting out to sea, had his hand chopped off" (Plu. *Mor*. 305BC).

A badly mutilated version of this story by Plutarch (who completely distorts here the report on the Athenian command as presented by Herodotus but by other sources as well) has been incorporated in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus, who probably lived during the fifth century AD. Stobaeus writes (Stob. 7.63; pp. 328-329 of Hense's edition) that Δαρεῖος ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς ... ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ("Darius the king of the Persians … pitched camp"), omits the contempt for the foreigners felt by

[60] This sentence seems inspired by a line by the Roman poet Lucan (**4**.787), who lived AD 39-65: *conpressvm tvrba stetit omne cadaver* ("For each body was held bolt upright by the dense array": translation J.D. Duff, Loeb Classical Library, slightly adapted) and may, in turn, have inspired Ammianus Marcellinus (*ca.* AD 325-*ca.* 400): *Hic mixti cvm Persis, eodem ictv procvrrentibvs ad svperiora nobiscvm, ad vsqve ortvm alterivs solis immobiles stetimvs, ita conferti, vt caesorvm cadavera mvltitvdine fvlta, reperire rvendi spativm nvsqvam possent* ... ("Here, mingled with the Persians, who were rushing to the higher ground with the same effort as ourselves, we remained motionless until sunrise of the next day, so crowded together that the bodies of the killed, held upright by the throng, could nowhere find room to fall ...": Amm.Marc. 18.8.12), describing the fate of the Romans in their war against the Sasanian king Shapur II.

the Athenians in Plutarch's version, refers to the number of soldiers to counter the invasion as χίλιοι (χιλίους [acc.] in the text: "one thousand"; in itself, obviously, a true act of contempt against 300,000 enemies, and remarks on Polyzelus τυφλὸς ὢν ἀνεῖλε τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ ("In spite of being blind he killed 48 <enemies>").

Apparently, Stobaeus either was only remotely familiar with Plutarch's work, or he wrote this work extempore, or the tradition was affected to such an extent at this time that he was unable to acquire any proper source to found his work upon. As it is, Stobaeus' version cannot be used for an assessment of the situation at Marathon (nor, as it seems, of Plutarch's efforts). Plutarch's version (certainly in the *Paralella*), however, is not too reliable either – even less so if we take Herodotus' work as the starting point for the story. Only Callimachus and Miltiades were in a (confirmed) position of command, one as the *polemarch*, the other as one of ten *Stratêgoi*, but neither Cynegirus nor Polyzelus (Epizelus in both Herodotus' and Aelian's account, see below) appear to have had a commanding position but only figure in some of our sources. One phrase in this source, however, struck me as being especially out of the ordinary. It is Plutarch's remark that the Athenians held the foreigners in contempt, while the (not necessarily altogether correct) current image in our sources displays the very opposite situation, i.e. the Persians looking down upon the Greeks (also see below, Isoc. **4**.86). Nevertheless, given the (potential) pejorative connotation for βάρβαρος/βαρβαρικὸς, also some contempt from the Greek side is not at all out of character.

Another source for the Battle of Marathon is the work of Justin (M. Iunianius Iustinus: cf. Stronk 2014-15, 199 note 49), i.e. his epitome of the *Philippic History* by Gn. Pompeius Trogus (*floruit* 1st century BC-1st century AD: cf. Stronk 2014-15, 199). This *History*, too, appears to some extent to have been based upon the work of Ephorus (and, likely, that of Theopompus; here, however, predominantly upon οἱ δημοτικοί, i.e. a group of Atthidographers: cf. Hammond 1973, 234) and, therefore, shows some familiar characteristics. Moreover, it shows at several places to have been written in the vein of moral history as discussed by Lisa Hau (2016), perhaps owing to its sources. In view of its relevance (and notable divergencies from Herodotus' version of events), I will render the larger part of this chapter *verbatim*, even though Hammond (1973, 234) remarks that, here, Justin's work "carries all the marks of debased rhetoric …". The chapter starts with the reign of Hippias in Athens, his abuse of power, growing enmity in Athens, and the ensuing need for him to flee the city to Persia, to Darius' court. There, he envigorates Darius' desire to punish the Athenians (who had given help to the Ionians during their revolt). Learning of the approach of Darius' troops, the Athenians ask for help to the Lacedaemonians:

Justin *Epitome of the* Philippic History *of Pompeius Trogus* 2.9.8-21:

[2.9.8] *Igitvr Athenienses, avdito Darii adventv, avxilivm a Lacedaemoniis, socia tvnc civitate, petivervnt,* **[9]** *qvos [i.e. Lacedaemonios] vbi vidervnt qvadridvi teneri religione, non expectato avxilio, instrvctis decem milibvs civivm et Plataeensibvs avxiliaribvs mille, adversvs sexcenta milia hostivm in campis Marathoniis in proelivm egredivntvr.* **[10]** *Miltiades et dvx belli erat et avctor non expectandi avxilii; qvem tanta fidvcia ceperat vt plvs praesidii in celeritate qvam in sociis dvceret.* **[11]** *Magna igitvr in pvgnam evntibvs animorvm alacritas fvit, adeo vt, cvm mille passvs inter dvas acies essent, citato cvrsv ante iactvm sagittarvm ad hostem venerint. Nec avdaciae eivs eventvs, defvit:* **[12]** *pvgnatvm est enim tanta virtvte, vt hinc viros, inde pecvdes pvtares.* **[13]** *Victi Persae in naves confvgervnt, ex qvibvs mvltae svppressae, mvltae captae svnt.* **[14]** *In eo proelio tanta virtvs singvlorvm fvit, vt, cvivs lavs prima esset, difficile ivdicivm videretvr.* **[15]** *Inter ceteros tamen Themistoclis advlescentis gloria emicvit, in qvo iam tvnc indoles fvtvrae imperatoriae dignitatis apparvit.* **[16]** *Cynegiri qvoqve, militis Atheniensis, gloria magnis scriptorvm lavdibvs celebrata est,* **[17]** *qvi, post proelii innvmeras caedes, cvm fvgientes hostes ad naves egisset, onvstam navem dextra manv tenvit nec privs dimisit qvam manvm amitteret;* **[18]** *tvnc qvoqve ampvtata dextera, navem sinistra conprehendit, qvam et ipsam cvm amisisset, ad postremvm morsv navem detinvit.*	**[2.9.8]** Therefore the Athenians, when they heard of the arrival of Darius, asked for help from the Lacedaemonians, at the time an allied *polis*, **[9]** but when they [the Athenians] found that they [i.e. the Lacedaemonians] were kept at home four days due to a religious cause, not awaiting their help and mustering ten thousand of their citizens and a thousand additional Plataeans, they went out to battle in the plain of Marathon against six hundred thousand of the enemy. **[10]** Miltiades was both their military commander and the person who advised them not to wait for assistance; he was possessed with such confidence, that he thought there was more security in speed than in allies. **[11]** Great, therefore, was their spirit as they proceeded to battle, to such extent that, when there were a thousand paces between the two lines, they ran full speed upon the enemy before their [i.e. the enemies'] arrows were discharged. Nor did the result fall short of their daring; **[12]** there was fought with such *virtus*, that you might have supposed there were men on one side and sheep on the other. **[13]** The Persians, utterly defeated, fled to their ships, of which many were sunk and many taken. **[14]** In this battle, the *virtus* of every individual was such, that it was difficult to determine to whom the highest praise was due. **[15]** Amongst others, however, the quality of Themistocles, then a young man, stood out; in whom already then became apparent the disposition of his future eminence as a commander.

[19] *Tantam in eo virtvtem fvisse, vt non tot caedibvs fatigatvs, non dvabvs manibvs amissis victvs, trvncvs ad postremvm et velvti rabida fera dentibvs dimicaverit.* **[20]** *Dvcenta milia Persae eo proelio sive navfragio amisere.* **[21]** *Cecidit et Hippias, tyrannvs Atheniensis, avctor et concitor eivs belli, diis patriae vltoribvs poenas repetentibvs*.	**[16]** The merit of Cynegirus, too, an Athenian soldier, has met with great commendation by authors, **[17]** who, after innumerable killings in the battle, when he chased the fleeing enemy to their ships, seized a crowded vessel with his right hand and would not let it go till he had lost his hand; **[18]** and even then, when his right hand was cut off, he took hold of the ship with his left, and having lost this hand also, he at last held on to the ship with his teeth. **[19]** So full of *virtus* he was, that, neither weary by killing so many nor vanquished by the loss of two hands, he fought to the last, maimed as he was, with his teeth like a wild beast. **[20]** The Persians lost two-hundred thousand[61] men in the battle or by shipwreck. **[21]** Hippias also, the Athenian tyrant, the promoter and encourager of the war, was killed, since the divine avengers of his country inflicted the penalty of his perfidy.

First of all, it is obvious that in Justin's version the Persian army is led by King Darius. Further, Pompeius Trogus (or, for that matter, Justin) makes clear that the Athenians only set out for Marathon after they had learned that the Spartans would (or could?) only come to help the Athenians after their religious duties had been completed. Once more, Callimachus is absent from the story, Miltiades is extolled, the number of Athenian soldiers is given as 10,000 (1,000 more than others present), here the tale refers to "many ships being sunk, many taken" (though without any quantifications). Furthermore, there is, for me, incertainty regarding the phrase *Plataeensibvs avxiliaribvs*: does it mean that the Plataeans are referred to as mere (more or less enlisted) auxiliaries instead of allies volun-

[61] All MSS read here either *dvcenta milia persae* or *dvcenta milia persarvm*, which in both cases translates as "two-hundred thousand Persians", obviously an absurd number of casualties. Some translators adapted that number and read "two-thousand" (*inter alios* followed by Sekunda 2002, 83) which, in view of on the one hand Herodotus' tally and on the other the number of Persians present according to Justin, seems both exceedingly low and is, moreover, not supported by the MS-evidence. A satisfactory solution is absent, even though – in view of Justin's numbers – 20,000 might, perhaps, qualify.

teering to help (as I tried to translate it above)? Moreover, Themistocles is being praised (and given the same qualification as later in Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* 3.3, sc. that he still was a young man), the feats of Cynegirus (brother of the poet Aeschylus) are recorded in some detail (at the end perhaps to some extent comparable with a remark regarding the Spartans during the Battle of Thermopylae by Herodotus: ἀλεξομένους μαχαίρῃσι, τοῖσι αὐτῶν ἐτύγχανον ἔτι περιεοῦσαι, καὶ χερσὶ καὶ στόμασι ("defending [themselves] with swords, if they still happened to have them, and with hands and teeth": Hdt. 7.225.3) perhaps another Herodotean *topos*).

The number of Persian dead that is referred to by Justin is very different from the number given by Herodotus (who refers to about 6,400 Persian dead: Hdt. 6.117.1: see also below *ad* Aftermath). As usual, the number of Persian soldiers is hugely exaggerated as well (here even to 600,000), and the account is concluded by a moralistic remark regarding Hippias' death: *sic fatvm tyrannorvm*[62]. Noteworthy is that Herodotus as regards Marathon nowhere refers to Persian ships being sunk by the Greeks, like Pompeius Trogus does according to Justin's *epitome*. I find it one of the more striking differences, just like the tally of adversaries killed. It clearly suggests that Pompeius Trogus (or indeed Justin, if he adapted Trogus' account instead of merely epitomised it: cf. the remarks as regards this issue by Yardley/Develin 1994, 5-6 referred to in Stronk 2014-15, 189; also see Stronk 2018 at xxvii-xxviii), probably did not use Herodotus as his prime source, but another one. It could have been Ephorus or another source-author, in that case possibly one of the Atthidographers, a man like Demon. Here, too, however, we are groping in the dark due to insufficient material for comparison. It seems, however, highly unlikely – in view of the scraps we do have – that Theopompus was at the basis of this account, due to Theopompus' problems with bragging Athenians (and this looks like braggadocio in the overdrive). Nevertheless, we cannot be entirely sure. There always remains a possibility – no matter how distant – that a source was understood completely wrongly.

A slightly different picture emerges from the events as related by Isocrates (436-338). In his *Panegyricus,* he starts his story of 'Marathon' by telling how noble a rivalry existed of old between Athenians and Lacedaemonians. These two *poleis* "did not look upon each other as enemies, nor did they court the favour of the foreigners [i.e. the Persians] for the enslavement of the Greeks"[63] (Isoc. *Paneg*. [= **4**]

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[62] Though it closely resembles the content, I absolutely prefer not to render Justin's remark by the motto of the U.S.-state of Virginia ("*sic semper tyrannis*"), due to its (modern and distinct) political connotations. As a matter of fact, also Cicero reports that Hippias had been killed at Marathon: *nefarivs Hippias, Pisistrati filivs, qvi in Marathonia pvgna cecidit, arma contra patriam ferens* ("Pisistratus' son, the detestable Hippias, who was killed during the Battle of Marathon while using his weapons against his homeland": Cic. *Att*. 9.10.3).

[63] Obviously referring to the so-called Peace of Antalcidas a.k.a. 'the King's Peace' of 386, in which Sparta concluded a treaty with the Achaemenid King Artaxerxes II, which formally

85). He then continues to tell that the Athenians first showed their *aretae*[64] when Darius sent his troops. The Athenians set out forthwith, not waiting for allies, πρὸς τοὺς ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καταφρονήσαντας … ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας ("To meet an enemy who looked with contempt upon the whole of Hellas … a few against many tens of thousands": Isoc. **4**.86). The Spartans immediately responded to the emergency in Attica "as if it had been their own country that was being laid waste" (*ibidem*). Isocrates concludes his account as follows:

Isocrates *Panegyricus* 87:

[87] σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ τάχους καὶ τῆς ἀμίλλης· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἡμετέρους προγόνους φασὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πυθέσθαι τε τὴν ἀπόβασιν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ βοηθήσαντας ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῆς χώρας μάχῃ νικήσαντας τρόπαιον στῆσαι τῶν πολεμίων, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τρισὶν ἡμέραις καὶ τοσαύταις νυξὶ διακόσια καὶ χίλια στάδια διελθεῖν στρατοπέδῳ πορευομένους. οὕτω σφόδρ᾽ ἠπείχθησαν οἱ μὲν μετασχεῖν τῶν κινδύνων, οἱ δὲ φθῆναι συμβαλόντες πρὶν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς βοηθήσοντας.	**[87]** A proof of the swiftness and of the rivalry of both: it is recorded that our ancestors [i.e. the Athenians] on one and the same day that they learned of the landing of the foreigners [sc. the Persians] rushed to the defense of the borders of their land, won the battle, and set up a trophy of victory over the enemy, while they [i.e. the Lacedaemonians] in three days and as many nights covered twelve hundred *stadia* in marching order. So much did they both hasten, one [sc. the Lacedaemonians] to share in the dangers, the other [viz. the Athenians] engaging the enemy before their helpers should arrive.

Isocrates' account looks like an epitome of part of Lysias' (458-380) *Funeral Oration*, possibly composed after an Athenian defeat at Corinth in 392, or perhaps somewhat later (cf. Lys. **2**.20-27[65]). Though many elements from Lysias' *Oration* found their way to Isocrates' condensed version (like the erecting of a trophy: Lys. **2**.25), Isocrates' story stands apart by the (positive) role attributed to

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ended the so-called Corinthian War, but in fact the state of war between Sparta and Persia (see also Stronk 1990-91). The Greeks in Ionia were, at least for the time being, left under Persian dominance. Cf. also Pl. *Mx*. 245A-246A.

[64] I left ἀρετή/ἀρετὰι untranslated because the usual translation (very much like its Latin counterpart *virtvs*), "virtue", "valour", in my view does not right to the word's implications in Greek (or, for that matter, Latin): as *LSJ s.v.* indicate, it represents rather "excellence". In most cases, though, "positive qualities" might generally come closest. To avoid any misunderstandings, *aretê*/*aretae* (or *virtvs*) will do, I think.

[65] In my view, the generally accepted date of the *Panegyricus*, viz. *ca.* 380, makes it unlikely that Lysias' *Oration* was published much later than about 390, unless we accept both Lysias and Isocrates independently go back to an unknown common source: I am not sure the latter option is feasible.

the Lacedaemonians during the Persian invasion of 490. I believe that this positive attitude may at least partly be ascribed to Isocrates' major goal, sc. to plea for a united Greece in order to create a force that could stand up against the Achaemenid Empire (as well as, causally, to the changing political relations between Sparta and Athens, even though they absolutely were not outright cordial at the time of the speech, *ca.* 380; cf. also Flower 2000, 65-66). Noteworthy, within the framework of this paper (notably its first part, i.e. Stronk 2016-17), is the total absence of the Persian invasion of Euboea and the sack of Eretria in both Lysias' and Isocrates' version of the events, as well as the absence of Plataea among Athens' allies (even though Isocrates acknowledges that the Athenians "did not wait for their allies", albeit that πρὶν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς βοηθήσοντας appears to solely reflect upon the Lacedaemonians). Finally, it should be stressed that in this account there is no waiting game, no stand-off between the two armies, but that the armies engaged as soon as the Athenians arrived on the plain.

As it seems, Isocrates' version (and, for that matter, Lysias') of events only confirms to some extent that by Herodotus. In fact, however, it serves much more as a prelude to the typical refrain, especially from the latter part of the fifth century BC onward, that 'we – the Athenians – faced the Persians alone at Marathon'. I am not sure whether this refrain was part of Theopompus' annoyance regarding the Athenian attitude as regards 'Marathon'. Though marginally conceding Athens did have allies, indeed (even though in the context of Isocrates here probably only the Lacedaemonians were intended), 'such allies were absent in the hour of our need but we, the Athenians, managed to withstand the foreign hordes by ourselves' (apart from allies obviously omitting *metoeci* and – above all – released slaves). The attitude of Isocrates and Lysias, therewith, distinctly fits a distinct tendency in Athenian policy, emphasising the qualities of members of the Athenian upper class(es), from at least the late fifth century BC onwards (see also below, *sub* Implications). Moreover, it is one of the, quite persistent, lies told by Athenians, possibly hinted at by Theopompus (see above).

In these accounts, it is made clear that the Athenians set out from the city immediately after the Persians had landed, on this issue, perhaps, contradicting Herodotus. As Lysias was a slightly older contemporary of Plato, I find the absence of 'Euboea' and the Plataeans in his version of the events to some extent remarkable, though conceding his (and Isocrates') aims were not to write history, obviously. In fact, the Persian invasion of Euboea and destruction of Eretria followed by the deportation of the Eretrians figure nowhere at all in the works by Lysias transmitted to us neither, for that matter, in those by Isocrates[66]. The latter only refers, summarily, to the Plataean assistence to Athens during the occurrences of 490 in the *Panathenaicus* 93 and the *Plataicus* 57, while it is completely absent

[66] See my remarks above on tendencies in Athens and below, *sub* Implications. Isocrates (**4**.108) merely refers directly to Euboea as being naturally suited to exercise a *thalassocracy*.

in the transmitted works by Lysias. Another striking detail in the version above is the alleged immediate reaction by the Lacedaemonians (apparently no *Carneia* to observe, nor any other detractions!) and that the Spartans marched three days and nights on end to help the Athenians. Looking at all these issues, it seems likely that Herodotus was not among the sources consulted by either orator. Who was, remains elusive, but at least it definitely cannot have been Ephorus. Perhaps – and I state this very hesitantly – it might have been at least inspired by the work of either Aeschylus or Simonides (or a combination of the two) or else by a source unknown to us. The lack of sources is here evident as well.

Anothor *rhetor*, though of much later date, referring to Marathon is (Publius Aelius) Aristides (AD 117-*ca.* 180, born in Northern Mysia but mostly residing in Smyrna). In the *Panathenaic Oration* he states: ... ἥ τ'ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρώτη διαβᾶσαι δύναμις διὰ τῶν νήσων προσέσχεν εἰς Μαραθῶνα, καλῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀχθεῖσα τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τὸ δοῦναι δίκην ὧν ἐπεβούλευσε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ("… The first force to cross from Asia against the Greeks through the islands landed at Marathon, justly attracted by the nature of the location to pay the price for the things it aimed at for the Greeks": Aristid. *Or*. **13**.13 (= i.157-158D[67]). Further on, Aristides mentions the glory of the Athenians and that they made Marathon a symbol of *aretê*, adding ... καὶ συνέβη δὴ τῇ πόλει πρώτῃ μὲν κινδυνεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἤπειρον Ἑλλήνων, μονῃ δὲ ἀρκέσαι νικῆσαι ... ("… It so happened that she [Athens] was the first *polis* throughout mainland Greece to face the danger [sc. of Persian attack], and succeeded to achieve victory unaided, …": Aristid. *Or*. **13**.110 (= i.203D)), again repeating the fact that Athens fought alone in **13**.167 (= i.230D) and **13**.272 (= i.276D). The defeat at Marathon made Darius out of his wits (Aristid. *Or*. **13**.114 (= i.206D)). Darius' son, Xerxes, next told the Athenians to repent for their ἀγνωμοσύνη ("folly", "unkindness") at Marathon and submit to the Persians (Aristid. *Or*. **13**.117 (= i.207D)).

Obviously, the Athenians turned Xerxes' request down and summoned the Greeks to a common contest, not because they were afraid to face the Persians alone, like they did at Marathon, but because all of Greece was threatened (Aristid. *Or*. **13**.126 (= i.211D)). In **13**.131-132 (i.214-215D), Aristides compares the outcome of the Battle of Thermopylae and that of Marathon and concludes that, in spite of the bravery of the defenders at Thermopylae, they were overwhelmed. It leads him to bragging μήτ'ἐν τῇ γῇ φανῆναί τινας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμοίους τῇ πόλει καὶ οἷς ἐκεῖνοι πρότερον κατέπραξαν … ("that on land no

[67] The *Panathenaic Oration* is counted (by Dindorf) as oration 13. The pagination followed by 'D' for Aristides refers to the edition by Dindorf 1829. The lower case Roman numeral refers to the Dindorf-volume, the Arabic numeral to its page number. The Loeb edition (in its renewed version still incomplete) adopts a different order than Dindorf's, though retaining Dindorf's page numbers *in margine*. However, both the *Panathenaic* and the *In Defence* (= *A Reply to Plato*) appear in the Loeb Aristides volume 1, be it in the older edition by C.A. Behr or the new one by M. Trapp.

one of the Greeks appeared equal to the *polis* [= Athens] and to what they formerly accomplished …"). In **13**.256 (= i.272D), without referring to numbers, Aristides tells his audience that the Athenians were vastly outnumbered by their opponents. Finally, he remarks elsewhere (in the '*In Defence of Oratory*', or probably preferably '*A Reply to Plato*') ... ὡς τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐπέδειξαν ὅτι πᾶς πλοῦτος καὶ δύναμις ἀρετῇ ὑπείκει ("… that they made clear to the foreigners that 'all wealth and power yields to *aretê*'"[68]: Arist. **45**.341 (= ii.113D)). Even though Aristides refers quite frequently to the Battle of Marathon, he adduces no news. The remarkable issue he reiterates a few times – like his predecessors did as well – is that Athens fought at Marathon without the support of other Greek *poleis*, thereby obscuring the contribution of Plataea.

We already mentioned that Aeschylus was among those who actually fought at Marathon (as a matter of fact: as it seems he also fought at Salamis (480) and Plataea (479): cf. Ion of Chios, *FGrH*/*BNJ* 392 F 7). It is, if in my view only remotely, even possible that Aeschylus was not the only poet known to us who fought at Marathon (even though I think that Luigia Stella's suggestion that also Simonides was among the combatants is quite dubious and [not an uncommon situation, regrettably] rests upon the interpretation of one source only: cf. Molyneux 1992, 26, 153[69]). Be that as it may, it appears at least undisputed that in Simonides of Ceos' work attention was paid to the occurrences at Marathon (cf., e.g., Molyneux 1992, 148-155), as was the case in Aeschylus'. Both Simonides' and Aeschylus' elegies on 'Marathon' are mentioned in the *Vita Aeschyli* 8[70]. The Athenian rhetor Lycurgus (*ca.* 390-324) remarks in the *In Leocratem*: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρόγονοι τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐνίκησαν, οἳ πρῶτοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐπέβησαν, καὶ καταφανῆ ἐποίησαν τὴν ἀνδρείαν τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ πλήθους περιγιγνομένην ("Our ancestors, in fact, defeated the foreigners (i.e. Persians) who first set foot in Attica, demonstrating clearly the superiority of prowess

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[68] A reference to Pl. *Mx*. 240D: πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπείκει ("any multitude of men or money yields to *aretê*") and Lycurgus (**1**.108; see below).

[69] Stella 1946, 22 (though she gives too little, I think, to substantiate her suggestion) refers to X. *Hier*. 6.7-9, but equally 10.6 or 10.7, be it each apart or in combination, could have been chosen: each of these references, however, in my view has to be stretched to the very extreme to make the suggestion hold any water. Add to this that, though Simonides probably lived at Athens at the time, he was as yet legally an outsider, a *metoecus*, and therefore less likely to have been enlisted (even though it was not impossible, as we have seen above). If the old, high dating for Simonides is accepted, Simonides' participation in 'Marathon' could be even more in doubt: he would have been, by then, about 67 years of age (cf. Molyneux 1992, 24, referring to epigram 77 Diehl = XXVIII Page, making Simonides eighty years in 477/476). In the revised chronology, based upon the *Suda*, Simonides *may* have been born in the 62nd Olympiad, sc. between 532 and 529 – a date Stella (obviously) supports – (cf. Molyneux 1992, 25, 153) and died *ca.* mid-fifth century BC. If that date is accepted, Simonides *could* have been part of the Athenian force at Marathon, at least as regards his age.

[70] That, indeed, an elegy is meant rather than an epigram is argued by Boedeker 1995, 223; on Aeschylus as a historian, see also Harrison 2000, 25-31. In the case described, Aeschylus lost to Simonides. The most recent edition of the *Vita Aeschyli* by an anonymous author was taken care of by Marta Frassoni 2013.

over wealth and *aretê* over numbers": Lyc. **1**.108), in the next paragraph followed by an epigram on 'Marathon', which is ascribed to Simonides: Ἑλλήνων προμαχούντες Ἀθηναίοι Μαραθώνι | χρυσοφόρων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν ("The Athenians, fighting at Marathon in defence of the Greeks | laid low the might of the gold-clad Persians (lit.: Medes)": Simonides XXI Page; see also Molyneux 1992, 150).

As regards the occurrences at Marathon, however, neither Lycurgus nor Simonides (or Aeschylus[71]) add much to our knowledge. This conclusion is also valid for other epigrams that may or may not be ascribed one way or another to either Simonides or epigrams by other authors (cf. Jacoby 1945, 161-185) and somehow connected to 'Marathon'. Though, apart from Simonides' epigrams, "[t]he Persian Wars in the fifth century alone was the subject of lyrics by … Timotheus, epic by Empedocles and Choerilus, tragedy by Phrynichus and Aeschylus, as well as elegies by Simonides and Aeschylus" (Sider 2006, 339)[72], neither of them adds to complete our view on 'Marathon'. A similar conclusion, finally, though emphatically concentrating on Simonides, is reached by Richard Rawles (Edinburgh University; personal communication April 27, 2018). The only possible exception I can think of, in this context, is an epigram in the *Anthologia Palatina* (7.257), in the Loeb edition by Paton ascribed to an anonymous author (though Page *FGE*, 218 ascribes it to "Simonides', xviii'; *LSJ*, 242, *s.v.* ἀρκέω, A.[I.] resolutely ascribes it to Simon. 101). It reads as follows: παῖδες Ἀθηναίων Περσῶν στρατὸν ἐξολέσαντες | ἤρκεσαν ἀργαλέην πατρίδι δουλοσύνην ("The sons of Athens, utterly destroying the army of the Persians, warded off vexetious slavery

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[71] Apart from some sentences by the chorus and a sentence by Atossa in Aeschylus' *Persae* (a work first performed at the *Dionysia* in 472 with as *chorêgos* (producer) Pericles the son of Xanthippus), recalling that the Persians had been defeated at Marathon (A. *Pers*. 475; also see below, *sub* Persian perspective), the clearest reference (in the poet's transmitted works) connecting Aeschylus and 'Marathon' is the poet's epitaph. It reads: Αἰσχύλον Εὐφορίωνος Ἀθηναῖον τόδε κεύθει | μνῆμα καταφθίμενον πυροφόροιο Γέλας· | ἀλκὴν δ'εὐδόκιμον Μαραθώνιον ἄλσος ἄν εἴποι | καὶ βαθυχαιτήεις Μῆδος ἐπιστάμενος ("Aeschylus of Athens, the son of Euphorion, conceals this | tomb, who died in wheatbearing Gela; | his glorious valour the sacred grove of Marathon might well state | and the Persian [lit.: Mede] with thick long hair, who is well aware of it": A. *Fr*. 272; also Ath. 14.627D, who only quotes lines 3 and 4, though giving βαθυχαῖταί κεν Μῆδοι ἐπιστέμενοι (in plural) in stead of the words in singular quoted from the fragments proper. The most remarkable feature of this epitaph is the reference to an ἄλσος, indeed suggesting that at least part of the battle was fought in or near a grove: this most likely was the (olive) grove sacred to Heracles (as it seems (also see below *sub* Archaeology…) probably situated about where the coastline road from Athens entered the plain of Marathon), where the Athenians appear to have pitched camp. Both Athenaeus and Pausanias *Periêgetês* (1.14.5) state that the epitaph was composed by Aeschylus himself.

[72] For Simonidean lyric: *Suda s.v.* Σιμωνίδης (*sigma*,439; 536 *PMG*). For Timotheus' Περσικά, see Hordern 2002; Empedocles' Περσικά is attested by Diogenes Laertius 8.57 (and should not be emended to read Φυσικά: cf. Sider 1982).The fragments of Choerilus Samius' Περσικά (in at least two books) are collected as 316-323 in the *SH* and again in the *PEG*. For Phrynichus' *Phoenissae*, see 3 F 8-12 *TrGF*. Simonides' and Aeschylus' elegies on Marathon are mentioned in the Anon. *V. Aes.* 8 (Aes. T 1 *TGF*). Perhaps we should add to this list an elegy on Thermopylae by Philiadas: see Page 1981, 78-79; see also Sider 2006, 330 note 10, 339 note 43.

from their country"). It is, however, not entirely certain that the epigram bears upon the Battle of Marathon (Salamis, e.g., possibly might equally qualify without too many problems). As such, however, the epigram provides no new information.

Thucydides, too, is of little help. His first reference is that: … μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον καὶ ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένετο ("… A few years after the deposition of the tyrants [sc. by the Lacedaemonians], the Battle of Marathon was fought between the Persians [lit.: Medes] and the Athenians": Th. 1.18.1). Further on, Thucydides refers to a speech by an Athenian embassy to the Lacedaemonians, *ca.* 430. In it, the Athenians remarked: φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ … ("We assert, in fact, that at Marathon we braved the Persian [lit.: foreigner] alone …": Th. 1.73.4)[73]. It is, to say the least, remarkable that here the Plataean assistance is not referred to at all, even though politically understandable in the context of the speech (facing Aeginetan and Corinthian embassies, at the time allies of Sparta, in Sparta), moreover fitting in the widespread tendency in Athens to obliterate the Plataeans' role (cf. Walters 1981; see also below *sub* Implications). In an excursion on the tyranny of the Pisistratids (explaining Athenian legal steps against Alcibiades in 415), Thucydides remarks:

τυραννεύσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἱππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων καὶ παυθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν τῶν φευγόντων, ἐχώρει ὑπόσπονδος ἔς τε Σίγειον καὶ παρ᾽ Αἰαντίδην ἐς Λάμψακον, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ὡς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον, ὅθεν καὶ ὁρμώμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ὕστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ ἤδη γέρων ὢν μετὰ Μήδων ἐστράτευσεν	After Hippias had ruled as a tyrant three years more over the Athenians and had been deposed in the fourth year by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonids [sc. in 510][74], he left the city with a safe conduct to Sigeum [in the Troad] and to Aeantides [Hippias' son-in-law] at Lampsacus, and from there to King Darius, from where he [i.e. Hippias], setting out twenty years after, already being in old age, took the field with the Persians [lit.:Medes] to Marathon": Th. 6.59.4.

[73] Thucydides' statement we find reflected by Xenophon: ἐλθόντων μὲν γὰρ Περσῶν καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτοῖς παμπληθεῖ στόλῳ ὡς ἀφανιούντων τὰς Ἀθήνας, ὑποστῆναι αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσαντες ἐνίκησαν αὐτούς ("For, indeed, when the Persians and their multitudinous expedition came to blot out Athens, these very Athenians, daring to withstand them, won the victory": X. *An*. 3.2.11).

[74] In 510/509, Hippias was ousted by a coalition led by the Spartan King Cleomenes I. See also Hdt. 5.65. Hippias eventually ended up at Sardis, at the court of the satrap Artaphernes, asking the latter to restore him [viz. Hippias] at Athens: Hdt. 5.96. As discussed before, Artaphernes did demand of Athens to accept Hippias as their sovereign, which they refused. At Athens, Cleomenes in the meantime helped install and supported a pro-Spartan tyranny under Isagoras, ousting the Alcmaeonids, notably Cleisthenes. However, in 507 the Athenian *dêmos*, having turned against Cleomenes and Isagoras, restored Cleisthenes.

In sum, Thucydides adds no relevant new information in these paragraphs either.

Some *couleur locale* is added by Pausanias *Periêgetês*, even if it generally does not really add to our understanding of the occurrences at Marathon in 490 either. He writes: Pausanias 1.32.3-5:

[1.32.3] ... ταύτῃ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔσχον οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ μάχῃ τε ἐκρατήθησαν καί τινας ὡς ἀνήγοντο ἀπώλεσαν τῶν νεῶν. ... ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον. **[4]** ... ἐνταῦθα ἀνὰ πᾶσαν νύκτα καὶ ἵππων χρεμετιζόντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν μαχομένων ἔστιν αἰσθέσθαι· καταστῆναι δὲ ἐς ἐναργῆ θέαν ἐπίτηδες μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ συνήνεγκεν, ἀνηκόῳ δὲ ὄντι καὶ ἄλλως συμβὰν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν δαιμόνων ὀργή. … **[5]** συνέβη δὲ ὡς λέγουσιν ἄνδρα ἐν τῇ μάχῃ παρεῖναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν σκευὴν ἄγροικον· οὗτος τῶν βαρβάρων πολλοὺς καταφονεύσας ἀρότρῳ μετὰ τὸ ἔργον ἦν ἀφανής· ἐρομένοις δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἄλλο μὲν ὁ θεὸς ἐς αὐτὸν ἔχρησεν οὐδέν, τιμᾶν δὲ Ἐχετλαῖον ἐκέλευσεν ἥρωα. πεποίηται δὲ καὶ τρόπαιον λίθου λευκοῦ. …	**[1.32.3]** ... It was at this place [viz. Marathon] in Attica that the Persians [lit.: foreigners] landed, were defeated in battle, and lost some of their vessels as they were putting off from the land. ...[75] for slaves were then part of the <Athenian> army for the first time. **[4]** ... [cf. note 74]. You can hear neighing horses and fighting men there all night through. No one who has expressly set himself to behold this vision has ever got any good from it, but there is no anger of the spirits towards such who happen to witness it by ignorance. … **[5]** They say too that there happened to be present in the battle a man of rustic appearance and dress. Having killed many of the Persians [lit.: foreigners] with a plough, he was invisible after the job was done. The god [i.e. Apollo] ordered the Athenians who made enquiries at the oracle [sc. at Delphi] nothing else than to honour *Echetlaeus* [viz. 'He of the Plough-tail'] as a hero. Also, a trophy of white marble has been erected[76]. ...

Pausanias' first noticeable remarks concern his statement (or affirmation) that the Persians only lost some ships and that 'slaves' (liberated, but that part he omits here: cf. though Paus. 7.15.7) formed an integral (though unsubstantiated) part of the Athenian army at Marathon. The ghost-story may look remarkable but is, I believe, not at all out of the ordinary. Throughout the centuries, similar stories in relation with battlefields have been told all over the world (cf., e.g., Kinnee 2018, 25).

[75] For (some of) the sentences I left out here, see further below, *sub* Aftermath.
[76] See below, *sub* Archaeology, Trophy.

The story of *Echetlaeus* might seem a bit more peculiar but, in fact, serves as an elucidation of one of the paintings in the *Stoa Poikilê* Pausanias already described, depicting the hero *Echetlus* (as he is referred to in 1.15.3)[77]. In 1.32.7, Pausanias *Periêgetes* next describes the surroundings, referring to "a lake which for the most part is marshy". He tells that many Persians found themselves snared in the marsh during their flight, if only due to "ignorance of the roads", causing τὸν φόνον τὸν πολὺν ("great losses"; see also Paus. 1.15.3: φεύγοντες εἰσιν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐς τὸ ἕλος ὠθοῦντες ἀλλήλους ("the Persians [lit.: foreigners] are <displayed> as they fled and pushed each other into the marsh"; also see below *sub* Archaeology).

Pausanias next describes that above the lake were stone mangers for the Persian horses and καὶ σημεῖα ἐν πέτραις σκηνῆς ("marks of his [sc. Artaphernes'] tent on the rock"), which seems hard to believe after a period of over six-hundred years. In view of the geography the next statement might be relevant: ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ ποταμὸς ἐκ τῆς λίμνης, τὰ μὲν πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ λίμνῃ βοσκήμασιν ὕδωρ ἐπιτήδειον παρεχόμενος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τὴν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἁλμυρὸς ἤδη γίνεται καὶ ἰχθύων τῶν θαλασσίων πλήρης ("A river flows out of the lake, providing near the lake itself water suitable for cattle, but where it flows into the sea it becomes salt and full of sea-fish").

The marsh referred to by Pausanias here was, in all likelihood, the so-called Schinias or Great Marsh[78], if only because it was situated in the most probable direction the Persians would have fled to from the site of the battle, i.e. in the direction of their ships. Probably these were moored directly west of Cape Marathon and Cynosura Peninsula (not to be confused with Cape Cynosura on the island of Salamis), which – together with Mt Draconera of which it is a promontory – could protect the ships from northerly and easterly winds, the so-called Etesian winds or *Meltemi*, which can blow especially fiercely during summer (cf. Van der Veer 1982, 313; also see above, Fig. 5)[79]. Even though (several) other elements may have favoured a Persian landing at the beach of Marathon, it has been argued that by remaining there the Persians may well have turned the potential advantages into a disadvantage due to the huge problems the terrain offered as well (so, more or less, Hammond 1988, 507; contra: Maurice 1932, see below *sub* Structure). For the causes of the Persian delay – if, indeed, they

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[77] In this respect, Wilson remarks in the introduction to his Herodotus edition: "[o]ne should bear in mind that we cannot be sure that ancient authors were consistent in matters of orthography" (Wilson 2015a, vii).

[78] It seems that the marsh to the south (the Brexisa marsh) was only formed (centuries) after the Battle of Marathon took place and was caused by a change in sea-level (cf. Van der Veer 1982, 306). Also see above, *sub* Geographical features. Pausanias uses the word τὸ ἕλος, a singular, as it seems suggesting there only was one (relevant) marshy area at the time of the battle.

[79] Most modern representations of the situation surrounding the Battle of Marathon position the Persian fleet further south, between the two (?) marshes. Though it is possible that this was the place the Persians first landed, it was not the most favourable position to moor the ships, as they would have been more exposed to the winds in that position.

really did delay there and pitching camp there was not part of their strategy (see below *sub* Structure the view of Maurice) – we can only guess, as none of our sources presents us with any direct suggestion. My second guess would be that the Persians, guided by Hippias, waited at Marathon for some favourable sign out of Athens (from Hippias' partisans, for example; also see, e.g., Holladay 1978; Ruberto 2010). Another option may well have been (in view of Herodotus' remarks of 6.108.1), that the Persian force could not be deployed (properly and/or fully) because of the presence of the combined force of Athenians and Plataeans on the Marathon plain (cf. also Hammond 1988, 507). As it is, however, I increasingly tend to regard Maurice's views for the Persian strategy (see below *sub* The Structure) as a worthwhile *basis* for a reassessment of the occurrences surrounding the Battle of Marathon.

Some amusing stories are told by Aelian (*ca.* AD 170-after 230), *NA* 7.38, involving a soldier and his dog, rendered in a painting of the battle in the *Stoa Poikilê* together with Cynegirus, Epizelus[80], and Callimachus[81], a painting, Aelian adds, made by Mico or Polygnotus of Thasos. Another story is presented by Aelian in the *Varia Historia*. It is a story of Athenian usages in which, finally, also 'Marathon' comes to the fore. It reads as follows:

Aelian *Varia Historia* 4.22:

[4.22] οἱ πάλαι Ἀθηναῖοι ἁλουργῆ μὲν ἠμπείχοντο ἱμάτια, ποικίλους δὲ ἐνέδυνον χιτῶνας· κορύμβους δὲ ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν, χρυσοῦς ἐνείροντες αὐταῖς τέττιγας καὶ κόσμον ἄλλον πρόσθετον περιαπτόμενοι χρυσοῦ προῄεσαν. καὶ ὀκλαδίας αὐτοῖς δίφρους οἱ παῖδες ὑπέφερον, ἵνα μὴ καθίζωσιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἡ τράπεζα ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ λοιπὴ δίαιτα ἁβτροτέρα. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ὄντες τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἐνίκησαν.	**[4.22]** The ancient Athenians wore purple garments, and various-coloured tunics. They likewise tied their hair in knots, fastening it with golden <brooches shaped as> cicadas[82], and adding other ornaments of gold when they went out. Moreover, their servants carried folding chairs, to enable them to sit down whenever it pleased them. It is clear that their diet and other way of living was rather luxurious as well. Though being such men, they were victorious in the Battle of Marathon.

[80] Epizelus, the son of Cyphagoras, was an Athenian soldier who fought at the Battle of Marathon and, for some reason, fell blind there: cf. Hdt. 6.117.2-3. Macan (1895(1), 393 *ad* 117.4) finds Epizelus' blindness (temporary or permanent) not out of the ordinary, referring to Saul's conversion reported in the *Acta Apostolorum* 9:1-9. Tritle (2006, 214-215) explains it as something experienced by modern soldiers as well, a case of 'hysterical blindness'.

[81] In Hellenistic and later Greek the construction οἱ ἀμφὶ usually merely indicates the person himself/herself. In Pausanias' description of the paintings in the *Stoa Poikilê* dedicated to 'Marathon' no reference is made to either the dog or Epizelus.

[82] Aelian here closely resembles Ath. 12.512CD, who adds though: καὶ μόνοι τὴν τῆς

It is, I think, obvious that Aelian's fragments do not really add to our specific knowledge as regards the occurrences surrounding the Battle of Marathon. Nevertheless, for completeness' sake I find they need to be included in this review of ancient accounts on the battle[83]. Conspicuous in the latter story by Aelian is the almost explicit antithesis between luxuriousness on the one hand and *aretê* and/or valour on the other, accentuated by the use of τοιοῦτοι δὲ ("though such men"). For many ancient authors (like – but not at all restricted to –, e.g., Diodorus of Sicily) it was nearly inconceivable that love of luxury (i.e. τρυφή, which constitutes a moral defect) and courage (or rather ἀρετή/*aretê*, obviously a moral asset) could go together: the incongruity of the combination is, in fact, a recurring *topos* in many classical sources (see, e.g., Isoc. **5**.124; see also Stronk 2017, 537-538).

A final author I want, here, to refer to is the Roman author Lucius Ampelius (second, third, or even fourth century AD), who noted in his *Liber memorialis* ("Mnemonic Device"): *Darivs rex, ..., cvm CCLXX milibvs Evropam transivit. Victvs ab Atheniensibvs dvcente Miltiade apvd Marathona recessit* ("King Darius, …, crossed into Europe with 270,000 [men]. Being defeated by the Athenians under command of Miltiades he retreated": Amp. 13.3 [ed. Assman][84]). Remarkably though, only slightly further the same author states that: *Miltiades dvx qvi LXXX*

Ἀσίας ἁπάσης δύναμιν χειρωσάμενοι. καὶ οἱ φρονιμώτατοι δέ, φησίν, καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἔχοντες μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι νομίζουσιν, Σιμωνίδης μὲν οὑτωσὶ λέγων· τίς γὰρ ἀδονᾶς ἄτερ | θνατῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποία τυραννίς; | τᾶσδ' ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζαλωτὸς αἰών ("The only people who overcame the power of all Asia. Even the wisest men, they say, they who enjoy the highest reputation for wisdom, consider pleasure as the greatest good, Simonides speaking thus: 'Indeed, without pleasure, what | life of mortals is desirable or what lordly power? | Without this, not even that of gods is enviable'"). In their account on the Athenians, Aelian and Athenaeus may well have been inspired by a remark by Thucydides (Th. 1.6.3), referring to Athenians wearing golden brooches in the shape of cicadas in their top-knot. Such brooches underlined the Athenians' claim to be autochtonous (cicada larvae emerging from the ground). As it seems, to wear such brooches already was old-fashioned in Athens in the days of Aristophanes (cf. Ar. *Nu*. 984; *Eq*. 1331), but it seems very feasible they still were fashionable in the days of 'Marathon'.

[83] Though relevant as regards belief, I nevertheless left out the references to the god Pan as helper of the Athenians. Though he features as such from at least Herodotus' account (Hdt. 6.105.1-106.1, also see above) onwards, I find that inferring his help as well does not bring us closer to understand the occurrences at Marathon. As a matter of fact: allegedly Pan was not the only divine/supernatural helper of the Greeks. Plu. *Thes*. 35.5 states that: καὶ τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶνι πρὸς Μήδους μαχομένων ἔδοξαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι φάσμα Θησέως ἐν ὅπλοις καθορᾶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους φερόμενον ("Many of those who fought at Marathon against the Persians [lit.: Medes] believed they saw an apparition of Theseus in arms rushing on in front of them against the foreigners [lit.: barbarians]"). Regarding the painting in the *Stoa Poikilê* Pausanias *Periêgêtes* informs us that: ἐνταῦθα καὶ Μαραθὼν γεγραμμένος ἐστὶν ἥρως, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πεδίον ὠνόμασται, καὶ Θησεὺς ἀνιόντι ἐκ γῆς εἰκασμένος Ἀθηνᾷ τε καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ("Here is also a portrait of the hero Marathon, after whom the plain is named, of Theseus represented as rising out of the earth, of Athena, and of Heracles": Paus. 1.15.3).

[84] In her online edition, Marie-Pierre Arnaud-Lindet (who tentatively dates Ampelius to the fourth century reads that the defeat took place: *apvd palvdem Marathonia* ("near the Marathonian morass"). As a matter of fact, the *OLD* dates the author – equally tentatively – to the second century.

milia militvm Persarvm Darii regis praefectis Date et Tisapherne in saltv Marathonio superavit ("Miltiades, the *stratêgos*, who defeated 80,000 of the Persian soldiers of King Darius under command of Datis and Tisaphernes [*sic*!] in the Marathon region": Amp. 15.9). Such extreme variations within a few lines from each other in a work by one and the same author is a rarity and, therefore, worthy of being mentioned (still apart from the obvious mistakes). As it is, though, I believe it is time to focus on some of the other intriguing aspects of the battle, i.e. the structure of the battle first, foremost guided by our primary sources, and the date of the battle next.

The structure of the Battle of Marathon

Though our sources provide us, randomly, with some – and sometimes contradictory – glimpses on the course of events leading up to and during the battle, they tell us almost nothing at all regarding the structure of the battle. Admittedly, they tell us that the Atheno-Plataean force had the two wings at full strength, sc. usually eight men deep, with a less deep centre (perhaps as few as four, as discussed above, like also Giessen 2010, 37 has it, perhaps one or two more at best), but not how some components – notably the former slaves and the *metoeci* – had been deployed (if at all?[85]), nor how the Persian force had been arranged[86]. It seems fair to assume that both the Greek and the Persian line – once deployed –

[85] Just like the Plataeans were generally left out of the story at the earliest (Athenian) convenience, at least from Thucydides onwards – as we have seen above –, it appears that also the contribution of (former) slaves and *metoeci* was obliterated as soon as possible. What remained was the (worked, as Theopompus may have suggested) tale of a heroic stand of the hoplite 'class', which (obviously) compared favourably with the heroism of the Athenian rowers during, e.g., the Battle of Salamis. The parallels with Homer's *Iliad* no doubt will have served to accentuate the role of the privileged citizens. Especially in 6.112.2, Herodotus emphasises the hoplite element of the battle (cf. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 253 *ad* 112.2, final paragraph) – and therewith of the virtue and/or *aretê* of the social class they, and probably Herodotus' sources, (traditionally) belonged to. Equally significant is the lack of attention in Herodotus for the Schinias 'killing-field': the marsh had no Homeric counterpart (cf. Pelling 2013). In 2013 (149), Krentz wrote: "[a]rchaic Greek cavalry was really mounted infantry, men who rode to get into position but dismounted and fought on foot. Archers and other lightly armed men fought in the same ranks. Such armies could not match the Persians. The way forward was shown by Miltiades, who armed all the Athenians at Marathon as hoplites and closed with the Persians before their mounted archers could get into position". Much as I admire Krentz's contributions to our knowledge, I believe he cuts a few corners too many, here. As I stated above, I believe it feasible that the (vast) majority of the Atheno-Plataean army at Marathon was armed as hoplites – they certainly all were infantry, to be sure. However, I believe (though unable to adduce evidence substantiating my hunch) that their lines were interspersed with former slaves and/or *metoeci* (equipped as light armed or archers) – a step into the direction of an integrated army (as we would see it operate – even though it was necessity driven there – in the final stages of Xenophon's *Anabasis*: cf. Stronk 1995, 25).

[86] See also above. Sekunda 2002, 43 (frame: Persian forces) presents some suggestions as well. Obviously Datis, being the commander of the Persian army, was positioned in the centre with his personal guard: traditionally Persian commanders led from the centre: cf., e.g., X. *An*. 1.8.6, 12, 21-23. As regards Persian armour see, e.g., Charles 2012.

had a front of about 1,200 to 1,500 men, which therefore occupied some 1,200 to 1,500 paces, yards or metres (cf. Sekunda 2002, 60 who opts for the higher number -like Giessen 2010, 37-, which is in my view the absolute maximum). If the Persian force amounted to 12,000 men, a front of c. 1,200 men looks more realistic. Hammond 1988, 510, believes both lines were about 1,250 metres long, even though Hammond 1973, 178 reckons the line was 1,600 metres long "or even considerably more". The Greek force adapted its width to the Persian one: hence the variation in the depth of the Greek centre I indicated above.

More important though, in my view, is that our sources do not inform us regarding the starting position of both armies. To come to grips with this problem, researchers have tried to read the starting position from the landmarks left on the plain (most significantly the *Sôros*, but also the location of the Atheno-Plataean camp), whether or not in combination with, e.g., the road they assumed notably the Athenian army had followed en route from the city to the plain. In this context both the location of the sanctuary of Heracles and that of the Athenian trophy play an important role as well. In the discussion on the archaeological evidence we shall pay attention to that aspect, too (also see Sekunda 2002, 58).

Basically, there are two main views on the starting line-up of the armies on the Marathon plain. The first believes in a north-south array of both forces, with the Greek forces with their backs towards the (future location of the) *Sôros*, the Persians with their backs towards the sea (clearly in favour of such a view Hammond 1973, 179 and Keaveney 2011, 31 map 2). Arguments for such an array are/have been: the Greeks had pitched camp in or near the Vrana valley, the *Sôros* was located where the Greek centre had been pushed back (or had been broken) – making it the place where most Greeks had fallen and therefore the most suitable place for the common tumulus, i.e. the *Sôros*, and the Persians had camped near Schinias, as close as possible to where their fleet had been moored. All this (either apart and/or combined) made the north-south array in their view a natural option.

The other view favours/favoured an east-west array, both armies having the end of one wing on the seaside, the Greeks advancing from the south, the Persians from the north. Here, too, the location of the camps played a pivotal role: that of the Greeks was just north of what later would become the Brexisa Marsh (allegedly at or near the location of the sanctuary of Heracles), that of the Persians still at (or near) Schinias (cf. also Sekunda 2002, 51, 60). Personally, I believe the latter array the more feasible one by far for a, perhaps seemingly insignificant, additional reason (the location of the camp being the primary and/or guiding one, though) that I have not yet encountered in literature. In view of later occurrences on the day of the battle as they have been reported by various sources[87], we may assume the

[87] Most sources and, indeed, most discussions on 'Marathon' relate the encounter between the Persian and Atheno-Plataean armies as a single battle. A notable exception is Schreiner 1970,

battle started at an early hour, or at least not extremely late in the day (with regard to the season of the year, the temperature towards noon or later would, moreover, have made fighting much less attractive in view of the soldiers' equipment). Hammond 1973, 211, 225 believes "the battle started very close to dawn, i.e. very close to 5.30 a.m."

In the case of a north-south formation, the Greeks would have had to look straight into the (rising) sun. This could potentially be a major disadvantage as the battle continued, moreover worsened by the fact that helmets, shields, and greaves of the Greeks – as far as present (see below) – would have reflected the rays of the (rising) sun, making the Greeks an easier target to hit. None of our literary sources suggests, in my view, that any of this actually happened: instead they suggest that both sides had a (relatively?) clear view of each other when starting the approach. Moreover, I cannot believe the Greek commanders would have been ready to take the additional risk of becoming blinded by the sun, even less so if the numerical advantage of the Persian force was as considerable as some suggest it was. Instead, I think, they will have tried to offer battle on the most favourable conditions for themselves. In my view, that would have been in a formation in an east-west array. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 239 *ad* 108.1), who – as I do – also locate the sanctuary of Heracles north of the later Brexisa (see also explicitly their map 7; regrettably, though, the insert the Brexisa or Little Marsh in their drawing), acknowledge as well the near impossibility of the Persian line in a north-south array with their backs to the sea if the Greeks had pitched camp at the sanctuary – and assert that at present most prefer an east-west array. Steinhauer (2009, 103) certainly appears to do so.

In such an array, moreover, a Persian attempt to surround the Atheno-Plataean army by an outflanking movement of its right wing would be thwarted by the sea. To prevent such a movement on their left wing an abattis, for example, might (have) serve(d) the Greeks well (cf. Van der Veer 1982, 300; Hammond 1988, 508; Sekunda 2002, 51, however, has doubts as regards this interpretation of Nepos' words). At least, if there would have been any Persian cavalry left, it would – provided such measures would have been taken – have lost part of its primary use, i.e. to harass the Greek hoplites during their advance. As it is, neither the historical nor the archaeological evidence we have can be used to support this theory. In fact, both types of evidence seem to be totally insufficient to support any theory at all on the structure of the battle. What might come closest to support my idea is the remark by Cornelius Nepos: *et arborvm tractv eqvitatvs hostivm impediretvr ne mvltitvdine clavderentvr* ("And prevent through an abattis of trees that the cavalry of the enemy would encircle them by their number": Nep. *Milt*. 5.3). One of the problems to advance this text as evidence is its entire context, another that the

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who believes the Battle of Marathon in reality entailed two battles. Though I find his suggestion at least interesting, I struggle to find any support for it in the classical sources.

interpretation of '*tractvs*' as "abattis" is far from uncontested (cf. above, note 52). Another impediment, in my opinion, is that this idea ultimately depends too much of 'woulds' and 'may be's, in itself not uncommon in this type of studies, occasionally perhaps even necessary, nevertheless unwanted in the end.

In the *Atlas of Ancient Battlefields*, Kromayer and Veith present their audience with a map detailing various views on the deployment of both armies (Kromeyer/Veith 2016, Sheet 1, maps 1 and 2)[88]. Map 1 makes clear that the issue of an east-west or a north-south deployment of the armies has been discussed by several authors, e.g. Delbrück and Macan believing in a north to south array (as also Hammond 1973, 179 and Keaveney 2011, 31 advocate), Duncker [1860, JPS] and Meyer [1901, 328, JPS] in an east to west one, as also Kromeyer (Kromeyer/Veith 2016, 9-10 as well as Sheet 1, map 2) and Steinhauer (2009, 103) do. Yet another view is advocated by Curtius [1879, JPS], but Kromayer makes unmistakably clear that Curtius's view looks to be completely untenable (Kromeyer/Veith 2016, 10). I find the deployment suggested by Kromeyer (slightly adapted by De Sanctis 1925, 118-122) and drawn in his map 2 as well as Steinhauer's, referred to above, the more appealing ones. I do even more so, because they make clear that the *Sôros* also might mark the centre of the Atheno-Plataean line in an east to west array of the armies. An objection I have to these maps (based upon the *Karten von Attika* by Curtius and Kaupert [in fact the relevant maps, 18 and 19, were drawn by (Von?) Eschenburg and Von Twardowsky, see below]: cf. Kromayer/Veith 2016, 9), is that the Brexisa Marsh has been inserted. As I made clear above, based upon the geological *data*, I do not believe it already was existent at the time of the battle of 490. The same objection goes for the reconstruction (presented as alternative C) by Van der Veer (1982, 315-317, 318-321). Even though I believe his reconstruction fits the evidence we have best, drawing the Brexisa Marsh on his map seems to be a mistake. The same remark is valid for the otherwise excellent maps in Sekunda 2002, 42-43, 47 and the discussion of the battle in Hammond (1988, 510, e.g.).

The map by Kromayer/Veith underlines one more aspect, that has received too little attention to this date. So far, we have assumed (and on the basis of the literary evidence we have rightly, I believe) that the Atheno-Plataean army had pitched camp near the sanctuary of Heracles. I believe it had done so on slightly elevated terrain, where the foothills of Mt Agrieliki met the Marathonian plain proper, if only to ensure maximum protection against a Persian surprise attack. In its turn, the Persian army – as it appears – camped – at least in part – as closely as possible near where the ships had been moored, at Schinias. Nevertheless, the *Sôros* (allegedly the place where most Athenians had fallen and were bur-

[88] This edition is an adaptation of their 1926 work *Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte: 120 Karten auf 34 Tafeln; mit begleitendem Text (4. Lieferung, Griechische Abteilung 1): Von Marathon bis Chaeronea*, Leipzig.

ied) is situated much nearer to the probable Greek campsite than to the Persian one. Moreover, notably Herodotus tells us the following: ἐνθαῦτα ὡς ἀπείθησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δρόμῳ ἴεντο ἐς τοὺς βαρβάρους. ἦσαν δὲ στάδιοι οὐκ ἐλάσσονες τὸ μεταίχμιον αὐτῶν ἢ ὀκτώ ("The Athenians were sent forth and charged the Persians at the double. The space between the armies was no less than eight *stadia*": Hdt. 6.112.1). This means that there was a space of about 1.5 km or a mile between both armies when the Athenian advance started, immediately after the σφάγια, the pre-battle sacrifices, had been found in order.

If we, then, look at the maps, we only can reach one conclusion, in my view at least. The Persian army was not unprepared at all for the encounter but had taken the initiative, proceeding already some distance from its campsite, perhaps to entice the Atheno-Plataean army into a battle, perhaps – even – en route for Athens[89]. Like Maurice, Pritchett (1960, 156), and Sekunda (2002, 60), I believe Datis had first deployed his army, possibly on the banks of the River Charadra which may have provided some advantage because of their steepness (the banks may have risen up to eighteen feet/about six metres in places). However – as reported above in note 8 – we cannot be sure as regards the actual course of the Charadra in 490 and the suggestion is, therefore, speculative. The fact that the Greek line stretched to the same length as the Persian one – reported by several testimonies – suggests as well, in my view, that the Greeks reacted on the Persians (cf. also Holoka 1997, 335-336; Tuplin 2010c, 267; Meissner 2010, 277; Sekunda 2002, 54). This is another indication that the initiative originally started from the Persian side, which (therefore) makes remarks on "slow starting Persian cavalry" (e.g., based upon the remark of X. *An*. 3.4.35) for the absence of Persian cavalry in Herodotus' account in my view consequently largely irrelevant. Such a conclusion, however, does not solve the problems we encountered so far, far from it. If anything, it still further adds to our problems to acquire a better understanding of the battle, how precisely things happened and why[90]. Moreover, it adds to my frustration towards Herodotus' biased approach as well as his inattention to actual developments related to this event.

Another frustration pertains to Marinatos's unsubstantiated view (most clearly expressed in Marinatos 1970b, 164-166), stating that: "[n]ow we have possibly the two extremities of the battle: the right 'horn' [i.e. of the Greek line, JPS] near the Soros and the left 'horn' [i.e. of the Greek line, JPS] near the tumulus of the Plataeans [see for this below, *sub* Archaeology, JPS]. Certainly the battle of Marathon must be reconsidered". As Van der Veer (1982, 302) phrases it (rather mildly, in

[89] The suggestion presented by Hammond 1988, 511 of an initial, nightly, stealthy, Greek advance to shorten the distance between both armies, during a time-frame of several nights, I find implausible.

[90] I must admit that, in view of these problems, I feel increasingly sympathetic as regards the ideas as exposed below by Maurice.

my view): "[i]t is a pity that death prevented Marinatos from providing a more detailed argumentation of his thesis. By putting the right wing of the Greek battle line near the Soros he departs so far from usual reconstructions that a more detailed exposition of his view would not have been superfluous". Van der Veer moreover, underpins his view with two arguments (Van der Veer 1982, 303 sub c and sub d) that make Marinatos's theory practically untenable from the start. As it was presented, Marinatos's view deviates not merely from usual reconstructions (which, as we discussed above, already diverge considerably), but, moreover, also from military logic. Be assured that I am well aware that (modern) military logic cannot be counted as an overriding argument, but as yet we should accept the fact that the Greeks (nor the Persians, for that matter) were tactically completely unpractised (a fact made unmistakeably clear by, e.g., Maurice as well).

In my view, the differences in armour and equipment (like bows [especially in use by the Persians] and spears, to name the most significant: cf., e.g., A. *Pers*. 146-148; also see Charles 2012) – which certainly were present – are insufficient to explain the outcome of the battle, even though Hammond (1988, 510) believes the contrary. First of all, there is the matter of the (perhaps overemphasised impact of the) Greeks' hoplite equipment. It consisted primarily of the ὅπλον (*hoplon*; shield), *ca.* 0.90 m in diameter, round and convex and serving first and foremost to protect the soldier, but also used in the "pushing game" against the adversary. The shield, thus, was not merely protection but weapon as well. Other weapons were the δόρυ (*dory*; spear), 2-2.5 m in length, at one end tipped with an iron or bronze spearhead, on the other with an (equally lethal) butt spike; and as secondary weapon the ξίφος (*xiphos*; sword), usually single-handed, with a double-edged leaf-shaped blade, *ca.* 0.50-0.60 m in length (the *xiphos* in the Greek soldier's hand in Fig. 12 is of a somewhat different type). The equipment was completed with a κόρυς or κράνος (helmet); a (λινο)θώρηξ (a protective corslet [optional]); and κνημῖδες (greaves) [optional]. Relatively recently, Krentz (2010b; 2013, 135-136) has forensically investigated the hoplite's panoply and concludes it weighed at most between 14 and 21 kg, sometimes even as little as 9 kg, by all means considerably less than the about 36 kg the panoply has been assumed to weigh so far (cf., e.g., Billows 2010, 76 [60 lbs or more]; Krentz 2013, 135 [referring to the traditional estimate between 50 to 70 lbs, e.g., in Hanson 1989, 56]; Garland 2017, 17 mentions 35 lbs as average, slightly over 13 kg).

In Krentz's view, most concisely expounded in his 2013 contribution, the reduced weight of the panoply (*inter alia* achieved by means of using equally protecting but much less heavy material: several layers of linen, e.g., instead of a sheet of bronze for the *thorax*) would enable a hoplite to run much further – and with more ease – than many believe(d) feasible. The one-mile run preceding the battle has, thus, become less of an improbility, even though it remains – in my view – as yet questionable (see for an elaborate discussion on this issue, e.g., Krentz 2010a, 143-152). The reduced weight of the hoplite's panoply also counts in the following

Fig. 11. Median guards from Susa. Currently: musée du Louvre, Paris. Photo: © Jona Lendering, <http://www.Livius.org>.

phase of the battle, the hand-to-hand fight, starting with the so-called *ôthismos*, "the infamous 'shoving' phase of Greek infantry battle" (Hyland 2011, 267 and his note 7). A reduced weight of the panoply obviously made the hoplite more mobile than previously assumed and less a largely passive participant of a mere 'game' of large-scale pushing with shields (a 'traditional' view e.g. Billows 2010, 79 still adheres to; also see Van der Veer 1982, 299). Simultaneously, we now also have to take into account that (certainly in the following phase of battle – and no doubt occurring at Marathon, the hand-to-hand fight: see Fig. 12) the Greek panoply might have offered somewhat less protection than has been generally presumed. Accepting this premise, we might assume that there was probably less difference in the protection that the Greek armour offered compared to the Persian armour. At least, a difference in protection looks unlikely as a prime explanation for the difference in casualty numbers between Greeks and Persians in this encounter.

Equally important as the matter of the Greek equipment is, thus, that of the Persians. I quote Hyland's observations (Hyland 2011, 272): "Herodotus makes three assertions about the inferiority of Persian to Greek infantry in the battles of 480–479 that are commonly applied to Marathon as well: (1) in close combat, Persian soldiers were helpless due to lack of hoplite shields and armor (9.62-63); (2) Persian spears were too short to match their Greek counterparts (7.211.2); (3) as a result, Persian infantry formations were defensive, relying on a barricade of wicker shields that allowed archers to shoot with impunity unless Greek infantry forced them to fight at close range (9.610-62, 99, 102)". Even though

Billows (2010, 224-225) appears to accept poor protection of Persian infantry as a cause for their defeat, more or less paraphrasing Aristagoras' words referred to earlier[91], Hyland rightly points out that – according to Herodotus' account of 'Marathon', at least – this very infantry (initially) did defeat the hoplites in the Athenian centre (cf. Hdt. 6.113.1; Hyland 2011, 272-273; Keaveney 2011, 32).

Hyland moreover refers to an inscription by Darius at Naqš-i Rustam, on the use of the spear as an essential Persian weapon during the many wars fought to expand the Achaemenid Empire (*DNa* § 4: cf. Kent 1953, 137-138) and to an image of Susa guards, showing guards carrying a spear of about the same length as the Greeks used (cf. Kuhrt 2007, fig. 11.20; also see above Fig. 11). This becomes especially relevant in view of Herodotus' remark that the Greeks at Marathon first faced opponents wearing Median dress (πρῶτοι δὲ ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρέοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους ("They were also the first to endure looking at Median dress and men wearing it": Hdt. 6.112.3)[92]). It could suggest at least that the Greeks' adversaries also may have been equipped as Medes. In its turn, this makes Hyland's observation valid, suggesting that the Persians' equipment may well have been a match for that of the Greeks. For a suggestion regarding the Persian army at Marathon made by Hammond (1988, 510), that "there were also some troops inferior in armament and morale, which were placed on the wings", I can find absolutely no confirmation in the sources I have seen. At least, Hammond acknowledges, though, that the Persians and the Sacae (positioned in the centre) "were the pick of the opposing infantry." As it is, taking into account the importance Darius apparently attached to restoring '*arta*' or proper order (if only shown by dispatching this army at all), I cannot imagine that the Persian army sent out to do so really would have had 'inferior' parts. Though I – obviously – cannot adduce evidence substantiating my view, I therefore believe, contrary to Hammond, that the entire Persian army (or at least an overwhelming majority of it) consisted of picked troops.

Hyland then notices: "Due in part to their misunderstanding of Persian weaponry, both authors [i.e. Billows 2010, 133-34; Krentz 2010a, 156] imagine Persian tactics as passive, based on shooting from behind the wicker shield wall until the enemy broke or closed to hand-to-hand range. This is how Herodotus describes Persian behavior at Plataea and Mycale, but he gives no details on how Da-

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[91] Aristagoras remarked as regards Persian fighting and dress: οὔτε γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἄλκιμοι εἰσί, ὑμεῖς τε τὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἐς τὰ μέγιστα ἀνήκετε ἀρετῆς πέρι, ἥ τε μάχη αὐτῶν [sc. βάρβαρων] ἐστὶ τοιήδε, τόξα καὶ αἰχμὴ βραχέα· ἀναξυρίδας δὲ ἔχοντες ἔρχονται ἐς τὰς μάχας καὶ κυρβασίας ἐπὶ τῇσι κεφαλῇσι ("For they [i.e. the Persians] are not valiant men, while your *aretê* in war is preeminent. As for their manner of fighting, they carry bows and short spears, and they go to battle with trousers on their legs and turbans on their heads": Hdt. 5.49.3).

[92] I find this, to some extent, incomprehensible. According to Charles 2012, 262, referring to Hdt. 1.135.1, Persian soldiers (usually) wore Median dress and this was not the first time Greek (or for that matter Athenian) soldiers faced Persian ones. As it seems, they may have had previous encounters during the Ionian Revolt.

Fig. 12. Greco-Persian duel. Detail of a *kylix* by the Triptolemos Painter, c. 460. Currently housed at the National Museum of Scotland, Edinburgh (inv. no A.1887.213). Image © National Museum of Scotland.

tis' and Artaphernes' infantry fought at Marathon. ... It is not necessary to assume that the Persians awaited the Athenian charge without launching immediate counterattacks, and such an aggressive charge by Persian spearmen may have caused the breakthrough in the Athenian center, even if archery played a supporting role. K{rentz} [2010a, 156] admits that the action in the center suggests that Persian technological inferiority had its limits and that victories over hoplite armies in the Ionian Revolt may have made the Persian infantry confident of its success in such an engagement. Nonetheless, a lingering belief in the weakness of Persian infantry contributes to B{illows}'s and K{rentz}'s unquestioning acceptance of Herodotus' claim (6.117.1) that 6,400 Persians fell at Marathon, in staggering contrast with the 192 Athenian dead (B{illows} p. 227; K{rentz} pp. 171, 224). The slanted casualty ratio, if true, means that the engagement devolved at some point into a one-sided massacre, and even if that slaughter is tied to the partial encirclement and pursuit of the Persian center, its scale supports ideas of basic inequality between Persian soldiers and Greek hoplites. Yet the Persian figure is so much higher than the normal losses in Greek battles that it is reasonable to consider the other option, that Herodotus' numbers are exaggerated" (Hyland 2011, 273-274). I can only concur with Hyland's view on this issue: it will be further discussed below (*sub* Aftermath).

It has become clear, meanwhile – as also Hammond (1973, 227) concedes – that our main source for 'Marathon', Herodotus, "was not writing military history, and that he was not reciting to an audience of scholars who wanted to reconstruct the

battle of Marathon". Guided by this view, Hammond asks too little of Herodotus from my perspective, but Hammond is blaming others – like, e.g., Macan or Delbrück – that they ask too much from a military point of view. Perhaps Hammond is right, though the questions – like Macan's and/or Delbrück's – are justified as well.

I think, therefore, the time has come to pay some more attention to the views of Maurice, which I have already hinted at some times earlier above. A little background may be of service here as well. (Sir) Frederick B. Maurice (1871-1951) was trained at Sandhurst Military College and served, *inter alia*, during the Boer War and the first World War, reaching the rank of major-general. After he had to resign from military service for political reasons (still during the first World War) – he fell out with David Lloyd George, the then prime-minister –, Maurice was appointed Professor of Military Studies at the University of London in 1926, and taught both there and at Trinity College, Cambridge until the end of his life. Though much of his focus was directed at more recent campaigns, conflicts, and wars, he published a paper in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, in 1932, titled 'The Campaign of Marathon' (followed by a brief sequel in 1934, to elucidate some issues). In the 1932 paper, he reassessed the situation up to, during, and immediately following the battle, since – as he stated: "It is a further help to us to remember that Herodotus had no knowledge of the art of war, and therefore usually did not understand reasons for the military movements of which he tells us. Not infrequently he ascribes to military commanders plans and intentions which are clearly wrong, and this he does not, as I believe, dishonestly, but from ignorance. In fact, ..., a knowledge of military strategy was very rare in Greece in the fifth century before Christ. ... ... It is natural, then, that Herodotus should misunderstand or ignore the reasons for the manœuvres of Persian armies" (Maurice 1932, 13-14).

Maurice starts his observations on 'Marathon' with the remark that "if we ascribe to the Persian commanders a considerably higher degree of military experience than Herodotus credits them with, our task is simplified. For the theatre of war in the campaign of Marathon was small in extent and its topographical conditions in the fifth century B.C. can be reconstructed with reasonable accuracy [perhaps a somewhat optimistic view, JPS]. Ground and the conditions of time and space were then, as they are to-day, the dominating factors both in tactics and strategy. I start, then, my reconstruction of the campaign of Marathon with the premises that the Persian military system of that time was highly developed, that the Persian commanders had behind them considerable experience of war [a fact underlined, e.g., by Darius' inscription *DNa*, § 4, referred to above, but also by the expansion of the Achaemenid Persian Empire since the days of Cyrus II the Great, JPS] and would act with reasonable intelligence, and that we should not expect from Herodotus understanding of the reasons for a military manœuvre, which were not obvious" (Maurice 1932, 14).

The first major break with the literary accounts, both ancient and modern, we encounter so far, is that Maurice believes there was no cavalry as a part of the

Persian expeditionary force. He declares that its added value would have been negligible in comparison with the problems it would have caused to embark and disembark cavalry on a beach without proper harbour facilities, still apart from the inordinate amount of space horses would take up on board. Instead, he believes Persian cavalry was an arm the Greeks particularly feared (and had feared), which is why Herodotus had assumed its presence without strict inquiry. As regards this issue, Maurice might, perhaps, be right, but we firmly should bear in mind he contradicts (nearly) all of our primary literary (and probably art-historical, see below) evidence. From a methodological point of view, I find Maurice's stand as regards this issue therefore not at all acceptable. Moreover, it unnecessarily focuses the attention on what ultimately turned out to be a matter of secondary importance, at least in my view as I made clear above.

In total, Maurice assumes, the Persian expeditionary force (the landlubbers, as Hammond 1973, 203 describes them) consisted of two divisions, each consisting of about 12,000 men. This number appears to be much less than the about 70,000 that have been presumed by Hammond (1988, 507), a number that seems overrated at first sight. Obviously, the number Hammond presents for the whole expedition (Hammond 1973, 203, 222), sc. a *minimum* [his emphasis] of 77,000 men (increasing to at least 80,000 men, perhaps as many as 90,000), appears to look too much in that respect as well, even though this also would include all the ships' crews. However, Hammond's estimate for the 'striking force' is 25,000 fighting troops and at least 1,000 horses (Hammond 1973, 222), which comes much closer to Maurice's estimate (which, moreover, seems to suit, to some extent, the amount of space available at Marathon as well). Returning to Maurice's idea of the composition of the Persian army, he believes that one division was commanded by Artaphernes, the other by Datis, who – as the senior commander – was in charge of the whole force, too. Having crossed the Aegean, *inter alia* touching at Naxos and Delos, Maurice believes that the Persians established an advanced base at Carystus in southern Euboea (also in this vein Figueira 2013, 198-199, who, though, does not refer to Maurice; a Persian stay at Carystus is, as already discussed, also testified to by Herodotus; also see Hammond 1973, 222).

From there, Maurice's views diverge from what is reported in our literary sources. As regards that issue, I have no (or at least fewer) objections out of a methodological point of view, if only because the literary sources we have seem to be not really solidly consistent. Maurice suggests that Datis sent Artaphernes with the larger part of the latter's division to Eretria to subdue that *polis*, while Datis himself – with about 16,000 men (cf. also Krentz 2010a, 91-92) – landed at Marathon. "Just as the bay of Karystos was an excellent choice of a site for an advanced base, so the bay and plain of Marathon were excellent choices of positions for a force covering the siege of Eretria. The Kynosoura peninsula provided an anchorage in the northern portion of the bay sheltered from the east winds, ... In the northern portion of the bay there is anchorage space for about

250 triremes close inshore. Datis' ships could there be kept ready for immediate action, if the Athenians were to attempt to move by sea up the channel to Eretria. Similarly, Datis' troops, encamped north of the Charadra brook, would cover the roads leading from the plain towards Chalkis, and be in a position to operate effectively against any attempt from Athens to move by land to the relief of Eretria" (Maurice 1932, 20; also see Maurice 1934, 206). Such advantages of the Persian camp at Marathon were clearly understood – and underlined – by Hammond (1973, 204, 223), even though he apparently does not believe in Maurice's solution, if only because it, apparently, contradicts Herodotus.

As regards "the Athenians, my suggestion is that on receiving the appeal from Eretria they, urged by Miltiades, marched out by the road to Chalkis through Dekeleia, but when near that place they heard of the landing of Datis, and after meeting or getting into touch with the Plataeans, who very probably had received a similar appeal from Eretria, they moved down to the enclosure of Heracles to cover Athens" (Maurice 1932, 21; see also Maurice 1934, 206). More or less deadlocked, Datis waiting for Artaphernes to have completed his task at Eretria (and simultaneously preventing the Athenians to assist Eretria), the Atheno-Plataean force waiting for the Lacedaemonians, both sides kept their positions for up to about eight days. "But when the news of the fall of Eretria reached the Athenians, Miltiades made the only decision which could have saved Athens, for if Datis alone could not be defeated it would be hopeless to attempt anything against Datis and Artaphernes together. Miltiades therefore formed the wise and bold decision to attack Datis before Artaphernes could come up. Such seems to be the only tenable explanation of the delay between the arrival of the Athenians at the enclosure of Heracles and the battle" (Maurice 1932, 21).

As regards these views, I disagree with Maurice's idea in three aspects. The first and most important pertains to the moment of the engagement which – as I explained above – took place, in my view, when Datis ordered his force to break up and head for Athens. The second objection I indicated several times as well: it is the fact that, though Miltiades may well have had a major input as advisor at that time, the command as yet still rested with Callimachus. The third issue I have with Maurice's views is regarding the place where precisely on the plain the encounter took place. His idea is based upon the assumption that the sanctuary of Heracles was situated near the Vrana gorge and that the Persians had deployed between Mt Stavrokoraki and the sea. These objections, though not unimportant *per se* in my view, have had – however – no real impact on the way the battle itself evolved.

As it is, however, Maurice – too – rejects the idea of a Persian army being arrayed with their backs turned to the sea. Next (22-23), Maurice paints a vivid picture of the Persian centre (that part of the Persian army where Datis himself was positioned, probably with his best soldiers) being defeated after initial successes and driven

back, most Persians perishing in the Great Marsh. "After Datis had re-embarked the remnants of his division (and if my estimate of his strength and Herodotus' account of the Persian losses, 6400 (vi. 117), are even approximately correct, the proportion of casualties was, as one would expect, high), he was joined, I suggest, by Artaphernes' victorious force; so, with such a reinforcement, an attempt to anticipate Miltiades at Athens was natural. This failed owing to Miltiades' prompt march back to the city and, finding that the Spartans were approaching to reinforce the Athenians, the Persians sailed away" (Maurice 1932, 24).

Admittedly, our (literary) evidence does contradict (part of) Maurice's suggestions outlined above – or at least appears to do so. The most essential difference is that (in his view) 'Eretria' and 'Marathon' were not – as our literary evidence suggests – sequential but (partly) simultaneous. Maurice is convinced that the stand-off at Marathon between the Atheno-Plataean army and the Persian one took place shortly after the Persian siege of Eretria was about to start or had just started. He also argues that the battle took place – probably – at most some days after Eretria had fallen, but as it appears definitely before the force led by Artaphernes was about to rejoin the main force under Datis. Emphatically contradicting such views as expressed by Maurice, Hammond (1988, 491) maintains that: "[Herodotus'] sequence of events too is likely to be correct: for instance, Eretria falling a few days before the Persians landed at Marathon". Equally, the suggestion, which I support, that the Persians took the initiative at Marathon, could possibly prove to be at odds with Maurice's suggestions. Finally, as already hinted at, Maurice's idea that no Persian cavalry at all was present during the 490-expedition appears to contradict nearly all of the literary evidence we have (and as it seems some pictorial evidence as well), with as most vocal exception a late passage which is rendered in the *Suda* – see above note 41 – and has been said to be spurious (however, as stated before, in my view the presence or absence of Persian cavalry under the circumstances was not very relevant). Nevertheless, to accept (some of) the main line of Maurice's suggestions could solve a significant number of issues that continue to baffle us. From a military point of view, the solutions he offers clearly seem to make sense, especially regarding the Persian option to use the beach of Marathon as a base to prevent Athenian aid from reaching Euboea.

As yet, however, I have second thoughts as well. Let us, though, assume for a moment – for argument's sake – that Maurice is right. The Persian army lands on the southern tip of Euboea and establishes there what appears to be a semi-permanent campsite from where the operations planned by Darius and his commander-in-chief, Datis, can be executed. First, the chief commander of the expedition, Datis, dispatches Artaphernes, with part of the division under his command, to subdue Eretria. Discerning what is about to hit them, the Eretrians ask Athens and Plataea to help them. However, to prevent that very Athenian help reaching Eretria, Datis himself sets out very shortly later (having learned that Artaphernes and his men have landed safely) and lands at Marathon with the

(largest part of the) remainder of the expedition to keep the Athenians in check (possibly leaving a small detachment at Carystus to maintain it as a Persian forward base: we have, though, no evidence to substantiate this).

So far, so good. I can understand this sequence completely and agree to its logics. What I fail to understand, however, is that the Athenian military command, being by now completely aware of the presence in the area of a (sizeable) Persian force, would have set out in full force (whether or not to assist Eretria). As it is described in the literary sources we have to date, the Athenian command did not even leave a decent force in the city itself to defend it in case the Persian landing(s) at (Eretria and) Marathon would turn out to be a red herring (Hammond 1973, 223-224 states, though, that the *Stratêgoi* left a rudimentary force in the city, without suggesting a number). This looks plain and simply like reckless behaviour, from any military point of view. I am, however, fully ready to admit the truth in one of Whatley's observations (the fourth of that series, to be accurate), viz. "[t]hat generals make mistakes and do idiotic and irrational things" (Whatley 1964, 125). This may well have been one such occasion.

A reasonable action for the Athenian *Stratêgoi* in a situation as the one at hand might well have been (in the case of an Eretrian call for help), in my view, that the Athenians would have asked – or ordered – their *klêrouchoi* on Euboea to assist Eretria if need be. As it happens, this was Herodotus' initial story regarding Eretria, but completely discredited by his own account in its sequel (cf. Stronk 2016-17, 162-164, 165). In case the Atheno-Plataean force 'merely' aimed to block and/or counter the Persians at Marathon and had set out for that purpose alone, the situation might have been slightly different and have resulted in a position for the Greek command that comes closer to the one described by Herodotus. Even then, though, more protection for Athens itself would seem to have been advisable[93]. Maurice, however, leaves such options completely out of the equation. Therefore, his assessment that Miltiades' plans (and, for that matter, apparently also those of Callimachus) were the right option for the Athenians becomes, in my view, less self-evident (in a similar vein: Giessen 2010, 35). I must admit, though, that I am not absolutely sure Maurice really believes those plans – from a military point of view – to have been the right ones from the start, in spite of his final praise for Miltiades and even if their outcome ultimately was what was hoped for by the Athenians.

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[93] This seems to have been even more compelling due to the seeming absence of a city wall protecting the city. In spite of the fact that the existence of an archaic wall at Athens has been claimed, not a stone of it has been found (cf. Weir 1995). In fact, between the Mycenaean circuit wall surrounding the Acropolis and Pelargicon and the Themistoclean wall of which the construction started in 479, no construction of a city wall can be shown in the archaeological record: cf. notably Papadopulos 2008. Theocharaki 2011, 73-74, however believes there may well have been an archaic wall, based upon her interpretation of the literary evidence. It might be possible.

As indicated several times above, I am fully prepared to believe (in fact convinced) that Datis at Marathon, after successfully completing his job to prevent an Athenian action in support of Eretria, had reshuffled his force, possibly doing so once he had learned Eretria had been taken (to some extent following Maurice's suggestion). Datis had ordered part of the force he commanded to re-embark (perhaps as many as 4,000 soldiers?) to (re)join Artaphernes' regiment, now on its way to Attica having completed the capture of Eretria (again partly following Maurice's views). In fact, the view expressed here combines elements of Maurice's suggestions, of our literary sources, and some conjectures (as might be expected, if only because not all evidence needed for the full complement is present). While Datis and his men would advance – in my view – to the city over land, Artaphernes and his now reunited full regiment aboard their ships could attack (perhaps first the Greek force at Marathon from behind and next) the (then) largely undefended city from the sea – as Keaveney 2011, 32 seems to imply. Perceiving the danger and – in fact – with no other realistic options left, Callimachus and the *Stratêgoi* immediately joined battle, using to their advantage every element they could. As it was, their gamble paid off with a noteable victory as a result. However, to avoid a defeat in the end, the surviving *Stratêgoi* – probably Miltiades now featuring prominently since Callimachus had been killed in action on the beach – led their men back to the precinct of Heracles at Cynosarges and – as it seems – thereby thwarted a Persian landing at or near Phalerum, simultaneously putting an end to the 490-invasion.

The date of the Battle of Marathon

Another of the issues not addressed (at least not directly, even though his idea of simultaneity of the operations around Eretria and in Attica might give us an idea) in Maurice's suggested reconstruction, concerns the matter of the date of the Battle of Marathon. As we have discussed above, Philippides most likely arrived at Sparta – in the Spartan calendar – on 9 *Carneus* (cf. Hdt. 6.106.3). He was informed there that the Spartans, though gladly willing to assist the Athenians, could not set out before full moon, i.e. most likely 15 *Carneus*[94]. Assuming

[94] As it seems, many Greek *poleis* (including Lacedaemon) started each (lunar) month at new moon, dividing the following twenty-nine (κοῖλοι or 'hollow months') or thirty days (πλήρεις or 'full months') into three periods ('decades'): the first ten days were the 'rising'or 'waxing' period, the following ten days the 'middle' one (centred around full moon, which, therefore, most likely must have been on the fifteenth of the month), and the month was concluded with the 'waning' period, another ten (or, if it so happened, nine) days. The day (in fact the night) of the new moon was originally determined by sighting, after 432 by calculation on the basis of the so-called Metonic cycle (or system), called after the mathematician and astronomer Meto of Athens (lived fifth century BC): cf. Bischoff 1919, 1569. A main problem was that 11¼ days lack in the lunar year as compared with the solar one, another that the observation by sight of the new moon could differ several days per *polis* (see, e.g., Hannah 2005, 48-49). To compensate for the difference between the lunar and the solar year, ideally every three years an intercalation should be inserted to make the calendar follow the seasons. Intercalations, indeed, did take place. When the practice of intercalation precisely started we do

that the Lacedaemonian army left Sparta – early – on 16 *Carneus*, and that both Isocrates and Herodotus (Hdt. 6.120) are right to state that it arrived at Athens after a three days' (and nights'?) march (a great feat by itself!), it only can have arrived sometime on 18 *Carneus* at the soonest in Athens. By all accounts the battle by then already had been fought.

Plato states very specifically οὗτοι δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ τῆς μάχης ἀφίκοντο ("They [i.e. the Spartans] arrived on the day after the battle": Pl. *Mx*. 240C; see also Pl. *Lg*. 3.698E: "they [i.e. the Spartans] arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon") and Herodotus remarks that the Spartans ὕστεροι δὲ ἀπικόμενοι τῆς συμβολῆς ἱμείροντο ὅμως θεήσασθαι τοὺς Μήδους· ἐλθόντες δὲ ἐς τὸν Μαραθῶνα ἐθεήσαντο ("Although having arrived too late for the battle, they wanted to see the Persians as yet; having gone to Marathon they looked at them": Hdt. 6.120). On the other hand, when Philippides returned from Sparta, it seems the Athenian army already had set out (for now, using the Lacedaemonian chronology). Probably at the earliest on 11 *Carneus* the Atheno-Plataean force can have had word that the Spartans were delayed. According to Herodotus, who appears to be our most direct witness here (not necessarily to be equated with our most trustworthy witness!), the Athenians did not attack the Persians immediately, but waited several days, either for favourable omens[95], for a favourable opportunity, or – preferably – both. Assuming our calculations are right and that the Spartans arrived 18 *Carneus* in Athens and that Plato right is as well, telling us that the Spartans arrived the day after the battle, we could – tentatively, obviously – suggest that the Battle of Marathon took place on 17 *Carneus*.

This assumption should, theoretically at least, enable us to transfer the battle into the Gregorian calendar we use, provided that we – for example – are able to reconstruct the chronological system(s) Greek *poleis* used. All Greek *poleis* used a so-called lunisolar calendar: all over Greece the calendars were primarily based upon lunar months (cf. above, note 93). Usually, though, all over Greece months

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not know. Geminus simply ascribes it to 'the ancients' (without specification: Gem. *Calend*. 8.26), notices moreover that (generally?) intercalary years (in Greece) were inserted every other year (*ibidem*), as also Herodotus remarks regarding the situation in Greece (Hdt. 2.4.1).

[95] It seems likely that the Atheno-Plataean force's μάντεις sacrificed the ἱερά on a daily basis (cf. also Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 252 *ad* 112.1). Nevertheless, the practice is largely absent from Herodotus' account, but might be inferred from the practices as described in, e.g., Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Perhaps Miltiades influenced his *mantis*, forestalling Plato's advice (Pl. *La*. 199A) that the general should be master, not servant, of his *mantis*. Notably Xenophon's *Anabasis* underlines in several cases the utmost importance (sensible) commanders attached to favourable omens as well as the apparent risks they ran ignoring unfavourable ones (cf., e.g., X. *An*. 6.4.13-25; cf. also Plu. *Arist*. 17.6, 18.2). Herodotus' remark here is, therefore, very much to the point. That other (ancient) authors neglect this issue could – in my view – to some extent harm the trust we can attach to their testimonies. Another difference to keep in mind is the difference between the daily ἱερά ("*offerings*") and the σφάγια ("pre-battle *sacrifices*"), specifically referred to in Hdt. 6.112.1.

did start on a different day (cf. Aristox. *Harm*. 2.37 (οἷον ὅταν Κορίνθιοι μὲν δεκάτην ἄγωσιν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πέμπτην, ἕτεροι δέ τινες ὀγδόην ("for example, when the Corinthians have the tenth day <of the month>, the Athenians have the fifth, and some others again the eighth"); see also Plu. *Arist*. 19.7). This phenomenon was less caused by different modes of intercalation to make the lunar year agree with the solar one than by the, sometimes quite substantial, difference per *polis* in the first observation of the new moon (cf. Hannah 2005, 48-49). Nevertheless, the differences, though notably present, ultimately were not exceedingly great. A complicating issue, however, is that most *poleis* used their own names to indicate the names of their months. Moreover, to add to the problem, also the year did not start at the same time in all *poleis*. As for Athens, the rule is made clear by Plato: ... πάσας δὴ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὁπόσαι τε κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ὁπόσαι πλείω χρόνον ἄρχουσιν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ νέος ἐνιαυτὸς μετὰ θερινὰς τροπὰς τῷ ἐπιόντι μηνὶ γίγνεσθαι … ("... On the day preceding the commencement of a new year of office, *which commences with the month next after the summer solstice* [my emphasis, JPS] …": Pl. *Lg*. 6.767C). It implies that the new year started in Athens probably somewhere in our month of July with their first month (i.e. the month of *Hecatombaeôn*), which would then extend to somewhere in August.

Amidst all the confusion this mixture can generate, there may be one or two potential footholds. In his *Life of Nicias*, Plutarch somewhere remarks of the Lacedaemonian month of *Carneus* that it runs parallel to the [Athenian] month of *Metageitniôn* (cf. Plu. *Nic*. 28.1; also see Bischoff 1919, 1580), which would roughly correspond to our August/September. Though this seems a promising start, it appears to radically contradict another statement by Plutarch: τοῦτο δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν Πέρσαι μηνὸς Βοηδρομιῶνος ἕκτῃ μὲν ἐν Μαραθῶνι … ἡττήθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ("Again, on the sixth day of *Boedromiôn* the Persians … were defeated by the Greeks": Plu. *Cam*. 19.3[96]). This month of *Boedromiôn* is the **third** month of the Athenian calendar and roughly corresponds with our September/October. As indicated in the abstract of this paper, till the present day, the day the Battle of Marathon is remembered on what was 6 *Boedromiôn* in 490. We may, however, question, based upon Plutarch's observation from the *Life of Nicias*, whether his explicit statement in the *Life of Camillus* and two of his other works

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[96] Plutarch mentions this date also in *Mor*. 861F (= *De Her. Malign.* 26; it leads him there to a contorted version of Herodotus' story) and *Mor*. 349E (= *De Gloria Ath*. 7). Aelian (*VH* 2.25) even appears to suggest (referring to a sacrifice to the goddess [Artemis] *Agrotera* in accordance with a vow by Miltiades: cf. X. *An*. 3.2.12, who merely refers to the goddess Artemis as recipient of the sacrifice) that the battle took place on 6 *Thargeliôn* (somewhere in May/June). This date is plain and simple out of the question, if only because it is completely incompatible with the Spartan calendar. As a matter of fact, on the basis of Blackman 1999-2000, 13-14 we may conclude that the temple of Artemis *Agrotera* was located on the spot where in modern Athens the Ardittou, Koutoula, Kephalou and Thomopoulou streets run. It was a Ionic temple, known from drawings by Stuart and Reyett (1751-1753), that stood – largely undisturbed – until 1778, when *Voevoda* Hatzi Ali Haset had it demolished.

may hold and – as Böckh (1855, 66) rightly remarks – whether Plutarch did not confuse the day of the sacrifice for Artemis *Agrotera* [i.e. "the huntress"] with the actual day of the battle (cf. also Popp 1957, 75-76 and note 1).

August Böckh (1855, 64-73) firmly believes Plutarch was mistaken in assessing 6 *Boedromiôn* as the day of the Athenian victory at Marathon and asserts his audience that the battle took place during the Athenian month of *Metageitniôn*, to be specific on the seventeenth day of that month. Böckh enlisted the help of a friend, the astronomer Johann Franz Encke, to determine the date of the new moon of *Metageitniôn* 490: he concluded this occurred on August 25. Working from there, Böckh calculated the *Carneian* full moon to have been on September 9, the Battle of Marathon (*mirabile dictu!*) consequently corresponding with September 12! Böckh's (admittedly ingenious) reconstruction has found wide appeal and support, which extends to our days (cf. Doenges 1998, 16; Sekunda 2002, 50, who, however, – like Hammond 1968, 40 note 121 or Hammond 1973, 216 note 3 – believes the date of the battle was September 11).

Not everyone is – or was – content with a date for the battle in September, if only because it was believed to be too late in the year for the Persian invasion of Attica (and also because Herodotus remarks that, on their way to Eretria, the Persians landed at Carystus on the island of Euboea and, since its inhabitants refused to comply with Persian demands, τὴν γῆν σφεων ἔκειρον ("ravaged their country by cutting down their crops": Hdt. 6.99.2)). This statement seems to suggest a date about half July at the very latest for that occurrence (by that time harvest generally has been concluded and no more crops can be cut down). In its turn, this could probably suggest a date about the end of July for the Eretrian part of the the Persian expedition[97]. Most prominently Burn argues that the astronomical calculation by Böckh for the Battle of Marathon is ambiguous: "an element of uncertainty is introduced by the fact that there was a new moon practically *at* the summer solstice that year" (Burn 1984, 241 note 10 cont'd). It is an open question whether the phenomenon was observed correctly and whether "the Karneian moon of 490 was that of August 11th …" (*ibidem*). Such questions and calculations (including Böckh's), no matter how inventive, creative, and interesting, moreover, have one major disadvantage: they reckon on the basis of the Athenian calendar (very much exemplified by Hammond 1973, e.g., at 216), not the Spartan, even though the *Carneia* are very much a Spartan festival.

[97] If we take Hesiod's *Works and Days* to the letter, grain was harvested in May and (probably after a period of drying) threshed in July (cf. Hes. *Op*. 383-384, 597-599). According to Dondlinger 1908, 77, the harvest time of grain in this region is in June, allowing some weeks for some special varieties. Obviously, vines and olives take longer to grow and ripen, but to the best of my knowledge they were of secondary importance in southern Euboea. Obviously, these calculations may be in conflict with Maurice's suggestions reported earlier, but the time of the establishment of the (surmised) advanced base at Carystus does not necessarily imply that the attack on Eretria followed immediately after the base had been established and made defensible.

To calculate a date as solidly as possible, we therefore primarily should have to turn to the Spartan calendar instead of the Athenian. The only problem with this solution is that the data for the Spartan calendar are less solid than those for the Athenian one.

A starting point, is to establish when the Spartan new year started. Based upon the work of Friedrich Ginzel (1911, 346) and Ernst Bischoff (1919, 1569, 1578), we may conclude that the Spartan new year began with the new moon after the fall equinox and that *Carneus* was the eleventh Spartan lunar month (Bischoff 1919, 1591). Normally, there would be nine new moons between a fall equinox and the next summer solstice, in that case making the eleventh month after the fall equinox to coincide with the second Athenian month, i.e. the month of *Metageitniôn*. To be clearer: *normally* [my emphasis] the Spartan month of *Carneus* would, therefore, coincide with the Athenian month of *Metageitniôn*, conform to what Plutarch tells us (Plu. *Nic*. 28.1, referred to above). Occasionally, however, not nine but ten new moons can occur between a fall equinox and the next summer solstice, due to the phenomenon popularly known as the blue moon (cf. Olson c.s. 1999, 36). Olson c.s. (2004, 40-41) argue that such a case "did happen in the time period overlapping 491 BC and 490 BC" (Olson c.s. 2004, 40). He reckons that the new moon starting the month of *Carneus* of 490 occurred on July 26 in the Gregorian calendar, the full moon of that month on August 10. Olson c.s. assert that: "[o]ur calculation depends on three assumptions: that the Spartan festival was the Karneia, that the festival fell in the 11th month after the fall equinox, and that no leap month intervened that year. If these assumptions are correct, then the Battle of Marathon must have been fought on August 12, 490 BC" (Olson c.s. 2004, 40; Giessen 2010, 34 believes this date to be feasible, too)[98].

[98] Carl Koppeschaar informed me that between the fall equinox of 491 and that of 490 *possibly* 13 full moons *might* be accounted for, depending on the fact whether the full moon of September 19, 491 was simultaneous with the fall equinox of that year, which is not at all improbable. Astronomically, therefore, Olson c.s. 2004 might find themselves perhaps on thin ice; historically, however, accepting the start of the month of *Carneus* on July 26, 490 seems at least feasible, perhaps (but technically I am not entirely sure on that point) even without the construction of a 'blue moon'. Counting back from the full moons, new moons after the fall equinox of 491 occurred for Sparta (in Gregorian-calendar dates) on: Oct. 4, 491 [1]; Nov. 2, 491 [2]; Dec. 2, 491 [3]; Jan. 1, 490 [4]; Jan. 31, 490 [5]; Mar 2, 490 [6]; Apr. 1, 490 [7]; Apr. 30, 490 [8]; May 31, 490 [9]; Jun. 28, 490 [10]; Jul. 26, 490 [11]; Aug. 25, 490 [12]; fall equinox 490; Sept. 24, 490 [1] (dates for the full moons: personal communication Carl Koppeschaar, July 31, 2017). In this *particular* [my emphasis] case the eleventh Spartan month would, therefore, have corresponded with the first Athenian month of that year. As our oldest sources only (indirectly) refer to a Spartan festival, it does not need to surprise that later sources applied the normal concordance of the months to calculate (and establish for later generations) the day of the battle for an Athenian date.

Though I must immediately concede that I am neither qualified nor able to assess the astronomical details involved in the reconstruction proposed by Olson c.s.[99] and have to rely on the expertise of others in that field, I must confess as well that I find a date for the battle in the first half of August more appealing than a date in the first half of September. Let us assume that the Persian force – or at least that part of the Persian force charged to keep the Athenians in check – left for Attica fairly soon after their job at Carystus on Euboea had been concluded and pretty much simultaneous with Artaphernes' departure for Eretria (accepting Maurice's suggestion as our starting point). If one does so, one is, by accepting a date for the Battle of Marathon somewhere about the middle of August, "the less puzzled by the question how the Persians had managed to spend so much time in reaching Euboia" (Burn 1984, 241 note 10 cont'd). The argument, moreover, gains in strength if we take into account the reported Persian destruction of the crops at Carystus (100-odd km south of Eretria), i.e. probably at the latest about mid-July. As it is, in an 'Additional note', fittingly titled 'The Marathon Moon', Burn already advocated as date for the battle the day corresponding with August 12, a day after the *Carneian* full moon that he took to have been visible during the twenty-four-hour period we refer to as August 11 (Burn 1984, 257). Moreover, using the available data for the Spartan calendar and the available lunar data (as above in note 97), I believe it is clear that the month of *Carneus* in 490 started in this exceptional case on the 26th of July. I am, therefore, much less hesitant to uphold the day corresponding with August 12, 490 as the date for the Battle of Marathon, even more so because to extend the Persian campaign to mid-September would bring it dangerously close to the end of the end of the sailing-season with all its risks of high winds[100]. I firmly believe both Datis and his Ionian and/or Phoenician seamen were far too experienced to take such a huge risk.

Obviously, this does not correspond at all with the date of 6 *Boedromiôn* 490 as the date to remember when Athens' victory at Marathon took place, as propagated by Plutarch and the many following his lead. Nevertheless, the solution looks simple and straightforward and can also be found in Hammond's contributions (1988, 507;

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[99] To be clear: as regards the cause of their calculation, the alleged run to Athens by 'Pheidippides' (as they refer to the errand-runner) after the battle (and their argument not to organise a so-called marathon-run in August: I find there may well be more pressing arguments against such a run in unfavourable conditions than a feeble and unproven historical one), I believe – as I stated earlier in this paper – that there is no (near-)contemporary source to confirm that such a run ever took place in 490 (not even Herodotus, who usually excels in such stories) and that the suggested deadly run by an errand-runner directly after the battle therefore might well have been a later invention. Steinhauer 2009, 113 also believes the story to be fictitious.

[100] During Fall, the *Meltemia* disappear, caused by the decrease of the summer's high Balkan barometric pressures. The resulting winds, generally still from northerly directions, are not cold winds, but they may blow continuously for 3 to 4 days in a sunny sky, reaching an intensity of force 6 and in some cases 7 to 8 on the Beaufort scale. Source: <http://boatgreece.com/destinations/winds-in-greece>. As noted above, the revised date likely also implies that the Athenian officials had only just taken their offices when the Persians landed at Marathon.

also see Hammond 1973, 217, 227), though not precisely in the way he envisaged. He explicitly refers to a "festival … in honour of Athens' war deities, Artemis Agrotera and Apollo" (Hammond 1988, 507). At this festival, he continues, "on the sixth day of the lunar month Boedromion (*c*. 8 September, 490 B.C.) the Assembly made a vow to sacrifice one goat for each Persian that was killed …" (Hammond 1988, 507). However, as argued above, by 6 *Boedromiôn* 490 the battle already had taken place, contrary to what Hammond so firmly believes, and the promise to offer goats – be it 300, 500, or whatever number – to the goddess already had been pledged. That day, though, was the first appropriate day to fulfil that promise. Finally, as Jung (2006, 55) observes, this sacrifice was "eines der ganz wenigen Opfer, das vom Archon Polemarchos dargebracht wurde", referring to Arist. *Ath*. 58.1 and Poll. 8.91 as well as the link with the person of Callimachus. The practice possibly lasted till Plutarch's days, causing him to link 6 *Boedromiôn* to the Battle of Marathon in perpetuity, even if for the wrong cause (cf. Plu. *Cam*. 19.3). Essentially, the solution I present here is the very solution presented before by Böckh (see Böckh 1855, 66; cf. also Popp 1957, 75-76 and note 1; Jung 2006, 55). More important than this correlation, in my view, is that now the Athenian calendar and its festivals do no longer interfere, as regards 'Marathon' with the Spartan one, its festivals, and – even more to the point – its consequences for our use of the literary material we have – and have to trust as much as possible. Though Plutarch loves to correct Herodotus, Herodotus' words, nevertheless, appear to reflect the date of the battle best and Plutarch clearly appears to stand corrected, at least regarding this issue.

c. the aftermath

As already indicated above, Herodotus (who is the prime testimony for this section as well) reports that the Persians, having been beaten at Marathon, sailed past Cape Sunium and headed for Phalerum, the Athenians' arsenal at that time (see above, Fig. 4). Doenges (1998, 16) believes that Datis, though knowing he now was unable to master the city, as yet wanted to survey the Bay of Phalerum and the defences of the city with the intent of reporting back to Darius. Meanwhile there were, according to Herodotus, problems in the city (ἄστυ) of Athens itself: αἰτίην δὲ ἔσχε ἐν Ἀθηναίοισι ἐξ Ἀλκμεωνιδέων μηχανῆς αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἐπινοηθῆναι· τούτους γὰρ συνθεμένους τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι ἀναδέξαι ἀσπίδα ἐοῦσι ἤδη ἐν τῇσι νηυσί ("There was an accusation at Athens that they [sc. the Persians] devised this by a plan of the Alcmaeonids. These were said to have arranged to hold up a shield as a signal for the Persians who were in their ships": Hdt. 6.115)[101].

[101] The so-called shield-incident is a question full of contradictions and uncertainties, like who flashed the signal, when was it flashed, and from where. As Herodotus' text itself is largely inconclusive as to these matters and the incident is not recorded by other classical authors (apart from Plutarch reacting on Herodotus' words), it needs not surprise that the incident has sparked a vivid discussion, as, e.g., Macan 1895(1), 372 *ad* 115(7); Macan 1895(2), 164-167 (= Appendix X, § 8); Hudson 1937; Hodge/Losada 1970; Hodge 2001 and many others demonstrate, so far, however, without reaching a distinct conclusion. I shall not venture to add to their insights.

Hammond (1988, 512; 1973, 210-211, 226) believes the so-called shield incident (as he assumes, a signal given with a signalling disk) took place about 9 a.m. By that time, therefore, the battle already must have ended, at least in his view. Herodotus (Hdt. 6.116) mentions that, after the battle, the Athenian force (whether he omitted the Plataeans or that the Plataeans (had) returned to their own *polis* is left in the dark) marched ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον τάχιστα ("as fast as their feet could carry them": Hdt. 6.116) from the precinct of Heracles in the Marathon plain to that of Cynosarges[102], where they pitched camp (cf. also Fron. *Str*. 2.9.8 [not 2.2.9 as Hammond 1973, 209, has it!]). The location of the campsite might suggest that the returning army took the coastal road road on their way back as well[103], being the easiest (and therefore fastest) route between Marathon and the city of Athens. They reached the city before the Persians arrived there. Hammond (1973, 210) believes the march "started about 9 a.m. or 10 a.m." and, according to him, it may have taken 8 or 9 hours to reach Cynosarges from Schinias by the inland route, possibly faster via the coastal road. The Persians stayed on board of their ships and shortly after returned to Asia (Hdt. 6.116).

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[102] Cynosarges was a public gymnasium located just outside the walls of Athens on the southern bank of the River Ilissos, which empties in the Bay of Phalerum. Its location was found in the southern suburbs of modern Athens at the junction of Kokkini and Perraivou Sts. and again at the junction of Diamantopoulou and Kallirhoe Sts., at the latter of which part of the *aule* was identified: Catling 1977-1978, 7. The shrine there became a famous sanctuary of Heracles, but it was also associated with Heracles' mother Alcmene, his wife Hebe, and his helper Iolaus (see Paus. 1.19.3). Cf. also Woodford 1971, 215-216; Wycherley 1978, 229. As regards the location of the Athenian arsenal at Phalerum and to avert the threat of a Persian attack from the sea, the sanctuary of Heracles at Cynosarges was situated quite ideally.

[103] Doenges 1998, 7 believes (like Hammond 1968, 37 note 107; equally 1973, 205) that on their way to Marathon the Athenians had opted for the shorter, more difficult, northerly route, stating that it may not have significantly slowed down hoplites in good physical condition. I am not convinced by this argument: as Berthold 1976, 84-85 demonstrates, physical condition is not the problem, numbers is, though. The coastal road is, in spite of its problems, the only feasible option for a *speedy* march of the *entire* (my emphases) army: see also Sekunda 2002, 41; Keaveney 2011, 29. The version of Clemens Alexandrinus (focused on the march to Marathon) appears to be more romantic than realistic: Μιλτιάδης ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς ὁ τῇ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχῃ νικήσας τοὺς Πέρσας ἐμιμήσατο τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ἤγαγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νύκτωρ δι' ἀνοδίας βαδίσας καὶ πλανήσας τοὺς τηροῦντας αὐτὸν τῶν βαρβάρων ("Miltiades, the Athenian *stratêgos*, who defeated the Persians in the battle of Marathon, imitated it in the following fashion. Marching over a trackless desert, he led on the Athenians by night, and eluded those of the Persians that were set to watch him": Clem.Al. *Strom*. 1.24.162.2). I am also not convinced by Doenges's arguments as regards the advantages for the Greeks of the northerly position (at the exit of the Vrana Valley; equally Hammond 1973, 205) on the edge of the plain: whether one enemy wing is vulnerable or another in essence does not make a huge difference. Nevertheless, though for different reasons, both Berthold and Doenges believe the Greek camp was in or near the exit of the Vrana Valley. I disagree, because the archaeological evidence – as far as available – suggests as the location of the Marathon shrine of Heracles a site about a km due SSW of the *Sôros* (see above, *sub* Geography). Hammond 1973, 209 appears to believe the Athenians also took the inland road back to Athens.

Herodotus continues with the tally of the casualties: 6,400 Persians, 192 Athenians (Hdt. 6.117.1). The number of Plataeans fallen is absent, both in the established text and in all MSS. Assuming the percentage of Plataeans killed to have been roughly identical with that of the Athenians, i.e. slightly over 2% (taking the Athenian force to have numbered about 9,000), the number of Plataeans fallen may well have been about 20-22 at the most. Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 259 *ad* 117) acknowledge that the Persian casualty level was very high, or – as Garland (2017, 17) has it – "certainly … a rout". Though admitting that the size of the Persian force is uncertain, Hornblower/Pelling refer to the usual percentage of losses in (hoplite) battles as presented by Krentz (1985, 18), viz. 10-20% and rarely exceeding the latter percentage. Accepting, as they do, that the Persian force did not exceed 30,000 men[104], they conclude that "the slaughter in the marsh made this a very atypical hoplite battle" (Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 259).

Nevertheless, Hyland (2011, 275) questions: "… whether the killing of 6,400 Persians was beyond the capabilities of a hoplite army in such circumstances, when neither Thucydides nor Xenophon's *Hellenika* ever reports death tolls above 1,100 in accounts of fifth- and fourth-century Greek battles, even disasters such as Delion and Leuktra". Regrettably, Hyland provides no definite answer to his question. Avery (1972) tries to review the number of Persian dead as well. In his view, the number as presented by Herodotus underlines a "mystical significance of the number three in Greek religion". In view of the connection he sees between the number of notably Athenian and Persian dead, Avery concludes that "it should cast some doubt on the historicity of the number of Persian dead" that Herodotus presents, even though "[c]ommentators and historians have tended to accept the figure given by Herodotus".

Herodotus' account refers nowhere to the burial of either group (if at least the Persians received any (proper) burial at all: see below *sub* Archaeology *ad* Schinias). It does, though, refer to Datis and Artaphernes. They returned to Asia (Datis through a byway to Delos, to return a statue of Apollo, which had been taken from Euboean Delium: Hdt. 6.118) and delivered the captured Eretrians to King Darius (Hdt. 6.119.1). Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian army, consisting of 2,000 men, arrived at Athens: … ὕστεροι δὲ ἀπικόμενοι τῆς συμβολῆς ἱμείροντο ὅμως θεήσασθαι τοὺς Μήδους· ἐλθόντες δὲ ἐς τὸν Μαραθῶνα ἐθεήσαντο. μετὰ δὲ αἰνέοντες Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν ἀπαλλάσσοντο ὀπίσω ("… Although they had come too late for the battle, they desired as yet to see the Persians [lit.: Medes]. Having gone, therefore, to Marathon, they did see them. Then they departed again, praising the Athenians and their achievement": Hdt. 6.120).

[104] Maurice 1932, 20 even asserts that the Marathon plain could – at best – have accomodated only 16,000 Persian combatants.

Though Herodotus *expressis verbis*, as indicated above (see note 100), acknowledges that some sign (to the Persians?) was given by means of a shield (… ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἀσπίς, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας, οὐκ ἔχω προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τούτων ("... Indeed, a shield was held up: that cannot be denied; indeed, it happened; however, as regards the one it was who raised it, I can tell no more of these matters": Hdt. 6.124.2; also see above, note 100), he goes to great length to indicate that, in his view, it cannot have been given, nor ordered, by one of the Alcmaeonids (Hdt. 6.121-126; also see Holladay 1978; Ruberto 2010). In the course of his defence of the Alcmaeonids, Herodotus remarks, among other matters: οὕτω οὐδὲ λόγος αἱρέει ἀναδεχθῆναι ἔκ γε ἂν τούτων ἀσπίδα ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ … ("Therefore, plain reason cannot understand that one of them [sc. the Alcmaeonids] could have held up the shield for any such cause [i.e. to deliver Athens to the Persians]. …": Hdt. 6.124.2). Even fully admitting that the Alcmaeonids in all likelihood probably had much less reason to facilitate Persian action against Athens than, e.g., the Pisistratids (even though How/Wells 1928(2), 359-360 suggest otherwise), Herodotus' argument is not phrased very convincingly (nor one that might have been expected of the *Pater historiae*: for the phrase see Cic. *Leg*. 1.5). It rather looks like an argument born out of gratitude towards a family he had befriended during his stay at Athens. With his comment on this affair Herodotus appears to cross the line between a reporter and a partisan. As it is, Doenges's (1998, 15) suggestion that the story, that a signal had been given and that the Alcmaeonids were blamed for it, sprouted from political propaganda of the mid-480s and was not current until after the ostracism of Megacles, the son of Hippocrates, in 486 might well hold true, even though he can adduce no evidence to support his suggestion. For a discussion on this incident also see, e.g., Sekunda (2002,73-76).

A different number of Persian casualties than reported by Herodotus is (as already stated earlier) presented by Justin (or Pompeius Trogus). He tells us, at least according to the extant MSS, that 200,000 odd Persian casualties (including Hippias) were accounted for, both on land and at sea (Just. 2.9.20). It really is a significant difference, moreover one that cannot be explained (nor is explained) by their respective accounts of the battle. Moreover, it would have amounted to a loss of one third of the entire Persian force, if one would accept its (inconceivable under the circumstances, in my view) size as given by Justin (or Pompeius Trogus). Macan in my view therefore rightly refers to the number of dead in Justin's epitome as a "patent exaggeration" (Macan 1895(2), 205). The loss of one third of the Persian force (regardless of its size) indeed could appear higher than realistic, even accounting for 'special conditions', i.e. the presence of a marsh.

Perhaps such 'special conditions', in combination with an exaggerated 'estimation' of the Persian force, is why Plutarch shows himself slighted by the 'low' number of Persian dead related by Herodotus: ἀπαγγείλας δὲ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι

μάχην ὁ Ἡρόδοτος[105], ὡς μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι λέγουσι, καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ καθεῖλε τοὔργον ("At the end of his story on the Battle of Marathon, Herodotus detracts from the credit of it by the number he gives of the killed [sc. of the Persians], as most say": Plu. *Mor*. 862B (= *De Her. Malign*. 26)), followed by the story we encounter in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (below). However, as we already discussed, also Hornblower/Pelling (2017, 259 *ad* 117) acknowledge that Herodotus' casualty number of 6,400 is very high in view of the generally accepted (maximal) size of the Persian army (cf. also Hyland 2011, 274-275). In view of such numbers, too, the Persian death toll at Marathon could increase to 25%, 33⅓%, or even still higher. On the other hand: the goat-sacrifices – referred to below – could suggest there may have been some element of truth in the number presented. Moreover, 'Marathon' was not a typical hoplite battle but a battle between non-equivalent sides (as Krentz 1985, 19 concedes), fighting with different tactics, culminating in the flight into a marsh by one of the sides, i.e. the Persians. It stands to reason that in such cases standard calculations do not *need* to be applicable. However, in view of the probable size of the Persian army as discussed before, the number of Persian dead mentioned by Herodotus appears to me, in hindsight, to be the absolute maximum and probably even to some extent exaggerated.

Apparently, Plutarch clearly would have preferred the number of Persian dead as presented by Justin (at least according to the MSS) to that given by Herodotus. Another suggestion that Herodotus' body-count could well have been too low *might* be read in Xenophon. In the *Anabasis* he tells regarding the Battle of Marathon: καὶ εὐξάμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὁπόσους κατακάνοιεν τῶν πολεμίων τοσαύτας χιμαίρας καταθύσειν τῇ θεῷ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἶχον ἱκανὰς εὑρεῖν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν πεντακοσίας θύειν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν ἀποθύουσιν ("And having vowed to Artemis to sacrifice so many goats to the goddess as they would kill men of the enemy, they decided to offer five hundred every year, since they could not find sufficient [victims], and to this very day they are paying this sacrifice": X. *An*. 3.2.12, repeated in Plu. *Mor*. 862B. Ael. *VH* 2.25 mentions a number of 300 goats that were offered yearly to *Agrotera*, "following a vow by Miltiades"[106]). Taken to the letter, however, Xenophon can (and in my opinion probably should) be read as putting a limit to the number of victims the city could afford in rea-

[105] Though no lacuna is recorded in the MSS, it is apparent that some words are missing. In the Loeb edition of Plutarch's *De Herodoti Malignitate*, Pearson and Sandbach suggest to insert the words ἀναριθμήτων βαρβάρων φονευθέντων, which have found their way into my translation.

[106] Sekunda 2002, 37 rightly rejects the suggestion that this was Miltiades' vow. Being the *polemarch* (and at the time of 'Marathon' the position and role of the *polemarch* still being what it had been), the only one with the authority to make such vows on behalf of the *polis* was Callimachus, the acting *polemarch*. In this vein also Schol. Ar. *Eq*. 660. Hammond 1988, 507 has it (as discussud *sub* The Date) that the sacrifice was decided to by the Assembly. He may have been mistaken. Jung 2006, 56-57 believes the sacrifice amounted to 500 goats yearly and that this number involves the totality of the Athenian *polis* in various respects.

son (in perpetuity) and should not be used to counter Herodotus' count of killed Persians by any suggestion the tally has/had not yet been met (suggesting such a thing would mean that, at the time of Xenophon's remark, the number of Persians killed would have exceeded 45,000: no doubt a number to Plutarch's liking but utterly unrealistic in many respects, in my view). Understood as the promise of a fixed yearly amount, Xenophon's statement is, therefore, no measure to determine the number of Persian casualities, apart from the fact that they obviously were very many. Hyland therefore rightly states that: "[t]he sacrifices associated with the Artemis vow, therefore, seem to have relied on grandiose exaggeration of enemy losses" (Hyland 2011, 274), which is why Hyland does not accept this sacrifice as proof for the number of deceased Persians.

Nevertheless, the impression of great Persian losses is reinvigorated by a phrase, apparently from Simonides, quoted by Aelius Aristides, in Dindorf's edition (ii.511: Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι, | ἔκτειναν Μήδων ἐννέα μυριάδας ("fighting for the sake of the Greeks at Marathon, the Athenians | killed 90,000 of the Persians (lit.: of the Medes)": Aristid. *Or*. **49**.380). The number looks like a huge poetical exaggeration as well, perhaps rather chosen because of metric purposes than for accuracy, but may at the same time serve as an indication that the number of Persian dead could have been, indeed, very considerable (and have influenced Plutarch's attitude towards Herodotus' count, obviously). As already referred to above, Cicero mentions also Hippias among the Persian dead (Cic. *Att*. 9.10.3). Elsewhere, he reports that Miltiades had been wounded in the battle, too[107]. The fact that Hippias' death is referred to by both Cicero and Pompeius Trogus (or rather Justin), might suggest (as Macan phrases it) that "we are in the presence of an elder tradition or inference" (Macan 1895(2), 204). If so, one may rightly question, as *inter alios* Macan does (*ibidem*), why neither Herodotus nor, for that matter, Thucydides refers to Hippias' demise. Within the entire context of the occurrences, Hippias' death is (or: would have been) no insignificant matter at all. It could suggest that the idea that Hippias had been among the 'Persian' dead (or that Miltiades was wounded) was only conceived later, at least after Thucydides' death.

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[107] *Miltiadem, victorem domitoremqve Persarvm, nondvm sanatis volneribvs iis, qvae corpore adverso in clarissima victoria accepisset, vitam ex hostivm telis servatam in civivm vinclis profvdisse* "[We are told] that Miltiades, the victor and exterminator of the Persians, not yet recovered from the wounds which he had received during his celebrated victory, only preserved his life from the weapons of his enemies to be thrown in bonds by the [Athenian] citizens": Cic. *Rep*. 1.5). We may wonder whether Cicero reports the actual situation or confounds Miltiades' wounds from the Paros expedition with wounds (allegedly?) sustained at Marathon. As regards the death of Hippias, the *Suda s.v.* Hippias (*iota*,544), reports that, after the Persian defeat at Marathon, Hippias died "a painful death" on the island of Lêmnos (remarkable, if true: after Miltiades' taking the island for Athens, our sources do not refer to it having been taken by any one other power than the Macedonians after 348). Garland 2017, 17 merely reports that Hippias "died on the voyage back" (viz. from Athens back to where the 'Persian' fleet was headed to).

Though Pausanias *Periêgetês* mentions no number of casualties in his description of the plain of Marathon (he does so elsewhere, see note 110), he provides us with some information on the aftermath of the battle.

Pausanias 1.32.3-5:

[1.32.3] ... τάφος δὲ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ Ἀθηναίων ἐστίν, ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ στῆλαι τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀποθανόντων κατὰ φυλὰς ἑκάστων ἔχουσαι, καὶ ἕτερος Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ δούλοις· ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον. **[4]** καὶ ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἰδίᾳ μνῆμα Μιλτιάδου τοῦ Κίμωνος, συμβάσης ὕστερόν οἱ τῆς τελευτῆς Πάρου τε ἁμαρτόντι καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἐς κρίσιν Ἀθηναίοις καταστάντι. ... **[5]** ... τοὺς δὲ Μήδους Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν θάψαι λέγουσιν ὡς πάντως ὅσιον ἀνθρώπου νεκρὸν γῇ κρύψαι, τάφον δὲ οὐδένα εὑρεῖν ἐδυνάμην· οὔτε γὰρ χῶμα οὔτε ἄλλο σημεῖον ἦν ἰδεῖν, ἐς ὄρυγμα δὲ φέροντες σφᾶς ὡς τύχοιεν ἐσέβαλον.	**[1.32.3]** ... On the plain is the grave of the Athenians, and upon it are slabs giving the names of the killed according to their *phylae*; and there is another grave for the Boeotian Plataeans and for the slaves; for also slaves participated at that moment in a battle for the first time. **[4]** There is also a separate monument to one man, Miltiades, the son of Cimon, although his end came later, after he had failed to take Paros and for this reason had been brought to trial by the Athenians. ... **[5]** ... Although the Athenians assert that they buried the Persians, because it is always sanctioned by divine law to cover a corpse with earth, I could find no grave. In fact, there was neither mound nor other trace to be seen, as if carrying the dead to a pit they [i.e. the Athenians] threw them [sc. the Persians] in at random.

Pausanias refers to at least two distinct graves: the first for the Athenians (clearly intending Athenian *citizens*; see also below *sub* The archaeological evidence *ad Sôros*), marked by slabs on which, by *phylê*, the names of those killed in the battle were inscribed, the second grave as it seems for both the Plataean dead (their number is recorded nowhere, but above I argued there may have been about 20-22 of them) as well as for the former slaves (their number is recorded neither)[108]. Having been freed before joining the Athenian force, they had, technically, at that moment become *metoeci* (foreign inhabitants) in Athens until the moment they could be formally en-

[108] Marinatos 1970b, 362 doubts that Plataeans and 'slaves' were buried together, as Pausanias seems to imply, as a burial of free men and slaves together in one grave would constitute ὕβρις. He appears to neglect that, technically, the 'slaves' had been liberated and, though – as it seems – at the time of their death *metoeci* and not yet full citizens, there would have not been committed any breach of any divine law when buried together with the Plataeans. The number of former slaves that had been killed is difficult to assess because we have not been given in any source an indication of the number of them that had joined the Athenian force.

rolled in the *phratries*, a social division of the *phylae* (cf. Notopoulos 1941, 353)[109]. As it seems they, therefore, *temporarily* probably ranked with the Plataeans (but had not beocme Plataean citizens, as Hmmond (1992,150) suggests).

It is impossible to say whether the arrangement as described by Pausanias fitted Plataean feelings (as indicated Marinatos doubts the Plataeans would have been too pleased with it) and/or how the Plataeans (re)acted. As regards the monument (or tomb: μνῆμα can indicate both: for its location see Fig. 16) for/of Miltiades, son of Cimon (1), we already referred to his fate earlier. Whether he really received a proper burial at Marathon 'after the fact' or that he was (only) honoured here with some kind of memorial, a cenotaph, eludes us[110]. The most fascinating information provided by Pausanias, in my view, is that of the fate of the Persians fallen in the battle. We shall discuss it later, when we look at the archaeological evidence, but, as already indicated, elsewhere (Paus. 4.25.5) he possibly refers to their number as being 300,000[111].

I find it remarkable that Pausanias does not refer to another monument in Athens that had been erected, as it appears, for the *Marathônomachai*, sc. a cenotaph, set up in the centre of Athens. Evidence for the existence of such a monument was revealed – in 2000, during a conference held in Athens – by A.P. Matthaiou, presenting an inscription that had come to light not long before (Matthaiou 2003, esp. 197-200). It concerns *Ag*. I 7529, an unpublished second-century BC inscription from the Agora (not unlike *IG* II^2, 1006.26-27, see below), dated to 176/175, which Matthaiou sees as a counterpart to the cenotaph at Marathon itself (Matthaiou 2003, 197-198, 199-200). In view of the date of these inscriptions, they theoretically could have been present and visible in Athens and as such, in view of the type of objects he usually pays attention to, relevant information for an author like Pausanias *Periêgêtes*.

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[109] The time for such an initiation was during the celebration of the *Apaturia* which occurred in the month of Πυανεψιών (*Pyanepsiôn*), the fourth month of the Athenian calendar and roughly corresponding with our months of October/November: also see Notopoulos 1941, 354. After admittance into a *phratry*, they next could be enrolled into a *dêmos*, thereby becoming full citizens. Since the battle took place between enfranchisement and the *Apaturia,* they formally were not yet Athenian citizens and, therefore, metics. See also Lambert 1998, 32. Above, I already referred to the idea expressed by Hammond 1992, 150 that the former slaves had been given Plataean citizenship, an idea I believe not to be realistic.

[110] Stroszeck 2004, 317 believes Miltiades was actually buried there.

[111] The use of the word ἐφθάρησαν (from φθείρω) signifies a more or less active role of the "less than 10,000 in number [of Athenians]", even though Pausanias nowhere explicitly tells us that the Athenians actually killed all of the Persians, though it might be implicated. However, it is equally possible (as Pausanias, to the best of my knowledge, nowhere indicates the strength of the Persian force sent against Eretria and Athens) that he merely wished to express the fact that a force of 300,000 Persians had been (decisively) defeated at Marathon (a Persian force of 300,000 corresponds with the size indicated by Plu. *Mor*. 305B, see above). If Pausanias meant to state that 300,000 had been killed: that number is staggering and out of any proportion.

d. The archaeological evidence[112]

Introduction

Among the exhibits shown in the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM, Toronto) is (what is left of) a Corinthian type helmet (inv. no. ROM no. 926.19.3), which was purchased from T. Sutton by the ROM in 1926. A skull (ROM no. 926.19.5) was said at one stage to have been inside it, and the 'set' was stated to have been excavated in this condition by George Nugent-Grenville, 2nd Baron Nugent of Carlanstown, on the Plain of Marathon in 1834. How reliable this attribution is, we cannot be entirely sure of, but Nugent would have been in Greece very shortly after it had obtained its freedom following the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) during which the British Navy had been very influential. It is, therefore, conceivable that a British antiquarian could have been digging around the site and – at least in theory –, therefore, could find (or obtain) such a helmet at this important site. Moreover, the helmet is indeed of the type that would have been used at this date. As for the skull, it is difficult to be certain of the association. Since Marathon was a victory for the Greeks, they would have been in a position not to leave any body parts or any useful equipment of one of the soldiers of the Atheno-Plataean force on the field. As it is, the only damage to the helmet seems to be from age. An alternative solution might be that helmet *cum* skull (if belonging together *and* related to 'Marathon') did not come from an Athenian (or Plataean) soldier but from one fighting on the Persian side[113].

It is, therefore, conceivable that it is just as unlikely that a helmet would be lost as much as the head that may have worn it. The reality is that we cannot be certain that the skull indeed did belong to the owner of the helmet, but we cannot really discount it, either. We also cannot confirm or exclude whether helmet (and/or skull) were at all related to the battle. A DNA and radiocarbon study could tell us whether the skull could have belonged to a Greek of the time, but that is presently not planned[114]. As a matter of fact, however: *even if* [my emphasis] a DNA and/or radiocarbon study could demonstrate that (the helmet and) the skull could have belonged to a Greek of the time, any connection with the Battle of Marathon (let alone on which side that Greek would have fought) is as yet rather a matter of (willing to have) belief than of proof, no matter the text on the displayed item's sign.

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[112] Much of the material excavated in (or just robbed from) the plain of Marathon has, in the course of the centuries, ultimately been landed in various museums all over the world. Some of it, though, is still present at Marathon, in the local Archaeological Museum, notably in 'Gallery III': cf. Petrakos 1996, 135-150.

[113] Hdt. 4.180.3 refers to Libyan female warriors in Corinthian helmets, suggesting the use of such helmets was not restricted to Greece. As it was, moreover, several Greeks fought, together with Hippias, on the Persian side – as did some of the hostages: cf. Hdt. 6.99 – and one of them (wearing such a helmet) might have been killed and left on the site.

[114] Cf. <http://www.rom.on.ca/en/blog/weapon-wednesday-the-nugent-marathon-corinthian-helmet>, posted February 19, 2014 by Robert Mason, for a fuller description.

As it appears, the whole story seems typical for the so-called Romanticism and even though Nugent may have been *bona fide*, nearly a century passed between the moment he (allegedly) acquired the helmet (and skull?) and the moment Sutton offered it for the auction where the ROM acquired it/them. The vicissitudes of the object(s) between those two dates is/are only documented in very broad outlines. Nevertheless, the situation on the whole fits the picture of the archaeology and/or archaeological practices we encounter as regards the Plain of Marathon. Almost nothing recovered is uncontested, most people searching there (Martin Kreeb's contribution in Buraselis/Meidani 2013 (135-150) lists quite a few visitors, some of whom – Edward Dodwell, for example – did some small-scale excavations as well) found what they believed (and/or hoped) to find. Corroboration of the finds by scientific analysis (DNA or radiocarbon or any other) is practically absent[115]. One of many examples of the general confusion is the issue regarding the location of the *Heracleum* in the plain of Marathon.

The *Heracleum*

In his 1982 paper on the topography of the plain of Marathon, Van der Veer observed that concerning the location of the *Heracleum* two main views had been proposed until then. The following paragraphs are directly based upon his report (294-295). The adherents of the first view on the location of the *Heracleum*, people like Leake, Finlay, Ross, and Milchhöfer, are in general also adherents of the identification of Vrana (modern Vranas) as the ancient location of the village of Marathon. They placed the *Heracleum* at Mt Agrieliki, about three quarters of a mile to the south-east of Vrana. Hammond, notably in his 1973 contribution to the discussion, appears to favour a location of the *Heracleum* "at the southern tip of Mount Kotroni", i.e. near Vrana, too. The other view, proposed by Lolling (1876, 83-84 in combination with 89 and Tafel IV), identified the enclosure ἡ μάνδρα τῆς γραίας ("the old woman's sheepfold"), in the narrow valley of Avlona (not mentioned on the map of Fig. 13, see though Fig. 3, but nearly 4 km due west of Bei in Fig. 13), as the *Heracleum*. Soteriades, unsatisfied with this idea – absolutely rightly in my view – thought to have found a better solution in 1934. He identified, in that year, the *Heracleum* with an 22,000 m^2 enclosure beneath the chapel of St. Demetrios on the lower slopes of Mt Agrieliki. Pritchett initially accepted Soteriades's suggestion, albeit reluctantly, believing the walls of the enclosure to be too recent to belong to the *Heracleum*. In 1965, however, his doubts materialised in the certain belief that the walls did not provide evidence for the *Heracleum* (cf. Pritchett 1965, 89).

Apart from Pritchett, also Vanderpool came to reject Soteriades's identification and he shed new light on the location of the *Heracleum* (cf. Vanderpool 1966a, 322-323 and map on 320). For the identification of the *Heracleum*, Vanderpool made use of

[115] See for the confusing array of involvements and conclusions, notably on the *Sôros*: Galanakis 2013.



Fig. 13. Map showing some of the modern drainage features in the Marathon area as well as the main localities in this region. Map taken from: Diakakis 2010, 1324.

an inscribed stone. This stone had been found in the thirties of the twentieth century near the narrow south end of the plain, near the hamlet of Valaria, and contained regulations for the conduct of the Heraclean games in Marathon in the fifth century BC. On the basis of this inscription, Vanderpool (who published the inscription[116], which is now housed in the Marathon museum under number 13046) came to the conclusion that the *Heracleum* must have been situated either there or extremely nearby. There appears to be, however, no sign of the enclosure that should have been there as

[116] Notably the text on the back or reverse side is relevant in the context of this discussion. It deals with the selection of officials for the Heraclean Games at Marathon and dates from shortly after 490. See Vanderpool 1942, 334-335; see also Vanderpool 1966a, 322-323; Woodford 1971, 217-218; Petrakos 1996, 137-138.

suggested in Herodotus' remarks. Yet, there had existed a building here as witnessed by the *Unterbau und Baustücke* indicated on sheets 18/19 of *Die Karten von Attika*, in the mid 1880s compiled by the captains (Von) Eschenburg (Pritchett continues to refer to him with the nobiliary 'Von' preceding the family name but the references to him in *Die Karten* … are all without the preposition: I therefore have put 'Von' always between brackets with regard to his name) and Von Twardowsky [see also below *ad* Schinias]. Moreover, the so-called *Zerstörte Theodoros-kapelle* in the neighbourhood contains re-used ancient material which, though unconfirmed as yet, *might* [my emphasis, JPS] originate from the *Heracleum* (cf. Van der Veer 1982, 295).

Concerning the *Heracleum*, Vanderpool's view is getting increasing support. In 1972 a second inscribed stone was found bearing the inscription Ἡρακλεῖ τόδ'ἄγαλμα ("This gift for Heracles"; cf. Marinatos 1972, 6), near the find-spot of stone 13046. The fact that two stones (not yet even three, see Cline 2017) referring to Heracles have been found close to each other makes it feasible (however, no more than that!) that the *Heracleum* indeed had been situated in the neighbourhood of the find-spot. The discovery of these two inscribed stones induced Burn (1977, 90-91) to now cautiously opt for Vanderpool's view instead of his original preferred location of the *Heracleum* near Vrana (as, e.g. Hammond 1973, 190 believes). Burn believes, moreover, that Vanderpool's location has an additional bonus from a tactical point of view, viz. the fact that the Athenian encampment is blocking the south end of the plain and the coastal road more effectively than it would have done at or near Vrana, where it would have been threatening from one flank only. Finally, there is also a literary *datum* that could support Vanderpool's suggestion. Pindar (Pi. *P*. 8.79), in 446, refers to games μυχῷ τ' ἐν Μαραθῶνος ("in the nook of Marathon"). We know for a fact that games in honour of Heracles were held at Marathon (cf. Pi. *O*. 88-95 in combination with the remark of the Scholiast on Pindar's *Olympian Odes*: ἀργύρεαι φιάλαι ἆθλα ἦσαν ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐν τοῖς Ἡρακλείοις ("silver bowls were the prizes in the *Heraclea* at Marathon")). The fact that Pindar describes the location of those games in the *Pythian Ode* as μυχῷ τ' ἐν Μαραθῶνος may well be a support for Vanderpool's view, as the oblong southern entrance into which the narrowing plain leads clearly could be conceived as a recess or nook (= μυχός; Hammond 1973, 190, though, explains it differently). The *combination* of such indications makes me support Vanderpool's suggestion.

The latter conclusion is supported by several scholars as well, like Themelis (1974, 236, 297), Burn (though cautiously, as already referred to above), Koumanoudis (1978, 237-242), and Matthaiou (2003, 190-197). On the basis of the second inscription found near Valaria (referred to above), Koumanoudis concludes that the passage between Mt Agrieliki and (what would become) the Brexisa Marsh was called Πύλαι and that the god honoured there with games was Ἡρακλῆς Ἐμπύλιος ("Heracles at the Gate"), the games themselves being the Ἡρακλεῖα Ἐμπύλια ("*Heraclea* at the Gate"). In Koumanoudis's view this might be corroborative evidence for the location of the μυχὸς Μαραθῶνος in the oblong southern entrance or Πύλαι between Mt Agrieliki and the sea, guarding the route along the sea into southern Attica and to

Athens. It is, in my view, a conclusion that could solve a number of problems, like the starting position of at least the Atheno-Plataean army before the battle (cf. Van der Veer 1982, 315-317 *ad* plan C). Another example of long-lasting controversies in debates regarding 'Marathon', not unlike the matter of the location of the *Heracleum*, concerns the status of the tomb of the Plataeans killed at Marathon.

Tomb of the Plataeans

Near the *Sôros*, Clarke (1818, 27) observed a small(er) elevation of the surface, as did Leake shortly later. Both suggest that it could be the location of what Pausanias *Periêgêtes* had described as the grave of Plataeans and (former) slaves. However, the suggestion did win little support, if only because the elevation disappeared from the terrain, either flattened by rain or the hand of man (or, obviously, a combination of the two). Therefore, it remained unattested in literature since Leake (1841(2), 101). The latter describes it on this page as "a heap of earth and stones, not indeed of any considerable height, but having much the appearance of being artificial: it is the tomb perhaps of the Platæenses and Athenian slaves". In spite of the fact that it cannot be seen on the surface any more, Pritchett believes that the "base of the mound may very well be intact today" (Pritchett 1960, 142 note 34). Whether or not this is the case remains uncertain. It largely depends on whether some (machinal) trench-ploughing has taken place on the spot or not. Pritchett's suggestion that the disappearing of the elevation may well have been caused by the rising of the ground level at this point – Staïs believes it might well have amounted to three metres (cf. Pritchett 1960, 141 [who, like Hammond, refers to Staïs as Staes – based upon a different transcription of Σταης-, see also below]) – seems unlikely to me under the circumstances. The rise of three metres was calculated by Staïs from 490 till present, not from the 1820s until today (contra the idea that today's level differs from that in 490, as already indicated before, Hammond 1988, 516 *sub* Note 2).

During a press conference, which was reported *inter alia* in *The New York Times* of May 3, 1970[117], Spyridon Marinatos informed the audience that – on a completely different location – a tumulus, recently excavated at Marathon, had been identified "beyond any reasonable doubt" as the tomb of the Plataeans who had assisted the Athenian force at Marathon. The mass grave, Marinatos said, lay under a carefully built stone tumulus or burial mound, 10 feet high and 50 feet in diameter, its edge marked by hewn stones, on a plain 26 miles northeast of Athens. Only part of the burial trench had been excavated at the time of his announcement, revealing five perfectly preserved skeletons. Marinatos stated that according to experts [see below, JPS], these skeletons would have belonged to young soldiers aged 20 to 25, placed next to one another. During the press conference, he also pointed to the skull of a sixth warrior, probably a leader, that still bore the marks of the spear or sword that killed him (also see Fraser 1969-70, 6).

[117] In the following paragraphs I will predominantly follow the report of *The New York Times*.

Fig. 14. Marathon. The so-called Tumulus of the Plataeans. Photo: Wikimedia commons.

Next to each skeleton there had been found a tiny, painted five-inch *lekythos*, or oil phial, as well as a large clay eating plate placed there "for use in after life," Marinatos said. Marinatos also said the excavators had found traces of a large sacrificial pyre, containing animal bones, that had been lighted prior to the burial, as an offering to the gods. He believed the losses of the Plataeans, if proportionate to those of the Athenians (who lost about 2% of their soldiers, at least if Herodotus' numbers are correct), could not have been more than 20 men (as I already hinted at above). In the Dutch (at that time still fiercely social-democratic) newspaper *Het Vrije Volk*, Marinatos's find was only announced on June 15, 1970[118], though this newspaper brought the news that Marinatos also had recovered the (separate) tomb of the 'slaves' or 'servants' of the Athenians who had assisted their 'masters' in the fight against the Persians. Class-struggle was, obviously, still an issue (knowledge of the literary sources available apparently less so). This also shows in the remarks by Hammond (1973, 197), who actually believes in the interpretation of the tumulus by Marinatos if only because "[t]here was … no one spot on the battlefield where the Plataeans and the slaves had to be honoured in particular as a group, and their separate burial-place was not in fact made in the plain". It produced in the end, though: "a fine monument, but less conspicuous than the mound of the Athenians" (Hammond 1973, 198).

[118] Remarkably, though, this was the only Dutch newspaper that announced Marinatos' discovery at Marathon at all: source Delpher (<https://www.kb.nl/digitale-bronnen/zoek?=-Delpher>), accessed August, 12, 2017.



Fig. 15. The tumulus of the Plataeans from the south, showing the excavated part with eleven burials (from: Marinatos 1970b, 358 Fig. 15).

Both the 'reports' in *The New York Times* and *Het Vrije Volk* are reflected in the report of Fraser in the *Archaeological Reports*: "About 100 m. east of the grave-circles a large tumulus constructed entirely of stones and containing two circles of pit-graves (...). Eleven graves have so far been found, and the skeletons have been classified by Professor Breitinger of Vienna [the expert referred to above, JPS] as those of young men between 20 and 30 years of age, except for one of about 40, and one child of about 12 years of age. The pottery found in the graves is contemporary with that found in the Athenian *Sôros* (b[lack] f[igured] lekythi, skyphi, two loutrophori), and Professor Marinatos has identified the tomb as that of the Plataeans who fell at Marathon, and which Pausanias records as a separate memorial" (Fraser 1969-70, 6).

So far, these reports in brief state that, in 1970/71, Marinatos partly excavated (he only investigated its southern part) a tumulus of 18-20 m in diameter and a height of about 3 m in the exit of the Vrana Valley (see Marinatos 1970a; Marinatos 1970b). In what since has become known as the 'Tomb of the Plataeans', not far from the current Marathon Archaeological Museum and some Middle Helladic tombs, *inter alia* the inhumated bodies of ten men were found, the cremated remains of two more, as well as a child's grave (cf., e.g., Welwei 1979, 101 and note 1; Steinhauer 2009, 120; for the location of their alleged tomb, see Fig. 16). All remains belonged – according to the initial research executed on site by Breitinger – to male deceased. The oldest (and as it appears principal person buried there) was at the time of his death about forty years of age, the child about ten years (or twelve, as some reports have it), the others between

twenty and thirty years of age, two of these having died of injuries to the head, probably caused by arms. Because the few ceramic grave gifts date to a very limited period, it has been surmised – and apart from by Welwei 1979, 105 not challenged – that the graves were constructed in one single phase (cf. Marinatos 1970a, 165; Marinatos 1970b, 361-365; Mersch 1995, 59 note 32 – in my view rightly – doubts whether Welwei's criticism holds water).

The fact that in an allegedly simultaneous burial different forms of interment had been used, i.e. cremation and inhumation, does not need to surprise us and certainly is no indication for social differences: both forms of interment coexisted in Attica at that time (cf. Welwei 1979, 103; Mersch 1995, 59 note 33 with relevant literature; Meadows 2011 is somewhat more sceptical on this issue; Pritchett 1985, 251, rightly in my view, refers to the *Schol*. Th. 2.34.1, who expressly states that cremation was (at that time) the custom, not merely of the Athenians but of all Greeks, though Pritchett also admits that Plu. *Sol*. 21.6 might be read as stating that burial by inhumation was the practice at Athens). As it is, personal or family preference appears to have determined the manner of burial (also cf. Pritchett 1985, 252).

Based upon the ceramical finds near the bodies (black figure *lekythoi*, plates, *skyphoi*, *kylikes*, and *loutrophoroi*), which showed great similarities with the finds from the *Sôros* (a feature also underlined by Hammond 1992, 149; also Hammond 1988, 510 describes this burial mound as the tomb of the Plataeans and liberated slaves), Marinatos dated the inhumations to 490 and accordingly stated he had found the remains of the Plataeans fallen during the Battle of Marathon, a claim fiercely contested ever since[119]. The remains themselves were delivered to the German anthropologist E. Breitinger (mentioned by Fraser) for further studies in Vienna. As incredible as it may seem, this led to the 'Plataean' (?) skeletons remaining forgotten in Austria to this very day: at least no publication whatsoever detailing research on these remains has, to the best of my knowledge, been published to this date. Moreover, as early as 1974 the identification of the so-called tumulus of the Plataeans was already questioned both on archaeological grounds (see, e.g., Themelis 1974; Camp 2001, 48, refers to it merely as "more controversial") and because "its precise location was so unexpected and hard to reconcile with any natural interpretation of the ancient sources of the battle" (cf. Snodgrass 1983, 166).

In addition to that, Welwei (1979, 102) points out that the situation found by Marinatos does not match the description by Pausanias (who writes about a common grave of Plataeans and former slaves) and that especially the ten-year old boy, inhumated in a *pithos*, is very particular in the context as suggested by Marinatos (Marinatos 1970b, 360-361 suggests the boy may have served as a spy or as a messenger). A suggestion by Schuchhardt that the boy could have been an *aulêtês*, a flute-player,

[119] Cf., e.g., Mersch 1995, 55 note 1 for some of the critical literature regarding Marinatos' find and claims.



Fig. 16. Plain of Marathon with some key features. Photo: Google Earth, adapted with 'pins'.

is resolutely turned down by Welwei (1979, 102). Also the idea brought forward in Hammond 1973, 197, that the boy could have been a slave who accompanied his master to the battlefield, is rejected by Welwei (1979, 102-103). Taken together, Welwei argues: "Marinatos' Hypothese vom sog. Plataiergrab ist keine überzeugende Lösung" (Welwei 1979, 106; contra, though, Hammond 1992, 149, who argues that the Plataeans were cremated and honoured at Marathon, but that they were buried at Plataea: what Marinatos found at Marathon was, in his view, simultaneously a cenotaph for the Plataeans and a tomb for the slaves). I only can agree with Welwei's conclusion, as the situation is till today (January 2019). Koumanoudis (1978, 243: "La 'tombe des Platéens' en réalité appartient à des villageois") is on the same wavelength as Welwei as well, as it appears. The conclusions by Mersch (1995) are more cautious and come closer to Marinatos' conclusions. She believes that the excavated part of the tumulus and its contents suggest that this tumulus "presumedly is the grave of the Plataians or of the slaves. But a certain identification is impossible because of the limited excavation" (Mersch 1995, 61). At the same time her contribution is very critical as regards long cherished views regarding the *Sôros*.

The *Sôros*

As indicated earlier, practically no monument one way or another related to the Battle of Marathon of 490 has escaped discussion. This also goes for the *Sôros*, the tumulus in which, allegedly, the 192 Athenian citizens killed during the battle (the so-called *Marathônomachai*) had been interred (cf. Hammond 1973, 171, note 4). Sekunda states (though without adducing evidence) that he believes that the *Sôros* was "another Kimonian construction, but equally almost certainly on the site of the original mass burial after the battle" (Sekunda 2002, 61).

That the Athenian dead indeed had been buried at Marathon is unmistakeably corroborated by Thucydides (Th. 2.34.5). After he referred to the fact that those fallen in war are always buried in the public sepulchre[120], which was situated "in the most beautiful suburb of the city"[121], he continues: πλήν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι· ἐκείνων δὲ διαπρεπῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν ("Indeed, apart from those <who died> at Marathon; judging the *aretê* of those to be exceeding, they [i.e. the Athenians] buried them on the spot"). Preceding this remark, Thucydides explains the procedure followed in such public ceremonies[122]:

[1] ... ἐν ... τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. **[2]** τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων πρότριτα σκηνὴν ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐπιφέρει τῷ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ἤν τι βούληται· **[3]** ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾖ, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας ἄγουσιν ἅμαξαι, φυλῆς ἑκάστης μίαν· ἔνεστι δὲ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἧς ἕκαστος ἦν φυλῆς. μία δὲ κλίνη κενὴ φέρεται ἐστρωμένη τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἳ ἂν μὴ εὑρεθῶσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν.**[4]** ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ὀλοφυρόμεναι .	**[1]** ... The ceremony is as follows. **[2]** Three days before the celebration a tent is erected in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and everyone brings to his own dead any offering which suits him. **[3]** At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing and cannot be recovered after the battle. **[4]** The procession is accompanied by anyone who chooses to do so, not only citizens but also strangers, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation: Th. 2.34.1-4.

Also cf. Pritchett 1985, 103-106; Pritchett also refers to an ἀγὼν ἐπιτάφιος in honour of the dead, but dates these after the Persian wars.

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[120] The fact that Thucydides here states that "only after the battle of Marathon" the fallen had been buried on the field where they were killed has come to be referred to as "Thucydides' Blunder", insofar as battlefield burial – certainly up to 470, and therefore also in 490 – was not unique (see, e.g., Toher 1999 for some other examples). As a matter of fact, Toher argues that Thucydides' remark was no blunder (the word 'blunder' refers to a remark by Gomme 1956, 98). Pritchett 1985, 249 remarks that for the Greeks "[t]hroughout the Persian wars what evidence we can assemble points to burial on the battlefield".

[121] Sc. the Outer Ceramicus, just outside the so-called Dipylon Gate. This area is situated slightly to the north-west of both the Acropolis and the *agora*, by the River Eridanus, where the so-called Sacred Way to Eleusis started.

[122] The context here suggests that this ceremony did not occur directly after a battle but once a year, leading to suspect that (some) Athenians killed in a war had (had) a temporary burial before the state one. In fact, that is confirmed by Marchant 1891, *ad loc.*, who states that the bodies had been burnt already at the scene of the action, then the bones were collected and buried at Athens. As regards Thucydides' remark that the state funeral took place τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ (Th. 2.34.1), see, e.g., Hornblower 1991, 292-293; also Gomme 1956, 94-103.

Fig. 17. The *Sôros* (or 'Great Tumulus') as seen by Edward Dodwell, from: Dodwell 1819, 158. Image: Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.

No one of our literary sources makes clear whether this procedure also was observed at Marathon or even whether – and if so, which – any ceremony had taken place to honour the Athenian dead of 490.

As we have seen before (and shall see below), a common grave for the fallen citizens at Marathon is also mentioned by Pausanias *Periêgetês*. In fact, veneration for the fallen of Marathon continued well beyond Thucydides' date, as is shown by a fragment of *IG* II^2 1006, lines 26-27, dating to 122/121 (and the, earlier, Agora-inscription, referred to before). Both concern so-called ephebic texts, referring to the fact that the *ephêboi* went to Marathon at some point in the year, visited the collective tomb of the Athenian dead there, and sacrificed on behalf of the warriors who had died 'for the sake of Freedom' (cf. also Nagy 1991, 303 [though as regards *IG* II^2 1006 he refers to lines 27-28])[123]. When these ephebic visits to Marathon began is uncertain. Direct evidence is generally late, but the Athenian preoccupation with the glorious past of the Persian Wars is already evident in the fourth century (Kellogg 2013, 272, her note 47).

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[123] … πα[ρ]αγενόμενοι δὲ [ἐπὶ τὸ ἐμ Μαραθῶνι πολυ]άνδρειον ἐστεφάνωσάν τε καὶ ἐνήγισαν | τοῖς κατὰ πόλεμον τελευτήσασιν ὑπ[ὲ]ρ τῆς Ἐλευθερίας, … ("having arrived at the *polyandrion* at Marathon they provided it with wreaths and offered to the fallen during the war for the sake of Freedom…": *IG* II^2 1006, lines 26-27): see <http://epigraphy.packhum.org/text/3226?&bookid=5&location=7>.

However, before Pausanias we find no clear literary reference to a *visible* grave for either the Athenians and the Plataeans and former slaves on (or near) the Plain of Marathon (even though Thucydides reports the Athenians were buried there). Moreover, as it is, Pausanias' description makes not unmistakably clear that the grave of the Athenians at Marathon he refers to can be identified beyond doubt as the *Sôros* either. As a matter of fact, until the middle of the nineteenth century AD it has frequently been asserted (e.g. by Dodwell and Gell: cf. Galanakis 2013) that the *Sôros* was the place where the Persians had been buried. On the other hand, Colonel William Martin Leake (1777-1860), who visited the site in 1802 and again in 1806, states to be sure the *Sôros* was the "tumulus of the Athenians" (Leake 1835, 431-432; repeated in Leake 1841, 99-101). Leake stood not alone in this view. On 12 May 1836, the then Greek Minister of Education, responsible for cultural affairs, Iakovos Rizos Neroulos, sent a decree to the Provincial Directorate of Attica specifically prohibiting any unauthorized excavation. "[B]eing informed that foreign travellers passing via Marathon are frequently excavating, with the help of the locals, in the very tumulus [mound] of those Athenians who fell in the battle (the so-called *soros*) in order to find arrow heads, and wishing this most ancient monument of Greek glory to remain untouched and untroubled, we ask you to issue as quickly as possible the necessary orders to the municipal authority of Marathon, so that it is not allowed for anyone on any pretext to excavate the afore-mentioned tumulus or the other monuments on the field of battle" (translation by Petrakos 1996, 186, n. 43). What these excavations had done to the *Sôros* is made clear by Fig. 18, certainly comparing it with Fig. 17.

As it is, the *Sôros* has been investigated from at least the eighteenth century AD for evidence regarding the battle. The first mention of an 'excavation' (if we really can use the word) appears to be that by Louis François Sébastian Fauvel (1753-1838) – a painter, antiquarian, and French consul in Athens – who conducted an eight-day dig in 1788. He apparently cut a huge trench in the mound in search of antiquities but found nothing. His method of investigation was severely criticised, e.g., by E.D. Clarke, who remarks that Fauvel's trench presented to "the spectator a chasm … visible from the village of Marathon at the distance of two miles and a half" (Clarke 1818, 24). He, moreover, judged that Fauvel had done a bad job: it was "ignorantly conducted, as the operation does not extend below the visible base of the mound and the present level of the Plain … in order to find the conditory Sepulchre, if the bodies were not promiscuously heaped towards the centre of the Mound, it would be necessary to carry the excavation much lower" (*ibidem*). In 1802, Lord and Lady Elgin (a name inextricably bound up with the sculptures taken from the Parthenon frieze now housed in the British Museum, but husband and – as it appears very prominently active – wife were here actively scouring as well) searched the hill for antiquities – notably weapons – and found some pottery fragments and a small mass of silver (cf. Lawrence 2001), but little else. Assorted "speculators in antiquities" dug further in the mound in the 1830s and left the *Sôros* in a sorry state



Fig. 18. Marathon in the 1830s. From Christopher Wordsworh, *Greece* (1839), 113 [design by Captain Irton; engraving by Bonner].

as an engraving from that period, Fig. 18 – already referred to – shows. However, the 'excavations' of the Frenchman Louis Fauvel in 1788 and those of Lord and Lady Elgin in 1802 in particular greatly altered the shape of the mound.

In 1883, Heinrich Schliemann came to Marathon, and decided to investigate the *Sôros* by sinking a huge trench into the top of it, and a smaller one on the eastern side. He did not find much, and decided it was: "ein blosses Kenotaph …, welches höchst wahrscheinlich aus dem neunten Jahrhundert v.Chr. stammt" (cf. Schliemann 1884, 88). The next major excavations of/on the *Sôros* were those conducted by Valerios Staïs (Hammond – 1968 and 1973 – transcribes his name as Staës), whose findings are generally taken as proof that this was the grave of the Athenians fallen in the 490 battle against the Persians (see Staïs 1890 a/b; 1891 a/b/c; 1893). He dug deeper than anyone had previously dug – just like Clarke had already advised in 1818 (see above) – and "found a funeral pyre on a brick-lined tray, with ashes and charred bones and black-figure pottery not later than the early fifth century" (cf. the description by Whitley 1994, 215-217; for the pottery notably see Steinhauer 2009, 124-139).

Essentially, the following three constructional elements are, according to Staïs (as I shall further refer to him), to be discerned as regards the *Sôros*: 1) a central cremation "tray", containing the cremated remains of the war dead, surrounded by black-figure *lekythoi*; 2) an exterior trench (which Staïs called a *stenon*), not

for cremations, but apparently for other offerings; more pottery was found in this trench; and 3) a tumulus or mound over the whole. In addition, a number of grave *stelae* were placed around the tumulus (cf. Whitley 1994, 215-216). Discussing Staïs's excavation and its results, Whitley confesses himself confused as regards the way the *Marathônomachai* had been buried.

Trying to place the results of the finds in the *Sôros* within the context of hero cults – a practice observed notably during the Classical Period in Attica[124] – he observes that: "[i]n this light, the practices evident at Marathon appear doubly paradoxical. The war dead died defending the new, Cleisthenic democracy – indeed, as the *Marathonomachai* they became its most characteristic representatives. But the kind of burial they received recalled nothing so much as the old, pre-democratic manner of aristocratic burial; the cult that was their due revived practices that had been in steady decline for the past century" (Whitley 1994, 227)[125]. His – preliminary – conclusion is that: "[p]erhaps the Athenians who erected this monument were unaware, or at least barely conscious of, these resonances, which only appear paradoxical to the archaeologist. The Marathon tumulus, its cremations, stelae, and offering trench, may represent nothing more than an attempt to create an imposing and durable monument, while at the same time trying to accommodate both half-remembered ancient practices and current forms of honoring the dead" (Whitley 1994, 228). I venture to assume that the Athenians who erected the monument were very much aware of the fact that the burial resembled the aristocratic practices. In fact, I believe they intentionally linked up with such traditions, emphasising the purely hoplite (heroic?) character (as it seems deliberately) attributed to the battle and reflected in several passages of Herodotus' account.

To accentuate this attitude, I refer to a blog on Jona Lendering's *Mainzer Beobachter* of February 6, 2019 (<https://mainzerbeobachter.com/2019/02/06/herodotos-catalogi/#more-37442 >). In the introduction he states that: "[i]n Herodotus' *Histories*, two catalogues are included. The author is imitating Homer, but there is more to be said. The information appears to be reliable and tells something important about the nature of the Persian Empire and the Persian view on the Greek War". In the blog itself (regrettably in Dutch), he further refers to these catalogues, the first in Herodotus' book three (a review of all provinces of the Persian Empire, a long series of tax-districts instituted by King Darius I, probably drafted by Herodotus' predecessor, Hecataeus of Miletus: Hdt. 3.89-95), the second in book seven (a review of the origin of all troops participating in King Xerxes' army invading Greece in 480: Hdt. 7.59-100). He compares these catalogues with Homer's cat-

[124] According to Whitley 1994, 227: "[t]he new order, the new democratic state, required new heroes and new cults".

[125] Such a method of burial *might* fit in with efforts to connect the Battle of Marathon specifically with the hoplite class of Athens and its 'aristocratic' connection, as also displayed by the Homeric parallels in Herodotus' account.

Fig. 19. The *Sôros*. Photo: ©Jona Lendering (www.Livius.org).

alogue of ships (cf. Hom. *Il*. 2.494-759), a comparison also recognised by, e.g., Armayor (1978, 7): "there are 67 nations in Herodotus' account of Darius' Empire. There are 67 contingents in Xerxes' army, navy, and cavalry. And there are 67 commanders in the combined Greek and Trojan armies of the Iliad. What we have to contend with here is not coincidence but Catalogues, Greek Catalogues with themes and rules of their own ...". Herodotus' catalogues are far from complete and as it seems only shed fragmentary light on the diversity of the Persian Achaemenid Empire (cf. Armayor 1978, *passim*), but the information he does provide is essentially correct and supported by several sources (cf. Lendering's blog). Lendering then states that: "[d]e historische betrouwbaarheid is niet het enige interessante aspect van de lijsten … . Elke antieke lezer of luisteraar moet het hebben herkend als eigentijdse *Scheepscatalogus* en hebben begrepen dat Herodotos in feite een nieuwe Trojaanse Oorlog wilde beschrijven, een ambitie die hij meteen aan het begin van de *Historiën* ook verwoordt" ('The historical reliability is not the only interesting aspect of the lists … . Every reader or listener in Antiquity should have recognised it as a contemporary *Catalogue of Ships* and have understood that Herodotus actually wanted to describe a new Trojan War, in fact, an ambition worded right at the start of the *Histories'*). The construction of the *Sôros* as an essentially pre-Cleisthenic burial site appears to me to appeal to a similar sentiment.

All this, however, presupposes that the *Sôros* was the actual burial place of the *Marathônomachai*. Before, we already have seen that the issue who exactly had been buried inside, or under, the *Sôros* has been discussed extensively. Only the results of the work by Staïs had resulted in a more or less general acceptance of this tumulus as the burial site of the *Marathônomachai*. However, first Koumanoudis

(1978, 243: "Le τύμβος des Atheniens est aussi suspect") and later Andrea Mersch brought the topic again to the fore, Mersch in her paper from 1995[126]. She remarks that elements supporting an identification of this prominent tumulus as the tomb of the Athenians are first and foremost: a) the exceptional dimensions of the tumulus (i.e. 9 m in height and a diameter of about 50 m); b) the numerous human bones in the layer of ash; c) the dating of the *lekythoi* found; d) the location of the tomb in the area of Marathon. Next, she discusses each of these elements (Mersch 1995, 57-59), adducing arguments based upon research into other tumuli throughout Attica as well as brought forward by and/or based upon our literary sources.

Doing so, she states that she misses the *stelae* referred to by Pausanias (see, though, below!) and the heroic cult. Finds do suggest presence of a "Grabkult, aber keinen Heroenkult" (Mersch 1995, 58). Moreover, the results of the excavations do not show a continuous "Brandschicht", while Staïs also pointed out an "Urnenbeisetzung" (as a matter of fact, Staïs refers to a *kalpis*, found in the centre of the burial, containing the remains of a single person of – allegedly – high rank, Staïs suggests it may have been Callimachus or the *stratêgos* Stesilaus: Staïs 1890b, 131). Furthermore, the chronology of the ceramics found in the *Sôros* shows a date ranging from about 570 to the early fifth century BC. Among those finds, the presence of a *pyxis*, moreover, is remarkable, as *pyxides* normally only occur in burials of women. Here, it appears in one of the offering trenches [exterior trenches/*stenoi*] ("Opferrinnen"), which are a phenomenon that ended in other graves about 550 and has been viewed here as a (status-heightening) relict. Finally, Mersch argues that the fact that the tumulus is the largest in the area of Marathon is more a result of luck than design, because only luck caused it not to have been flattened for agricultural use. Her final conclusion is that the *Sôros* is not the burial mound for the *Marathônomachai,* but that of an aristocratic family that buried its deceased there over a prolonged period: "Wenn es sich bei dem prominenten Tumulus nicht um das Grab der Athener handelt, muß er die Grablege eines herausragenden Genos sein. Mingazzini deutete den Tumulus wie bereits Maurice sowohl als lang genutzten privaten Bestattungsplatz als auch als das "Grab der Athener" [i.e. Maurice 1923, 23f; Mingazzini 1974-75, 13 note 2, JPS]. Aber die Bestattung der Gefallenen in einem zuvor privat genutzten Tumulus erscheint fragwürdig. Da das "Grab der Athener" Gefäße aus verschiedenen Jahrzehnten enthalt, darunter eine Pyxis[127], wie sie in Frauengräbern vorkommt, und außerdem Opferrinnen aufweist, handelt es sich m.E. um den äußerst prominenten Tumulus eines aristokratischen *genos*, das dort über einen längeren Zeitraum bestattete, und nicht um das Grab der gefallenen Athener" (Mersch 1995, 59).

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[126] See also the very critical remarks by Francis 1990, 134-135 (= note 82), *inter alia* referring to a "possible Cimonian refurbishment at Marathon" of the *Sôros*.

[127] Notably a black figure so-called tripod *pyxis*, dating to the mid-sixth century BC, currently in the Marathon Archaeological Museum as number 764a: cf., e.g., Petrakos 1996, 140-141; also Steinhauer 2009, 125-127.

Valavanis (2010) offers, in my view, a thorough study of the much-discussed question of the identification of this tumulus. After Mersch's paper, the authenticity of the *Sôros* on the Marathon plain as the burial ground for the 192 Athenians fallen in the battle has been recently disputed once more, after the publication of one of the alleged *stelae* of the Athenian *polyandrion* on the battlefield (the very *stelae* of which the absence was one of the arguments for Mersch to doubt the *Sôros* to have been the burial site of the *Maratônomachai*), which surfaced in Herodes Atticus' Peloponnesian villa (see below). It has been suggested that Herodes stole the *stela* from the Marathon plain and took it to his villa in the Peloponnese, as part of his collection of antiquities; then, Herodes himself would have planned the construction of the tumulus on the battlefield[128]. On the basis of both archaeological arguments and comparisons with other burial mounds for fallen soldiers, Valavanis asserts that the tumulus had been, indeed, constructed and destined for the fallen Athenian citizens, a view that has also been expressed by Sekunda (2002, 60). Valavanis pays attention to the Athenian burial practice as well, which shows both public and private aspects. In fact, the vases predating the battle found in the offering trench show that relatives of the dead and/or inhabitants of the region also took part in the burial ceremony. As a matter of fact, the yearly (ephebic) sacrifice near Marathon[129] underlines, in my view, the lasting importance of the public aspect of both the tumulus (assuming the *Sôros* indeed being the tumulus covering the remains of the fallen Athenians) and the memory of the Athenian dead. Regarding Valavanis judgement – at least in the context of this discussion and for the time being – as the final word on the *Sôros* as being the resting place of the *Maratônomachai*, I think it is now time to turn to the *stelae*, at least one of them.

An inscription from the *Sôros*?

As noticed before, Pausanias *Periêgetês* describes the tomb of the fallen Athenians and observes that ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ στῆλαι τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀποθανόντων κατὰ φυλὰς ἑκάστων ἔχουσαι ("And upon it [sc. the grave] are slabs giving the names of the killed according to their *phylae*": Paus. 1.32.3). In her paper of 1995, Mersch still noticed that on the *Sôros* no sign of such slabs had been recovered. However, during excavations of the villa of Herodes Atticus at Eua Kynouria on the Peloponnese, executed between 1980 and 2001 and conducted by T. and G.

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[128] In view of, e.g., *IG* II^2 1006, lines 26-27, referred to above, as well as Th. 2.34.5, I find this hard to believe. It is, though, possible that Herodes Atticus restored the *polyandrion* – or at least this tumulus – to some extent. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 6 believe "that Herodes Atticus, a Marathon-dweller himself, moved the memorial of the Erechtheis tribe from Marathon to his estate in the Peloponnese" (adding in the accompanying note: "For second-century AD celebrations of Marathon, see Bowie 2013"). Herodes Atticus (born at Marathon *ca.* AD 101) owned an estate there, of which the so-called 'Sanctuary of the Egyptian Gods' (just north of Brexisa), ordered by him *ca.* AD 160, was a characteristic part.

[129] Cf. *IG* I^3 255 line 11 (an inscription dating to the fifth century BC); for elucidation see Stroszeck 2004, 320 and her note 69.

Spyropoulos, a slab was found, in 2000, mentioning 22 dead of the Erechteid *phylê*[130]. The header of the slab makes it likely that the text refers to the fallen at the Battle of Marathon (cf. also Butz 2015). The header reads as follows:

> Φε̃μις ἄρ' | hος κιχ[ά|ν]<ει> αἰεὶ || ἐὐφαος hέσσχατα | γαί[ες]
> Τονδ' ἀνδ|ρο͂ν ἀρετὲν || πεύσεται, | hος ἔθανον
> [μ]αρνάμε|νοι Μέ|δοισι || καὶ ἐσστεφά|νοσαν Ἀ|θένα[ς]
> [π]αυρότε|ροι πο|λλον || δεχσάμε|νοι πόλεμον[131].

It can be translated as follows: "The fame that reaches the end of the bright earth | will preserve the *aretê* of these men, how they died | facing the Persians [lit.: the Medes], crowning Athens with glory, | though few in number, nevertheless accepting the battle" (adapted by the author after Steinhauer 2009, 122 and Butz 2015, 85). An essay by Steinhauer (sc. Steinhauer 2010) discusses this so-called 'Marathon stela', which was first integrally published in 2009 (Spyropoulos 2009; also see Steinhauer 2004-2009). On the basis of formal evidence, Steinhauer (2010) – once more[132] – argues in favour of the authenticity of the *stela* and suggests a hypothetical restoration of the monument to which the *stela* belongs as the *polyandrion* of the Athenians fallen at Marathon, which would be similar in its structure to *IG* I^3 503-504 (the monument with the so-called 'Marathon epigrams')[133].

In spite of this enticing thought, additional epigraphic and philological considerations are worth examining, as there appear to be some obstacles to overcome. The first and foremost, in my view, concerns the difference between the letters of the *stela* and those of two other famous public inscriptions firmly dated to the end of the sixth or early fifth century BC[134], a distinct stylistic difference, I think, that cannot be ignored without discussion. A second objection should be that the peculiar engraving of the list of the fallen, described by Steinhauer (2010) as an example of the so-called *plinthedon* writing, does not conform to the definition of *plinthedon* we find in some literary sources (*Schol.* Eust. 1305.55; *Schol.* D.T. 191, 3; 484, 26)[135], nor is it otherwise attested in epigraphy. Instead, it seems

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[130] Spyropoulos 2009, 24 reports also the find of another two fragments of similar (?) lists of fallen.

[131] Text according to Steinhauer 2004-2009, 280.

[132] Steinhauer 2009, 122 also refers to the *stela* as "a unique genuine monument of the battle", dating to the fifth century BC. His contribution in Buraselis/Meidani 2013 (99-108) equally advocates the authenticity of the *stela*. For an elaborate discussion on the *stela* see also Tentori Montalto 2013.

[133] See for these texts also Petrovic 2013.

[134] These are, apart from *IG* I^3 503-504 (already referred to), *IG* I^3 4, the 'Hekatompedon inscription', and *IG* I^3 1, the 'Salamis decree'.

[135] The names have been inscribed one to a line and, rather than plotting the letters of each line independently, or aligning them vertically in a standard *stoichedon* arrangement (i.e. the practice of engraving inscriptions (in capitals) in such a way that the letters were aligned vertically as well as horizontally; there are no spaces between words, and no spaces or punctuation

to fit Ameling's definition as 'versetzten στοιχηδόν-Schema' much more (cf. Ameling 2011, 11; also see Butz 2015). Less dramatic but as yet conspicuous is, thirdly, that several terms and *iuncturae* in the epigram reappear in later literary sources on the Persian Wars (like some epigrams by Pseudo-Simonides, as well as some passages of Demosthenes and Plato's *Menexenus*).

If the epigram would be original (as – like Steinhauer – e.g., also Keesling (2012, 139) believes to be the case), we would have here a first occurrence of later *topoi* in the literary tradition. However, another possibility is that a *stela* was ordered by Herodes Atticus (or a third person unknown to us), more or less in the style of late sixth-early fifth century BC inscriptions (perhaps not even a genuine copy of the original *stela*), incorporating 'titbits' of the literary tradition. It might well be the conclusion that Butz (2015, 94) appears to harbour. In view of the first two objections I already referred to (and especially the stylistic one), I find this an equally feasible (and perhaps even a more appealing) conclusion, rather than the suggestion that the *stela* was at the origin of the literary tradition (even though I have to admit that the latter version absolutely remains a possibility, e.g. as a late(r) copy of an original early fifth century BC inscription). It seems to me, for example, hard to imagine that someone from the Marathon region – like Herodes Atticus was – would have contemplated to desecrate a monument that was essentially related to his home region by removing a vital element of it. Given his means, ordering a copy in one form or another would perhaps have been a less controversial option. As regards this inscription as well a definite conclusion appears still far away.

The Trophy

As we have seen earlier, first Lysias (**2**.25) and Isocrates (**4**.87) and again Pausanias remark that the Athenians erected a trophy at Marathon to commemorate their victory. As Sekunda (2002, 61) phrases it: "the trophy … is the most valuable [viz. monument] for our reconstruction of the topography of the battle. The Greeks normally erected a victory trophy at the point where the 'turn-round' (*trope* [as he refers to it]) of the enemy had first occurred" (also see Kinnee 2018, 12). If this is correct in its absoluteness as well as looking at the place of the trophy in the topography of the Marathon Plain (see Figs. 5 and 16) we, cautiously, might suggest that the *tropê* of the 490 Battle of Marathon started with the Plataeans, fighting on the Greek left wing, first breaking the Persian right wing and forcing it to flee (see also Sekunda 2002, 70). Though I am ready to believe the above as the likeliest situation, one remark should be added. It is the view

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between sentences), the letter cutter has alternated them in the inscription under scrutiny: that is, the letters of each line have deliberately been situated between the letters directly above them, usually resulting in the vertical alignment of letters in alternate lines of the inscription (lines 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on). This pattern of alternating letters is only enhanced by the very wide horizontal spacing of the letters throughout the twenty-two preserved lines of the name list. Steinhauer (2004-2009, 682-684) shows that the term *plinthedon* was used in antiquity to describe such a pattern (cf. also Keesling 2012, 139-140).

of Proietti 2015, 155-157 that there was no Greek precedent for erecting such a memorial on the field of battle. If her view holds (I do not believe Kinnee 2018 speaks out clearly on this issue), the Marathon trophy underlines the significance the Athenians attached to this battle.

The British Museum possesses a marble trophy, *ca.* 84 cm high, from the plain of Marathon ("Said to be found in Athens according to an annotated drawing by L.S. Fauvel published by L. Beschi", according to the museum's website), which was presented to the museum by one John Walker in 1802 (British Museum inv. no. 1802,0806.1; see: <https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details/collection_image_gallery.aspx?assetId=879094001&objectId=406277&partId=1#more-views>). The date of the British Museum trophy is not easy to fix exactly. A date in Classical Greek times is to be excluded on various grounds. The style and technique, some surfaces being finished with a rasp, are late, and a date in late Hellenistic or possibly early Imperial times appears most suitable (see Vanderpool 1967; Beschi 2002). An earlier version of a trophy was excavated in 1965 by E. Vanderpool and N.M. Verdelis. Whether *their* find constitutes the remains of the (original?) marble (also see below) trophy at Marathon is open to discussion. As matters stand today, this trophy (made of Pentelic marble but in fragmentary state, nowadays housed in the Marathon Archaeological museum, see Fig. 20) is to be dated to the second quarter of the fifth century BC (see Vanderpool 1966b; Kinnee 2018, 55 suggests a date around 460). The column currently on the site is, obviously, a replica (for the various trophies at Marathon, see, e.g., Kinnee 2018, 50-53, 55-56).

As regards the Marathon-trophy, Pausanias *Periêgetês* remarks: πεποίηται δὲ καὶ τρόπαιον λίθου λευκοῦ. … ("Also, a trophy of white marble has been erected": Paus. 1.32.5). To erect a trophy is, in itself, not out of the ordinary at all but was, in fact, a common practice in ancient Greece (cf., e.g., E. *Andr*. 694; And. 1.147; X. *An*. 7.6.36; D.S. 11.14.4, 61.7; 14.24.4; 18.32.2). The added information that it was made of white marble is a nice detail. One might object that the text merely states that the trophy was λίθου λευκοῦ ("of white stone"), but as *LSJ s.v.* λίθος *ad* II rightly observe, it is in the combination λευκὸς λ. commonly used for "marble". The trophy at Marathon described by Pausanias appears to match as regards date the one at present housed in the British Museum (see above). What had happened with the first (?) marble trophy at Marathon eludes us. That there had been one is made clear by the excavation by Vanderpool and Verdelis in 1965, while – moreover – a trophy at Marathon is, *inter alios*, also referred to by Ar. *Eq*. 1333, *V*. 711.

Whether this trophy found by Vanderpool and Verdelis *was* the original one is another matter: I very much doubt it was. As customary, the original trophy may well have consisted of a pile of armour taken from the deceased Persians (whether or not piled up against a tree-trunk or a pile of stones: cf. also Kinnee 2018, 13, 14). Some time afterwards this was – likely – replaced by the marble one (for the

Fig. 20. Marathon Archaeological Museum. (Part) of first (?) stone trophy at Marathon. See, e.g., Petrakos 1996, 135-136.

shape also see Stroszeck 2004, 307 and her Fig. 8), which in its turn may well have been replaced by the trophy currently in the British Museum. I am, however, much more confident that all trophies had been placed at or near the same place, the spot where the defeat of the Persian army led by Datis (if we are to follow Maurice's suggestions) started to take shape, i.e. the so-called *tropê*. In the view of Captain (Von) Eschenburg[136] – in the *Archäologischer Anzeiger* (1889, 36): "Nach eingehender Durchwanderung des ganzen Terrainabschnittes habe ich die Ansicht gewonnen, daß der Punkt, wo jetzt die Kapelle Panagia Misosporitissa steht (der Punkt heißt heute Chani), der Brennpunkt der Schlacht gewesen ist ... Ich halte es nicht für unmöglich, daß ein dort befindlicher Trümmerhaufen, aus dem Fundamentsteine, eine Säulentrommel und ein riesiger ionischer Architrav, beides von Marmor, der besten griechischen Zeit angehörend, zu Tage treten ... zu einem der den Gefallenen gesetzten Denkmäler gehörte." His observations make the identification of the trophy, the precise location and the reason why the trophy (the latter elaborated in the following point) was placed there as clear as possible, as far as anything regarding 'Marathon' can be made clear. Equally Hammond (1973, 200) holds a similar view. It led, at least, Steinhauer (2009, 155) to the following remark, accompanying a picture of the drums of the trophy in the Marathon Archaeological Museum: "it was erected several years after the battle at the point of the Persians' final defeat on the edge of the Great Marsh, and replaced the earlier traditional dead tree with armour on it".

Finds at the Schinias

Let us, next, follow Hauptmann (or Captain) H. (von) Eschenburg on his way in the region while he adds a number of valuable observations to our knowledge (more or less condensed by Milchhöfer 1889, 53). Having discussed the (presumed) location of the trophy, he continues with the observation that there were huge masses of bones lying in disorder in that very area of the Mesoporitissa chapel and over as far as the marsh is, and that: "bei der Anlage der hier liegenden Skouzee'schen Weinberge [= vineyard, JPS] in Unmassen regellos liegende Knochenreste aufgedeckt [= excavated, JPS] wurden, die auf viele hunderte von Todten hindeuten. Ich verdanke

[136] Captain H. (von) Eschenburg, originally of the Royal Prussian army, later the German Imperial army, spent seven months (together with Captain Von Twardowsky (for the name see Milchhöfer 1889, 54)) at Marathon in the winter of 1884-85, making a survey of the plain for the *Karten von Attika*: i.e. maps 18 [Drakonera, E.] and 19 [Marathon, v. T./E.] of the '*Karten*', scale 1:25,000): see <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/curtius1895a/0001>. As an army man (Von) Eschenburg became (or as is suggested by his review he already was) interested in the battle and subsequently wrote his own account of it. This is no longer much read, as his analysis of the battle proper is based on the (erroneous, as it seems to be established by now, even though at the time shared by, e.g., Milchhöfer 1889, 51) assumption that the *Sôros* was not the tomb of the Athenians, an idea that, though already expressed earlier, had a brief vogue after Schliemann's incomplete excavations in 1884 until the Greek excavations of 1890. Nevertheless, he offers some interesting and relevant observations, especially regarding the surroundings of the Schinias Marsh.

diese Mitteilung dem Epistaten des Herrn Skouzee[137], einem jungen intellegenten Griechen, unter dessen Leitung diese Weinberge angelegt wurden. Ich selbst habe am Rande der Weinberge nachgegraben und gefunden dass das Erdreich [= soil, JPS] mit Knochenresten durchsetzt, *sich bis in den Sumpf hinein erstreckt* [my emphasis, JPS]" ((Von) Eschenburg 1886, 10, also quoted by Vanderpool 1966b, 101 note 15; Sekunda 2002, 83). In (Von) Eschenburg's own 'summary' he states (once again): "Ich selbst habe am Rande der Weinberge nachgegraben und gefunden, daß das Erdreich bis in den Sumpf hinein mit Knochenresten durchsetzt ist. ... Alles das deutet darauf hin, daß hier Bestattungen einer ungewöhnlich großen Anzahl von Leichen stattgefunden haben. An dieser Stelle muß der Hauptkampf und die Hauptniederlage der Perser stattgefunden haben" ((Von) Eschenburg 1889, 36; equally: Hammond 1973, 200). (Von) Eschenburg then continues the 'summary' by stating that he believes that here, at Chani, the victors were buried and a trophy was erected "während am Rande des Sumpfes, da wo sie geblieben, die Perser verscharrt [= interred, JPS] wurden" ((Von) Eschenburg 1889, 36). Pritchett (1985, 236) rightly, in my view, connects (Von) Eschenburg's observations with the remark by Pausanias (1.32.5) that it is a sacred and imperative duty to cover a human corpse with earth, deducing that the Athenians must have tossed the Persian bodies in a trench that left no landmark, or at least he could not find one[138].

Here again, however, the repeated warnings by Hall (2014) should be reiterated, viz. not to connect too easily seemingly related situations and present them as a certainty. Moreover, as the bones have disappeared, no scientific research on

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[137] Obviously referring to a member of the Skouze family (οικογένεια Σκουζέ). The Skouze family was one of the leading families of Athens. The family first appears in the seventeenth century AD (i.e. during Ottoman rule) in the person of Nikolaos Skouze (1640-1710). A great-grandson of his, Panagis Skouze (1777-1847), became one of the greatest landowners before the Greek revolution which attained Greek independence and played an active role in it. Though (Von) Eschenburg clearly cannot refer to this Panagis here, he does so probably to a direct relative of his. The family kept its prominent position through to the early twentieth century, when a great grandson thrice removed of Nikolaos Skouze I, one Alexandros Skouze (1853-1937) served several times as Foreign Minister of Greece. Another member of the family, Dimitrios Skouze (1890-1970), served as the mayor of Athens for a short time in 1949.

[138] In 9.32.9, Pausanias *Periêgetês* once more states that the Athenians had buried the Persians fallen at Marathon. Jacoby 1944, 43 note 26 remarks, though, that "[f]or Marathon we have a rather amusing tradition in Pausanias 1, 32, 5, who himself distrusted it … the story is a later invention, one of the many illustrations of Athenian humanity or of their observance of the νόμοι Βουζυγῶν." In my view Clairmont (1983, II.293 *ad* 82) is absolutely right in pointing out that Jacoby is here wide off the target. There is no irony in Pausanias' statement (that I can see; it rather seems a statement of facts) and the Athenians had no choice at all but to bury the Persian corpses, if only for sanitary reasons. Even Garland (2017, 18), though, states that "the Athenians falsely claimed that they buried the Persian dead in accordance with divine law", in reality tossing them in a trench (also: Camp 2001, 47). However, as Kinnee 2018, 25 rightly remarks, "[t]he Greeks were interested in putting ghosts to rest and in removing the stain of death from battle sites ..." If only for these reasons, some very basic and simple kind of burial of the Persian dead might be expected. Also see Kinnee 2018. 26.

them has been carried through, at least not one that I have been able to trace. In view of the absence of any remains and/or hard data related therewith, I would prefer to be cautious as regards (Von) Eschenburg's finds, no matter how exciting they may seem to be.

The assumption by (Von) Eschenburg (and Pritchett) might, moreover, appear to contradict the view expressed by Valavanis (2010, 90), based – like theirs – upon the suggestion by Pausanias, quoted from Valavanis's translated summary (95): "[t]he burial of most Persians must have taken place near the point where the trophy was erected. Recent observations by M. Korres [*non vidi*, JPS[139]] suggest that the initial trophy had been erected on a low mound, which was possibly composed with Persian corpses. The two mounds, Athenian and Persian, both constructed by the Athenians, marked the two most important points of the battle, functioning at the same time as trophies of the Athenian triumph". As it appears, Valavanis's view is shared by Tuplin (2010c, 251), who describes the bones unearthed by (Von) Eschenburg as "putative Persian bones". As these bones appear to be lost, so are – as I already indicated above – the (potential) answers to their origin.

As it is, Valavanis's view appears to have been based not merely on Korres's observations but upon a remark in Clairmont (1983, I.112) as well: "[t]he bones could only be those of the Persians, over whom the Athenians appropriately erected their Tropaion". In view of the, on closer inspection, relatively close distance between the location of the Athenian trophy and the vineyard/part of the Schinias Marsh described by (Von) Eschenburg (the vinyard is referred to as 'on the edge', viz. of the marsh), Valavanis' point of view ultimately might seem to be the right one (obviously with the proviso indicated above). As it appears, this view is also expressed by Clairmont (1983, II.293 *ad* note 81), who refers to a remark by Vanderpool 1966b, 101 note 15, reporting the finds of (Von) Eschenburg. Ultimately, there appears to be no contradiction at all in these sources, only a difference either in phasing or emphasis. It looks like the Athenian trophy may have been erected upon Persian corpses (though, likely, not all), while the *Sôros* – not that very far off – covered the remains of the Athenians who fell in the battle. At the same time, the location of the trophy on top of the fallen Persians could well explain (like Sekunda 2002, 83 does) why Pausanias was unable to detect their graves.

In view of the construction of the Olympic rowing track at Schinias for the 2004-games, several excavations were carried through, most of which can be followed

[139] I assume the reference must be to Korres 2008. Korres is here referring to J.A. Kaupert (not to be confused with H. Kiepert), who published, in collaboration with E. Curtius, *Karten von Attika*, Berlin 1862-1897, comprising 32 maps in scale 1:25,000, four in scale 1:12,500 and ten in scale 1:100,000. Kaupert was another member of the Prussian/German army, a lieutenant, supporting the topographic survey of Attica for the Kaiserlich Deutschen Archäologischen Institut in Athens, the very same project the maps drawn by (Von) Eschenburg and Von Twardowsky were part of (see above). Regrettably, I could not get hold of Korres's publication.

in the various 'Excavations in Greece' in the *Archaeological Reports* (published by the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies and the British School at Athens). To the best of my knowledge, no finds have been reported in any of those corroborating Von Eschenburg's finds. Elsewhere in the Marathon region, excavations were (and still are) carried out as well. However, neither of them – again to the best of my knowledge – sheds additional light on the battle of 490 (as also becomes clear by the contribution of Ioanna Tsirigoti-Drakotou in Buraselis/Meidani 2010). An excavation that might have yielded some result was reported by Arapogiannê-Mazokopakê (1985), who excavated there a "Teil eines Gräberfeldes mit Bestattungen vorwiegend aus der archaischen Epoche aufgedeckt. Die Belegung des Friedhofes wurde jedoch auch in klassischer Zeit fortgesetzt …".

Indirectly, the finds in this cemetery confirm what we have seen in the burials in the 'Tumulus of the Plataeans' and in the *Sôros*, but as such they do not present us with new evidence. The same goes for a one-page notice by Photiou (1986). According to his summary, the paper entails that: "[t]he monumental gate or arch of Herod Atticus at Marathon was similar in size and in shape to Hadrian's arch. All that remains of the Herod Atticus gate is ruins. Three epigraphs were found among these ruins. Two of the inscriptions lay claim to the land belonging to Herod and Rigilla [= Aspasia Annia Regilla, Herod's wife, JPS], while the third inscription refers to what is now the town of Marathon, giving it Rigilla's name. It seems in the light of recent research that the ancient town of Marathon lay above Vrana on the plateau that is now called Stamata. Consequently, the Tomb [town? Regilla lies buried in the present *Parco della Caffarella*, part of the *Parco Regionale Appia Antica* in Rome, JPS] lies in a location that has nothing to do with the actual battle of Marathon which must have taken place in the Straits of Avlona". In view of the available evidence discussed above in this paper, the latter observation of Photiou looks to me to be ill-guided.

Arrowheads and other finds

A final word should be dedicated to arrowheads, sling-shot, spearheads, cylinder seals, and helmets which have been associated with 'Marathon', not a few of them (allegedly?) found in the fill over the *Sôros* (cf., e.g., Sekunda 2002, 61). Hammond (1988, 513) remarks on this issue that the proof that the *Sôros* was erected where most casualties fell "is confirmed by the discovery of many arrowheads of the Persian barrage in the fill of the soil which came from nearby in the construction of the mound [referring to Staïs's reports as well as Hammond 1973, 172ff = 176 notably, JPS]" (also in this vein Hammond 1973, 177-178). I find such 'confirmation' from a methodological view rather dubious, as none of these finds appears to really originate from a 'closed context' (see below, emphatically including the remarks by Elisabeth Erdmann, too).

Both the British Museum of London and the archaeological collection of Karlsruhe (Germany) own a sizeable collection of arrowheads that have been brought

in connection with 'Marathon', and were, consequently, described as 'Persian arrowheads' (see, e.g., BM, inv. no. GR 1935.8-23.35 and <http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/search.aspx?searchText=Marathon>. Part of the British Museum arrowheads were acquired in 1906, but allegedly had been found by the (later) Rear-admiral Thomas Saumarez Brock R.N. during an (if it happened at all) hastily executed 'excavation' in 1830 (cf. Galanakis 2013 and his notes 29 and 30). Like the British Museum material, the Karlsruhe material is referred to as well by Galanakis (2013) and his note 90. The Ashmolean Museum of Oxford, on the other hand, houses two spearheads allegedly also retrieved from Marathon and the primary subject of Galanakis's paper. Apart from the arrowheads (and sling-shot), the British Museum also owns three so-called cylinder seals, allegedly found at Marathon, too, and said to have belonged to Persian owners who lost these seals there. The collection of such materials, as we already hinted at above, already started at least as early as the eighteenth century by West-European travellers visiting the Plain of Marathon.

"Three cylinder seals, among the first to be recorded from a European collection and originally in the possession of Sir William Hamilton (1730-1803), were added to the BM in 1772 (Reg. No. 1772,0315,GR.418-420 [i.e. British Museum inv. nos. 89303 (19th century), 89334 (early 7th century), and 89781 (no established date according to the museum; Galanakis suggests 5th century, remarkably in my view): no one of these seals is (normally) on display, JPS]. Said to have been possessions of Persians who fell in the battle of Marathon, they date – as indicated above – to the 19th, early 7th and (perhaps) 5th century BC respectively. Their alleged provenance from the plain of Marathon and their interpretation as Persian possessions probably stems from the romantic connotations already attached to the battlefield in 18th century scholarship" (Galanakis 2013). The British Museum's website is in its description of the provenance even more cautious than Galanakis already is, adding a definite question mark to the findspot or acquisition spot of each of the seals. Luckily (and rightly), Galanakis (2013) makes it unequivocally clear as well that, though perhaps attractive in the eyes of the beholders, the adscription is not at all warranted, rather on the contrary. Obviously, much of his observation is equally valid for the arrowheads, in my view even for most of the arrowheads found by Staïs.

Some lines further in Galanakis's discussion on these finds he remarks that: "[t]he only other substantial collection of 'Marathon' arrowheads still in existence is that at Karlsruhe in Germany (35 pieces). Elisabeth Erdmann has shown that they fall into four types, three of which are contemporary with the battle and the fourth is not, clearly suggesting that the association of this material with the famous battle is not trustworthy". And again: "[t]he numerous arrowheads in existence in collections across the world (the Pitt Rivers Museum at Oxford having a fair amount of them), of types similar to those now in the British Museum and Karlsruhe appears to suggest that these 'Greek', 'Scythian' and 'Persian' type ar-

rowheads were probably far more common than people have previously thought and should thus not necessarily be fixed to a particular location, unless they come from a well-excavated context"[140]. Such a well-excavated context is basically absent for most of the arrowheads referred to above and, in fact, for an object now in the archaeological museum of Olympia (inv. no. B 5100) as well. The latter object is a conical helmet of Eastern, possibly Assyrian, origin with a dedication on the edge Διὶ Ἀθεναῖοι Μέδον λαβόντες (ΔΙΙ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ ΜΗΔΟΝ ΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ: "The Athenians, who took it from the Persian (lit. Mede), to Zeus": cf. Hatzi 2008, 142). As Baitinger (1999, 127) makes clear, it *might* well have originated from Marathon, but it cannot be excluded that it came, e.g., from Plataea – or even from any other place where Athenians faced Persian opponents. Hatzi's remark (*l.c.*) that the inscription "authenticates it as a trophy of the Persian Wars" is about the maximum that could be stated with some plausibility. Like of this helmet, the provenance of the (second) so-called helmet of Miltiades as well, also at Olympia, is not at all certain (see Hatzi 2008, 142; this helmet is not to be confused with that discussed by Kunze 1955, see above). In fact, a secure context is absent for all of these, relatively small, finds. Finds from *within* [my emphasis, JPS] the mounds and originating from the excavations at Marathon by Staïs and Marinatos basically are the only ones relating to the battle with a provenance that to some extent could be described as, more or less, 'secure'[141]. However, as discussed before, (even) the interpretation of the results of these excavations still is very much under discussion.

Persian perspective

As discussed earlier, we have no direct literary evidence detailing the Persian view of notably the 490-campaign. The only remark that could come close, derives from one of the preserved fragments of Ctesias' *Persian History*. It reads: Δᾶτις δὲ ἐπανιὼν ἐκ Πόντου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ στόλου ἡγούμενος, ἐπόρθει νήσους καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα. ἐν Μαραθῶνι δὲ Μιλτιάδης ὑπαντιάζει, καὶ νικᾷ τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ πίπτει καὶ αὐτὸς Δᾶτις· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα Πέρσαις αἰτησαμένοις ἐδόθη ("On his return from Pontus, Datis, the commander of the Persian fleet [or: expedition], ravaged the islands and Greece. At Marathon, he was met by Miltiades. He [i.e. Miltiades] defeated the Persians [lit.: foreigners] and Datis himself was killed. And his body was not returned [sc. by the Athenians] to the Persians at their request": Ctes. *Pers*. F. 13(22); see Stronk 2010, 330-331). Regrettably, this part of Ctesias' story (preserved by Photius) is hopelessly incomplete and offers no clues or causes

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[140] Also see the remarks on this subject by Tuplin 2010c, 251-252.

[141] We can, at least, to a certain extent verify that these excavations have not been tampered with. As far as can be ascertained, the same conclusion – at least for his work at Marathon – is applicable for Heinrich Schliemann as well. As regards other searches in the Marathon plain up to the twentieth century, such a conclusion seems to have to remain unwarrented. However, as Hammond makes clear, the soil used for the construction of the *Sôros* was gathered in its neigbourhood. That this soil contained arrowheads generally described as Scythian, Persian or similar is no conclusive proof that they indeed were that, nor were used by Persians, nor were actually used in the Battle of Marathon.

for Datis' expedition to Greece (like, e.g., also the causes for Xerxes' expedition of 480-479 remain underexposed, not even referring to the Greek expedition against Sardis: Ctes. *Pers*. F. 13(22-25); see Stronk 2010, 330-331)[142].

The Life of Apollonius of Tyana by (L. Flavius) Philostratus (*ca*. AD 170-247) refers to tapestries in a palace in Babylon, as he states a city richly adorned by a queen of Median origin. On one tapestry, he writes: ἐνύφανταί που καὶ ὁ Δᾶτις τὴν Νάξον ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνασπῶν καὶ Ἀρταφέρνης περιεστηκὼς τὴν Ἐρέτριαν … ("Also woven into the tapestries are Datis drawing up Naxos from the sea and Artaphernes encircling Eretria, …": Philostr. *VA* 1.25.2). Naturally, this description is more than likely of an object sprouting from the author's phantasy, though based upon events from the Greco-Persian Wars as described by Herodotus and, as argued by, e.g., Jacoby and Grosso (see note 141), likely also Ctesias (Philostratus mentions that the subjects on the tapestries "come from Greek tales"). An author like Lysanias (*BNJ* 426: Tuplin 2010a) might come to mind as a potential source, too, but the description might as yet also reveal a certain attitude on the Persian side or at least might be a reflection of Persian state ideology. An enticing image in this description, by the way, is that here Artaphernes appears to be described as sole Persian commander at Eretria, very much as Maurice has it. Regrettably, though, we cannot attach too much value to it.

A view that such remarks might reflect Persian state ideology could be reinforced by a fragment derived from *The Trojan Discourse* by Dio Chrysostom (*ca.* AD 40-120), discussing events relating to the Greco-Persian Wars. He relates there that:

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ στρατήγημα παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστιν. ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἤκουσα Μήδου λέγοντος ὅτι οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ Πέρσαι τῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλὰ Δαρεῖον μέν φασιν ἐπὶ Νάξον καὶ Ἐρέτριαν πέμψαι τοὺς περὶ Δᾶτιν καὶ Ἀρταφέρνην, κἀκείνους ἑλόντας τὰς πόλεις ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ βασιλέα. ὁρμούντων δὲ αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ὀλίγας ναῦς ἀποσκεδασθῆναι πρὸς τὴν Ἀττικήν, οὐ πλείους τῶν εἴκοσι, καὶ γενέσθαι τινὰ μάχην τοῖς ναύταις πρὸς τοὺς αὐτόθεν ἐκ τοῦ τόπου	This is a very common strategem [i.e. to use every pretext one can to support one's countrymen]. I heard, for instance, a Mede declare that the Persians concede none of the claims made by the Greeks, but maintain that Darius despatched Datis and Artaphernes against Naxos and Eretria, and that after capturing these cities they returned to the king; that, however, while they were lying at anchor off Euboea, a few of their ships – not more than twenty – were driven on to the Attic coast and that their crews had some kind of an

[142] Ctesias may, though, have influenced Philostratus' comments on the Eretrians who were deported to Asia (*Vita Apollonii* 1.23.1 ff.), as is suggested by Grosso 1958. The influence of Ctesias on this work is considerable; cf. Jacoby 1922, 2073. On Philostratus' Eretrian episode see further Penella 1974.

	engagement with the locals of that place : D. Chr. **11**.148.

Allegedly, the events leading up to and at 'Marathon' have been downplayed here by a Persian – at least in the words of a Greek – but it may perhaps have actually only reflected the outward feeling at the time of the Arsacid (Parthian) Empire (the indirect successor of the Achaemenid Empire) and equally during the Achaemenid Empire itself. It is as such, at least, a view reflected in the words of the poem 'The Persian Version' by Robert Graves: "Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon | The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon" (see Tuplin 2010c, 251 and his note 1)[143]. Such a picture would be, though, according to Tuplin, deceptive. The Persians actually were not at all "reluctant imperialists", as is proven by "[t]he pattern of events from Cyrus to the first decade of Xerxes" (Tuplin 2010c, 259). Tuplin's view is, moreover, corroborated by utterances of the state ideology of the Achaemenids – and their predecessors – as rendered in Stronk 2016-17, 138-139 notes 11 and 12 – which make clear that the inward feeling likely was not at all so noncommittal. Perhaps, the real position taken could be found somewhere in the middle, but firm evidence is – once more – absent.

As it was, the defeat at Marathon was by no means the only defeat suffered by the Persians during the expansion of the Achaemenid Persian Empire (cf., e.g., also Rop 2018, 69-70 *sub* Conclusion). In fact, from the days of Cyrus II the Great onwards military defeat was part of Achaemenid Persian life. Though Xenophon informs us Cyrus the Great died peaceably at his capital (X. *Cyr*. 8.7.28), Cyrus II lost his life making war against the Massagetae along the Syr Darya in December 530 according to Herodotus (cf., e.g., Hdt. 1.214; Beckwith 2009, 63), while Ctesias reports that the Persian king lost his life fighting the Derbices (Ctes. *Pers*. F. 9(7); Stronk 2010, 316-317) and Berossus tells us Cyrus fell making war against the Dahae. As regards the region where Cyrus died these three authors more or less agree as well as on the fact that he did not die peacably. In one aspect, however, Cyrus II appears to have been an exception, as Rop points out, following Pierre Briant's view. Rop asserts that "[a]lthough Achaemenid royal ideology stressed the importance of the king as a warrior and commander-in-chief, Briant (2002), 227-228 notes that Achaemenid kings rarely entered combat themselves and even when present often delegated command responsabilities to their generals …" (Rop 2018, 52 his note 6).

Even though defeat was, as it seems, part of the Achaemenid Empire's expansion, it should be stressed as well that a large part of the classical literature on

[143] This view appears to conform with that of Theopomp. *FGrH*/*BNJ* 115 F. 153; also see Plu. *Mor*. 862D (= *De Herod. Malign*.). Theopompus and the likes of him state on Marathon that it was οὐδ' ἀγών τις ἔοικεν οὐδ' ἔργον γεγονέναι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλὰ πρόσκρουμα βραχὺ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀποβᾶσιν ("not a battle at all or an action of any great importance, but a brief clash with the Persians [lit.: foreigners] as they landed"). Also see Giessen 2010, 50-51.

Persia that has been transmitted to our days was especially focused on the "Empire's military losses, from the Greco-Persian Wars of the fifth century to the invasions of Egypt and the Macedonian conquests of Alexander in the fourth" (Rop 2018, 54). The emphasis on Persia's defeats as they occur in our sources may have been, therefore, somewhat disproportionate. At the same time, these very classical sources make unmistakeably clear that military defeat was seldom held against the (especially Persian) commanders who suffered such defeats, with Tissaphernes in 395 as a noteable exception (after a defeat near Sardis against the Spartan king Agesilaus). On the orders of Artaxerxes II, Tissaphernes was killed by the commander of the king's bodyguard, Tithraustes, following that defeat. In the case of 'Marathon', however, no punitive actions against either Artaphernes or Datis have been reported. Even though Datis himself is not mentioned to have commanded an army again, his sons served Xerxes as cavalry commanders during Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480/479 (cf. Hdt. 7.88.1). Artaphernes himself served during this very campaign as an infantry general (cf. Hdt. 7.74.2).

As regards the Battle of Marathon itself, Tuplin (2010c, 252) confirms that "Persian (or non-Greek) written sources for the battle … do not exist." He refers, though, for some activity that might be connected with the Greco-Persian Wars, to *PFT* NN [≈Q?] 1809, discussed earlier (see Stronk 2016-17, 155, note 48, referring to Hallock 1978, 115; also see Lewis 1980), a tablet detailing several activities by Datis early in 494 (cf. Tuplin 2010c, 253). However, Tuplin argues, absence of non-Greek evidence for events at Marathon is not just a malign incident. The Persepolis archives were essentially non-military in nature, Babylon's *Astronomical Diaries* only included events outside Babylonia if the Persian king was personally involved, and texts like the Bisitun inscription are formulaic and (as such necessarily) imprecise. All these circumstances cause, in his view, that we should not look primarily in Persian sources for a Persian perspective on occurrences like 'Marathon' (even though such sources should be consulted, I think, for the background to expound Persian actions; for that purpose, they are very illustrative). As it is, according to Tuplin, the best possibility to acquire a Persian perspective (e.g., on Persia's intentions leading up to 'Marathon') is as yet to be acquired from Greek sources (Tuplin 2010c, 255; see also Dimopoulou 2010, 237 and her note 1). On the other hand, e.g., Garland (2017, 133) rightly remarks, as regards Aeschylus' more or less contemporary *Persae*, that it is "heavily colored with Athenian propaganda". We should, therefore, be careful when using Greek sources for the Persian perspective (like, obviously, for the Greek perspective as well).

In a conversation with the Persian queen-mother Atossa in Aeschylus' *Persae*, centred on Xerxes' expedition to Greece of 480/479, the chorus describes 'Marathon' as πολλὰ κακά "a great evil" for the Persians (A. *Pers*. 236), ὥστε Δαρείου πολύν τε καὶ καλὸν φθεῖραι στρατόν ("to such extent that it destroyed Darius' great and splendid army": A. *Pers*. 244). Afterwards, the messenger brings the news of

the Persian defeat – and massive loss of lives – at Salamis. It leads to Atossa's utterance: κοὐκ ἀπήρκεσαν | οὓς πρόσθε Μαραθὼν βαρβάρων ἀπώλεσεν ("and not sufficed those of the Persians [lit. foreigners] which Marathon earlier destroyed": A. *Pers*. 474-5). Even conceding that the *Persae* could reflect (occasionally?) a Persian perspective on 'Marathon', the words nevertheless are very much from a Greek one, in my view. Contrasting Aeschylus, however, Herodotus' report is, in Tuplin's view, quite meagre from a Persian perspective (Tuplin 2010c, 256, nevertheless conceding that in Hdt. 3.134.1-6 Darius and Atossa already discussed an all-out attack on Greece: Tuplin 2010c, 259; Keaveney 2011, 27 declares himself less certain on this issue), as are – in fact – other Greek authors' accounts as well (*ibidem*). Remarkable, in Herodotus' work, is the three-cornered relationship Persia-Athens-Hippias, especially in view of Persia's demands for earth-and-water from Greece's *poleis*, emphatically including Athens (cf. Hdt. 5.73, 96; 6.49; Tuplin 2010c, 259-62). In the end, in view of the available literary material, I believe Tuplin's conclusion regarding 'Marathon' ("since we cannot assume the Persians committed exceptionally large forces and since we do not know the military plan in the event of a Persian victory in Attica … we cannot readily decide what sort of discomfort was caused by the defeat in Attica": Tuplin 2010c, 263) to be apt.

As yet, Tuplin appears to believe there has been actual Persian discomfort as a consequence of 'Marathon', adducing as evidence the extensive preparations for the 480-expedition. I am not at all sure this alone suffices as proof, even though it might well be a potent indication. More to the point, I believe that the fact that Xerxes himself decided to participate in this expedition might suggest that 'Marathon' had struck home. Earlier in this paper, I already argued that I do not believe that Darius would have sent soldiers with Datis and Artaphernes that were not fully equipped and believed to be able to perform the duties they were ordered to execute. My reasoning was that the Greeks, emphatically including Eretrians and Athenians, had violated divine order as Darius saw it. The army sent by Darius had to right that wrong, very much like Xerxes' army was due, in part, to right the previous wrong as well as that of 490, which is why the 480-expedition got additional weight (and royal attention). In view of such essential tasks, however, no ruler could allow himself to dispatch a (partly) inadequate army to do such a vital job at any moment. It asked, obviously, for an elaborate preparation as well. Evidence, though, to corroborate my view (and that of Tuplin, obviously) is – once again – absent.

Implications

"The importance of Marathon seems in many ways to have been exaggerated by most ancient writers except Herodotus, and even Herodotus shares in the exaggeration in Book ix, Chapter 27. It certainly was not one of the decisive battles of the world. It decided nothing, for the Persians came again in ten years. Certainly, it illustrated, possibly for the first time, the superiority of the hoplite in close order to the skirmishing Persian; but not in a way which the Persians accepted

as decisive" (Whatley 1964, 131). Nevertheless, Raaflaub is positive regarding the meaning of 'Marathon' in the end: "I cannot help thinking that from this perspective too Marathon was crucial: it denied the Persians a stronghold in Greece proper, kept Athens free and undiminished, and thus was an indispensable condition for the successful resistence of the Hellenic League in 480/79" (Raaflaub 2010, 232), adding that "this apparently was not Herodotus's perspective" (*ibidem*).

As it was, the Athenian action has fuelled immensely strong feelings in due course, which might – perhaps – best be described as 'patriotic' , praising Athens' achievement excessively, like, e.g., Plato does (*Mx*. 240DE: "freedom of all dwellers of the continent" *cet. par.*; see also Pl. *Mx*. 241AB, C). According to Dimopoulou, a similar view permeates Aeschylus' *Persae* as well (and it certainly permeates her contribution, be it notably extolling the results of 'Salamis' and 'Plataea', even though she attributes a special meaning to 'Marathon': Dimopoulou 2010, 247). Tuplin (2010c, 258, note 36) refers to an inscription, i.e. Meiggs/Lewis 26[144]: if (but as the comments on the inscription make clear it is a big 'if') the inscription does refer to Marathon, "then its author regarded Marathon as defending all Greece from slavery." In fact, the attribution is debated and may as well refer to, e.g., Salamis (also see Jung 2006, 84-96).

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[144] The (badly damaged) inscription itself (= *IG* I^3 503/4) is reconstructed from four parts, labelled A I, A II, B and C, other parts still being lost (probably). The text is extensively commented upon on the website of 'Attic Inscriptions'. The comments make clear that, "[g]iven its fragmentary state, the exact nature of the monument and the battle or battles commemorated by it are uncertain. A. Gomme suggested that the whole monument was an epitaph for the fallen in the Battle of Salamis (*Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 1956, vol. 2, 98-102). Matthaiou identifies the monument with the 'cenotaph near town' (*to pros toi astei polyandreion*) mentioned in *Ag*. I 7529, an unpublished second-century inscription from the Agora, which he sees as a counterpart to the cenotaph at Marathon itself (Matthaiou 2003, 195-199). The most recent interpretation sees it as a memorial for the Persian Wars as a whole, with A.II referring to Marathon, B to Salamis, and C to Mykale or to Salamis, emphasising thematic links between the battles (Petrovic, 158-177 [= Petrovic 2007; JPS]; E. Bowie in: Buraselis/Meidani eds., *Marathon*, 2010, 204-212; Hornblower/Pelling, *Herodotus: Histories Book VI*, 2017, 2-4). The inscription is one of a number of monuments set up in the immediate aftermath of the Persian Wars through which various groups attempted to stake a claim to the victory and define the meaning of that victory in different ways, …". And, somewhat further: "[m]ost commentators associate A.II with the Battle of Marathon, though Gomme 1956 links it with the Battle of Salamis. The Greek text is unclear on the identity of the 'gates' and whether it is them or the city that is 'by the sea'. Most older restorations assume that they are the gates of a city by the sea (e.g. Peek 1960; Meritt *AJP* 83, 1962), but no battle of the Persian Wars was fought before the gates of Athens, unless the sense is metaphorical, and Athens is not really 'by the sea'. Matthaiou instead reads the 'gates by the sea', understanding them as the seaside pass between Agrieliki and Brexiza, through which the Athenians marched to Marathon (Matthaiou 2003, 200; for the pass see *IG* I^3 1015bis, with Koumanoudes, *Archaiologika Analekta ex Athēnōn* 11, 1978, 238)." See: <https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/ML/26 >, published online March 13, 2018. As may have become clear, certainty is not acquired here, either.

It is, therefore, absolutely correct that Buraselis describes in the introductory contribution to Buraselis/Meidani 2010 (32) that "[t]he elevation of the battle to an event of not just Athenian or Greek but, more generally, European significance can be traced already in antiquity (Plato, [referred to above, JPS] and, more decidedly and elaborately, Aelius Aristides [also see above]), that is long before such views expressed by modern thinkers like John Stuart Mill and a whole series of classicists." A fine example of such thinking may be found in Georges (1994, 83-85), who notes as a reason for Aeschylus to present things from a Persian perspective in the *Persae* the need to magnify the Greek achievement (a view shared by, e.g., Dimopoulou (2010, 246-249)) and to stress the distance between the Greek and the Persian culture. Even though, as we have seen, an author like Theopompus appears to have tried redressing this view, his efforts seem to have been futile, both in antiquity and extending to the present.

It seems that the exalted feeling regarding the Athenian achievement extends at least as far as Burkhard Meissner who, referrring to the battles of 490 and 480, states that they "triggered the failure of a territorial power (the Achaemenid Empire) to expand into a peripheral hinterland of small-scale, quasi-tribal politico-social entities (Greece)" (Meissner 2010, 275; in similar vein Giessen 2010, 51-53). Admitting fully that the direct Achaemenid-Persian expeditions into Greece ultimately failed, I am nevertheless far from conceding that the Achaemenids did not (indirectly) expand their power (if only through their financial abilities) sufficiently into the Greek world to influence the occurrences there during at least a century after Mardonius' defeat at Plataea in 479 (also see Stronk 1990-91). Giessen (2010, 49), therefore rightly, prefers a terminology drawn from the chess-play and calls 'Marathon' no more than a "*remis*", a draw (while I believe the 480-479 Persian expedition certainly did not result in a final checkmate for the Persians).

Another modern author, one with a background as a soldier, sc. James Lacey, exalts the result of 'Marathon', stating that "[h]ad the Athenians and their Plataean ally failed at Marathon, Greece would have been doomed" (Lacey 2013, 188)[145]. He believes the Persian army would have been reinforced during the winter, that many Greek *poleis* would have gone over to the Persian side, and that Persia would have completed their conquest of Greece in the campaigning season of 489 (*ibidem*). Instead, 'Marathon' had given Greek morale a boost against "the Oriental hordes [*sic*!] of the Persian Empire" (Lacey 2013, 189). Consequently, in his view, "[i]n the decades after the battle, no Greek doubted its importance" (*ibidem*). Moreover, Athens did not merely save itself and Greece, it saved "by extension all of Western civilization" (Lacey 2013, 189-190). Though I fully appreciate

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[145] This kind of views, occasionally phrased as Lacey does, sometimes slightly more shrouded - as rendered above -, emerges with some frequency, ever though Max Weber (1905 [6th edition, 1985:], 273-276,285-286) made clear that such statements are utterly unwarranted and untenable.

Lacey's military knowledge, it may be clear from the material I have adduced until now that I believe that he is grossly overstating Athens' case. His view as such, moreover, in the end cannot be corroborated by the evidence available to us.

I believe Meissner is on much firmer ground when he concludes that Athens' struggle against the Persians "is usually seen as a struggle of freedom against aggression and suppression, … This interpretation … was part of an *ideological construct* [my emphasis] that emerged alongside increasing Athenian-Spartan dualism during the fifth century and it dominates our general picture of the epoch from Herodotus until today" (Meissner 2010, 278). Especially the emphasis, as we have discussed several times, the Athenians laid on the fact that they withstood the Persians unaided (even though untrue), in my perspective, stresses the ideological component in the accepted approach, from early on – as also Meissner underlines –, not merely of the Persian invasion(s) but above all of the Athenian role in 'the defence of the west'. In addition to Meissner's view, Sommer (2010, 307) believes that their victory at Marathon legitimised the Athenians in their view "to take their own imperial run-up". Even though I hold a less absolute belief on this issue than Sommer does, I completely share his view that "the battle was depicted as the one decisive victory of Greek *eleutheria* over Barbarian slavery. In Athens itself, the event began to be transformed into a myth some 30 years after the battle, when Kimon was in power" (*ibidem*). However, this is as much as we can uphold in view of the evidence, I think.

Above, I already outlined several times – implicitly and explicitly – that I believe that Cimon's view and narrative influenced Herodotus' account and thus (if only indirectly) shaped our view on the occurrences as well. As it seems, Cimon's attitude may also have (greatly) contributed to Themistocles' being ostracized in 472 or 471. Moreover, Themistocles had not made himself better-liked by disputing the merits of the victory at Marathon (cf., e.g., Garland 2017, 115). Add to this toxic mixture that Cimon and Themistocles "were bitter political rivals" (*ibidem*) and the recipe for a fierce controversy was at hand. As regards the issue of the image of Athens' role, Giessen (2010, 54-55) *expressis verbis* believes that the extolling of Athens' role in the Greco-Persian conflict – notably 'Marathon' – by especially Athenian authors was caused by the vicissitudes during the *Pentecontaetia* and succeeding Peloponnesian War. Here was a victory that Athens did not need to share (we already saw that *at least* as early as the beginning of the fourth century BC the role of Plataea had been completely whisked away). Moreover, it seems to have been a battle that at least preluded upon the prominent position (at least for the mid-fifth century BC) in Athens of one particular family, sc. the Alcmaeonidae – the family Cimon married into, if only by Herodotus' comments regarding the so-called shield incident after the battle had been fought.

There is a final implication relating to the battle to be stressed, even though it is not strictly (or directly) of historical nature. Buraselis (2010, 32) underlines there

is more to 'Marathon', notably including its landscape, than meets the eye and advocates its preservation against "the most sinister successors of the Medes, that is bulldozers and cement". My review of the archaeological evidence in the Plain of Marathon made clear, I hope, that this particular plea by Buraselis is very much relevant to the present day. A similar threat as presently endangers the Marathon plain I previously witnessed along the coast of the Sea of Marmora in the European part of Turkey, with catastrophic results for the historical landscape (cf. Stronk 1995, 13). I only can hope there still is some time and/or opportunity for the Marathon Plain to redress the situation, be it not completely, but anyway in part, and save it from 'progress'.

Conclusion

Guided by an almost unshakeable belief in the unerring correctness of the description by classical authors – in spite of an increasing flow of evidence from Ancient Near Eastern sources, both literary and archaeological, from about the middle of the nineteenth century AD onwards – European scholars have portrayed a picture of the Greco-Persian wars that still largely holds to the present day and still (largely) omits the Persian perspective. A key role in this situation – and in this part of the paper focused on the Battle of Marathon (but also in the preceding part) – has been played by Herodotus. From our perspective it seems inconceivable that an author, who set out his investigations ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι ("That things done by men will get not forgotten in time, nor great and marvelous deeds, some performed by the Hellenes, some by the Persians [lit.: foreigners], will lose their glory, including among others why they made war on each other": Hdt. 1.1.0), did not even take the trouble – at least not as it seems – to have a look at a battlefield, situated close by where he settled for quite some time. Instead, he made up an extremely cursory account, as it seems largely composed of shards of some personal recollections of (alleged) participants, supplemented with a few general remarks, a little gossip, and a limited supply of facts. Morever, at least part of the facts he does provide, appear to have been influenced in some measure -we cannot determine the precise extent nor how much he was aware (or even could be aware) of this- by the views of Cimon c.s., the dominant people at Athens at the time Herodotus wrote his work and read it in public and to whom he was indebted.

In sum, Herodotus produced a story that seems all in all quite unsatisfactory. Herodotus' method here might, perhaps, be explained by the fact that, at the time of his writing this account, this very battle *might* not (yet) have had the status it would acquire (already very shortly, if – though – not already achieved at that time) later. It may also fit in with the view expressed by Raaflaub that Herodotus made a conscious choice "to reserve his fireworks for the Xerxes campaign" (cf. Raaflaub 2010, 234; see also the remarks by Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 242 *ad*

109-117, cited earlier and my comment on it). Anyway, the method applied here by Herodotus appears to be very much at odds with the one he wrote to have used before, in his account of Egypt: μέχρι μὲν τούτου ὄψις τε ἐμὴ καὶ γνώμη καὶ ἱστορίη ταῦτα λέγουσα ἐστί ("Until now, all I have said is based upon my own autopsy, judgment, and inquiry": Hdt. 2.99.1). The ὄψις ἐμὴ ("autopsy"), certainly, appears to have been frequently missing here.

As it seems first Thucydides, but also Plato expanded – as we have discussed in the two parts dedicated to the Greco-Persian relations in the period 499-490 – on Athenian heroism displayed during the Marathon encounter between the Persians and the Atheno-Plataean army (though notably focusing on especially the hoplite element within the Athenian part) to defend the *polis* of Athens. However, they merely were two among a host of other authors and rhetors glorifying the Μαραθωνομάχαι, the "fighters of Marathon", from at least the end of the fifth century BC onwards (cf. Hornblower/Pelling 2017, 5-6 and notes 9-15). I believe that, as the meaning where this *polis* (allegedly and differing for each individual) stood for, what it represented (or especially what it is/was believed to represent, as indicated above *sub* 'Implications'), grew, also the value attributed to the Battle of Marathon increased. This is shown by the visitors of the site from at least the 17th century AD onwards (cf. Kreeb 2010), but especially during the Age of Romanticism after the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) – as may, e.g., gathered from the activities of Nugent referred to above. Notably a too Europecentric view of the world (still further) enhanced the value attached to the heroism displayed in the (distant) past – without any attempt from my part to distract even the slightest from that very heroism, for heroic the Athenians' stand at Marathon was, indeed, certainly under the circumstances. Nevertheless, relatively too much value was – in my view – attached to the Battle of Marathon *per se* or, rather, the battle was placed in a wrong perspective, in a frame that did (and does) not fit the occurrences properly[146]. Equally important: the predominant, western, view failed (and still largely fails to this day) to take the 'Persian perspective' sufficiently into account (obviously facilitated by the paucity of especially Achaemenid material that can be associated directly with this event) – still further distorting the outcome of such research (cf., e.g., Tuplin 2010a).

The absence of a proper, factual, (near) contemporary historical account that does right to both sides involved in this conflict facilitates the growth of what might be described as 'historical myths', which distort(ed) our view on the ac-

[146] See, e.g., the remark of Vivi Vassilopoulou, especially the second sentence, in 2013 General Director of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage of the Hellenic Ministry of Culture: "Marathon, as the emblematic symbol of European cultural heritage belongs to all of us. See in contrast the views of Weber in the 1905 paper, referred to in my note 144. In my view this is a purely political statement, not one that has any bearing in the historical discourse. It is the trophy of the supremacy of human values, spirit and democracy" (quoted in Christos/Anastasios 2013, 91).

tual occurrences. This distortion is/was further facilitated by the fact that also archaeological evidence – even more if we take the warnings provided by Hall (2014) into account – gives us precious little in support. The final result of it all is the (majority of the) confusing and contradictory material I offer my audience, notably in this second part of the survey but also already in the first part (= Stronk 2016-17), together with my comments and remarks. On the basis of these comments and remarks, it may be obvious that I am unable to offer a conclusive synthesis of the evidence presented (especially as regards 'Marathon', a slightly better one – I think – for 'Eretria' and 'Sardis' (see Stronk 2016-17)). Nevertheless, I have ventured to suggest some views which, perhaps, could be taken as a starting point for further research. As it is, I tend to believe that combining the main ideas propagated by Maurice and my view that prior to the Battle of Marathon the Persian army had split up, due to which the army led by Callimachus (and Miltiades) only faced a reduced Persian army and fully exploited that advantage might open new roads to investigate.

I therefore do not believe that my exercise has been (or is) without any use at all. First of all, it underlines the importance to observe the *caveats* set out by Hall (2014), certainly as regards this type of investigation, where the evidence is so conflicting. The second use, and in my view certainly as important as its first, is that it should have become clear – once more – to (future) researchers that it is unwise to *unquestionably* believe Herodotus' account, important and agreeable to read as it may be, in spite of Hammond's adamant defence of Herodotus (e.g. Hammond 1973, 228-231). His view is/was one of many, both in antiquity and later, and, moreover above all, he certainly was not at all an impartial bystander. For many who consider Herodotus' account as the leading testimony for the Greco-Persian wars – as it is overwhelmingly used, even in the great source-book of Achaemenid Persian history by Amélie Kuhrt (Kuhrt 2007) – this should not merely be a sobering thought, but above all one to take to heart[147]. Instead, we should use, whenever and wherever they are present (even though their number still is rather limited), both classical and, certainly, the Ancient Near Eastern sources more fully to complete our still too biased picture.

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[147] There are, in my view, at least three reasons to treat Herodotus' account (of Marathon) with the utmost care:

First: his clear Athenophile inclinations, here enhanced – as it appears – by the bias with Cimon;

Second: the fact that several of his descriptions rather appear as a *topos* than as a precise rendering of occurrences;

Third: that the (pre-)battle scenes often seem to have been rather moulded in Homeric (or: traditional Greek) images than necessarily aimed at maximal accuracy.

On the other hand: his is the only extensive and – more or less – coherent account, moreover to some extent based upon the stories of eye-witnesses and/or people directly involved in the occurrences described.

Abbreviations

ARV^2 = Beazley, J.D. 1963: *Attic Red-figure Vase-painters*, 2nd ed., Oxford.
BNJ = *Brill's New Jacoby*, Worthington, I. (ed.), <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby>) [subscription required].
CEG = Hansen, P. 1983-1989: *Carmina epigraphica graeca*, 2 vols, vol. 1: *Saeculorum viii-v a. Chr. n.*; vol. 2: *Saeculi iv a. Chr. n. Accedunt addenda et corrigenda ad CEG 1*, Berlin/New York.
FGE = Page, D.L. (ed.) 1981: *Further Greek Epigrams: Epigrams before AD 50 from the Greek Anthology and Other Sources, Not Included in Hellenistic Epigrams or The Garland of Philip*, Cambridge.
FGrH = Jacoby, F. (ed.) 1923-1958: *Die Fragmente griechischen Historiker*, 3 parts in 17 vols, Berlin/Leiden.
LGPN = The *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*. See for its website: <http://www.lgpn.ox.ac.uk/online/search_data.html>.
LSJ = Liddell, H.G./R. Scott/ H. Stuart Jones/R.McKenzie (eds.) 1996 (9th edition): A Greek-English lexicon, With a Revised Supplement (P.G. Glare (ed.)), Oxford.
MS(S) = manuscript(s).
OLD = Glare, P.G.W. (ed.) 1996: *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford [reprint with corrections].
OP = Old Persian.
PAA = Traill, *Persons of Ancient Athens*, see below under Traill.
PEG = Bernabé, A. 1988: *Poetae Epici Graeci* (2nd edition 1996), Berlin/New York.
PFT = Persepolis Fortification Tablet(s).
PMG = See below: Page, D.L. (ed.) 1975.
PTT = Persepolis Treasury Tablet(s).
RE = Pauly, A./G.Wissowa/K. Ziegler (eds.) 1894-1980: *Real-Encyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 84 vols., Stuttgart.
SH = Lloyd-Jones, H./P. Parsons 1983: *Supplementum Hellenisticum*, Berlin.
TGF = Nauck, A. 1889: *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 2nd ed.; Suppl. by B. Snell (1964).
TrGF = Snell, B./R. Kannicht/S. Radt (eds.) 1971-2004: *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, 6 vols., vol. 1^2: 1986, Göttingen.

Texts and editions

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