

SPARTA AND PERSIA: 412-386

An Outline

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One of the interesting topics in Greek history is the relation between Sparta and Persia. Especially for the 5th century this relation has been discussed by David M. Lewis in his *Sparta and Persia*. Originally a collection of several lectures delivered at the University of Cincinnati in 1976, the book is a challenging mixture of both trodden roads and a fresh and new approach to old problems. To my regret Lewis largely omitted the period after 412 from his analyses, only describing the events after that date.

In the present article I have tried to go somewhat deeper into the relations between these two powers, primarily taking the political situation within Sparta as a basis. As time limits for my study I have chosen 412 and 386 B.C. (all data in the article are B.C., except, of course, in the references to secondary literature). In 412/1 Sparta and Persia concluded a treaty. That treaty ended the state of war that, technically, still existed until then between both states. That state of war was still discernable and resounded in the agreements.¹ Moreover, the terms of the treaty were a first surrender by Sparta of the Ionian Greeks to the Persian throne. Since the Greeks in Asia were one of the main points of common interest in the relations between Sparta and Persia, this treaty looks to me a proper starting point.

Again in 386 a treaty was negotiated, the King's Peace or Peace of Antalcidas. The treaty ended the state of war between Sparta and Persia. Again the Ionian Greeks were the main victims. After the treaty a new set of relations developed within Greece. The treaty was, therefore, the proper closing point for this article.

I have in no respect the illusion that I dealt with all problems between Sparta and Persia within the period of 412-386. Nor do I think that whatever problem I discuss is dealt with completely or even satisfactorily. That was not the aim of this study. Its main purpose is to outline (some of) the problems connected with the relations between the two

¹ Cf. Amit, M., *Rivista storica dell'antichità* 4 (1974) 55-63.

major powers in the Aegean world at that time. At the same time it is intended as an invitation for further research in this field.

In 404 Sparta had concluded the Peloponnesian War successfully, with Persian aid. This Persian aid had mainly been received due to Cyrus the Younger. Sparta was now unquestionably by far the 'superpower' of the Greek states. But what would Sparta do? Would it return to its previous policy of more or less limited isolation? Would it replace Athens and engage into an active policy in Greece? And if so, how would it deal with that other superpower within the Greek world, Persia? Would Sparta allow Persia the overlordship over the Ionian cities or would it challenge the Persian empire?

As anxious as the rest of the Greek world awaited the answer to these questions, so arduous was within Sparta the political struggle connected with the answer. In fact, there could be discerned within Spartan politics three separate political factions,² each adhering to a different answer.

The first faction, headed by King Pausanias, was the moderate, traditionalist group, which objected a Spartan empire: it amounted to a policy of restraint. It would act actively only within the sphere of the Peloponnese, or if Sparta's reputation asked for action, and stressed diplomacy rather than force. Its members feared the corrupting influence of the introduction of wealth and luxury which imperialism would bring: a return to the traditional Lycurgan rules would prevent chaos. Among this faction we may find some *gerontes* who had opposed the introduction of money in 404.³

The second faction, headed by King Agis, enjoyed the fruits of rule and favoured a strong foreign policy. Probably partly moved by private motives,⁴ Agis felt that the time had come for a policy of Spartan supremacy and toughness in Greece. He wished to increase Spartan power also outside the Peloponnese, into central Greece (including Attica), perhaps even into Thessaly.⁵ He supported the system of *harmosts* and *decarchies*, many of which were installed by Lysander during his commands and activities abroad, as long as they were loyal to Sparta and not to Lysander. On the other hand, since Agis' activities could bring in large quantities of wealth and booty, he may have been less traditionalistic on this point, too.

The third faction consisted of Lysander and his supporters. Their

² Hamilton 1970: 294-315; *id.* 1979: 82-5.

³ Cf. Plut., *Lys.*, XVII; Paus. III, ix, 11. The abbreviations used in the notes for names and works of classical Greek authors are according to Liddell and Scott, *Greek English Lexicon* (Oxford 1968).

⁴ Hamilton 1979: 83-4.

⁵ Cf. Thuc. VIII, iii, 1.

domestic program called for a departure from the traditional austerity of Spartan life, possibly more or less in concert with Agis' views. What divided Agis and Lysander—besides the fear of the former for an unchecked power of the latter, that might threaten his own position—was the approach to foreign policy. Where Agis contented himself with continental Greece, Lysander chose for the Aegean as a more fertile field of imperialism. His methods also were somewhat harsher. Where Agis worked towards his goals by active collaboration with pro-Spartan elements,⁶ Lysander's methods were brutal and direct, accompanied by murder, purge, or exile of opponents.⁷ However, the differences between Agis' and Lysander's factions are, in fact, rather marginal to the eye, and certainly not a matter of principle. I think that personal sentiments may have had the priority over political reason in the formation of the third faction.

In spite of their personal controversies the Kings Agis and Pausanias seem to have made in the spring of 403 a certain agreement to check the *de facto*—if only by his reputation as commanding officer—power of Lysander.⁸ At that time Lysander commanded in Attica. Plutarch described the situation as follows: "But the kings were jealous of him and feared to let him capture Athens a second time; they therefore determined that one of them should go out with the army. And Pausanias did go out, ostensibly on behalf of the tyrants [i.e. the Thirty at Athens, JPS] against the people, but really to put a stop to the war, in order that Lysander might not again become master of Athens through the efforts of his friends. This object, then, he easily accomplished, and by reconciling the Athenians and putting a stop to their discord, he robbed Lysander of his ambitious hopes."⁹ According to Xenophon¹⁰ the kings (or Pausanias) had to persuade three of the five ephors to accomplish the scheme. This suggests that Lysander (still) had a strong support in Sparta. After all, this same board of ephors had endowed him with the command in Attica.

The jealousy of the kings is understandable if we take the atmosphere of competition, that existed in Sparta, into account. The individual Spartan's desire for honour is an important factor in his behaviour—or of other Spartans towards him (cf. the position of Brasidas¹¹ or the preference of the ephor Endius¹²). Moreover, the Spartan *homoioi* are

⁶ Cf. Thuc. V, lviii sqq.; Xen., *H.G.*, III, ii, 27-9.

⁷ Plut., *Lys.*, VIII, 1-4; XIII/XIV, XIX, 1-4; Nepos, *Lysander*, II.

⁸ Cf. Plut., *Lys.*, XVIII.

⁹ Plut., *Lys.*, XXI, 3.

¹⁰ *H.G.*, II, iv, 29.

¹¹ Thuc. V, xvi, 1.

¹² Thuc. VIII, xii, 2.

only notionally equal: there appears to have existed considerable differences between them.¹³ The kings may as much have wanted to keep Lysander at his place as Lysander, possibly with some support of his communal messmates,¹⁴ tried to advance himself. At the same time any balance between factions in Sparta *could* be disturbed by the activities of the ephors, the principal political functionaries, chosen for one year.¹⁵ Their power in Spartan society was very considerable.¹⁶ However, since they were elected every year, the ephorate also was potentially an unstable factor in Spartan politics. As long as Sparta adhered to its traditional values no real big problems were to be expected, other than connected with the peculiarities of the Spartan governmental system. When Sparta had to deal with the consequences of an expanding empire troubles might arise. As there were at least two or three factions in Sparta with (very) opposite views, there was no certainty that a policy adopted during one year still would be supported during the following year.¹⁷ In this context it is a pity that we know only a few names of ephors, also for the period between 404 and 395, the critical years for the Spartan empire.¹⁸

Immediately upon his arrival in Sparta, King Pausanias was brought to trial—about October 403¹⁹—by his enemies, in this case both the Lysandrians and King Agis' faction. The court consisted of 28 *gerontes*, the 5 ephors and King Agis. Fourteen senators and King Agis declared that Pausanias was guilty, the rest of the court voted for his acquittal.²⁰ This verdict shows that, now, all 5 ephors supported King Pausanias, or at least thought the disadvantages of a sentence greater than its profits. Pausanias did not mention the charges brought in against King Pausanias, but probably his foreign policy has played a part. When King Pausanias was standing trial for the second time, in 395, one of the charges brought in was that he had "allowed the Athenian democrats to escape when he got them in his power in Peiraeus"²¹ during his campaign of 403. That might indicate that some in Sparta, including King Agis, thought him too soft and lenient in foreign affairs.

¹³ Lewis 1977: 32-3.

¹⁴ Cf. Lewis 1977: 34-5.

¹⁵ Cf. Arist., *Pol.*, 1270b6-1271a8; Lewis 1977: 40 and (n. 66 and) 87.

¹⁶ Cf. Den Boer, W., *Laconian Studies* (Leiden 1954) 197 ff. (with bibliography).

¹⁷ Cf. Artaxerxes' complaint: Thuc. IV, 50, 2; on this letter Lewis 1977: 2-3 and n. 3.

¹⁸ Poralla 1913: 168-9.

¹⁹ Hamilton 1970: 306.

²⁰ Paus. III, v, 2.

²¹ Xen., *H.G.*, IV, v, 25.

After the trial of King Pausanias, there seems to have existed some sort of a truce in Sparta. The closeness of voting at Pausanias' trial and the relative inactivity of the Spartans abroad suggest that the three factions were rather closely balanced. No single one was able to secure effective control of the state or to assume consistent direction of foreign policy between late 403 and late 400. Sparta did not even react when Thebes seized Oropus, nor when Athens took Eleusis.²² Neither of these events was very much in line with Agis' (or Lysander's) policy: that Sparta did nothing may prove King Pausanias' still considerable influence.

In the meantime Lysander tried his luck in Thrace. His actions there caused a complaint to the Spartan government by Pharnabazus concerning Lysander. Lysander was called back to Sparta.²³ Next, Lysander tried to secure divine consent—by visiting several oracles—for his plan to widen the circle of those eligible for kingship to all Spartans when Agis should die.²⁴ The priests of the Ammon-oracle, however, did not cooperate, complained with the ephors (according to Plato²⁵ one of the tasks of the ephors was to check “ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γινόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ Ἑρακλειδῶν”) for attempted bribery by Lysander, and Lysander was called back once again to stand trial. In fact, nothing came of the trial and Lysander was commissioned with an embassy to Sicily.²⁶

The stalemate between the three parties ended in the winter of 400/399. The Greek cities in Ionia were the direct cause of this development. In 412/1 Sparta and Persia had concluded three treaties in which Persia promised support to Sparta in turn for the surrender of the Greek cities in Asia to Persia.²⁷ In the words of the Spartan general and one of the negotiators of the treaty, Lichas, the Milesians and other inhabitants of the King's land must be the slaves of Tissaphernes, and behave properly, and seek his favour till the war was well settled.²⁸

Lewis²⁹ argues that, about 407, Sparta and Persia concluded a fourth

²² Diod. Sic. XIV, xvii, 1-3; Xen., *H.G.*, II, iv, 41.

²³ Plut., *Lys.*, XIX-XXI; Nepos, *Lysander*, III, 1 sqq.

²⁴ Diod. Sic. XIV, xiii, 1-6.

²⁵ *Alc.*, 121 B.

²⁶ Plut., *Lys.*, II, 5; cf. Kahrstedt, U., “Lysandros”, *RE* XIII (1927), cols. 2503-6 for the chronology of the events.

²⁷ Cf. Bengtson, H., *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II, *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.* (München/Berlin 1962) 139-43; cf. on these treaties also Lewis 1977: 90-107; Cartledge 1979: 266 does not regard the first two Spartan-Persian agreements of 412/1 as genuine treaties.

²⁸ Thuc. VIII, lxxxiv, 5.

²⁹ Lewis 1977: 123 ff.

treaty, replacing the treaties of 412/1, concluded by an embassy under Boiotius.³⁰ The existence of this 'Treaty of Boiotius' is doubted by Cartledge.³¹ He argued that at the time of Boiotius' mission to Persia Sparta was making peace overtures to Athens, partly to recover Spartiate prisoners. Therefore, he argued, Sparta did not have time to spare for Asiatic Greeks. I think that the mission of Boiotius may well have resulted in an agreement or treaty—if only to have Persian support if the overtures to Athens did not succeed. I also believe that it would have been unwise from Spartan point of view to put the case of the Asiatic Greeks forward during talks in which Sparta had next to nothing to offer in return. Lewis, however, believes that the Spartans negotiated an autonomy of those cities, on condition that they paid tribute to the King of Kings³² and they would be secure from Persian armed action as long as they did.

Indeed, the wording of Diodorus of Sicily³³ *might* indicate that the *status* of the Greek cities in Ionia was more or less autonomous, at least independent from the satrap, in 400. The phrasing of the Spartan ultimatum towards Tissaphernes also *may* be explained by such a treaty.³⁴ However, the takeover of the Ionian cities in 404 by Tissaphernes, and the absence of a Spartan reaction then, is contradictory to such a treaty.³⁵ The actual developments as we can follow them with two different authors (Isocrates and Xenophon) form an obstacle for an in itself attractive theory. Resuming, I think there existed a 'Treaty of Boiotius'—the regulation and implementation of the Spartan-Persian contacts from 408/7 onwards make such a treaty believable. I do not believe that the Spartans will have considered a renegotiation of the *status* of the Ionian Greeks. If they were mentioned at all in this treaty it will only have been, I think, to reconfirm the stipulations of the 412/1 treaties.

In fact those treaties were an outright victory for the Persians. The Persian satraps would support Sparta and obtain complete overlordship over an important area. The extent of Persian support was, at least in the beginning, not very large. Especially Tissaphernes tried to secure the maximum advantage with the minimum investment.³⁶ No doubt advised

³⁰ Xen., *H.G.*, I, iv, 2-3.

³¹ Cartledge 1979: 266.

³² Cf. the position of the Thracian cities in the Peace of Nicias, Thuc. V, xviii, 5.

³³ Diod. Sic. XIV, xxxv, 2-7.

³⁴ Diod. Sic. XIV, xxxv, 6; Lewis 1977: 125.

³⁵ Cf. *infra* p. 125 and notes 62-3.

³⁶ *Hell. Oxy.*, col. xvi, 1-9.

by Alcibiades³⁷ Tissaphernes was slow to pay—and was frequently upbraided for his lack of coöperation by his new Greek allies. Though only Tissaphernes is mentioned in the third treaty, Pharnabazus seems to have helped the Spartans more eagerly than Tissaphernes.³⁸ Probably he, being charged with the territories about the Hellespont, had to fear more from the Athenians than Tissaphernes.

If we look at Thucydides VII.cix.2, we find there Tissaphernes, governor of the southern of the two Persian provinces in Asia Minor. He is hurrying to the Hellespont in 411 to patch up his relationship with the Peloponnesians. In particular he tries to prevent them coming to an agreement with his northern counterpart and rival Pharnabazus. Both Persians had reason to support Sparta against Athens. On the other hand, it was not in the Persians' interest that a defeated Athens should simply be replaced by another Greek superpower with imperial or 'panhellenic' ambitions. Sparta, thus, should be supported, but rather in the way that a rope supports a hanging man. This was particularly the policy adopted by Tissaphernes.³⁹

Possibly Spartan complaints about Tissaphernes' failures, a.o. to provide the Phoenician fleet he had promised, and that he was openly favouring the Athenians,⁴⁰ led to the appointment of Cyrus the Younger as *karanos* or overlord of the Ionian coast by King Darius II.

Cyrus arrived with great authority. He had been assigned the satrapies of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia as well as the title of *karanos* of all the troops which mustered in the plain of Castolus.⁴¹ According to Xenophon⁴² Cyrus was charged with the prosecution of the war against Athens and he claimed to have unlimited funds at his disposal. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, as a consequence of Cyrus' arrival, lost part of their districts, and power, to him.

Probably shortly after Cyrus' arrival at Sardis, he met there with Lysander,⁴³ the *nauarch* of the Spartan fleet for 408/7, who had Ephesus as his headquarters.⁴⁴ Cyrus and Lysander became friends.⁴⁵ Their friendship directly affected the course of the war. By his friendship with Cyrus Lysander was able to increase the wages of his sailors with one

³⁷ Cf. Thuc. VIII, lxxv, 6; lxxvi, 1.

³⁸ Xen., *H.G.*, I, i, 24-5; cf. also his speech to Agesilaus, Xen., *H.G.*, IV, i, 32-4.

³⁹ Cartledge 1979: 261.

⁴⁰ Thuc. VIII, lxxxvii.

⁴¹ Xen., *H.G.*, I, iv, 3; *An.*, I, i, 2; Diod. Sic. XIII, lxx, 3-4; Plut., *Art.*, XXIII.

⁴² *An.*, I, iv, 2.

⁴³ Plut., *Lys.*, IV, 1.

⁴⁴ Xen., *H.G.*, I, v, 1; Plut., *Lys.*, III, 2.

⁴⁵ Plut., *Lys.*, IV, 2; Diod. Sic. XIII, lxx, 2-4.

obol a day to four obols a day.⁴⁶ Not only did this delight Lysander's sailors. It also induced sailors of the ships of his enemies to come over to his side, since he paid the higher wages. Those of the enemies' seamen that stayed behind were listless and mutinous, and gave daily trouble to their officers.⁴⁷ It may have contributed to Lysander's major military success during his term, a victory over Antiochus, the lieutenant of Alcibiades (the Athenian commander who had sailed away from Samos to Phocaea), a victory of which the main significance was psychological.⁴⁸

More important than Lysander's military achievements were his results as a politician. He summoned from their various (Ionian) cities the boldest and most daring oligarchs. Lysander urged them to form political clubs and—as soon as the Athenian empire was destroyed—to get rid of their democracies and form *decarchies*.⁴⁹ In fact, Lysander collected a body of associates that was highly attached not as much to Sparta as to him personally.⁵⁰ We may say that Lysander also demonstrated that the pretensions of Sparta to liberating the Greeks were, at least to him, void. There were, however, some protests in Sparta, notably by Callicratidas.⁵¹ Lysander's replacement, after his term was finished, by Callicratidas may be viewed as a (temporary) victory for Lysander's political adversaries. They wished peace with Athens and a friendly but distant relation with Persia.⁵²

In the late summer of 406 Callicratidas died at a seafight at the Arginusae.⁵³ Both Lysander's friends in the Ionian cities and Cyrus the Younger sent embassies to Sparta to request Lysander's reappointment.⁵⁴ Since Sparta's constitution only allowed for one term as a *nauarch*—but wishing to consent to the appeal—Lysander was sent back to Ionia as *epistoleus*, second in command. In fact he was completely in charge of the conduct of the war.⁵⁵

When Lysander was still at work preparing his schemes both for the

⁴⁶ Plut., *Lys.*, IV, 3-4; Xen., *H.G.*, I, v, 3-7. In Pritchett, W.H., *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1971-4) the amount of (financial) support received by the Spartans from the Persians is analysed.

⁴⁷ Plut., *Lys.*, IV, 4.

⁴⁸ Plut., *Lys.*, V, 2.

⁴⁹ Plut., *Lys.*, V, 3; Diod. Sic. XIII, lxx, 4.

⁵⁰ Plut., *Lys.*, 4-5.

⁵¹ Cf. Cartledge 1979: 262-3.

⁵² Cf. Smits, J., *Plutarchus' Leven van Lysander. Inleiding, Tekst, Commentaar* (Amsterdam/Parijs 1939) 94.

⁵³ Plut., *Lys.*, VII, 1; Xen., *H.G.*, I, vi, 33.

⁵⁴ Xen., *H.G.*, I, vi, 7-35; II, i, 6-7; Plut., *Lys.*, VII, 1-3; Diod. Sic. XIII, c, 7-8.

⁵⁵ Plut., *Lys.*, VII, 2; Xen., *H.G.*, II, i, 7.

war and for the takeover of democratic governed cities Cyrus was called to the court to wait upon his father. Before he went, he assigned to Lysander the tribute of the cities and entrusted his own government to him. In addition he gave him whatever money he had in hand for the prosecution of the war.⁵⁶ In fact, by taking Tissaphernes with him to Media, Cyrus left Lysander virtually a free hand in any settlement he might choose to make if a decisive victory over Athens was won.

The Athenian defeat became imminent by the Spartan victory at Aegospotami in 405. The whole Athenian fleet but some 10 ships as well as 3,000 prisoners were taken.⁵⁷ It provoked the question for Sparta how to act once the war was won. Initially steered by Lysander, Sparta chose to follow the road to imperialism.⁵⁸ To start with, Lysander established in power oligarchs from the political clubs he had helped to found or by empowering *decarchies*, commissions of ten chosen from among his own partisans, to rule on his behalf.⁵⁹ After the conclusion of the war in late April 404, at which Lysander probably played a considerable part during the negotiations,⁶⁰ the ephors seem to have approved Lysander's measures concerning the (Ionian and) conquered cities.⁶¹

According to the agreement of 412/1 the time had come to surrender the Greek cities in Asia to Persia. The only question for Sparta seemed to be of whom to treat with on the Persian side. The treaty had been signed with Tissaphernes, but he had done little to fulfill his part of the deal. Moreover he had been replaced by Cyrus the Younger, so it might appear that the cities should be given to the latter. However, neither of the high-ranking Persians was present (apart from Pharnabazus, but he was not in the picture) since they were present at the death-bed of Darius II. They returned only at the end of the summer of 404. The wording of both Xenophon and Isocrates⁶² suggests that about that time the cities were indeed rendered to the Persians. To be precise, they were rendered to Tissaphernes on the orders of the new king, Artaxerxes II.⁶³

Certainly, this had not been to the pleasure of Cyrus, nor of the Greek cities that—except Miletus—revolted from Tissaphernes and went over to Cyrus. About 401 also Miletus was (back) with Cyrus. In fact, there was an open war between Tissaphernes and Cyrus over the Greek cities.

⁵⁶ Plut., *Lys.*, IX, 2; Xen., *H.G.*, II, i, 13-4; Diod. Sic. XIII, c, 7-8.

⁵⁷ Plut., *Lys.*, IX, 4-XI, 7; Xen., *H.G.*, II, i, 21-8.

⁵⁸ Hamilton 1979: 41-3.

⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. XIV, x, 1-2; xiii, 1; Plut., *Lys.*, XIII, 3-5.

⁶⁰ Hamilton 1979: 46-55.

⁶¹ Diod. Sic. XIV, iii, 4; x, 1-2; xiii, 1; in Plut., *Lys.*, XIV, 1 the dating is less clear.

⁶² Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 3; Isoc., *Panath.*, 104 next to *Paneg.*, 111.

⁶³ Cf. Xen., *An.*, I, i, 6-7.

Since Cyrus regularly remitted to the king the tribute which came in from the cities he chanced to have (though *de facto* belonging to Tissaphernes) Artaxerxes does not seem to have minded it very much.⁶⁴

In the meantime Cyrus planned his attack on his brother. Cyrus' motives to revolt may have been numerous. He may have thought it right to revolt because he was 'born in the purple', i.e. he was the first son born after his father's accession.⁶⁵ It may have been because he thought himself wronged because his brother had kept him prisoner.⁶⁶ It may be because he felt disgraced in another respect. Plutarch relates the following:⁶⁷ "Some say that he revolted from the king because his allowance did not suffice for his daily meals, which is absurd". The *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* show, however, that everyone, even the highest, in Persia was on a regular ration-scale or ration-salary.⁶⁸ Considerable differences could rise between officials and, according to Lewis, "the system was certainly capable of producing a fair amount of irritation and hurt pride even at the highest levels".⁶⁹ Probably then, Cyrus' complaint may not have been as absurd as Plutarch thought.⁷⁰ Whichever cause it may have been that provoked his action, Cyrus asked for Spartan aid in his enterprise, in compensation for previous benefits, a request that the Spartan ephors granted.⁷¹ Xenophon does not mention whether the Spartan ephors had any precise knowledge of Cyrus' intentions. Diodorus⁷² represented the Spartans as knowing allies of Cyrus. Isocrates⁷³ went as far as to insinuate that Sparta (almost) induced Cyrus to attack his brother. With regard to the risks involved for Sparta, that Cyrus' campaign might as well lead to a confrontation between Sparta and Persia, and the stalemate between the factions in Sparta, I think this suggestion of Isocrates an implausible one. Moreover, Isocrates also neglects any personal feelings that Cyrus may have had against his brother. However, whatever part may have been played by Spartans (or even Sparta) in the decision of Cyrus to start the expedition, the question remained whether Sparta would support Cyrus more than symbolically.

⁶⁴ Xen., *An.*, I, i, 8; Artaxerxes II had, moreover, more serious problems, like a revolt in Egypt, cf. Ruzicka 1984: 208-9.

⁶⁵ Cf. Plut., *Art.*, II, 3.

⁶⁶ Cf. Xen., *An.*, I, i, 4.

⁶⁷ Plut., *Art.*, IV, 1.

⁶⁸ Cf. Lewis 1977: 4-5 and n. 9.

⁶⁹ Lewis 1977: 5.

⁷⁰ This was also noticed by Ruzicka 1984: 206: he combines Cyrus' complaint about the food rations with a degradation of Cyrus due to his (supposed) *coup d'état* after his brother's accession.

⁷¹ Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 1.

⁷² XIV, xi, 2, quoting Ephorus.

⁷³ *Panath.*, 104; *Eirenes*, 98.

It remains uncertain whether there has been any debate in the *apella* concerning Cyrus' request, like there had been in 431 when Sparta finally voted that Athens had broken the treaty concluded in 445 after the Euboean War.⁷⁴ To support Cyrus will have been in line with the view of the Lysandrian faction. Possibly Lysander may also have pointed out that Cyrus had supplied the pay for the fleet during the war with Athens. Hamilton suggests⁷⁵—convincingly to me—that the remark of Pausanias about the pay⁷⁶ should be placed in the context of Cyrus' request. Apart from any materialistic motives that may have moved Sparta to support Cyrus—to whom they were of course deeply indebted—also political motives may have played a part. We may suspect that Sparta by helping Cyrus hoped to repair the damage done to their credibility as liberators by the treaties of 412/1 (and 407?) and Lysander's activities in Ionia. On the other hand, Sparta did not want to take too big personal risks and therefore the contingent it sent did not consist of Spartan citizens, *perioikoi* or even *neodamodeis*, emancipated Helots, but mainly of Arcadian and Achaean mercenaries.⁷⁷

The campaign of Cyrus failed. The best known account of it is given in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, but also Diodorus of Sicily related the story.⁷⁸ Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* in which also some attention is paid to the struggle between Artaxerxes II and his younger brother seems to be, at least partly, based on Ctesias of Cnidus. This Ctesias of Cnidus was the personal physician of Artaxerxes II and—as it appears—well informed on Persian life at court.⁷⁹

Cyrus' army, including some 12,000 Greeks, won the battle at Cunaxa against Artaxerxes II, but lost its commander. Artaxerxes is said to have been warned by Tissaphernes that his brother was marching against him.⁸⁰ Since the victory of Cyrus' army had become vain, the Greek generals in the army, headed by the exiled Spartan general Clearchus, a friend of Cyrus', tried to reach an agreement with Tissa-

⁷⁴ Cf. Thuc. I, lxvi-lxxxvii; for the role and position of the *apella*, cf. Bringmann, K., "Die Grosze Rhetra und die Entstehung des spartanischen Kosmos", *Historia* 24 (1975) 513-538, esp. 522-3 ff. *Id.*, "Die soziale und politische Verfassung Sparta's—ein Sonderfall der griechischen Verfassungsgeschichte (mit Nachtrag)", in: *Sparta*, ed. Christ, K. (Darmstadt 1986) [WBG-WdF 622] 448-469, esp. 453-4.

⁷⁵ Hamilton 1979: 106.

⁷⁶ Paus. III, ix, 1.

⁷⁷ Cf. Cartledge 1979: 272.

⁷⁸ XIV, xix, 2-xxxi, based on Ephorus of Cuma.

⁷⁹ Ctesias of Cnidus: Jacoby, *FGrH*, F. 688.

⁸⁰ Xen., *An.*, II, v, 11; Diod. Sic. XIV, xxvi, 4; according to Diod. Sic. XIV, xxii, 1 Artaxerxes had also been warned by Pharnabazus.

phernes for a safe-conduct to Hellas. Tissaphernes pretended to be ready to do so. However, having led the Greeks over the Tigris to the Zab, he planned and executed the elimination of 5 generals, as well as that of 20 captains, while some 200 soldiers also were killed.⁸¹ After the elimination of the generals and captains the Greeks, having chosen replacements for the deceased, resolved to fight their way back to Hellas. Going north they reached the Pontus near Trapezus and re-entered the Greek world. Meanwhile, Tissaphernes already had returned in Ionia.

When Tissaphernes returned, he kept the satrapies of Lydia, Ionia, and Caria as well as the position of *karanos* which Cyrus had held.⁸² Immediately upon his return Tissaphernes demanded the surrender of the Greek cities that had formerly revolted from his authority and had gone over to Cyrus.⁸³ The Greek cities shut their gates and begged Sparta for help.

Once again Sparta was in trouble. Did it have to keep to the treaty of 412/1 (or 407)? Did it have to act as "the leader of all Hellas" and also protect the Greeks in Asia?⁸⁴ Did it pursue its course and challenge Tissaphernes and the Persian king directly, as Sparta in fact had done indirectly by supporting Cyrus' expedition? Of course, the answer to these questions was directly connected with the struggle between the factions of Agis, Pausanias and Lysander.

The situation looked ready for a compromise. Two parties seem to have had interest to intervene in Asia for the Greek cities. The first party was Pausanias': to Pausanias the "public opinion" of the Greeks mattered much.⁸⁵ If Sparta had refused to help, any Greek city could blame it as an untrustworthy liar to which the "liberty of the Hellenes" was only propaganda. To act now would redeem the betrayal of 412/1. The other party, "bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble", was Lysander's. To Lysander it must have been a natural next step in the development of 'his' Spartan empire. Moreover, it was a step directed directly against his enemy Tissaphernes. And Agis? Just about this time Agis provoked a war with Elis, against which Agis harboured an ancient grudge.⁸⁶ Moreover, the Spartans marched out against the Messenians at Naupectus, restored (their) order at Trachinian Heracleia and made war on

⁸¹ Xen., *An.*, II, v, 30-2; vi, 1.

⁸² Ruzicka 1984: 205 argues that Cyrus had lost his position of *karanos* already in 404.

⁸³ Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 3; Diod. Sic., XIV, xxxv, 2 is very important: putting the demand in the archonship of Laches he dates it after July 400.

⁸⁴ Cf. Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 3.

⁸⁵ Cf. Hamilton 1970: 312.

⁸⁶ Xen., *H.G.*, III, ii, 21-3; Diod. Sic., XIV, xvii, 4 sqq.

the inhabitants about Mount Oeta.⁸⁷ It seems that Agis had got freedom of action to put in effect his policy as the price for letting Pausanias and Lysander act as they liked. Sparta had chosen for war with Tissaphernes.

In my opinion we can date the decision in Sparta to counter Tissaphernes rather precisely by Xenophon's *Anabasis*. What we have to do is to analyze the behaviour of the Spartan officials in Thrace during the stay of the "Ten Thousand" there. Initially, the Spartan officials tried to get rid of the Cyreans as soon as possible, partly due to an agreement with Pharnabazus.⁸⁸ The only action they are allowed to partake in is a war under the command of the Lacedaemonian general Cyniscus against the Thracians. Sparta and its officials are clearly on good terms with Persia or at least the Persian satrap Pharnabazus. What we see is the maintenance of a *status quo*, dictated at Sparta by a deadlock between the three factions.

However, when the army returned at Selymbria from an expedition against Salmydessos (on the Black Sea coast) with Seuthes II, a Thracian kinglet who had hired them to regain his (claimed) heritage, they were met by Charminus the Laconian and Polynicus. These two men had been sent by Thibron, who had been commissioned by the Spartans to direct the war against Tissaphernes.⁸⁹ The service of the Cyreans with Seuthes started about midwinter 400/399⁹⁰ and lasted nearly two months.⁹¹ In my opinion that means that Sparta's decision to march against the Persians must have been taken late in the winter of 400/399, about February or early March 399 at the latest. If we assume that Tissaphernes claimed the Ionian cities late summer, or even early autumn, 400⁹² we have a period of maximally about six months for the Ionian embassies to go to Sparta, the political factions there to settle their differences and make the necessary preparations. I think this may be regarded as a plausible period.

Cartledge⁹³ connected the turnover of the Spartan policy towards Persia about 400 with the death of Agis and the part played by Lysander in Agis' succession by Agesilaus. I disagree with him at this point, since Agis died about 398⁹⁴ and the decision to oppose Persia had already

⁸⁷ Diod. Sic. XIV, xxxiv, 2-3; xxxviii, 4-5.

⁸⁸ Xen., *An.*, VII, i, 1; 6; 13; 37; II, 12-3.

⁸⁹ Xen., *An.*, VII, vi, 1.

⁹⁰ Xen., *An.*, VII, vi, 24.

⁹¹ Xen., *An.*, VII, vi, 1.

⁹² Cf. *supra* p. 128, n. 83.

⁹³ Cartledge 1979: 273.

⁹⁴ V, *infra* p. 130.

been taken before that time. Cartledge's remark that Xenophon failed to make this connection is right: there was no connection.

When the Cyreans joined Thibron it must have been about early May. In the meantime Thibron had gathered an army of 1,000 *neodamodeis*, 4,000 of other Peloponnesians, some 300 Athenian horsemen and some troops from the Greek cities on the mainland.⁹⁵ He had, however, not yet offered battle to Tissaphernes' army. Only after the coming of the Cyreans Thibron's activities increased. Later that year, probably about July or August, when the army was at Ephesus, the command was taken over by Dercylidas.⁹⁶ He kept the command for three years, fighting Pharnabazus, the Bithynians, and also Tissaphernes, in the meantime also protecting the towns on the Thracian Chersonese with a wall. To achieve this last, he concluded a truce with Pharnabazus. The satrap of Phrygia made use of the truce to go to the Persian court. There he lent his decisive support to a plan (made by the former Athenian general Conon, who fled after the battle of Aegospotami to Cyprus)⁹⁷ to create a Persian fleet to be directed against Sparta.⁹⁸ Persia had accepted the challenge and collected its resources to take the initiative.

Early 397 Pharnabazus went to Cyprus to discuss the naval preparations with Conon. After that he agreed with Tissaphernes to join forces to drive the Greek army out of Asia.⁹⁹ Tissaphernes must have been pleased by this offer since his territory had become the major target of Dercylidas' actions, by orders from Sparta (on request of the Ionian cities).¹⁰⁰ The collected forces of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus surprised Dercylidas but Tissaphernes did not dare—possibly he remembered the force of the Greek hoplites at Cunaxa—to offer battle. Instead, a truce was decided upon and consequently messengers were sent to the Persian king and to Sparta to report the proposals of both parties. The Spartan proposal was that the Persian king should leave the Greek cities independent. The Persians proposed that the Greek army should leave Asia and that the Lacedaemonian governors should leave the cities.¹⁰¹

At Sparta, the situation had changed dramatically by then. King Agis had died, about 398, leaving his faction without a leader. The logical successor to Agis seemed to be his son, Leotychidas. However, his claims for the kingship were challenged by Agesilaus, saying that

⁹⁵ Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 4-5.

⁹⁶ Xen., *H.G.*, III, i, 8.

⁹⁷ Xen., *H.G.*, II, i, 29; Diod. Sic. XIV, xxxix, 1.

⁹⁸ Diod. Sic. XIV, xxxix, 1; Plut., *Art.*, XXI.

⁹⁹ Xen., *H.G.*, III, ii, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Xen., *H.G.*, III, ii, 12.

¹⁰¹ Xen., *H.G.*, III, ii, 15-20.

Leotychidas was not the legitimate son of Agis.¹⁰² Agesilaus was supported by Lysander (who he had had as his lover¹⁰³), who was able to explain an oracle favourably for Agesilaus.¹⁰⁴ The Lacedaemonians made Agesilaus king. Pausanias stated that Lysander's influence was of decisive importance for this choice.¹⁰⁵ Luria,¹⁰⁶ however, thought that Lysander's (and Agesilaus') efforts were of secondary importance. I think Luria was generally right. There had been previous cases of kings who had been deposed on the charge (be it rightly brought forward or not) of illegitimacy. Supporting Leotychidas now would have meant a severe "safety risk" for the family. That safety risk was dual.

In 427 the Pythia urged to 'bring home the seed of the semidivine son of Zeus' by restoring Pleistoanax. In the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon echoed Spartan ideology by emphasising how heartening it is to follow a king descended from a god.¹⁰⁷ Normally the kings held priesthoods of their royal ancestors and were associated with the divine twin brothers the Dioscuri.¹⁰⁸ In the conduct of public rites the kings had a central ceremonial role. The controversies that had surrounded the exile and recall of King Pleistoanax and now the accession of Agesilaus are crucial: one might say that in a way the whole well-being of Sparta depended on the king. If an unentitled person would take the throne Sparta might be struck by disasters. Apart from this religious safety risk, the most important one, was a second risk, i.e. the loss of honour of the family. Taken everything into account, supporting Agesilaus may have been the lesser evil.

In the meantime the prospects of the imperialist party in Sparta looked stronger than ever, with now the combined efforts of Lysander and Agesilaus. Their cause got a setback by the Cinadon-conspiracy. This conspiracy was a.o. inspired by the increasing discrepancy between rich and poor in Spartan society. This discrepancy was at least partly caused by the influx of money that entered Sparta as a consequence of its imperialistic policy.¹⁰⁹ The ephors probably acted instantly, issuing a decree that restored the ancient form of government and abolished the

¹⁰² Xen., *H.G.*, III, iii, 1-2; Paus. III, viii, 8; see also Luria 1927: 404-7, who concludes that Plutarch's opinion, according to which Leotychidas' father would have been Alcibiades, is untenable.

¹⁰³ Plut., *Ages.*, II, 1; *Lys.*, XXII, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iii, 3-4; Paus. III, viii, 9-10.

¹⁰⁵ Paus. III, viii, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Luria 1927: 419-20.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Parker 1989: 152-3.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Nilsson 1941-50: I, 381-5; Hdt. V, 75; Bethe, *RE*, s.v. *Dioskouroi*, cols. 1087 sqq.; Parker 1989: 147.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Hamilton 1979: 125-8.

decarchies in the Ionian cities.¹¹⁰ Unfortunately for the moderates in Sparta the Persian war-machine had been put in action. Probably in the autumn of 397 Sparta was warned by one Herodas that Persia intended to attack the Greeks and already had assembled a great fleet and army.¹¹¹

Having taken the necessary religious steps—by seeking favourable oracles¹¹²—Agesilaus obtained the necessary permission, no doubt aided by Lysander, who had his own motives to join Agesilaus,¹¹³ to sail to Asia. His task was “to try to effect a peace, or, in case the barbarian wanted to fight, [to] keep him so busy that he would have no time for an attack on the Greeks”.¹¹⁴

The future looked bright and shining for Lysander. He would join Agesilaus and, as the political mentor of Agesilaus, would be able to help his Ionian friends. He proved to be mistaken. Shortly after his arrival in Asia, Agesilaus shook himself free from Lysander’s domination and curtailed his influence.¹¹⁵ Dercylidas appears as a commissioner from Agesilaus to Tissaphernes.¹¹⁶ Probably he and his army, including the remaining Cyreans (who are mentioned apart later, when they are put under command of Herippidas, another of Agesilaus’ commissioners to Tissaphernes¹¹⁷), had become part of Agesilaus’ army.

The campaigning season, shortened by Agesilaus’ truce with Tissaphernes,¹¹⁸ was without great military achievements. Apart from some pillaging of Pharnabazus’ territory, *en passant* capturing some cities, Agesilaus’ army did not have to fight much.¹¹⁹ Politically it was, however, extremely important. By putting Lysander aside and, in fact, adopting ‘Lysandrian’ policy himself, Agesilaus had reduced the number of (important) factions in Sparta again to two. He also may have brought many of the supporters of an imperialist policy to his side. The sequel to his career showed that he continued to favour a strong and expansive policy whenever that was possible. Though Lysander, quite full of resentment, upon his return in Sparta “planned how he might wrest the kingdom from the two royal families, and make all Spartans once more eligible to it”,¹²⁰ his role was practically finished. In a last con-

¹¹⁰ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 2.

¹¹¹ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 1; Ages., I, 6-7; for the dating autumn 397, cf. Hamilton 1979: 129, n. 96.

¹¹² Cf. Plut., *Moralia*, 208 F 10.

¹¹³ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 2; Plut., Ages., VI, 1-2; Lys., XXIII, 1.

¹¹⁴ Xen., Ages., I, 7.

¹¹⁵ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 8-9; Plut., Lys., XXIII, 5-XXIV, 1; Ages., VII, 4-VIII, 4.

¹¹⁶ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 6.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*; also III, iv, 20.

¹¹⁸ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 5-6.

¹¹⁹ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 12-5.

¹²⁰ Plut., Ages., VIII, 3; cf. Lys., XXIV, 2-5.

vulsion of energy he induced the ephors to wage a war against Thebes.¹²¹ The chief command of the Spartan army was given to King Pausanias and Lysander was ordered to Phocis and collect an army. Pausanias and Lysander would meet on an appointed day at Haliartus. Arriving at Haliartus before Pausanias Lysander attacked the city and was killed.¹²²

In the meantime Agesilaus had prepared the next year's campaign, training his army, especially creating a cavalry.¹²³ Collecting his army at Ephesus, Agesilaus told the troops that he would lead them against the neighbouring countryside, i.e. Lydia. Suspecting that Agesilaus, in reality, would march against Caria, Tissaphernes sent his army thither. However, Agesilaus marched straight to the neighbourhood of Sardis, defeated a Persian army on his way, pillaged the land but failed to take Sardis.¹²⁴

The Persians accused Tissaphernes, who was at Sardis, that he had betrayed them.¹²⁵ Moreover: he had achieved little or nothing in his war against Sparta during the last five years. He had always tried to evade a fight with the Spartan troops, had practically never helped Pharnabazus against Sparta and now had shown incompetence near Sardis. The King of Kings decided to do away with Tissaphernes. He sent Tithraustes to Asia Minor (to Collossae in Phrygia) with orders to kill Tissaphernes. Tithraustes cut off Tissaphernes' head and sent, after this, ambassadors to Agesilaus. He offered him a truce of 6 months, peace and asked him to move to Pharnabazus (giving thirty talents in addition for provisions).¹²⁶ At the same time he sent Timocrates again to Greece with more money to stir up things there still more against Sparta.¹²⁷ Meanwhile Conon had caused the key (naval) base of Rhodos to revolt from Sparta.¹²⁸

¹²¹ Plut., *Lys.*, XXVII-XXVIII; Xen., *H.G.*, III, v, 1-6: Xenophon puts a good deal of blame for the war on the Thebans, who, induced by one Timocrates bringing Persian gold for this reason, provoked a war in Greece. The Persian aim was, of course, to create so much trouble in Greece that Agesilaus had to be recalled from Asia. The Persian scheme proved effective and in 394 Agesilaus returned to mainland Greece.

¹²² Xen., *H.G.*, III, v, 17-9; Plut., *Lys.*, XXVIII, 1-5.

¹²³ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 15-20.

¹²⁴ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 21-5.

¹²⁵ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 25; *Hell. Oxy.*, cols. vii, i, 4-viii, 42; cf. also commentary by Grenfell and Hunt, *P. Oxy.*, Vol. V (London 1905) 219-21.

¹²⁶ Xen., *H.G.*, III, iv, 25-6; Diod. Sic. XIV, lxxx, 6-8; Plut., *Ages.*, X, 3-4; Xen., *Ages.*, I, 35; Paus. III, ix, 7-8.

¹²⁷ Paus. III, ix, 8 sq.; cf. also Hamilton 1979: 207 and n. 76; Xen., *H.G.*, III, v, 1; IV, ii, 1; Diod. Sic. XIV, lxxxi, 5-6.

¹²⁸ *Hell. Oxy.*, col. xi, x, 1-3.

Nevertheless, the situation in the middle of 395 must still have looked favourable to many Spartans. The imperialist party had, though deprived of its former leader Lysander, a new and formidable champion in the person of King Agesilaus. It was in full control at Sparta (as may be shown by the rejection of the Athenian request for a negotiated settlement of the Phocis-quarrel).¹²⁹ Moreover, Agesilaus had defeated Tissaphernes and now ravaged Pharnabazus' territory, roaming where he wanted to. In addition King Pausanias had gone in exile, condemned to death by failing to appear at his trial, charged a.o. with having arrived at Haliartus later than Lysander.¹³⁰ The old leaders, King Agis, King Pausanias, and Lysander were off. A new and victorious king—though away in Asia—was in charge and successfully conducted his war. The other king, Agesipolis, was still a boy, under the guardianship of Aristodemus, and no political factor of importance as yet.¹³¹

Soon, however, heavy clouds darkened Sparta's bright future. Corinth, Argos, Athens, and Thebes joined forces in late 395 and caused many allies of the Lacedaemonians to defect them.¹³² The object of the war, then, in simplest terms, was to reduce Sparta to such a condition that it could no longer threaten the security or ambitions of the Greek allies or of Persia.¹³³ Sparta sent for Agesilaus to return home;¹³⁴ what was left of the Cyreans finally returned to mainland Greece.

Though Agesilaus left Asia, Spartan presence there was not ended. Agesilaus left a *harmost* there, Euxenus, with some 4,000 men. Sparta's policy changed, temporarily, from offensive to defensive, a policy continued during the term of office of Euxenus' successors, Phylopidas (393–2) and Alexander (392–1).¹³⁵ Only in 391, with the return of Thibron as *harmost*, Sparta resumed—for a while—an offensive policy. Sparta was disappointed at the failure of the peace negotiations of Antalcidas at Sardis. It also was vexed by the anti-Spartan attitude of the new satrap, Strouthas, who had replaced Tiribazus, Tissaphernes' successor.¹³⁶ Already in 389 Sparta recognised the futility of attacking Persian satraps and recalled Diphridas, Thibron's successor. Again Sparta tried, by sending Antalcidas to the court at Sardis (where Tiribazus again had replaced Strouthas) to secure peace.

¹²⁹ Paus. III, iv, 11.

¹³⁰ Xen., *H.G.*, III, v, 25; cf. also *supra* p. 120 and n. 21.

¹³¹ Cf. Xen., *H.G.*, IV, ii, 9; Plut., *Ages.*, XX, 5.

¹³² Diod. Sic. XIV, lxxxii, 1–2; Xen., *H.G.*, IV, ii, 1.

¹³³ Hamilton 1979: 214.

¹³⁴ Xen., *H.G.*, IV, ii, 2–3; Diod. Sic. XIV, lxxxiii, 1; Xen., *Ages.*, I, 36; Plut., *Ages.*, XV, 2.

¹³⁵ Cf. Parker 1930: 68.

¹³⁶ Xen., *H.G.*, IV, viii, 17; 22 sq.

In spite of Sparta's efforts the outcome of the war was what at least the Persian king had hoped for. In 387 a treaty was concluded upon, the so-called Peace of Antalcidas or also King's Peace,¹³⁷ in which the Spartans "on the most shameful and lawless fashion handed over to the King the Greeks resident in Asia, on whose behalf Agesilaus had waged war".¹³⁸ The terms of the treaty confirmed indeed the end of the Spartan empire. "The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all the other Greeks shall be independent; and upon those who refuse compliance and do not accept these terms I [i.e. the Persian king, JPS] shall make war through the aid of those who consent to them".¹³⁹ What we saw begin in the *Anabasis* appears to have ended in almost complete disaster.

However, the damage was—in fact—comparatively rather slight. Though Antalcidas was supposed to be an enemy of Agesilaus', Agesilaus himself defended the treaty. He remarked that the Spartans had not been "medizing", but the Persians had been "Iakönizing".¹⁴⁰ The treaty may, in fact, be considered as an arrangement sponsored by the Spartans in their own selfish interests. The Spartans abandoned, once again, the Asiatic Greeks in favour of concentrating first on re-establishing Spartan suzerainty on the Peloponnese and, consequently, extending it north of the Isthmus.¹⁴¹ Ryder has put it as follows: "The King's Peace had been devised by the Spartans as an acceptable basis for Persian intervention... It was, then, naturally suited primarily to the interests of the Spartans and Persians."¹⁴² Both Sparta and Persia had, again, agreed on the maintenance of a *status quo*. At first glance Sparta looks to have been the big loser of the confrontation with Persia. Looking at the terms and consequences of the treaty we must, I think, conclude that mainly third parties bore the losses. Of those third parties especially the Ionian Greeks suffered most. Battered as it may have been—certainly with respect to its future—Sparta may, technically, be considered as a winning loser of the war it started late winter or early spring of 399.

¹³⁷ Diod. Sic. XIV, cx, 2-3; Xen., *H.G.*, V, i, 25; 30 sq.; Plut., *Ages.*, XXIII, 1-2.

¹³⁸ Plut., *Ages.*, XXIII, 1.

¹³⁹ Diod. Sic. XIV, cx, 3; cf. also Xen., *H.G.*, V, i, 31 for a somewhat extended version of the treaty.

¹⁴⁰ Plut., *Ages.*, XXIII, 4; Art., XXII, 2; *Moralia*, 213B.

¹⁴¹ Cartledge 1979: 288.

¹⁴² Ryder, T.T.B., *Koine Eirene. General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1965) 39.

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