The Archaic Tyrannis

The use of the definite article in the title presupposes that, in spite of the considerable number of tyrants in relation to time and place, there is reason to speak in generalizing terms of the tyrannis as an exponent of the archaic world. With due caution I would like to take this presupposition as a starting-point for the following discussion. “La tyrannis est une même réponse donnée en divers lieux à de mêmes problèmes” Will wrote in 1955 and the English scholar Forrest echoed this view in 1966: “Any generalization is dangerous and yet we must feel that a general explanation can be found for such a general phenomenon as the tyrant”. It is clear that the question of what were “the same problems” and “the same answer” is vitally important. I shall here limit myself to the Athenian, Corinthian and Lesbian tyrannis. My reason for doing so is that these three tyrannies may be considered as resorting under what Aristotle called “the hate of the rich” (Pol. 1315 a 22–26); about other tyrannies which may well have been based on the same ideology we know too little (in fact often no more than the name of the tyrant) to discuss them even summarily; others again have been disregarded because they were founded or developed under the threat of foreign powers – I am here thinking of the numerous tyrannies in Asia Minor, and of the Sicilian situation. Indeed Gelon of Syracuse and Aristogoras of Milete can be termed Förderer der Aristokratie.

First an almost superfluous remark on the sources: the historian of the archaic period is, as regards the present subject, less handicapped by the scarcity of sources in general – which is after all an endemic difficulty for the ancient historian qua talis – than by the lack of contemporary sources. In this particular case the sources we have for a study of the Greek tyrants are to a high degree – if not

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completely coloured by the undeniable aversion to the tyrant in later, more democratic times, and in later philosophic writings which, due to the high ethical standards demanded of statesmen, described the tyrant as an absolute ruler responsible to no one, who did as he pleased, who was driven by personal greediness and had a variety of means at his disposal to reach his aims. We really know extremely little about the contemporary reaction to the phenomenon of the tyrant, and such information as we have generally comes from biased sources. Indeed both Berke's famous article on the Greek tyrannis of 1954 and his recently published *opus magnum, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* contain in this respect the faults of a method which tends to accept the judgments and analyses of later generations too readily. Surely there is little point, then, when seeking to determine the function of the tyrants in archaic society, in judging the tyrant against the background of the constitutional city-state, of "nomos" and "polis", where each citizen was guaranteed participation in political matters, and subsequently in characterizing the tyrant as the violater of the "nomoi", who did not strive for "überpersönliche Ziele", who wished only for subjects and not independently thinking citizens, who was, in short, a *Dämon der Macht* with a corresponding *Wille zur Macht*. All this seems somewhat anachronistic, and is stimulated both by later Greek analyses and perhaps also by the tendency today (springing from experiences with and under modern "tyrants") to be *plus démocrate que les démocrates*, to have an exaggerated view of *das Gemeinschaftsdenken*, to place everyone who lived to a certain extent alongside the constitution.

4. Compare Aristotle, *Política* 1314a, 30ff, where the tyrant is advised to take certain palliative measures which will allow him to play the part of a king and make him seem a supervisor and leader rather than a tyrant. Actually too much emphasis has been given by Aristotle to the outward appearance and "hypocrisy" (1304a 40) and the "semi-virtuous, semi-depraved, respectively" (1315b 10) for the passage to serve as proof "a tyrant can develop into a good ruler" (Breebaart, "Tyrann en Monarch in de grieke wereld van de 4e eeuw voor Christus," *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* (1965), 273ff, particularly 291). In Xenophon's *Hiero* and Isocrates' *Ad Nicoclem* we encounter a much more positive attitude towards the tyrant. The line dividing the tyrant from the good ruler is extremely delicate - the latter easily becomes an "improved tyrant." In Xenophon the bodyguard is even considered an inevitable institution which does not necessarily bring the ruler down to the level of tyrant. In the *Ath. Pol.* Aristotle himself paints a fairly favourable picture of the Athenian tyrants. The motives underlying the tyrant's actions may appear very fourth-century and negative, but the picture as a whole is not unfavourable; cf. Cl. Mossé, *Aristote et la tyrannie, ΓΕΡΑΣ G. Thomson*, 163ff, who demonstrated that in Aristotle the image of the wicked tyrant is often contradicted by his impressive knowledge of the facts.

5. Cf. the cliché view of the tyrant in Plato (*Politeia*, 566c-567d; *Nomoi*, 684e, 736c) and in Aristotle (*Política*, 1295a 17; 1311a 2-5; 1311a 10-11; 1313a 39-66; 1314a 15). A.H. Breebaart, *art. cit.*, 287ff, summarizes the main points.


such as the tyrant, simply outside it, and to regard him as a megalomaniac. Far be it from me to reject committed history writing, but care should be taken not to project too easily criteria of later times onto the attitudes and reactions belonging to earlier periods.

To my mind Berve's approach finds no support in the earliest source in which the term “tyrannis” occurs, nor in what we can reconstruct of the origin of certain tyrannies. We shall see that “tyrannos” used in malam partem, almost was a propaganda-slogan and sprang from a certain social group. This is hardly surprising. If Larsen, discussing the full-grown Athenian democracy, can speak of “the common Greek view of freedom which tended to include in freedom for oneself the right to dominate others”¹⁸, and if Andrews, writing of the same period, can say that “most educated Greeks (were) blind to the connection between freedom in general and the free play of party politics”⁹, then there is no need, as regards the archaic period, in which the various social groups were much less integrated in an all-embracing constitution, to shrink from the hypothesis that the characteristics of political leaders were often no more than party labels¹⁰. There are only few who assume that “the” Athenians agreed with the oligarchic approach of Pericles (the “new Pisistratids”: Plut. Pericles, 16); should one then simply follow the oligarchic/aristocratic approach and interpret what is no more than a party label as the correct and generally accepted approach of the politician concerned, for a period in which the constitutional thinking was less developed and the concept of equality between citizens did not yet exist?

But let us first consider the earliest source in which the word “tyrannis” occurs: Archilochus fr. 25, where the poet writes that he rejects the riches of Gyges, the works of the gods, and a great tyrannis. Archilochus apparently knew that there were alternatives to the regime of the “basileis” born from Zeus. And the form of government indicated by the Lydian word “tyrannis” was one of those alternatives. From the context it is clear that Archilochus did not use the term pejoratively: Gyges’ riches, the works of the gods, and a great tyrannis. If one assumes¹¹ – an assumption which, though not being entirely beyond criticism, does not seem implausible – that in the use of the word “tyrannis” the image of Gyges still hovers in the background, one can suppose that Archilochus used the word to indicate a new form of government, possibly inspired on the example of Gyges’ palace revolution. The morals of a Solon (violence, transgression of the

10. cf. what Breebaart, (art. cit., 282) writes on the fourth-century tyrannis: “The picture the writers give us is often coloured by far-reaching and in most cases aristocratic prejudice.”
11. This interpretation is derived from W.G. Forrest, op. cit., 78ff.
law) we can better disregard in Archilochus; the context suggests associations with wealth, ostentation, and greatness rather than the condemnation of an illegal Gewaltherrscher. Around 650 B.C. there were apparently people who did not accept Solon’s moral prejudices, and who would presumably not have understood Berve’s analysis.

Solon himself, as is known, condemned the tyrannis; he associated it with “ruthless violence”\(^\text{12}\); the tyrant intervened violently in the social order, confiscated the possessions of the nobles and expelled all or part of the nobility. Was he thinking of the Corinthian tyrant Cypselos nearby, or of the tyrant of Megara who mistreated the flocks of the rich? For the moment we are concerned with the fact that there were many in Athens who did not understand Solon’s scruples: for them “tyrannos” was a term which signified absolute rule; if carried out with virtue (δικαιοσύνη) it was on a level with kingship (βασιλεία) – the case of Pittacus may serve as an example.\(^\text{13}\) The Mytileneans had chosen him as “tyrant”; since they did so en masse, “praising him highly”,\(^\text{14}\) we may assume that if they themselves used the term, they did so in a positive sense. “If they used the word”, I have written, deliberately, for there are signs that make it seem probable that “tyrannos” was not the official term used by the followers of the man but rather an unofficial title propagated by a certain antigroup in a pejorative sense.

\(^{12}\) Plut., Solon, 14, 8. J.H. Thiel (“Solon en de tyrannis”, Symbolae van Oyen, Leiden (1946), 71ff., followed by H. Berve, op. cit., 541) goes one step further and denies that Solon can have said what Plutarch attributes to him: “to his friends Solon is reported to have said, that the tyrannis was a good position but that it did not offer any possibilities of escape” (14, 8). Thiel did not realize that Solon did not call the tyrannis καλὸν as such, but a “good position”. Solon’s remark is historically acceptable since it is to the point. The tyrannis was a strong position, but also one that was difficult to get rid of. Hippias, Hipparchos, and Periander discovered this in person. Thiel’s study is an example of how risky (albeit sometimes unavoidable!) it is to write history under the powerful and at times admittedly irresistible impact of the contemporary political situation. In 1946 the hate of the Germanic tyrant was so great that Solon simply had to be considered an arch-democrat who could never have said anything favourable or amusing about the tyrannis. Actually Plut. Solon, 8, 3 and 31 show that Solon and Pisistratus definitely did not hate each other to such a degree as would justify our calling Solon a full-fledged democrat. Solon’s bon mot may well have been a line from his own work (cf. W. den Boer “A New Fragment of Solon?”, Mnem. (1966), 46ff.).

\(^{13}\) Plut., Solon, 14, 5–7; Berve, (op. cit., 91ff and 572ff.) rejects this passage as having “no historical value”; if we take it that Pittacus was called both “basileus” (the miller’s song) and “tyrannos” (Alcaeus etc.), we can regard §7 as historically correct. Solon’s friends said as much as “What’s in a name?”. Indeed Pittacus’ example illustrates this most satisfactorily. Berve may be formally right when he says that Pittacus held an office and was therefore not a tyrant, but the question remains whether this formalism brings us any closer to the contemporary attitudes. In my opinion the miller’s song shows that the masses hardly thought “formally”; indeed neither did Solon’s friends.

\(^{14}\) Alcaeus, apud Aristotle, Poltica 1285a.
Aristotle calls Pittacus aisenētēs; for him Pittacus was a “chosen tyrant”\(^{15}\); a Lesbian song runs “grind, mill, for Pittacus grinds too, king of the great Mytilene” (βασιλευων). Incidentally, Pittacus’ “grinding”, in view of the positive context (king of the great Mytilene) may well stand for “Pittacus also worked hard, and ground much”\(^{16}\). This would seem more plausible than the theory according to which “grinding” is a metaphor for “oppressive exaction of penalties”\(^{17}\).

In the folk song Pittacus’ followers regard their leader as “king” — βασιλεύς. Solon’s friends were right: with a little “aretē” a tyrant becomes a king. In this case „aretē” meant a break-through of the rule of the Eupatriads and resulted in a mild government — at least for the tyrant’s followers. This “aretē” was pure depravity in the eyes of Alcaeus; indeed, for him Pittacus was a “lowborn tyrant of the submissive and unfortunate city”. The tyrant broke the aristocratic code, but this is no reason to place him linea recta outside the “polis”; others thought differently on the matter. Pittacus was, according to Aristotle, even a “maker of laws” (νόμων δημιουργός)\(^{18}\). He acted within the limits of the law.

As Aristotle says in the same passage, Pittacus was not the maker of a constitution, i.e. he did not define in extenso the political rights and duties of the various groups of the population. But once again this should not lead us to create a polarity between polis and tyrant. For there is no reason to assume that before Pittacus’ rule there was a constitution in the sense in which Solon gave Athens a constitution (albeit not yet an egalitarian one); there presumably was only a series of rather disconnected regulations (written or unwritten) to which Pittacus made additions. That his additions were anti-aristocratic is perhaps clear from his law against drunkenness: drunken offenders received heavier sentences than sober ones. Was this measure directed against ‘drunken’ aristocrats, who beat the ordinary man with their “walking sticks”? Aristotle uses the word τοπτω (to beat), and we happen to know that the Penthielids, i.e. the ruling Mytilenean nobility comparable with the Bakchiads (see below), were in the habit of beating people (again τοπτω)\(^{19}\) with their κορύφατ (clubs, “walking-stick” is an ana-

\(^{15}\) Aristotle, Politica 1285a 30–37.
\(^{17}\) D. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus, Oxford (1955), 170 note 5.
\(^{18}\) Politica, 1274b 17ff.
\(^{19}\) I can hardly resist the temptation to interpret the “club-bearers” (κορυφιφόροι) who were assigned to Pisistratus by decree as a bodyguard (Ath. Pol. 14, 1) in terms of the well-known dictum: “People in glass houses should not throw stones.” The noble gentlemen, drunk or sober, were accustomed to beating the ordinary citizen; now the latter saw to it that the former were beaten with the same instrument. Needless to say I am aware that the “club-bearers” were in the first place a bodyguard. However, this implies possible action against attackers, who must often have been members of the frustrated aristocracy; for the Korunēphoroi cf. also H. Berve, op. cit., 535.
chronism on my part!) However the case may be, Pittacus certainly did not stand outside das Rechtsdenken of his time; he in fact modified everyday life by his legislative work; the attested legal action against idleness (ἀργα) taken by other tyrants should be compared in this respect.

The Cypselids confront us with identical problems. On the basis of Herodotus V, 92 and Nicolaus Damascus fr. 57 (Jacoby, FGH), Will in my view rightly concludes that Cypselos was called "king" (basileus) by his followers. He was called thus in an oracle from Delphi, which although it may have been post eventum presumably said what the followers of Cypselos—who in the meantime had come to power—wished to hear: "King of famous Corinth" (βασιλεὺς κλειτοῦ Κορίνθου). Nicolaus Damascus (fr. 57) states: "the people forthwith proclaimed him king". It is interesting that what is so often held against the "tyrant", namely an arbitrary and illegal autocracy, was held against the opponents of the tyrant in Corinth. The oracle in Herodotus V, 92 which undoubtedly reflects the ideology of Cypselos and his followers, blames the Bakchiad-rule for being autocratic (ἀνδράσι μουνάρχοι) and unjust. Cypselos will break through the barriers surrounding the Bakchiad-caste and restore justice in Corinth: "he will turn on the absolute rulers and make Corinth just". If the Bakchiad-caste is regarded as the polis, and the set of rules operative under the auspices of this group as the laws of the city, Cypselos can easily be considered as the man who undermined the polis and made the laws meaningless. Only few of his contemporaries—and probably only the losers—would not have been shocked by such reasoning: presumably most of them regarded the Bakchiads as "bold and violent" men (Nic.Dam.)—precisely those qualities for which the losing nobility perhaps blamed the tyrant and his helpers, if we may assume on comparative and to my mind acceptable grounds that Corinth also had known its "Alcaeus" who reproached the tyrant for destroying the people (δάπτει).

What one party calls justice and law, is for the other no more than a function of a particular social group. Both Pittacus and Cypselos seem to have had even official, constitutionally determined functions in their cities. The Bakchiad-oligarchy knew the functions of prytan, basileus, and polemarch. In his function of polemarch Cypselos took the offensive; he must at that time have

21. Cf. p. 48f. of this article.
been assured of the support of the "armed forces"; on this assumption at least the success of the revolution can be reasonably explained. He killed the "king" of the Bakchiads and was proclaimed "king" himself. Pittacus, as said before, was made aismynêtês for a period of ten years, an office that had existed previously in Mytilene and elsewhere (cf. note 70). The tyrants attempted to maintain the existing constitution and to find a place for themselves within it.

Among the Pisistratids things were different; especially so, because when the outburst of hate of the ordinary man against the Eupatrids seemed imminent, Solon tried to avert a crisis by legislative means and by developing a detailed constitution, thus giving the tyranny the stigma of violence and illegality. But Solon's legal thinking could not prevent tyranny. How did Pisistratus come to power? Herodotus and Aristotle report how, supported by his "clientela" (of which more later) and by means of a trick, he succeeded in getting the people to give him a personal bodyguard recruited from Athenian citizens, by popular vote. Of course the very fact that he received a bodyguard may be stressed, but firstly it consisted of citizens, as opposed to the guards of the proverbial "bad" tyrant, who according to Plato and Aristotle recruited his men among foreigners, and secondly it had been the subject of a discussion in and a resolution of the popular assembly. Moreover Pisistratus did not disarm the démos, by which

25a. Berve (op. cit., 16/17 and 52ff.) calls Will's view very hypothetical, and rejects it. He believes that the people could never have proclaimed someone king in such early times; the people were not in a position to take legal action of this kind; moreover kingship for life would have been a monstrosity in a world of jahresämter. Nowhere is it more evident that Berve's formalism stands in the way of a correct interpretation of the facts. In a revolutionary situation the people took less notice than ever of what the aristocracy forbade them. The memory of the annual change of the basileus under the detested Bakchiads still fresh in their minds, the people decided to nominate Cypselos for life; for a parallel situation see Aristotle, Politica 1285a 31ff. where he writes of aismynêtai ruling for life (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, Munich 1920, 372 note 6). Berve (op. cit. 15ff. and 522) passes over the oracles mentioned in Herodotus all too lightly; he calls them "myths". One of his arguments is that they were all post eventum, another that the entire "setting" of the Cypselos-story is too reminiscent of a legend. Both arguments are weak: with regard to the first I refer to my text and to Forrest, op. cit., 109ff.; the second argument is hardly relevant to the question of whether the oracles may have reflected certain aspects of the ideology of Cypselos' followers.


he again avoided a characteristic of the cliché tyrant. Indeed one may wonder what exactly is the value of the statement in Herodotus and in the *Ath. Pol.* that the tyrant turned against the people and occupied the acropolis with the aid of his bodyguard. Did those who voted in favour of the bodyguard resolution in the ekklesia recognize it as the putsch which it was in the purely constitutional sense? Unfortunately we know too little of Athens' military apparatus at the time to be able to judge whether the bodyguard decree by Pisistratus' clientela in Athens was perhaps not paralleled by the local militia which could be drafted by the leaders of other factions for the maintenance of their own leading positions.

At the time of his second return Pisistratus made use of mercenaries in order to compensate the military inferiority of his own Athenian "clientela". This fact brands the tyrant once more as the man of power who does not shrink from any method. It is not clear however what he did with the mercenaries after the victory at Pallene; perhaps the Argive mercenaries were sent back. If we assume that the mercenaries who were recruited with Thracian gold were Thracian peltasts (pl. 1) and Scythian archers (pl. 2) such as occur increasingly on Athenian vase-paintings from 540 B.C. until after the expulsion of the tyrants, we can, with M. F. Vos, reasonably suppose that Pisistratus hired these mercenaries as a special corps which

29. With his last and definitive attempt to establish the tyranny, Pisistratus is indeed supposed to have disarmed the demos (*Ath. Pol.*, 15, 4) after his victory over his opponents. However, the *Ath. Pol.* version appears to be at variance with that of other sources (Herodotus does not mention the matter; Thucydides explicitly states that it was Hippias who disarmed the people after the murder of Hipparchus). Day-Chambers (*Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy*, Berkeley (1952), 20ff.) assume, quite plausibly, that Aristotelic is here attributing action which certain tyrants took (e.g. the Sicilian) to all tyrants in general and hence also to Pisistratus. Cf. also M. F. Vos, *Scythian Archers in Archaic Vase-Painting*, Utrecht (1963), 64. I may perhaps add that in *Politica* 1315a 32ff. the 'semi-improved' tyrant (cf. above note 4) is advised to win the support of both the poor and the rich, but at all events to take the strongest group as the main support of his rule; thus disarmament (διαλόγος παραδειγμιος) becomes unnecessary. A little further on Aristotle advises the same tyrant to build up social relationships with the aristocracy (τοις μὲν γνωρίσιν καθομελετι) and to become the champion of the masses (τοις δὲ πολλοῖς ἡμαγαγεῖν). In the *Ath. Pol.* 16, 9 Pisistratus actually is reported to have followed the latter advice; the term διάλογος - related to καθομελετι - is used here. In short, Pisistratus is portrayed as a man who regarded the masses as his main support, but who maintained social contacts with the (remaining) aristocracy. Nevertheless in 15, 4 Aristotelic suddenly tells us of this good ruler that he disarmed the people. And with that he suddenly jumps from the positive Pisistratus-image to the cliché of the wicked tyrant who always disarms the people (*Politica*, 1311a 12-13). This strain on the *Ath. Pol.* image of Pisistratus is my reason for rejecting the observation in 15, 4; contra H. Berve, op. cit., 51, 547, 556; 559; I cannot understand how Herodotus 1, 64 and Thuc. 6, 54, 5 can support the *Ath. Pol.* version; see also V. Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates*, London (1968), 80.

Plate 1. Thracian Peltasts (Munich, N. 1375)

Plate 2. Scythian Archers (London B.M., B 426)
was subsequently integrated in the regular Athenian army: “In actual fact it was of course Pisistratus who took the decision but he will have done so on behalf of the Athenian state”\textsuperscript{31}. Here again high-handedness goes together with concern for the community. Perhaps Ehrenberg’s formula according to which the tyrant sometimes lived alongside yet not outside the constitution\textsuperscript{32}, provides an acceptable compromise.

Of Cypselos it is explicitly stated that he acted without a bodyguard\textsuperscript{32a}, while in Pittacus’ case the few sources leave the possibility open\textsuperscript{32b}. Cypselos apparently had the Corinthian forces behind him\textsuperscript{33}, whereas Pittacus probably could also count on the support of the (or the majority of) the dēmos. The regional disunity of Attica may have put Pisistratus at a disadvantage. His “clientela” was undoubtedly the poorest, his two opponents presumably had more and better equipped followers; reason enough why a coalition between the latter two should render Pisistratus helpless at one blow unless he took to hiring mercenaries!\textsuperscript{34}

It is not known whether Pisistratus held an office at the beginning of his tyranny; prior to the latter he had triumphed in the war against Megara, undoubtedly in a leading function\textsuperscript{35}. Aristotle\textsuperscript{36} favours the theory that most of the tyrants started as demagogues; elsewhere he adds that in earlier times the function of strategos and demagogue often corresponded, as distinct from the time when he wrote. In addition Aristotle knows of tyrants who started out as kings or had held the highest offices (\emph{e.g.} that of prytanis). It is remarkable that, when Aristotellegives examples, he mentions Cypselos and Pisistratus as tyrants who started out as demagogues, \emph{i.e.} as strategoi. Cypselos did indeed start out as polemarch (a variation on the theme of the strategos as military leader); it would seem attractive, also as regards Pisistratus, to follow Aristotle, who after all had much more material at his disposal than we.

However this may be and however strongly the tyrant was a man of power (with bodyguard, mercenaries), it remains of essential importance that Herodotus and Thucydides, both of whom can hardly be called admirers of the tyrannis (Herod. v, 92 (Socles story); Thuc. 1, 17 (the trias tyrannis – private interest – private

\textsuperscript{31} M.F. Vos, \textit{op. cit.}, 66. J.G.P. Best told me that the first Scythian archer occurs on an Attic vase from 540 B.C. (see pl. 2). Vos regarded 530 B.C. as terminus a quo. Cf. now J.G.P. Best, \textit{Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare}, Groningen (1969), 5ff. (with pl. 2).


\textsuperscript{32a} Nic. Dam. fr. 57 § 8 (Jac.).

\textsuperscript{32b} Cf. Berve, \textit{op. cit.}, 91ff. and 572ff.

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. W.G. Forrest, \textit{op. cit.}, 113ff.

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. \textit{infra}, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{35} Plut., \textit{Solon}, 8, 3; Herodotus i, 59; according to H. Berve (\textit{op. cit.}, 47ff.) it was in the sixties.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Politica} 1305a 7ff.; 1310b 14ff.
wealth) state that Pisistratus and his sons did not change the “laws” or the rules (νόμοι, θέσεις), but that they did always see to it that one of their relatives held an office. The fragment of the Athenian archon list published by Meritt in 1939 supports Thucydides’ statement: in 522–521 B.C. Pisistratus junior presumably held the office of archon. That Pisistratus himself used an office as a stepping-stone to the tyrannos is, as we have seen, quite conceivable. Plutarch’s statement that Pisistratus respected most of Solon’s laws, acting according to them himself and obliging his friends to do the same, fits in with Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ information. If the archaeological hypothesis, according to which the first permanent building of the Heliaia and a building for the “standing committee” of the Council was constructed under the Pisistratids, is acceptable, we can go one step further and state that the tyrants not only did not change the constitution but even furthered its optimal functioning.

There is moreover the real possibility that after 525 B.C. the first coins with an owl and the letters ΑΘΕ (the first letters of ΑΘΕὰνων, “of the Athenians”) were issued. The discussion between W.P. Wallace and C.M. Kraay on the subject

37. Hesperia 8 (1939), 59ff; see also P. Levêque-P. Vidal Naquet, Clishtène l’Athénien, Paris 1964, 38 note 4; Herod. 1, 59; Thuc. v, 55.
39. Cf. Forrest, op. cit., 182/3; Ed. Will (Revue des Études Anciennes 63 (1961), 482) does not consider the archaeological indications strong enough to support Aristotle’s remarks on Solon’s Council of the Four Hundred; he denies the existence of this council. This problem cannot be discussed here (cf. A.G. Woodhead, Historia 16, (1967), 135 note 17), but I should like to mention that the “Council” (boule) in Herod. v, 72, 2 was probably not that of Cleisthenes (so Ed. Will, Revue Historique, (1965), 414 note 1), and may well have referred to the Solonian council. Aristotle gives an exact chronological indication of the date of the (beginning of the?) implementation of Cleisthenes’ phyle reforms (21, 1–2; 508/7 B.C., archonship of Isagoras). The boule of the Five Hundred did not come into being until after Cleisthenes’ definitive victory; before that it had only existed on paper and in Cleisthenes’ mind. The Cleomenes’ episode, with the mention of an existing boule (Herod. v, 72, 2) must be dated before the end of 508/7 B.C. and in any case before the Council of Five Hundred started working. Naturally, it remains possible that Herodotus’ boule was the Areopagus. Whatever the truth may be, at any rate it seems easier to fit Herodotus’ chronologically rather vague report (see esp. μετὰ ἐκ νυμφάδων in v, 661) into Aristotle’s tighter chronology than vice versa; cf. R. Seager, American Journal of Philology (1963), 287ff. and also Ed. Will, Revue Historique, 238 (1967), 394/5, note 1. The essential point is, of course, that Herodotus does not, and has no need to distinguish between the acceptance of Cleisthenes’ proposals by the démos and the implementation of Cleisthenes’ policy, which mainly took place after the Cleomenes’ episode; cf. now also M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy, Oxford (1969), 142–145.
40. Against Hignett’s view that the Pisistratids introduced constitutional innovations (e.g. conferment of full citizenship on all thetes, in the sense that they were admitted to the ekklēsia as well as to the private rights of citizenship) see the correct remarks by J.R. Ellis — G.R. Stanton, ‘Factional Conflict and Solon’s Reform’, Phoenix 22 (1968), 95ff., esp. 105.
of these coins^403 centres on the question when this "national" series started. Wallace attributes them to Cleisthenes, whereas Kraay dates them between 525 and 520. I am inclined to believe that the tyrants started with these series of coins and that Cleisthenes cum suis continued them; for in other respects the tyrants were also in favour of a centralization policy and Cleisthenes is in certain respects the man who continued along Pisistratus' lines (and broadened them: see below). If Kraay's thesis is acceptable, we may say that in the coin inscriptions the tyrant does not manifest himself as a power-seeking individual. It was, in the formal sense, the community of Athenian citizens which minted the coins.

Finally, Aristotle says that "some" support the theory that a democracy should not take over the debts of the tyrant, "since the tyrant, not the city, made them". Who those "some" are is not known, presumably they are the people of Aristotle's own time who were interested in constitutional niceties. For my purpose it is of importance to note that by implication others (or most people?) apparently saw the relation between the city and the tyrant in a different way. Actually Herodotus, when writing about the Corinthian offerings in Delphi, has some real difficulty in realizing that the famous treasury was not a gift of the Corinthian state but of Cypselos, the son of Eëtion.\(^41\) Cypselos' followers presumably did not see it in this light. The Cypselids were more of a ruling dynasty at the head of the polis; on that basis it also becomes understandable that colonies which were established by tyrants, and often placed under the leadership of their son(s), automatically fell to the polis after the tyranny's downfall. In this context A. J. Graham rightly says that "to make the tyrant something almost separate from the city he ruled seems a mistake."\(^42\)

In general the discussions on the relation between the constitution and the tyrant sometimes remind one of the somewhat difficult debates on whether Augustus re-established the republic or lived alongside it or even outside it. My own preference is for the theory that the princeps and the tyrannos maintained the

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41. Politica, 1276 a 10ff.; Herodorus i, 14; Heuss (art. cit., 46) simply projects Herodorus' distinction back into the archaic period; furthermore he passes too lightly over the forced aspect of Herodotus' remark. Cf. also Ed. Will, Korinthiaka, 488 note 1: "Il ne nous paraît pas possible de distinguer rigoureusement les finances des tyrans de celles de la polis."
42. A. J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece, Manchester 1964, 30/31; contra H. Berve, op. cit., 524/5.
existing constitution, held certain offices within the framework of the constitution, but also built personal strongholds; here the parallel between the bodyguard and the praetorians comes to the fore. With Ehrenberg’s above-mentioned dictum about the tyrant who sometimes lived alongside the constitution, a penetrating remark by W. Kunkel about the Augustan Principate should be compared: the latter "(wurde) nicht eigentlich in die Verfassung eingebaut sondern neben sie gestellt".43a.

In the above frequent mention has been made of the “followers” of the tyrant; the question of whom they consisted is in fact identical with the question concerning “the same problems” to which according to Will the tyrant provides “the same answer”. I believe that there is general agreement on who were the enemies of the archaic tyrants – the aristocrats, the landowners, often called Eupatrids, who knew the rules and kept them, and felt aloof, and indeed in terms of power and wealth were aloof, from the “ordinary” masses, which consisted of peasants, day-labourers and a few craftsmen. This situation is quite familiar from Hesiod with his “gift-hungry nobles (basileis)” and the small peasant who must work hard for his (meagre) daily bread. Generations of scholars have thought that the first symptoms of an agrarian crisis were on record in Hesiod. However, Ernest Will44 has recently demonstrated convincingly that wishful thinking and particularly the desire to find a prefiguration of the Solonian situation in Hesiod, are to be blamed here. Hesiod hardly thinks (see note 44) in terms of a fundamental agrarian crisis; he does complain bitterly of the pre-

43. Breebaart (cit. cit., 281) rightly points out that the theorists never blamed the tyrants for being usurpers; also in later tyrannies there is sometimes a clear link with the existing constitution. Cf. J.P. Barron, “The Tyranny of Duris of Samos”, Classical Review (1962), 189, who demonstrates that the son of the tyrant Kaioi may well be on record in a Samian decree as the man who introduced it to the assembly. J.A.O. Larsen (Some Early Anatolian Cults of Roma, Mélanges A. Piganiol, Paris (1966), 1655 ff., especially 1641) points out that during the second century B.C. in the small town of Cibyra in Asia Minor, “some sort of constitutional government was combined with the rule or influence of a dynast or tyrant.” Livy (38, 14) and Polybius (21, 4) mention Mogetes as a tyrant of Cibyra; in an inscription which contains the text of a treaty between Rome and Cibyra (OCD 762; ± 182 B.C.), we hear only of the démos!

44. Ernest Will, “Hésiode: Crise agraire ou recul de l’aristocratie?”, Revue des Études Grecques 78 (1965), 542ff. (contra Ed. Will, Revue Historique 238 (1967), 422 note 5). In Hesiod the difficulties of the small peasant are related to the peasant’s laziness and inability (v. 390ff.: from vv. 403/5 it appears that famine can be avoided by accepting Hesiod’s advice) rather than to a social crisis caused by a continual process of inheriting and by the fragmentation of the land. Cf. also H.T. Wallinga, De Grieks kolonisatie in Zuid-Italië en Sicilië, Groningen (1965), 78, and M. Detienne, Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode, Brussels (1963), chap. II, for an interesting hypothesis concerning Hesiod’s “Esya, v. 376ff., where the poet idealizes the peasant family-with-one-son, yet goes on to say that Zeus gives great wealth also to a family with more children!
judices and corruption of the nobles, but there is hardly a question of revolt against the existing social system. "I am not sure how we distinguish... between the private grudge of one man against a particular group of nobles and a general dissatisfaction with the system. Of the latter I see no certain sign". The era of colonization brought about the first cracks in this fairly simple, straightforward image of a society of nobles (basileis), in which "Thersites" does grumble and complain but hardly sees or advocates an alternative social system.

At first sight the colonization would seem to have prevented the emergence of cracks. Superfluous elements of the population were got rid of, possibly dissenting nobles accompanied them as "leader"—potential dissatisfaction could hardly be avoided more efficiently. This is of course true, but it is not what I had in mind; the colonization must—in the long run—have furthered trade, however slight it may have been in quantity, it must have suggested new possibilities of acquiring wealth, and in particular it must have had the psychological effect that the people realized that an existence was possible without the traditional rule of the Eupatrids at home. I am aware that the Greek colonization cannot on the whole be characterized as a commercial undertaking. Perhaps the need for metal played a role at Al-Mina and Ischia. The emporion character of the first and the geographical position of Greece's oldest colony make this supposition attractive. Yet most of the other colonies are best explained as agrarian settlements. However, this does not imply that in the course of the seventh century trade did not take place between the mother cities and the colonies, and particularly between Corinth and Sicily. The finds of Corinthian pottery are too numerous and too persistent to allow the explanation that they simply belonged to the baggage of visitors from the mother city. Obviously we can only guess at the nature of the goods that came back—grains and metals are

45. W.G. Forrest, op. cit., 60.
46. The colonization is generally (and rightly) regarded as a result of relative over-population. Of essential importance is the "unequal distribution of the land, which must be seen as a function of the population increase" (Wallinga, op. cit., 7). Cf. also M. Detienne, op. cit., chap. 2, where the inequality of landed property is considered to lie at the root of the agrarian crisis.
47. The problems of these early settlements are extremely complex. R.M. Cook, ("Reasons for the Foundation of Ischia and Cumae," Historia xi (1962), 113ff.) sees Ischia as an agrarian settlement, as J. Béard and others. The extraordinary site of this settlement, however, provides to my mind considerable support for the theory that (Etruscan) metal formed the motive for settling there. Cf. Wallinga, op. cit., 9; S.A. Immerwahr, AJA 63 (1959), 295ff., and Ed. Will, "La Grèce Archaique" (Conférence Internationale d'histoire économique, Aix-en-Provence (1962), Tome 1 (Paris, 1965), 41ff.), who in a postscript mentions the views held by Roebuck and Andrews that Ischia and Al-Mina were not agrarian settlements, yet himself favours a non liquet with respect to Ischia (but see now id., Revue Historique 238 (1967), 443, where Will now appears to be "converted" also concerning Ischia). For Al-Mina, "le plus ancien 'comptoir' grec à nous connu," see Will, art. cit., 48ff.
possible\textsuperscript{48}, but unfortunately the wear and tear of time has wrought havoc too badly with this sort of products of antiquity for us to have any certainty whatsoever.

At all events the Bakchiads levied heavy customs at the Isthmus\textsuperscript{49}. I am certainly not prepared to follow in the footsteps of P.N. Ure\textsuperscript{50} by characterizing the Corinthian nobles (or the tyrant who overthrew the governing nobility) as captains of industry or barons of trade. All we can say is that they did not halt commercial development, and perhaps even stimulated it and certainly profited by it. In i, 13 Thucydides tells that Corinth played a major role in seventh-century shipping; he correlates Corinth's increasing wealth with the favourable position of the Isthmus and with the increasing amount of shipping. The question of whether Corinth had a fleet for military or for commercial purposes is a typically sterile dilemma. A strong fleet of warships could theoretically have been financed with the income from the customs; in that case the latter must have been considerable, which presupposes fairly intensive trade; it is unlikely that this trade should be attributed exclusively to foreigners\textsuperscript{51}. Customs dues, harbour tax as well as participation of Corinthian citizens in trade presumably provided the funds (\textit{χρημάτων πρόσοδος}, Thuc. i, 13) with which a relatively strong fleet could be financed\textsuperscript{52}.

To my mind the undeniable result of this course of events was that a fundamentally new livelihood emerged. I am by no means overestimating the quantitative aspect. R.M. Cook\textsuperscript{53} recently demonstrated that at the time when the Attic export of ceramics flourished there were perhaps five hundred people earning a living in the ceramic workshops. In seventh-century Corinth their number may well have been even smaller. The Corinthian potters' quarter de-

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Ed. Will, \textit{art. cit.}, 45/6. For an attempt to make the "guess" more acceptable, see G. Vallet-F. Villard, "Céramique Grecque et Histoire économique", \textit{Études Archéologiques} i (1963), 205ff.; see also the same authors in \textit{Revue Historique} (1961), 295ff.

\textsuperscript{49} Strabo VIII, 378 (6, 20): "the Bakchiads ... had free access to the income of the harbour".

\textsuperscript{50} P.N. Ure, \textit{The Origin of Tyranny}, (New-York 1962; photomech. reprint of the original edition of 1922), \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{51} I shall not go into the question – closely related to these problems – of who transported the Corinthian pottery to the West, and whether, more generally, the producers transported their goods themselves. As far as Corinth is concerned it is at any rate commonly assumed, and reasonably so, that Corinthian ships carried a significant proportion of the goods; for a number of valuable observations on this problem cf. R.M. Cook, "Die Bedeutung der bemalten Keramik für den griechischen Handel," \textit{Jahrb. Deutsch. Arch. Inst.} 74 (1959), 114ff.

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. the very interesting remarks by H.T. Wallinga, in \textit{Een centraal probleem in de studie van de antieke economie}, Groningen (1960), 6/7; on the problem of whether the archaic nobility was involved in commercial enterprise and shipping see some remarks in my forthcoming review of H. Berve (see note 7).

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. note 51.

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initely cannot be called large; it was located outside the actual city centre. In fact we must admit that the problem of the quantitative aspect of the export, and hence of the intensity of trade and its function in the economy as a whole, cannot be solved on the basis of the ceramic finds alone.\textsuperscript{54} The very fact that trade and certain trends existed is all that can be stated with any certainty. And that is what concerns us here: in the seventh century the way of life of men like Kolaios or Sostratos — rich merchants from Samos and Aegina — became a distinct possibility also for Corinthians. A spirit of mobility got hold of the people. The sacred Eupatrid — ideology could now be attacked. The Cypselids by no means championed the cause of a class of shipbuilders, merchants and potters against the landowners. As said before, the Bakchiads themselves probably “directed” the development of commerce and craftsmanship too carefully for Cypselos to be able to make use of any dissatisfaction about restriction of commercial activities.

The commercial factor, however slight in comparison with the agrarian, can, apart from the psychological shock-effect, also have brought with it a certain prosperity and thus have made the formation of a hoplite phalanx possible. On the basis of the recent study on this subject by Snodgrass\textsuperscript{55} it may be said, that after the introduction of parts of the panoply at the end of the eighth century the complete hoplite phalanx — and that is the socio-economically significant aspect — had become a common phenomenon ca. 650 B.C. Cypselos’ polemarchy and the fact that he had no bodyguard, would perhaps seem to indicate that he could count on the support of a Corinthian hoplite force. It is typical of the historian’s helplessness that there is not a single text which makes explicit


\textsuperscript{55} A.M. Snodgrass, “The Hoplite-Reform and History”, Journal of Hellenic Studies 85 (1965), 110ff; cf. now also the brilliant essay by M. Detienne, “La Phalèse: Problèmes et Controverses” in J.-P. Vernant (ed.), Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, Paris (1968), 119ff. By “complete hoplite phalanx” I mean what Detienne has called “les milices des paysans”. It is especially on the aristocratic fore-runners of the rural hoplite phalanx that D’s study is illuminating. He draws a firm line from Homer’s φάλαγγας καρτέρας of the ἄριστοι χρυσάνθες (II. 13, 126–129; to be distinguished from the πληθος: II. 15, 295, 305) via the archaic elite-corps of “Heniochoi and Parabatai” (Thebes) and “Hippeis” (Sparta: mounted hoplites) to the peasant-hoplites from the late 7th century onwards; see also id., Les Maîtres de Vérité dans la Grèce archaïque, Paris (1967), 99/100. Detienne does not seem to be aware of the problem of the function of the archaic τραύς: horsemen (A. Alföldi, “Die Herrschaft der Reiterei in Griechenland und Rom nach dem Sturz der Könige”, Festschr. K. Scheffold, Bern (1967), 13ff.) or mounted hoplites, who used the horse as a means of transport or as a status-symbol (Helbig). Personally I feel that Helbig and Detienne may well be right.
mention of hoplites in connection with Cypselos. It is an extrapolation based on the "lesson" of the vase material, on Cypselos' polemarchy and the absence of a bodyguard, and on the common sense argument that a rebel can only win if he has the military on his side. Though I tend to accept the existence and importance of the "hoplite-factor", I must add immediately\(^56\), that these hoplites were apparently not in the least interested in gaining political rights. It was enough for them to break the cruelty and the exclusiveness of the Bakchiads and subsequently to follow one single Bakchiad\(^57\).

Although Will did not discuss the theory of the hoplites as followers of the tyrant in his *Korinthiaka*, he referred to the theory as attractive in a detailed review\(^58\) of Andrewes' *The Greek Tyrants*; nevertheless he believes the agrarian problem to lie at the root of the tyrannis in general and of the Corinthian tyrannis in particular. However, there are no direct indications to this effect. Aristotle\(^59\) says that in Corinth a certain Pheidon wished to keep the number of estates and the citizens equal, even though the pieces of land (kléroi) were unequal in size. The Bakchiad Philolaos even advocated birth control\(^60\) to ensure that the number of kléroi remained constant. Large differences in landed property and the threat of fragmentation were apparently very real. The aristocratic estate-owners will have been the men with the large "kléroi"; this situation had

\(^{56}\) Id., *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*, London (1967), 64, where Snodgrass calls the relation between Cypselos and the hoplites an "informed guess"!

\(^{57}\) Snodgrass doubts whether the early tyrants were indeed the champions of the hoplite class, and in particular whether Cypselos gave the hoplites political power. Snodgrass is right when he maintains that the hoplite phalanx was probably first used by the nobles within the framework of the existing social order. However, there is every reason to assume that around 650 B.C. Cypselos succeeded in mobilizing the rural hoplite phalanx (which had been formed in the meantime) against the class of nobles, whose regime had angered the peasant-hoplites. Cypselos used the hoplites and granted their wishes by expelling the Bakchiads (negative), not by giving the hoplite class political rights (positive). Snodgrass too readily assumes that being a champion of the hoplite-class is synonymous with giving political rights. Generally speaking it is hard to answer satisfactorily Detienne's question: "Quelle est la place de la phalange, comme phénomène global, dans les difficultés agraires qui caractérisent une situation "pré-solonienne"?" (art. cit. (cf. note 55), 130, note 56), witness A. French's remarks on hoplite-peasants, who in the process become almost identical with the debt-ridden peasants of ca. 600 B.C. who can hardly have been capable of paying for their own armour!! (The Growth of the Athenian Economy, London (1964), 16); cf. the remarks in my forthcoming review of Berve (see note 7).

\(^{58}\) *Revue des Études Grecques* 79 (1956), 439ff.; see also *Revue Historique* 238 (1967), 391/2, notes 5 and 2 where Will underlines the hypothetical nature of Forrest's "hoplite-theory" with regard to Cypselos, but fails to mention the even more hypothetical character of his own "agrarian" theory.

\(^{59}\) *Politica*, 1255b; 1274a-b.

\(^{60}\) Albeit in Thebes, and not in Corinth. But he may well have taken the idea with him from Corinth!
to be maintained, for inequality of property, of course, was a Bakchiad principle. Yet the measures mentioned by Aristotle as well as the protracted colonization were – one could object – not only indications of but also remediation for an agrarian crisis. Are we to assume – to use that helpless verb once more – that the remediation were stop-gaps? Should we, with Will, take the remark made by Nicolaus of Damascus – writing seven centuries later with no direct archaic material on which to base his suppositions – according to which Cypselos expelled the Bakchiads and confiscated their possessions (δῆμος, i.e. to make into public property; a most fitting word indeed, if he was indeed the champion of the δήμος), to mean that he divided the land among the poorer citizens, in other words made it the “possession of the δήμος”? 61

Nowhere this is said explicitly in our sources, as Will himself admits. Yet he puts forward this theory and supports it by referring to the events that took place in Attica at the time of Solon, where indeed there was a close relation between radical distribution of the land and tyranny 62. Will assumes that the small peasants in Athens were so full of land distribution and of the tyrannis which would effect this (Solon rejected both land distribution and tyranny), because they had seen a similar development take place recently in Corinth, where according to Will’s “low chronology” 63 Cypselos was in power at the time of Solon’s archonship. One could perhaps also mention Theagenes, tyrant of Megara (the same who wanted his son-in-low Cylon and his hetaireia to come

62. Ath. Pol. 12, 3, l. 7-9 (a clear relation between the “isomoria” (the same amount of land for ἄνθρωποι and ἄνθρωπος) and what Solon calls “the violence of a tyrannis”). According to Plutarch, Solon 14, 4, there was a remark of Solon in circulation, to the effect that “equality does not create war”. Plutarch adds that this bon mot pleased the ἀρχικίμικος, because their interpretation of ἀρχηγος was based “on measure and number”. Solon’s isomoria is evidence for the correctness of Plutarch’s remark, and accordingly I do not understand why “the suggestion that the poor expected arithmetical equality ... is of course a fiction” (F. D. Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality”, Classica et Mediaevalia 26 (1965), 101ff., esp. 211). On ἄνθρωπος and in general on problems concerning redistribution of land cf. A. Fuks, “Redistribution of Land and Houses in Syracuse”, Class. Quarterly (1968), 210ff., esp. 218ff., 222, note 3.
63. According to the “low chronology” the Corinthian tyranny lasted from ± 610-540 B.C.; the “high chronology” works with the period 657-584/3. The chronological problems are not relevant in this article, which essentially aims at determining the position and function of the archaic tyrants. Nevertheless the high chronology is to my mind more plausible than the lower; see for a short summary W. den Boer, Laconian Studies, Amsterdam (1954), 63/4: id., “Herodotus und die Systeme der Chronologie”, Mnem. (1967), 39ff., esp. “Exkurs” 7 on 58ff.; W. Barner, Hermes 95 (1967), 23, 26. Besides Will (and Beloch) also R. Sealey (‘From Phemios to Ion’, Revue des Études Grecques 70 (1957), 318ff.) defends the low chronology. Acceptance of the high chronology (Cypselos: 657-527 B.C.) makes Will’s “explanation” of the Athenian call for a tyrannis decidedly less convincing, albeit not completely impossible; for after all certain events lead long lives in the collective memory of a people.
to power in Athens ca 632 B.C.) whose rebellion (± 640 B.C.) started with the slaughter of the herds of the rich; in Megara, an important colonizing city and as such comparable to "commercial" Corinth, the tyrant is embedded in an agrarian context! In this connection it is worthwhile to consider Nicolaus Damascus' remark that Cypselos as polemarch treated those who had been fined by a tribunal, very leniently.

Forrest simply interprets this as a reference to a "lenient administration of the law governing debtors" (my italics, h.w.p.). This would be acceptable as a hypothesis, but no more. Cypselos' justice (for he was to make Corinth "just") would then operate within the context of an agrarian crisis.

It is evident that the material is hopelessly inadequate, but even so the theory of Cypselos as the champion of the dèmos against the violence of the exclusive Bakchiad caste is plausible enough. It also seems likely on comparative grounds that this same dèmos was mainly agrarian in character. The existence of a group of merchants, potters, and metal workers, however small in number, can perhaps be considered an additional factor. As said before, they indicated that there were alternatives to the ways of the traditional Eupatrids -and their relative prosperity and craftsmanship possibly gave the hoplite-dèmos the arms with which to attack the Bakchiad rule.

64. Aristotle, Politica, 1305 a. A.R. Burn (The Lyric Age of Greece, London (1960), 248) rightly calls Theagenes a "popular revolutionary leader" who, just as Pisistratus, was assigned a bodyguard by the dèmos, and did much for the city (he had an aqueduct built which was greatly appreciated by the city's poor in particular!).

65. Fr. 57 (Jac.), § 5.


67. L. Moretti (Richihere sulle Leghe Greche, Rome (1962), 58ff.) does consider Cypselos as a champion of the ἄπλα παρεβεβλημένοι, but he describes him as favouring the city population (i.e. the merchants, seamen, labourers) after the coup against the Bakchiads. In this way, then, Cypselos betrayed the interests of his (agrarian) hoplites. According to my theory the small peasant-class constituted Cypselos' main support; besides them he may, just as Pisistratus in Athens, also have flirted with the city population, but this must have been a numerically smaller group on account of the predominantly agrarian character of the archaic world. In this connection it must be mentioned that the ten kilometre-long wall around Corinth at the time of the tyrants is a myth. Although he is aware of R. Carpenter's solid doubts about the existence of this wall, M.P. Nilsson still takes the large city of Corinth as the basis of his theory that the tyrants were the champions of the merchants, labourers etc., who lived in the city which had grown large. ("Das frühe Griechenland von innen gesehen", Historia 3 (1955), 257ff. esp. 276). Nilsson's theory concerning the tyrants who stimulated trade and industry particularly reminds one of his readiness to accept Seeck's hypothesis on the "Ausrottung der Besten" as leading to the fall of the Roman Empire: Homer, too, slept at times (albeit seldom and even then a beauty-sleep!).

68. In Snodgrass' reconstruction of the hoplite body, the hoplite-dèmos also retains its agrarian character! On the problem of whether C. armed and incorporated in the citizen-body the poorer peasants in and around Corinth cf. some remarks in my forthcoming review of Berve (see note 7).
The problems presented by the Lesbian tyrannis are almost identical to those of the Corinthian tyrannis, with the difference that the sources here are practically non-existent. Alcaeus’ fragments, which are extremely poor from a historical point of view, hardly give information on the origin and aims of Pittacus’ tyrannis, let alone on the “questions” to which Pittacus’ tyrannis provided “the answers”. In the opinion of D. Page there is no proof whatsoever for the theory according to which Pittacus was the leader of a “popular party”, a “champion of the oppressed”; he sees only indications of a continual and bitter struggle for power between various noble “factions”, – “hetaireiai”. Gomme disagrees, partly on specific grounds but mostly on general historical grounds such as Will used in connection with Corinth. Gomme does not deny that men such as Melanchros and Myrsilos were leaders of a faction. However, in the case of Pittacus, who was certainly of noble birth (Alcaeus’ χαρώπατριδα belongs to the notorious Greek tradition of attributing low-born parents to political opponents) and initially also took part in the hetaireiai game, Gomme refers to Alcaeus’ words: “praising him highly, they proclaimed him tyrant en masse”. This implies wide popular support. Strabo observes that Pittacus overthrew the “dynasteiai”, making use of the μοναρχία.

But it is only on the basis of the assumption that Solon’s problems were identical to those in Lesbos (since the people opposed the ἐσθλοῖ – Eupatrids in both cases), that Gomme portrays Pittacus as the champion of the δῆμος. Gomme does not mention the possibility that the crisis was an agrarian one, but the explicit reference to Solon does suggest that Gomme turns in that direction for a

70. “Interpretations of some poems of Alkaios and Sappho,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957), 255ff.; contra H. Berve, op. cit., 575, 578. On p. 578 Berve discusses the election of Epimenes as aismynētēs by the δῆμος of Miletus after the fall of the Neleids. B. interprets the δῆμος as “nur die . . . oligarchisch bestimmte Vollbürgerchaft” and as a result of this the aismynēia becomes an “ausserordentliche politische Amt”, established by the oligarchs (cf. Aristotle, Política 1310b, 123–24) and comparable to the position of law-givers and διαλλάκτης. But if we interpret the Milesian δῆμος as “the people” and if we further realise (a) that according to Aristotle, loc. cit., l. 20–22 tyrannies sometimes arose from “men elected (by the δῆμος!!!) to fill the supreme magistracies”, (b) that the ε is independent evidence for the aismynēia as “reguläres Oberamt” (cf. e.g. Aristotle, fr. 524, R, mentioned by Berve, 571; cf. also 91 (aisymnētēs in Cyme as highest official) and (c) that Epimenes used the aismynēia as the basis for a tyrannical rule, we may perhaps conclude that in Miletus, just as in Lesbos, the aismynētēs was a preexisting magistrate, comparable to and perhaps even coexisting with the polemarch, prytanis, basileus etc. (cf. Ed. Will, Korinthiaka, above p. 24). Pittacus and Epimenes were appointed as aismynētai by the δῆμος, just as Cypselos was appointed as διαλλάκτης by the Corinthians (cf. note 25a). Anyhow the fact that in Miletus Thrasyboulos possibly used the prytany as a stepping-stone for his tyrannis, does not exclude the fact that the aismynētēs was another high magistrate in Miletus. On the aismynētēs see now also G. Gottlieb, Timochen (Sitz. Ber. Heid. Akad., Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1967, 3), 20ff.
solution. The parallels with Solon become even clearer when one considers that Pittacus was regarded as a νομόν δημοσίου (maker of laws)\(^2\); for was not Solon also a νομοθετής (lawgiver)?

By now it is clear that all theories converge on Attica. That a severe economic crisis took place around 590 B.C. is, to my knowledge, denied by no one who takes Solon's writings seriously. There, too, the struggle between landowners and impoverished peasants would certainly have led to tyranny, had Solon not been able (temporarily, as it happened) to avert it. Fortunately I need not go into the numerous interpretations that have been put forward (particularly in post-war studies) about the agrarian crisis\(^2\), the hektēmoroi, and the relation between the latter and those who were sold into slavery for debt\(^2\). At any rate it seems clear that Solon cancelled the debts of a large number of peasants who had been degraded to serf or slave. In addition to the debts, the actual slavery was annulled; slaves who had been sold abroad were brought back, or rather, repurchased: who paid for them, however, is not mentioned in the sources. Admittedly Solon's main virtue has been that he cleaned up the socio-economic chaos, and more over that he tried to narrow the gap between the various social groups by means of laws and rules, or at least to bring them closer together in a constitutional organization.

72. Cf. note 18 of this article.

73. I should like to make an exception for the theory proposed recently and more or less simultaneously by Ferrara, Finley, Andrewes, and Forrest, that the "hektēmoroi" had not reached the point of having to yield one sixth of the crops to their creditor because they could not refund the debts made earlier, but rather because they formed a caste of "serfs" who, at a certain point in the "Dark Ages" sought protection from a powerful neighbour in exchange of their loyalty and services and also regular payments in natura (Ferrara, *Parola del Passato* 15 (1960), 20ff.; Finley, *Revue Historique de Droit français et étranger* (1965), 159ff., particularly 168ff.; Forrest, *op. cit.*, 147ff.; 245 (Andrewes: also mentioned by Finley, *art. cit.*, 169, note 39). I contend that the peasants, unable to pay back their first debts, first "mortgaged" (part of) their land: ultimately they became Hektēmoroi ("métayers"). If they could still not pay the "rent", their ultimate refuge was to offer themselves as security. Forrest's remark: "if all debts were contracted from the start on the security of the person, there is, logically, no room for the hektēmoroi" (*op. cit.*, 148), misjudges the Greek in *Ath. Pol.* 2, 2. After having stated that the "hektēmoroi" could be sold as slaves if they did not pay their rent, Aristotle adds: "for the debts were, for all of them (πᾶσαι) contracted on the body" - he does not say: "all debts were contracted on the body". Of course Aristotle means that for all (who could not pay their sixth part) the body was the ultimate security. I am generally in favour of comparatism, but I cannot agree to reject the testimonies of Plutarch and Aristotle and to postulate a class of "serfs" in a sort of feudal position by referring to Genesis 47, 13–26 (Forrest, Finley) and old-Roman "parallels". Cf. also Ed. Will, *art. cit.* (see note 47), 65, note 2; 75/76, note 2; id., *Revue Historique* 238 (1967), 422/424.
However, the difficulties in the subsequent archonless years and Damasias’ irregular archonship starting in 582 B.C. 74 show that the fundamental problems had not been solved by Solon. Athens, too, eventually needed its tyrant.

According to the sources Pisistratus found support among the Hyperakrioi (or Diakrioi) 75: “those who lived beyond the hills” or the “hill people”. The difference in name does not embarrass me since it presumably merely reflects a difference in geographic point of view on the part of the user 76 of the name. In Athens people presumably referred to Hyperakrioi, instead of Diakrioi, which possibly was the name, used by the people on the spot. Anglo-Saxon scholars in particular 77 have pointed out that the three-party system on the basis of regional criteria is an invention of later authors, and hence that the followers of the three leaders were not determined regionally 77a. I must confess that Herodotus’ observation to this effect in 1. 59 strikes me as entirely acceptable. It is certainly demonstrable that Pisistratus’ clientela did not originate exclusively from one region; it consisted of poor mountain peasants from “beyond the hills” (from the Athenian point of view) and of a group of “men of the city” 78. Plutarch writes of the “Diakrioi among whom was the mass of the thetes” 79. Now who exactly constituted that ἰττικός ἵχλος is a problem. Hopper 80 writes that “the emphasis

75. Herodotus calls them Hyperakrioi (1, 59); in the Ath. Pol., 13 we find Diakrioi.
76. A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (Harper Torchbook, New York (1963)), 103, wonders which name is the correct and original one, and favours Herodotus’ usage. To my mind both names are correct (see text).
77a. Hopper even suggests that the regional origin of the various leaders (Megakles, Lykourgos, and, to a lesser extent, Pisistratus) is uncertain; to my mind this comes very near to hyper-criticism. Cf. C.W. Th. Elliot, “Where did the Alkmaionidai live,” Historia 16 (1967), 279ff., where the Alcmeonids are localized in the Paralia on convincing grounds. Mossé accepts the regional background of the leaders, and uses this fact – and this fact alone – to explain the origin of the party names.
78. Herod. 1, 62. Hopper rightly stresses the increasing importance of the city (“asty”) in sixth century politics. However, I cannot agree with him when he uses this fact against the regional determination of the parties: see below in the text.
79. Solon, 29.
80. Hopper, art. cit., 201, 205 note 159. Lauffer identifies the ἰττικός ἵχλος as freie Tageslöhner who can have lived, in principle, in all three parts of Attica. Furthermore he re-activates Ure’s old theory that the miners from the Laureion mountains were among them (Die Bergwerksklaven von Laureion, 1, 13 and II, 164; cf. also H. Berbe, op. cit. 47ff.). In view of Kraay’s studies, however, neither the coin production of the Pisistratids nor the number of miners should be considered too large. Actually it is far from certain that the Diakria included Laureion: see Hopper, art. cit., 217ff.; for the day-labourers from the “Plain” and the “Shore” see the text below. 
is on the importance of the region of Athens”. It is no mere suggestion of Plutarch’s when he says that the leader Pisistratus had a city clientela à-la-Pericles. Pisistratus did in fact have one. The text itself says nothing of the city. Hopper’s hypothesis is only acceptable if we interpret Plutarch’s terminology from the point of view of his own times and if we assume (see below) that after Solon a number of small peasants who had again run into difficulties drifted to the city, where they developed into Pisistratus’ clientela. Finally, Aristotle adds two more groups, who were not regionally determined, to Pisistratus’ party: “those who were exempted from their debts” and “those who were not pure of birth”.

At first sight regional and socio-economic categories seem to have been confused here. Nevertheless I believe that the regional approach carries the most weight: in my view we are basically concerned here with the poor mountain peasants, the true Diakrioi. I also believe that, as said before, after Solon developments took place which gave “the city” increasing importance, or at least made it less unimportant. In general it is assumed that the removal of the horoi had the result that the peasants who had been exempted from paying their debts got their land back.

Yet Solon had not forbidden borrowing as such, and there is no reason to assume that the small peasants suddenly became self-supporting after 594 B.C. Since credit was probably more difficult to obtain because after and thanks to Solon’s measures the creditors had to put up with smaller securities, it is not inconceivable that many small peasants soon spoilt what Solon had achieved for them. Limited possibilities of borrowing compelled the peasant to go to great lengths to stay alive or else simply to give up his farm. French has put forward the hypothesis that in due course many small peasants may have become day-labourers, or may have drifted to the city where they formed a δητικός διαλλάτης. The “men of the city” may easily have been degraded Diakrioi. The regional approach, then, remains relevant and important. In theory it is possible that also degraded small peasants from the Paralia and the Plain joined the “plebs” in the city. We know nothing of this. Better land and more favourable opportunities for shipping may have created a more favourable climate for the smaller peasants in those regions. Moreover the vertical loyalty to the local notables

81 Ath. Pol. 13, 5.
82. Ed. Will, art. cit. (see note 47), 75 note 2.
84. French, op. cit., 182 note 18, points out that the “Plain” was the richest area and “supplied the whole militia from its numbers.”
may well have carried more weight than the horizontal attachment to fellow-
peasants elsewhere in Attica whose poverty was identical to theirs.

Actually there were people “in the city” who marched against Pisistratus in
546 B.C. Did they perhaps constitute the clientela of the nobles from the plain
who after all lived either in the city or nearby? As said before, Herodotus makes
it quite clear that among Pisistratus’ supporters there were also “men of the
city” (1, 62). Is it possible that the craftsmen employed by Solon were among
them as well as those who, according to Plutarch, fled to Attica from all sides for
their safety (έστι ἄδειοι), i.e. small peasants from areas where people still could
be enslaved for debt? Without entering into the problem of the relation be-
tween ch. 22 and 24 in Plutarch’s Life of Solon, I may nevertheless point out,
that Solon certainly encouraged the crafts, both by making citizens enthusi-
astic for them and by employing foreigners; in short, the Ansätze for a city con-
glomeration existed from ca. 590 B.C. onwards. Those who were “not of pure
birth” may very well have been craftsmen, who were enfranchised by Solon or,
more generally, they may have been identical with those who had fled to Athens
(cap. 22, 1; 24, 1)

It is possible to argue about Aristotle’s other category: οἱ ἄφρηγμοι τὰ
χρέα διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν; they are generally regarded as creditors who had run
into hard times; “those who witnessed the abolition of the debts” joined Pisistra-
tus on account of their poverty. Hopper has suggested to identify them with
the debtors; “those whose debts were taken from them”. In that case they are
the small peasants whom Solon had freed – they were indeed freed but became
destitute due to the above-mentioned reasons. At first sight the Greek text would
not seem to support the latter interpretation. In 13,3 Aristotle mentions two

85. Plut. Solon, 24, 4; 22, 1; for the meaning of ἄδειοι in 22, 1 I accept the suggestion of
Ed. Will, art. cit. (see note 47), 67 note 6.
86. C.M.A. van den Oudenrijn, Demiourgos, Utrecht (1951), 73ff., gives a (too?) sharp
analysis of the two capita. He observes an insoluble contrast, since he concludes from
24, 2 that Solon wished for “an increase of the population” (p. 74). In my opinion Solon
wished for an increase of those elements in the population, which could be useful within
the framework of his “industrial” policy. The influx of foreigners (22, 1) led Solon to
encourage the “citizens” to take up crafts (with “citizens” I mean both the Athenians
who had come to the city from the country-side and the foreigners who had been given
citizenship; cf. Will, art. cit., 67, note 6, and 77, esp. note 4). The employment of foreign
craftsmen fits well with Solon’s “industrialization policy”; regarding the acceptance of
permanent exiles (24, 2) I can only echo Plutarch who thought that these men would
become dedicated citizens of their new “fatherland”. Solon hated those who were
“ lukewarm” (Solon, 20, 1).
87. M.F. McGregor, Athenian Policy at Home and Abroad, (Lectures in memory of
Louis Taft Semple), Cincinnati (1967), 4 reaches a similar conclusion.
groups of dissatisfied people around 580 B.C.; one is upset about the constitutional changes (metabolē) and should definitely be identified with the aristocrats from the Plain; the other group “uses the annulment of debts as a pretext: for it had so happened that they were impoverished”. In 13,4 the same group is referred to: “those whose debts were annulled” had joined the Diakrioi “on account of their poverty”. If poverty spreads after and through the annulment of debts, the first reaction is to think of the creditors. But Hopper observes, and not without reason, that the rich landowners must have had enough of their own — i.e. land which was not delimited with boroi — to prevent them from becoming ἐποροι overnight after the scisachtheia. This consideration would seem to be decisive. Formally, the Greek text leaves the possibility open to consider the group as impoverished debtors. However, such an interpretation requires a little more imagination, since the impoverishment of the freed debtor, nowhere stated explicitly, must be assumed to have been an inevitable and important phenomenon.

To sum up, one may assume that Pisistratus leant heavily on the Diakrioi and on an emerging city proletariat. So long as we assume that the first group formed the nucleus and that the latter included a large number of degraded members of the first, we need not follow Hopper’s (hyper) criticism on this point. Pisistratus’ initial failures may perhaps be explained if we take it that he did not succeed in recruiting a hoplite force worthy of that name among his supporters: all he had was a number of club-bearers (κοσμωνήφοροι) recruited as a bodyguard by and from the Athenian dēmos. If the “Plain” and the “Coast” were to reach an agreement, Pisistratus was done for. Does this mean that these parties could supply some sort of hoplite phalanx (see note 84)? If so, that would support our hypothesis according to which the number of very poor peasants in these regions was relatively small. The definite establishment of the tyrannis — I need not go into the chronology of the return of the Pisistratids in a study which aims at an assessment of the place and function of the tyrannis in archaic society — indeed took place with the “bayonets” of foreign mercenaries, with the aid of foreign money, and with the support of the city “clientela” and “others from the demes, for whom the tyrannis was more welcome than liberty”89. This sneer is quite understandable when seen against the background of Herodotus’ own time and experience. However, it does not do justice to sixth-century reality. Firstly because the Solonian constitution was hardly a democracy, (at most a first step in that direction) and secondly because the collapse of the small peasant-economy after 594 B.C. made primum vivere into an all-encompassing aim. Herodotus’ sneer springs from the same mentality which to-day leads certain people to wish

88a. See also H. Berve, op. cit., 47 and 543.
89. Ath. Pol. 15, 2; Herodotus 1, 61; 1, 62; who were the people “from the demes”? Diakrioi, or those poor peasants from the “Plain” and the “Coast” who had ultimately renounced their loyalty to their local notables, or both?
for a Western democracy to be established in darkest Africa where tribal chiefs and their "clientelae" dominate, and, if the enterprise fails, to give vent to their feelings of surprise and annoyance all too loudly.

The international relations which provided the tyrants with money and troops (and women) are so familiar that I need not discuss them here. L. Gernet has already written of the dynastic marriage policy of the archaic tyrants; moreover in their methods and attitudes the tyrants, in spite of their differently structured clientela and policy, still to a large extent remained f"urstliche Herren (Berve) who spin their webs outside the polis as well.

The dualism of Pisistratus' clientela is reflected in a dualistic social policy. On the one hand Pisistratus provided money to help the impoverished peasants, in part "so that they would not waste their time in the city but spread out in the country"; a small piece of evidence that a "trek" to the city may well have started after Solon. Whether Pisistratus also effected land distribution and assignment is, again, not reported. Once more we must resort to the familiar assumptions and inferences: a) a solid agrarian middle class appears to have existed in the fifth century; b) Solon's time was one of upheavals and polarization; c) The question arises who took the measures through which a healthy class of small farmers could emerge? In 1955 Will still believed that Pisistratus had carried out land reforms, on general grounds: a) Pisistratus banished a number of nobles and probably distributed their possessions; b) the party which had expected isomoiotia from Solon, certainly expected it from the tyrant: Solon himself associated the "isomoiotia" with tyrannic violence; c) Pisistratus' attitude to the small peasants must have been very positive in view of his financial aid program. By 1962 Will has changed his mind. He assumes that the elimination of the "horoi" by Solon resulted in the return of the land to the small farmers. If one rejects this assumption, it follows that Pisistratus must have founded the small peasant class; he may have distributed some confiscated land but nothing in the sources "indique qu'il procèda à une operation de grande envergure".

However this may be, Pisistratus' "aid policy" at any rate ultimately saved Solon's improvements from failure. The tyrant realized that an agrarian problem should be solved not only constitutionally but also financially. In this connection his direct tax on the agrarian production (δεκάτη or ενκοστή); that is a problem

90. L. Gernet, Mariages de tyrans, Hommage L. Febvre (1954) 1, 41ff.
91. Ath. Pol. 16, 2-3. Aristodemus, tyrant of Cyme, presumably also distributed money to the poor and organized "relief employment" for them (Plut., De mul. virt., 26; Dion. Halic., vii, 4, 5; 6, 4).
92. Korinthiaka, 480, note 2.
93. See above note 62.
94. La Grèce archaïque, 75 note 2, 76.
apart) should be considered. Beloch once said that in the full-grown democracy direct taxes were felt as a restriction of the citizen’s liberty. For Pisistratus it was the only way to support the small peasant – the *iusititia distributiva* of taxation – and of course to fatten his own purse. Ideology and personal interest are, to my mind, a common combination even to-day, in spite of the tendency stimulated especially by prosopography, to interpret the former as hypocrisy and to focus almost exclusively on the latter. Actually around 550 B.C. the idea of liberty was not what it had become a century later, when the small peasant, partly thanks to Pisistratus’ financial policy, had come to realize that man cannot live on bread alone. In Cypselos’ policy we find an interesting parallel. He is supposed to have demanded one tenth of the production in taxes, because he had promised Zeus that if he succeeded in coming to power he would devote all the Corinthians’ possessions to him in ten years’ time; another source tells that this oath materialized in an enormous statue. Finally, Aristotle believed he knew exactly what the motives of the Cypselids were: impoverishment of the Corinthian citizens, leading to the necessity to work hard and to the impossibility of conspiring. *Quellenkritik* is most called for here. Undoubtedly the Cypselids dedicated numerous anathemata, for they were *fürstliche Herren*, full of ambition and zeal (*φιλοτιμία*), as indeed most Greeks were if we may believe the terminology of their honorary decrees. Cypselos’ dekatē, however, should undoub-

95. *Ath. Pol.* 16, 4 (dekatē); Thucydides vi, 54, 5 (eikostē); it is possible that the tithe has been introduced by Pisistratus but altered by his sons. For Thucydides states, if interpreted formally, that Hipparchus and Hippias introduced the “eikostē”. Day and Chambers, *op. cit.*, 95, believe that the anecdote in *Ath. Pol.* 16, 5 (the peasant with the stony piece of land, who says “and Pisistratus must claim the dekatē from this misery”) was the only piece of information Aristotle had, and that he deduced the existence of a 10% tax from this – all the more readily since it was a traditional sum. I cannot help thinking that Aristotle’s deduction is quite correct, and hardly warrants the condescending predicate “a rationalistic correction of Thucydides”. K. J. Dover, *Thucydides*, book vi, Oxford (1965), is of the opinion that the dekatē should be interpreted as a general term (“tax”) and that “eikostē” was the specific sum. This is ingenious, but unlikely in view of the fact that Cypselos’ dekatē was precisely a 10% tax (see Aristotle, *Oikonomika* ii, 2, 1) and that it is tempting to draw a parallel between the policy of the two tyrants in this respect. H. Berve, *op. cit.*, 65/66 and 548 seems to contradict himself; on p. 65 he defends the view held by me; on p. 548 he writes that dekatē must have been used in a figurative sense, since Thucydides writes of 5%!


tedly be interpreted like that of Pisistratus. I have no difficulty in accepting Will’s suggestion to regard the dekαtē chiefly as a sort of “eisphora”, with which for example an agrarian assistance program could be effected and financed\(^99\). Anathēmata must definitely also have been paid with it. Φιλοτιμία – I repeat – was not unfamiliar to these gentlemen.

Aristotle’s motivation is an anachronism; it presupposes an interest in actual participation in political affairs, which would seem to be a projection of fifth and fourth century B.C. conditions. Cypselos admittedly emphasized the necessity to work hard; indeed there are traces of this in the statement in Aristotle’s Oikonomika (II, 2, 1) that Cypselos levied taxes and decreed that the rest of the money should be worked with. Pisistratus did the same. However, I believe that economic preoccupations indeed played a major role here. Aristotle indicates the prevention of idleness or, rather, encouragement of ἐργασία and increase of prosperity (ἐυτοπία) in particular as Pisistratus’ motives\(^100\). If Cypselos’ tax policy was indeed parallel to that of Pisistratus, we can hardly accept that the impoverishment of citizens in Corinth can have been his motive; on the contrary, idleness and poverty were the very difficulties that had to be overcome. Forrest has rightly pointed out that the political involvement, i.e. the interest in the possession and use of political rights, was minimal if not non-existent among Cypselos’ followers\(^101\); hatred of the exclusive and unjust Bakchidai caste prevailed. As far as Athens is concerned one can of course point to Solon’s lawgiving and postulate that it furthered the political awareness of the masses. However the general satisfaction with Pisistratus’ rule, and the tendency to compare it with “life at the time of Kronos”\(^102\) seems to indicate that the mass of small peasants was content, and certainly did not feel frustrated by the fact that they lacked political rights or, alternatively, were prevented by a wicked ruler from exercising the rights which they previously enjoyed.

In fact, Aristotle is honest enough to allow us a glimpse of his working methods. Elsewhere\(^103\) he praises what was in his eyes the best democracy (i.e. the ‘rēpubli-

\(^99\) Ibid., 48:ff. Aristotle, (Ath. Pol. 16, 2 and 4) himself does not link the taxes levied by Pisistratus and his financial assistance to the small peasants. The combination of both data (in the sense that the tax money was used inter alia for the assistance policy) seems to me hardly audacious (cf. also Forrest, op. cit., 181/2; Ed. Will’s criticism (Revue Historique 238, (1967), 426 note 1) is not only circumspect but also rather surprising in the light of his own theory presented in Korinthiaka concerning the aims of Cypselos’ tax policy!)

\(^100\) Incidentally, in Aristotle prosperity is not seen as an aim in itself but as a way of preventing the people from wanting to take part in politics.


\(^102\) Ath. Pol., 16, in particular §7.

\(^103\) Politica 1318b.
que des paysans’) for the very reason that in such a system the people must work hard for a living and cannot afford to concern themselves with participation in politics: “for the masses strive for profit rather than honour; this is proved by the fact that the people tolerated the archaic tyrannies, so long as they were not prevented from working and were not robbed”. Here he is telling the truth: in the sixth century the masses were indeed content with a piece of land and some “governmental” assistance. Pisistratus provided that assistance in order to help his “clientela”, to further Athenian agriculture, to create prosperity and also to eliminate a restless group of idlers. The idea that he wished to prevent them from attending a popular assembly is the fourth-century theory of a philosopher confronted with the problem of the “masses” in the Athenian assembly of the time, and searching for an explanation. “The tradition that Peisistratus provided assistance to the poor should be accepted. The ideas of the Politica are not enough to explain his doing so”.

The laws drawn up or favoured by various tyrants against idleness (ἀγνά) and against luxury (usually an aristocratic phenomenon) fit well in the above. According to Theophrastus, Pisistratus made a law against the ἀγνά, with a view to make the land more productive and the city emptier and quieter (ὁ τῆν τε χώραν ἐνεργοτερὰν καὶ τῆν πόλιν ἡμετατερὰν ἐποίησεν). Plutarch considered Solon as the proposer of this law. Both are possible candidates. Pisistratus either made the law or took great care to see that it was enforced. If Solon, who rejected tyranny so explicitly, proposed the law, he was practising a feature of “tyrannic” policy. Periander did not want the people to spend their time wandering about on the agora, i.e. in ἀγνά; he also forbade the purchase of slaves. Cypselos – see above – levied taxes while stressing the importance of working hard on the basis of what one possessed. These measures perhaps seem most appropriate when seen against a background of societies in which the food problem was urgent: parasitic idlers who ate much but produced nothing did not fit in with the policy of politicians confronted with an impoverished peasant

104. Day-Chambers, op. cit., 94.
105. Solon, 22, 4 (Solon); 31, 5 (Pisistratus, according to Theophrastus). R. S. Stroud, Drakon’s Law on Homicide, Berkeley (1968), 81 advocates attribution of this law against idleness to Draco. His arguments are reasonable. The purpose of Draco’s law is hard to define. Was it part of his legislation, if any, concerning debt and land-tenure? Both Hopper and French (see note 72a) have recently suggested that the main object of this legislation was to cut the number of consumers (sale of slaves) and the amount of food available for the remaining consumers (hektèmori). The surplus-food could be exported by the landowner or exchanged for imported luxury goods. If that is true, the law against idleness fits in very well: there was no need whatsoever for idlers who produced nothing but consumed only! As appears from the text below, the tyrants issued (or took over) laws against ἀγνά for different reasons.
population and an emerging city proletariat\textsuperscript{107} (but hardly disturbed by the idea of a city full of politically active and possibly even conspiring citizens!). Periander's prohibition concerning the purchase of slaves has elicited varying interpretations\textsuperscript{108}. Numerous scholars have explained it as a form of protectionism in favour of small free craftsmen versus "large slave factories"\textsuperscript{109}. This view dates from the time when the nobility was held to consist of captains of trade, shipbuilders, etc.

The measure should in my opinion be correlated with Periander's wish to free the city of idlers. The presence of slaves in the agrarian sector could render free poor men unemployed, and drive them to the city where they would go and sit in the agora. The tyrant led them back to the countryside possibly with financial assistance (Pisistratus, Cypselos and perhaps Periander, although the latter no longer levied direct taxes) and at the same time eliminated a factor causing agrarian unemployment (slavery).

I can be brief about the anti-luxury laws. Pisistratus probably made a law regulating the size and decoration of graves\textsuperscript{110}. Pittacus was active in the same field\textsuperscript{111}. Periander was supposed to have formed a committee to watch over extremes, \textit{h.e.} to admonish those who lived too luxuriously; he was supposed to have eliminated all luxury (\textit{τροφή}) from life\textsuperscript{112}. Will and Mazzarino\textsuperscript{113} have written fine pages on the background of this sort of policy; on the one hand he common man was to work hard, on the other the nobility should be persuaded that in a society which tended towards isonomy, in which everyone had equal legal rights, the exuberance of the exclusive, aristocratic "society life" was undesirable. To be quite honest I must add that in view of the ostentation and grandeur of the tyrants' "court" an element of repression of rivals should be reckoned in. Once again social policy and personal interest went together. Perhaps - the speculative element is becoming very strong now - the measure attributed by Aristotle to Periander which was intended to curb "hetaireiai and

\textsuperscript{107} Cf. Van den Oudenrijn's judicious remarks, \textit{op. cit.}, 72.

\textsuperscript{108} Cf. the concise summary in Ed. Will, \textit{Korinthiaka}, 510ff.

\textsuperscript{109} Cf. P.N. Ure, \textit{op. cit.}, 192 note 1.


\textsuperscript{111} In the second edition of her study of the archaic Attic gravestones (London 1961) Miss Richter regards the problem as unsolved (p. 38/9).

\textsuperscript{112} Cicero, \textit{De Legibus} II, 66.

\textsuperscript{113} Heracleides Ponticus v, 2 (= \textsc{phg} (Müller), II, p. 213); cf. Will, \textit{Korinthiaka}, 508ff.

\textit{Korinthiaka}, 513ff.; \textit{Fra Oriente e Occidente}, Florence (1947), 193ff.; 214ff. (quoted by Will). Even in the Athenian democracy the aristocracy was often characterized by a certain grandeur and snobbery; the nobles often were not held back by the awareness of being a citizen in a state founded on isonomy: see D. Locnen, \textit{Eugeneia}, Amsterdam (1965), 42 and 48.
paideia" was an extension of the anti-luxury laws\textsuperscript{114}. It looks as if Periander was, in this way, fighting "pratiques pédagogiques aristocratiques"\textsuperscript{116}. In the "hetaireiai" the young were initiated into the aristocratic code. The tyrant prevented the aristocracy from vaunting their riches (anti-luxury laws) and from passing their exclusive, aristocratic culture in an equally exclusive manner onto their children. We do not know if Pisistratus attacked the Athenian "hetaireiai" in a similar way. It is possible that the element of "paideia" in the social system of the Dorian, Peloponnesian world was stronger than elsewhere. However it may be significant that according to a recent study by F.D. Harvey\textsuperscript{116}, Pisistratus may very well have been responsible for the institution of one or more schools where the citizens could send their offspring for the "paideia": "the institution of schools would fit well with the rest of what we know of the policies of Pisistratus". Both Periander's and Pisistratus' measures in fact spring from one and the same mentality. The break-through of aristocratic exclusiveness and strong emphasis on the fact that the citizen quī citizen has a right to education are the two sides to one coin.

According to Aulus Gellius\textsuperscript{117} Pisistratus also gave the public access to his large private library. Most scholars tend to regard this as a legend\textsuperscript{118}. I am not in a position to prove the contrary, in particular because this would require a thorough study of the Greek Buchwezen. However, it is very tempting to assume that, if Pisistratus did indeed open his library to the public, the measure would fit excellently with the tyrants' levelling policy. But let us stop speculating on the tyrants' cultural policies and return to the socio-economic reality.

Agrarian re-settlement cannot always offer a solution for all evils: land suitable for farming was limited in and around the archaic city-states, and fertile land was even less available. Hence in spite of the agrarian policy of the tyrants, a group still remained of people who lived "in the city" (ἐν ἀστείᾳ); what could the tyrant do for this particular political "clientela?" Not much, in view of the relative underdevelopment of the "industrial" sector. We must also make a distinction between Corinth and Athens in this respect. When the Cypselids came to power the Corinthian potters already had a monopoly. Pisistratus came to power three decades after Solon had started stimulating the crafts. In view of Robert Cook's above-mentioned study I cannot believe that the crafts can have absor-

\textsuperscript{114} Aristotle, \textit{Politica} 1313 a 37 - b4.
\textsuperscript{115} Will, \textit{op. cit.}, 507 note 2.
\textsuperscript{116} "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy," \textit{Revue des Études grecques} 79 (1966), 585ff., in particular 631.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Noctes Atticae} 7, 17, 1.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Harvey, \textit{art. cit.}, 634 with note 4.
bed much of the "thētikos ochlos", though it seems reasonable to suppose that in Athens under the rule of the Pisistratids they absorbed more manpower than in Corinth under the Cypselids. It was precisely at the time of the Pisistratids that the export of Attic pottery started having any significance — particularly the export to the Black Sea, Egypt, and Sicily.\textsuperscript{119}

Obviously nothing can be quantified, and once again we can only speak of a tendency, a trend. We could assume that the production and export of earthenware objects, which often contained wine and oil, managed to keep a number of people in the city-ochlos employed. Perhaps the farmers, supported by Pisistratus (the ἄποροι) and attracted by Solon's\textsuperscript{120} encouragement of export, started cultivating vines and olive trees? An unknown number of Athenians may have found work on the Athenian ships, which either transported cargo or took part in the tyrants' overseas expansion program (see below). As far as the return cargoes are concerned, we assume, as we did in the case of the export of Corinthian ceramics, that corn was the most important item. The bulk of all corn export after Solon shows that there was no "national" surplus; the areas where Athenian pottery has been found in significant quantities were famous for their corn production. Consequently the above assumption seems most attractive, even though we do not hear of corn ships until the beginning of the fifth century when Herodotus\textsuperscript{121} mentions them as passing the Hellespont, with Aegina and the Peloponnese as their destination. We know that Pisistratus founded an Athenian fortress in Sigeion at the Hellespont\textsuperscript{122}, where he installed a relative as commander, after the example of the Cypselids and their colonies in the Adriatic, so to speak. We also know that Miltiades went with a number of Athenians\textsuperscript{123} to the Chersonēsos on the European side of the Hellespont.

According to Herodotus, Miltiades' main motive for doing this was his dissatisfaction with Pisistratus' rule. However, this may well be an explanation from later times, when there was a tendency to regard relations with a tyrant as unfavourable. Many assume that Pisistratus agreed with this undertaking, perhaps encouraged it, for he could in this way get rid of a rival. He certainly also got rid of a number of ἄποροι and perhaps eased the corn problem for those staying at home both directly (less hungry mouths in Athens) and indirectly (making

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. A. French, \textit{op. cit.}, 44ff.
\textsuperscript{120} Plutarch, \textit{Solon}, 24, 1.
\textsuperscript{121} Herodotus \textit{vii}, 147; for the implications of the pre-Solonian corn export in Attica see R. J. Hopper, "The Solonian Crisis", \textit{Studies V. Ehrenberg}, Oxford (1966), 139ff. (cf. note 105).
\textsuperscript{122} Herodotus, \textit{vii}, 94ff., a passage which is the main testimony in the struggle between the "high" and "low" chronologies; cf. E. Will, \textit{Korinthisaka}, 381ff.; D. Page, \textit{op. cit.}, 156/7; A.W. Gomme, \textit{Journal of Hellenic Studies} 77 (1957), 256 note 6.
\textsuperscript{123} Herodotus \textit{vi}, 34ff.
corn import easier). French \(^{124}\) rightly pointed out that Pisistratus, though convinced of the importance of trade for Attica’s population, should nevertheless not be regarded as the advocate of a pressure-group consisting of merchants and shipbuilders. At most Pisistratus created a political climate in which trade and crafts could flourish. It cannot have interested him very much who imported corn and who exported wine and oil, and what quantities of these products were bought and sold: the fact that it happened was essential (see note \(^{124}\)) and his forts at the Hellespont and his military power made the openings. The problem of the function of the tyrant’s colonies, both in Corinth and in Athens, is extremely complex because the surviving texts state very little explicitly. That the Cybelsids colonized in the Adriatic in order to compensate the markets they had lost in Sicily towards the end of the seventh century, is no more than an extremely modernistic and therefore misleading guess \(^{126}\). One reason may have been the removal of superfluous and unwanted groups of the population. Nicolaus \(^{126}\) mentions the unwanted aristocrats, i.e. those who opposed the tyrant. The superfluous elements may be traced to the agrarian policy \(^{127}\). I shall not go into the problem of the Illyrian silver; it is possible \(^{128}\) that it reached Corinth via the Adriatic colonies, but this certainly does not mean that they were founded for that purpose.

Finally an element of agrandissement may well have been involved. The fürstliche Herr undertook raids, such as the one Miltiades -albeit without success-

\(^{124}\) Op. cit., 35/6 and 40. M.I. Finley’s criticism on French’s point of view (The Economic Journal 75 (1965), 849) is not entirely justified. He blames French for a serious inconsistency because in his chapter on Pisistratus (op. cit., 32) he on the one hand writes of a new type of political leader, who has mobile capital (cf. Pisistratus’ gold-mines in Thrace) and who is “the successful representative of a new commercial class”, and because on the other hand he denies that Pisistratus can have championed a pressure group of merchants and industrials. French means – and rightly so – that Pisistratus represents a new class as far as his mentality is concerned: he is not the rich landowner who has invested all his capital in land: he has χρηματιστ, in ready cash at his disposal. In connection with the political importance of the city démos he must have stimulated crafts and trade to a certain extent without being involved personally. Quantitatively – I repeat – the latter may have been inferior in Athens’ economic life as a whole (there was indeed no pressure group of merchants). However, the qualitative aspect is of primary importance, and with this I mean the fact that something was being done – on however small a scale in comparison with the agrarian policy – to bring the crafts and trade from near non-existence to having a function, however small, in Athenian social and political life.

\(^{125}\) Will, Korinthiaka, 53ff. aptly remarks: “la question doit donc rester ouverte.”

\(^{126}\) Nic. Dam., fr. 57 (Jacoby) §7.

\(^{127}\) See above p. 48/9.

undertook against Paros as late as 489 B.C.\textsuperscript{129}, established a stronghold and created a position of power for his relatives. In connection with the Pisistratid settlements we should perhaps also take into account the demographic aspect (see Miltiades' expedition to the Chersonēsos) besides considerations of personal φιλοτιμία; moreover the geographic situation of the Chersonēsos and Sigeion suggests that the advancement of (and not personal participation in) beginning trade between the Black Sea and Athens may have been involved.

Finally we can point to Pisistratus' public works policy. I am aware that this formulation is reminiscent of the "New-Deal" ideology: I admit that it is not entirely justified, but neither is it entirely misleading. Casual reading of I. Hill's *The Ancient City of Athens* shows that water-works (wheels, aqueducts)\textsuperscript{130}, the Olympieion, the Anakeion and an Akropolis temple were built as a result of Pisistratus' building policy\textsuperscript{131}. By means of Pisistratus' tax policy, agrarian money was channelled to the craftsmen. With this building policy Pisistratus, of course, also satisfied a private ambition, but personal ambition can very well result in prosperity for the needy, and there are cases in which the "anēr philotimos" may well have deliberately contributed to that prosperity. I for one should like to believe in a duality of personal ambition and program policy, however primitive the program may be in comparison with modern economic models. Berve, however, recognizes personal motives only: he does not attribute über-persönliche aims to the tyrant. The solution would seem to be a combination of the two.

Corinth has yielded too little archaeological material to provide any proof that the Cypselids had a program of urban embellishment. H.S. Robinson\textsuperscript{132} who recently published a short summary of the architectural history of Corinth, has nothing to say on this point. It is only "probable that Cypselos himself has built a predecessor to this temple" (and "this temple" is the earliest, partly surviving, temple in Corinth)\textsuperscript{133}. A policy of agrandissement is of course best paralleled in Polycrates' ambitious building program\textsuperscript{134}. However, too little is known of the social basis of Polycrates' rule for me to be able and willing to discuss it here.

\textsuperscript{129} Herodotus VI, 132.
\textsuperscript{130} It was evidently the city population in particular which was directly interested in an improvement of the water supply to the "asty"; cf. also the activities in this field of Theagenes of Megara (A.R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece*, 248); cf. above note 64.
\textsuperscript{131} Cf. the index s.v. Pisistratids.
\textsuperscript{132} *The Urban Development of Ancient Korinth* (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1965).
\textsuperscript{133} Cf. also above note 67 for the supposed colossal archaic city wall. Robinson says nothing on this point!
\textsuperscript{134} Herodotus III, 60 (water supply (cf. notes 64 and 130); harbour mole and Hera temple); Polycrates' chronology need not be discussed here: cf. M. White, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 74 (1954): 36ff.; J.P. Barron, "The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos," *Classical Quarterly* 1964, 210ff.
In an extensive study on archaic Greece A. Heuss once wrote that the archaic tyrannis was in many respects the continuation of the regime of the nobles. It is no more than a “Spielform unter mehreren Möglichkeiten adliger Politik”\textsuperscript{135}. This is true, in so far as the tyrant did not effect constitutional innovations. We have already pointed out that the Pisistratids and Cypselids maintained the existing laws and rules, whereas Pittacus’ legal thinking was reflected in the fact that he was a “maker of laws” (but not of a constitution!).

In fact the tyrant is the exponent of wide-spread feelings of dissatisfaction with the rule of the Eupatrids. Through his measures he tries to solve certain (often socio-economic) problems. If he is successful, he becomes superfluous; personally he does not realize this or else does not wish to realize it; political opposition comes into being, particularly among the aristocrats who are tired of an era of cooperation\textsuperscript{136} and want to take action again themselves. This leads to repression on the part of the tyrant: Periander’s behaviour towards the ‘citizens above the masses’\textsuperscript{137}, the exile of Athenian nobles\textsuperscript{138}, and of Alcmaeus’ faction are quite familiar examples of this development. Nevertheless the aristocrats eventually had their way, for “la naissance d’une opposition est dans la logique interne de la tyrannie”\textsuperscript{139}.

In Corinth the Cypselid dynasty was followed by a mild oligarchic régime. The Corinthian dēmos had not learnt from a Solon to think in terms of a constitution, which defined the rights and duties of the various groups of the population. In Athens it looked as if the struggle between the oligarchic factions would explode again in 510 B.C.: Isagoras and Cleisthenes fought bitterly for power, with the help of their respective “hetaireia”. In an emergency Cleisthenes added the dēmos to his “hetaireia”\textsuperscript{140} and subsequently gave the dēmos further rights.\textsuperscript{141} One could say that Solon’s constitutional reforms together with Pisistratus’ socio-economic policy in favour of the impoverished peasants and the city dēmos resulted in the Cleisthenic democracy.

\textsuperscript{135} Art. cit. (see above note 3), 45.
\textsuperscript{136} Cf. Ath. Pol. 16, 9–11: many of the prominent citizens were on Pisistratus’ side.
\textsuperscript{137} Herodotus v, 92, ζ; cf. Forrest, op. cit. 116, where he says of the members of the Council of Eighty which operated after the fall of the tyrannis: “I should not be surprised if more than half of those eighty had grandfathers whom Kypselos had blessed.”
\textsuperscript{138} Although it is of course not true that the Alcmeonids all went into exile after 546 B.C., and stayed away until the very end. The inscription published by Meritt (see above note 37) shows that around 525 B.C. some Alcmeonids collaborated with Pisistratus’ sons.
\textsuperscript{139} Will, op. cit., 507.
\textsuperscript{140} Herodotus v, 66; “When Cleisthenes ran into hard times, he added the dēmos to his hetaireia”.
\textsuperscript{141} I shall not discuss the chronology of the various stages of struggle, expulsion, return and constitutional reform: an excellent survey is to be found in Levêque-Vidal Naquet, op. cit., 45ff.; M. Ostwald, op. cit. (see above note 39), 137ff.
Solon gave the people the beginning of political rights\textsuperscript{141a}; but since his agricultural program did not strike at the root of the difficulties, the political function of the Zeugites and Thetes threatened to become a sham. Pisistratus supported the impoverished citizens, gave them money or employment in the city (\textit{i.e.} a function in the economy) and thus took them in a certain sense from the local clientelae and transferred them to his own, which was "national" rather than local or regional. In this connection a reference to Pisistratus' centralization policy can hardly be avoided. The quadrennial Panatheniac festival became the major event in Athens' religious calendar. The annual festival of the Dionysia was created in honour of Dionysus\textsuperscript{142} and was celebrated in Athens. The idea that thereby Pisistratus sought primarily to attach the "ordinary" man to himself and to the city of Athens is decidedly attractive, although direct proof is lacking. At any rate the number of Dionysus-scenes on Athenian vases increases significantly after about 540 B.C.\textsuperscript{143}. Furthermore, the tyrant abolished the local jurisdiction of the clientela leaders by appointing the so-called deme-judges\textsuperscript{144}. Although the majority of

\textsuperscript{141a} A good summary of the constitutional reforms of Solon in V. Ehrenberg, \textit{From Solon to Socrates} (Univ. Paperback, London 1968), 65f ("Solon, with no idea of democracy in his mind..."). People must learn how to use their political rights. It is easier to introduce constitutional innovations than to change the prevailing mentality of people who from times immemorial had been taught to be obedient to or to acquiesce in the regime of the high-born Eupatrids. G.T. Griffith, "Isegoria in the Assembly at Athens", \textit{Ancient Society and Institutions (Studies presented to V. Ehrenberg} (Oxford 1966)), 115ff., has some fine remarks on this point.

\textsuperscript{142} Cf. Forrest, \textit{op. cit.}, 183ff.

\textsuperscript{143} This information was given to me by J. G. P. Best (University of Amsterdam), who has made a statistical, as yet unpublished, survey of the relevant vase material. E. Kluve, \textit{Die Tyrannis der Peisistratiden und ihr Niederschlag in der Kunst} (Diss. Jena 1966, mentioned by Berve, \textit{op. cit.}, 543) was inaccessible to me.

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Ath. Pol.} 16, 5. The historicity of this fact is denied by Day-Chambers, \textit{op. cit.}, 32 (with note 38) and 95ff. and by R. Sealey, "Ephialtes", \textit{Classical Philology} 59 (1964), 11ff., esp. note 36. Day-Chambers argue as follows: (a) the anecdote about the "dekata" (see above note 95) was Aristotle's only piece of evidence and implied that Pisistratus often travelled in the country "to keep the people out of the city and at work" (16, 2); (b) Pisistratus could of course not settle all questions personally; (c) from 26, 3 it appears that in 453/2 B.C. deme-dikasts have been appointed; according to Androtion and Aristotle this was an oligarchic measure "to counteract pressures of radical democracy"; (d) in view of (a) and particularly (b) the appointment of these dikasts was also attributed to Pisistratus; (e) in 26, 2 the word "again" was added to make things run smoother. The climax is the observation that "there is no reason to think that Aristotle had admissible evidence on this point". This reveals a kind of hypercritical attitude. Day and Chambers far too easily discard Aristotle's historical activities (148 politeial!) and pretend to know exactly what Aristotle could and could not have known. We know nothing of the oligarchic character of (c), unless we transfer the motivation of 16, 2 to 26, 3, which would make an admirable example of a vicious circle, and unless we all of a sudden see an element of aristocratic ideology in the motivation of the Periclean enfranchisement law in
Pisistratus' clientela lived in the country and only a relatively small part in the city, the above measures, when taken together, would seem to imply that Athens came to stand in the centre of interest of Pisistratus' followers. However, the Pisistratids did not advocate enlargement of constitutional rights (cf. note 40).

Initially, Cleisthenes was far from being a democrat; in the first instance he wished to have complete control in a restored oligarchy with his Gefolgschaft. In v, 69 Herodotus clearly says that Cleisthenes despised the "Athenian people" (i.e. the city démocrate) before his political salto mortale: 'When he had brought

26, 3 ("on account of the mass of citizens"); and the latter of course is untenable, Aristotle "simply" meant what he said. The Athenians knew that too many cooks spoil the broth: the radical city démocrate therefore purged the citizen lists. There is no indication that Aristotle "considered it an attempt to impede the growing supremacy of the masses", and certainly not in the Politica 1278a 29ff. where Aristotle "simply" says that, if there are too many people, the criteria for citizenship should be sharpened. Pisistratus' measure concerning the local judges fits excellently with his attempts to break through the local aristocratic power and to further centralization; all one can say is that the motivation given by Aristotle (16, 2) may not be the only correct one but a correct one. H. Berve, op. cit., 549, accepts the Pisistratid dikasts. For some judicious remarks on the extent to which Aristotle and more in general 5th/4th cent. Athenians had access to primary evidence about the law codes of Draco and Solon see now R. S. Stroud, Drakon's Law on Homicide, Berkeley (1968), 77-8.

144a. K. W. Welwei, "Der Diaphesphismos nach dem Sturz der Peisistratiden," Gymnastum 74 (1967), 423ff. quite rightly stresses this point. It is interesting to see how Welwei and I reached identical conclusions independently; see my remarks in Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 1968, 33.

144b. It has been pointed out, notably by E. Will (Revue Historique, 1967, 306, note 3) that Cleisthenes' extremely complex constitutional reforms cannot have been a matter of sudden improvisation but were the product of "une longue période de gestation intellectuelle". Admittedly during his exile Cleisthenes may have heard from Demox's tribal reforms in Cyrene, which are said to have been inspired by Delphi and which breathed the spirit of isonomia (cf. P. Leveque - P. Vital Naquet, Cléisthène l'Athénien, Paris (1964), 65ff.); but what precisely was "in the air" in Greece and especially in Athens in the field of ideology we do not know; nor do we know what thoughts Cleisthenes cherished in 510 B.C. However, we do know that Cleisthenes did not put forward his plans for tribal reform in 510 B.C. (cf. Sh. Marker Nenner, "Tre studi recenti su Clistene, Riv. Stor. Italiana 1968, 37ff., esp. 74.). It took him two years to realise that he could use such a reform in order to increase his own Hetaireia. We should allow Cl. to be capable of unfolding the essentials of his phyle-reform to the démocrate after a couple of weeks of hard thinking; even if we assume that he had been thinking hard from 510 B.C. onwards, we can only say that his policy between 510-508 B.C. did not reflect his thoughts. It was only after his victory and definite return to Athens that Cleisthenes began to implement his plans. How much time this took we do not know for certain but Eliot (The Coastal Demes of Attica, Toronto 1962, 135ff.) suggests that the actual work of establishing the trittues and welding them together into tribes may well have lasted until 501 B.C. However that may be, there is no reason to assume that Cleisthenes, when he addressed himself to the démocrate with his intriguing plans, had all the geographical details in his head. He did know that his new phyle would be a geographical unit and that his boule would be the antipode of the aristocratic Areopagus.

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the Athenian people to his side at that time (i.e. after Isagoras’ victory) after having kept it out of everything before’. A philological point is clearly involved here. Levêque and Vidal-Naquet favour another interpretation, and translate: “Après qu’il eut adjoin à son parti la classe populaire, exclue auparavant de tout”. This rendering suggests that the city population was not involved in anything at all before 510 B.C., i.e. that it had not belonged to anybody’s “clientela”. In keeping with this the French scholars maintain that Pisistratus leant on the dēmos in the country and that Cleisthenes was the first to include the city dēmos in a (i.e. his own) hetaireia. The superior reading of the Oxford text, however, conveys, in paraphrase, the following: “before then scorned (rejected) by him (but not by all, particularly not by the Pisistratids)”. Perhaps Herodotus deliberately used the vague participle ἀπωσμένον and left it to the listener to wonder who had rejected the dēmos before. Presumably Herodotus did not write ἀπωσμένον πάντων (see note 146), “excluded from everything, i.e. by everybody”, simply because in doing so he would have contradicted his earlier statements about the support given by ὁ ἐν κλήτη and by the poor “hill-men” to the Pisistratids. I assume that Herodotus avoided downright lies. Ἀπωσμένον, used absolutely, admits of several interpretations. A translation “rejected (by everybody)” would surely have been welcome to Herodotus, because it a priori severs any link between Cleisthenes and the tyrants in the matter of clientelae; and it would have been even more welcome to the Alcmaeonids among his audience, for whom Cleisthenes as the founder of democracy and as the great antipode of the tyrants had an enormous propaganda value. In case somebody would have pointed to Herodotus’ contradictory evidence, the latter could have replied that he was not responsible for the translation! A translation “rejected (by Cleisthenes)” undoubtedly would have pleased Herodotus. Strictly speaking, without denying the possibility explicitly, it simply glosses over the important question of whether or not the tyrants had rejected the dēmos and as a result it does not even pose the problem of the

145. Op. cit. 43 and 45; I should like to add that on p. 49 the authors suddenly make the correct observation: “Clishtène . . . transforme en faction politique la classe du dēmos émancipée depuis quelques décennies”. Cf. also Cl. Mossé, L’Antiquité Classique 33 (1964), 541.

146. The Oxford text runs: ὥς γὰρ ἐν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμον πρῶτερον ἀπωσμένον τὸτε πάντως πρὸς τὴν κλήτη μόνον προσθήκατο. All the manuscripts have the order τὸτε πάντως (some πάντως). Consequently I assume that τὸτε is likely to have preceded πάντως (πάντως) in the original text. The correction πάντως appears to me an extremely slight alteration; Schaefer emended πάντως τὸτε and that is Levêque-Vidal Naquet’s starting-point (πρῶτερον ἀπωσμένον πάντως, τὸτε etc.) and that of the Budé editor. I adopt How and Well’s (A Commentary on Herodotus, Oxford 1936) suggestion willingly: “before despised by him (as an aristocrat)” (vol. 11, 36); contra E. Will, Revue Historique 1967, 396, note 1 (“une interprétation pour le moins indue”); see also M. Ostwald, op. cit. (see note 39), 149, note 1, and 156.
relationship between Cleisthenes and the Pisistratids in the matter of their Gefolgschaft.

My paraphrase, as given above, has the advantage of reflecting what actually happened; moreover, though H. (and for that matter the Periclean Alcmaeonids) would not have appreciated it for obvious reasons, it does not seem to be excluded by the actual Greek text. Somehow Herodotus had to avoid the Scylla of irritating his Alcmeonid listeners and the Charybdis of writing down demonstrably false propositions. He may well have been successful!

Our interpretation implies that Cleisthenes in fact took over (part of) Pisistratus’ clientela. We have already remarked that the support the tyrants had in Athens was qualitatively significant. It is likely that the number of followers grew in the course of time (ca. 550–510 B.C.); even if they were quantitatively less important than the agrarian followers, the fact that they lived in Athens and that the city was becoming increasingly important as a political centre (partly because the ekklēsia assembled there, partly because of the centralization policy) made them an increasingly important pressure group. 146a

Not only did Cleisthenes take over Pisistratus’ city clientela, he seems also to have taken measures concerning its composition which meant a direct continuation of the tyrant’s policy. Aristotle provides us with two pieces of evidence: in the Ath. Pol. he says that “those who were not of pure birth” had joined Pisistratus’ party; Aristotle’s main argument for this is that after the expulsion of the tyrants the Athenians took a special decision (diapsēphismos) “because many enjoyed the rights of a citizen while they did not deserve it” 147. After the fall of the tyrants, “impure” citizens, followers of Pisistratus, apparently were removed from the citizen rolls. Elsewhere Aristotle reports that, after the fall of the tyrants, Cleisthenes included “many strangers and slaves who lived in Athens in the tribes (phylai)” (i.e. gave them citizenship) 148. Jacoby rejects both the diapsēphismos and the Cleisthenic enfranchisement as fourth-century

146a. Sh. Marker Nenner, *art. cit.* (see note 144b), 72/3 underrates the growing importance and increase of the urban dēmos in the period between Solon and Cleisthenes. She holds that the majority of the artisans will have been foreigners who did not belong to the dēmos; but she disregards both the “impure” citizens, followers of Pisistratus (see text below) and the possibility of Pisistratid “Neubürger” (see note 151a).

147. *Ath. Pol.* 13, 5; cf. Hopper, *art. cit.*, 195 who plays with the idea that it is ‘a category imagined in the light of later events’. Should we not allow Aristotle to use the same method that modern historians use? From a well-known fact he deduces another, perhaps not independently surviving but logically following from what he knows. I do not feel entitled to blame him for that.

inventions. His main argument is the fact that Herodotus only mentions the expulsion of the Alcmeonids and their supporters (the ἔμαγες) by Isagoras and Cleomenes. In addition Jacoby’s suspicions are aroused by the consideration that Aristotle in the *Politica* writes only of population increase, whereas in the *Ath. Pol.* he mentions population decrease (diapsēphismos); in the same *Ath. Pol.* he does admittedly refer to “neo-polita” (Neubürger) but Jacoby holds this reference to be extremely vague and incidental. I must confess that I cannot agree with Jacoby here, however profound his analysis. The fundamental mistake is on the one hand that the Gründlichkeit of a modern Althistoriker is attributed to Herodotus, whereas Aristotle is measured with the yardstick of modern historiographic composition. The simple truth of the matter is probably that Herodotus’ selection of facts was very personal and motivated not by what we should very much like to know, but what interested him personally. We must allow Aristotle to stand as he is, and we must allow him to work without using “cross-references”. If in the *Ath. Pol.* he mentions in passing “neo-polita” (21, 4) when discussing Cleisthenes’ reform of the phylai we must not immediately complain about his vagueness, and conclude from the absence of a cross-reference to Cleisthenes’ Neubürger in the *Politica*, that Aristotle himself had no clear picture and “therefore” introduced ideas of fifth and fourth century political groups.

I believe that Walker, rightly accepting both statements as factual, comes closest to fitting them satisfactorily into the historical tableau: Cleisthenes sought the support of those, who had been purged from the citizen lists immediately following the expulsion of the tyrants. The “diapsēphismos” was a measure which was taken immediately after the fall of the tyrants, in the period during which aristocratic factions competed for power in an aristocratic state. The bitter struggle for power did not prevent Cleisthenes and Isagoras from agreeing on the typically aristocratic decision to “purge” the citizen lists. However, once Cleisthenes had made his political salto mortale and had decided to make the “clientela” of the tyrant into his own, he also decided, quite consistent-

149. F. Jacoby, FGrH III b Suppl. vol. 1, 158ff.; cf. also Day-Chambers, op. cit., 116ff., where the authors follow Jacoby faithfully; Welwei, art. cit., criticizes Jacoby’s theory in extenso.
150. Mentioned by Jacoby, loc. cit., where numerous other interpretations are mentioned and evaluated. Gomme sees an anachronism in the diapsēphismos. I agree with him if he means that the term and the legal procedure it indicates are a projection from later times. The fact of a purge of the citizen lists is of course not contradicted by this. It is only the question of how this purge has been effected, which is under discussion.
151. McGregor, op. cit., 6 identifies the démos, whose favour Cleisthenes sought (Herod. v, 66, *Ath. Pol.* 20, 1) exclusively with the foreigners who had lost their civic rights through the diapsēphismos (see below in the text). This is too extreme. The city démos must have included a number of born and bred Athenians: strictly speaking Cleisthenes turned to them first. In view of the Seelenverwandtschaft between these and the “impure citizens” who had been degraded in 510 B.C., Cleisthenes’ appeal must also have been aimed at the latter – “also”, but not “exclusively”.

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ly, to rehabilitate those strangers whom Solon had given citizenship (see above
p. 43) and who had lost it in the diapsēphismos ("those who were impure of
birth", who had joined Pisistratus). They are the "new citizens" of the Ath.
Pol. (21, 4), who in their turn are identical with the strangers whom Cleisthenes
gave citizenship within the context of his tribal reforms, i.e. when he had finally
taken over the city clientela. It remains possible that Cleisthenes, apart from
giving citizenship to the "impure", also gave it to strangers who had settled in
Athens as "metics" at the time of the Pisistratids. The "strangers" from
Politica 1275b may have included both the "impure citizens" who had been de-
graded to the status of metics in 510 B.C., and 'true' metics.

D. Kienast's arguments against the above theory are to my mind not quite
convincing. Firstly Kienast believes that Cleisthenes himself was partly re-
sponsible for the diapsēphismos and that it is "therefore" extremely unlikely that he
had a diametrically opposed point of view a few years later. The answer should,
in my opinion, be that Cleisthenes did indeed change his political strategy
completely — from being a participator in the "contest" between oligarchic
factions, he suddenly became a champion of the city clientela. Secondly, Kienast
holds it that the words "after the fall of the tyrants" in the Politica passage
indicate that Cleisthenes' Neubürger-policy should be dated immediately after
510 B.C. and not in the period of his constitutional reforms (508–507 B.C.). The
answer is simple: the quotation offers no chronological certainty whatsoever.

All in all, after this lengthy discussion, it would seem justifiable to conclude that
Cleisthenes did at one point take over Pisistratus' strategy. But in taking over
the tyrants' clientela, he came to realize that a quid pro quo was required on his

151a. Welwei, art. cit., not unreasonably supposes that among the victims of the diaps-
ēphismos there may have been both Solonian and Pisistratid "Neubürger".
152. I do not think it is necessary to condemn the Politica passage as "blatantly corrupt",
as M. F. McGregor, op. cit., 7 does. "Kleisthenes did not admit new citizens; he restored
to their citizenship those whose names had been deleted by Isagoras." Strictly speaking
the "impure" citizens who had been expelled in 510 B.C. were strangers in 508 B.C.;
moreover he may have given citizenship to metics who had lived in Athens for a long time.
It is difficult to make out whether the "slaves" from the Politica passage are a product of
malicious propaganda or the assistants of the metics craftsmen whom Cleisthenes gave
citizenship together with their masters. The latter possibility cannot be dismissed a priori.
153. D. Kienast, "Die innenpolitische Entwicklung Athen im 6 Jahrhundert und die
Reformen von 508", Historische Zeitschrift 200 (1965), 265ff. My criticism on one point
by no means implies that I do not appreciate Kienast's excellently documented study.
154. It seems to me that the problems concerning the Alcmeonids and the seven hundred
families (Herodotus v, 70–72; Ath. Pol. 20) who were expelled from the city by Isagoras
and Cleomenes, should be kept separate from the problems around the diapsēphismos
and the "neo-politai". The Alcmeonids cum suis were "old" citizens who were driven
away on account of an old religious impurity. The "impure of birth", who to my mind
can be identified with the "strangers (and slaves?)" have nothing to do with the category
of the Alcmeonids cum suis.
part. It no longer had to be of a socio-economic nature: Pisistratus had already taken care of that. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Cleisthenes had sufficient mobile capital at his disposal: after all, he had no private gold-mines, as Pisistratus had had in Thrace. But he must have reached the conclusion that the constitutional seeds sown by Solon had ripened in a process of socio-economic development during the sixty-odd years after Solon. Cleisthenes could only win the support of the people by introducing constitutional reforms, which would further destroy the power of the local aristocracy and would give the city population a more central importance. Both Solon and Pisistratus were needed to make Athenian democracy possible: it is only when one focusses too exclusively on the constitutional aspects of the matter, that all honour is given to the former, and that the latter is seen as a Spielform adliger Politik. The way in which the game was played is sometimes more important than the recognition that it was a game at all.

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