Some Recent Work on the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Ancient Greece

How captives, Greek and barbarian, were treated in ancient Greek warfare is an interesting if sombre question. Not only has it equivalents in our own experience, but it has also long needed detailed and careful investigation. Among recent literature, four works in particular, all or partly concerned with this question, help to supply this need. They are, in order of publication, as follows:


2. H. Volkmann, Die Massenversklavungen der Einwohner erobarter Städte in der hellenistisch-römischen Zeit, Abh. Akad. Wiss. Lit. Mainz, Geist.-u. soz. wiss. Kl. (1961), 3 (referred to below as Volkmann; references to pages in this work are to the numbers at the foot of pages, not the Abh. numbers at the top).


The following assessment of their contribution to the subject, adopting in the main the order of topics in the longest and fullest of these, Ducrey, is divided into nine sections: 1. Terms; 2. Captives in the Field (excluding towns); 3. Captured Towns; 4. Raiders and their Captives; 5. Methods of Execution and Imprisonment; 6. Sharing, Sale, and Ransom of Captives; 7. Greeks and Barbarians; 8. Traditional Limits, Public Opinion and their Effect; 9. Conclusion: Future Work.

These pages concern mainly Ducrey’s work, since he covers all of these topics. The other works are referred to in detail where they become relevant.

This procedure is adopted simply to allow more coherent discussion of the whole question than a review of each work separately would permit.
1. TERMS

Greek terms to do with captives and their fate can sometimes present problems for historians. Volkmann well remarks on the trap set for the unwary by the rhetorical use of words for enslavement, (even ἡξανδράποιδὲςεσθεν), to mean political subjugation, (pp. 12–13 and p. 30). 1 Ἀνάστασιν πολεῖν can mean massacre, enslavement or dispersal (Kiechle p. 134, Ducrey p. 333, with references), a regrettable imprecise phrase.

Ducrey in Ch. I, usefully if not always lucidly, surveys terms for “captive” and “capturing”. His viewpoint is mainly linguistic; historical questions arise, but are not always followed up. On ἀνδράποδον (pp. 23–26), he seems right that it does not mean captive 2, and in texts where it seems to mean captive, his “bétail humain” or slave (in the sense of persons in the position of slaves, or bound for slavery), make sense 3. One must always remember, then, that not all ἄνδραποδὰ, as we read armies took, need eventually have reached actual slavery, though their capture might place them in the position of slaves 4.

Ἀγωνισμοῦ, Ducrey rightly notes (p. 19), can be warriors’ or raiders’ captives. This should be remembered wherever their captor’s character is unclear, as in 16 xii, 328. Is it significant, or not, that war and kidnapping were not differentiated in this respect and in this use? His view (p. 28) that captives called σώματα are non-combatants would make it an interesting term; a pity he gives only Polybius 1, 19, (15) to back this up 5. These are only some points in a “lexicon” chapter which will be of use for reference. Its scope might even have been widened, so that, for example, the possibility that δίω

1. Cf. also Ducrey p. 131, where this use is noted.
3. On p. 25 he ends discussing Thuc. viii, 28, 4 thus: — “Il nous paraît donc incontestable que le terme ἄνδραποδον exprime dans ce cas, comme dans un certain nombre d’autres, la volonté délibérée du vainqueur de réduire ses prisonniers en esclavage, quelle qu’ait été leur condition au moment de la défaite”. This is ambiguous. Does he mean reduction only to the position of slaves, or to actual slavery? If the latter, how could Lysander have found the Iasians at home soon after (Diodorus xiii, 104 (7))? Does he believe Tissaphernes’ payment, of one drachm per Iasian, to their Spartan captors, was a sale into slavery? If so, how does he explain such a cheap rate? It would be more likely that ἄνδραποδον here means “in the position of a slave”, not bound for actual slavery, for these and other reasons.
4. Cf. Xenophon Hell. 1, 6 (14–15), where of τὰ ἄνδραποδὰ πάντα, when Callicratidas took Methymna, τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθέρως ἄφηκε, τοὺς δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φρουροὺς καὶ τὰ ἄνδραποδὰ τὰ δοῦλα πάντα ἀπέδωκε.
5. Other texts throw the gravest doubts on this, e.g. Xenophon Hell. 11, 1 (19), Polybius II, 62 (12) and id. xvi 30 (4–7), where the σώματα surely include soldiers.
may sometimes mean only confinement, not actual chains (cf. pp. 218–219), could have been further explored. Certainly the terms mentioned above, and others, merit study.

2. CAPTIVES IN THE FIELD

Ducrey's is the first study of this, and is most welcome (Ch. xi). Yet perhaps, in including, besides prisoners of war, also some captives of mutiny and civil war, he has taken too many, and he treats them unjustly. For the latter are ignored in his final chapters on customs and public opinion regarding treatment. Should they not have been fully dealt with, or left entirely alone? He does not include every known capture; this is fair and makes for clarity, but Ducrey draws sweeping statistical conclusions from his selection (pp. 54–56). How can one be sure Ducrey's cases are a representative sample, as he believes? Of his 120 assorted times when captives were taken, only 24 times was there massacre, only 28 enslavement. As for the remaining 68, we learn that on ten occasions the prisoners were recruited into the captors' ranks, and for the others, we are assured that though their fate is often unknown, there is no reason to suppose they suffered death or slavery, not simply detention. Unfortunately, these obscure cases are not listed and Ducrey's reasons for optimism about their fate are not given. He will forgive those readers who reserve judgement.

But his analysis of individual incidents, particularly from the Peloponnesian war, is often full and fruitful. One point, on massacres and foreign policy. Ducrey sees Cleomenes' slaughter of the Argive army as aimed to remove for years the citizens who made Argos a dangerous rival to Sparta in war and diplomacy. Yet he rejects Lotze's theory that Lysander executed the Athenians after Aegospotamoi to reduce the number of democrats his planned oligarchy would

6. The discussion of χρυρ (pp. 22–23) could have been shortened to allow room for this.
7. Kiechle does not deal with this in any detail, although it is particularly relevant in the period when Greek towns were treated more mildly, after 335 and before 223 in Greece, cf. Section 4 below with n. 24 and n. 81; as Volkman, p. 17, says, in 240 a large number of Laconian Perioeci were enslaved by the Aetolians. Volkman excludes them by definition, on the ground that captives in the field were often ransomed (although this is debatable; cf. Section 6 below, with n. 54). Lonis, Pt. I, Ch. 2, pp. 41–55, has much less space for captives in the field, than Ducrey, mentioning a few cases of massacre, maltreatment, and release free or for ransom.
8. E.g. Herodotus iii, 39, (4); Xenophon Hell. ii, 4, 26–27; Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions Vol. 1 (ed. 2, Oxford 1946) no. 41, lines 5ff., are not mentioned.
9. Pp. 59–60, a thoughtful discussion. Incidentally, why did Cleomenes not disperse them by enslavement, like Gelon the Megarian demos (Hdt. vii, 156 (2))? Was this impossible? Might they have actually been ransomed, to fight again?
have to control. While one agrees with Ducrey that revenge for Athenian atrocities was also a motive, and that the slaughter contradicted his strategy of sending home Athenians the quicker to starve out the crowded city, could not Lysander have sought to weaken Athens by two different means at once?

As for enslavement, could it not have been more common than the sources suggest, because they sometimes take it for granted? But he is right that slaves were made for political and military reasons as often as for economic ones. He rightly follows Rostovtzeff in seeing some campaigns, which won many slaves to sell, as aimed to pay for war, not as simple slave-hunts (pp. 87ff.). Yet to give examples from only two periods of Peloponnesian warfare hardly conveys how widespread this method was. He is right that profit was not Syracuse’s motive in belatedly selling survivors from the Quarries (pp. 76–80). One may add that her refusal, when Nicias offered to have her huge war-expenses repaid if she spared his men, confirms this (Thuc. vii, 83, 2–3).

There is also some full discussion of cases in the last section, on holding of captives in detention (to reduce enemy manpower, for ransom, as bargaining counters, or for converting into a fifth column). But nothing is said here to justify optimism about all the captives whose fate is often unknown (see above). More captures in the field are discussed in Ch. iv on the Ten Thousand and on Alexander. But motives, Alexander's particularly, are not analysed often.

11. Xenophon Hell. ii, 2, (2).
12. One might mention, e.g., Agesilaus in Asia Minor, Xenophon Agisil. 1 (18–21) and Hellenica Oxyrhynchia xvii (4); Teleutias and Attica, Xenophon Hell. v, 1, (23–24); Dionysius I at Agylla, Diodorus xv, 14, (4); Philip II in Scythia, Justin ix, 1 (9)–3(3). These usually also had some direct military aim and effect as well as filling the war chest. See also H. Bolkestein (trsl. Jonkers) Economic life in Greece’s Golden Age, p. 142.
13. Valuable discussion of captives in Ptolemaic Egypt, pp. 83–87. One wishes he had examined Lauffer’s grounds, accepted p. 82 with n. 2, for thinking Cimon’s 20,000 captives largely went to Laurium; they are not solid (cf. S. Lauffer, Die Bergwerkssklaven v. Laureon, Wiesbaden 1955–6, pp. 63 and 163). On Herodotus i, 66 (p. 80ff.), might not Tegea have set the Spartiates to work to give them a bowlful of their own medicine?
14. Enrolment of captured soldiers is usefully surveyed, pp. 101–105. Release free without obligation might have been given more space (pp. 96ff.), e.g. Diodorus xiv, 105, (3–4).
15. He pleasingly suggests, pp. 158–9, that these rough gentlemen brought captives to sell at friendly Chryseopolis, (Xenophon Anab. vi, 6, 38) “comme une sorte d’hommage d’hospitalité”, a benefit the more welcome because they can scarcely have asked high prices, and hence Ducrey concludes that even on the Black Sea coast, slave labour was rather rare. But their motive could have been just to have something to sell, at a town friendly to the extent of providing a market; no more would then follow.
enough, and on his treatment of mercenarys (p. 164), one misses a reference to E. Badian, *J. H. S.* 81 (1961), pp. 25ff. Still, these chapters well define what could await the captive.

3. CAPTURED TOWNS

Kiechle believes some works on Greek international relations and law lay too much stress on massacre and enslavement. He therefore reminds us that, at least before the Persian Wars, the Delphic Amphicytyons seem to have kept their oath not to sack each others’ cities in war. Further, he sees no Greek town suffering slavery or a bloodbath during the Pentekontaëtia, and (like others), none so treated in Mainland Greece between the sack of Thebes in 335 and that of Mantinea in 223. But since all these periods are thinly recorded, this is argument from silence. Certainly the Pentekontaëtia saw conquered Greek towns less ruthlessly treated. But Diodorus (xi, 65, (5)) says Argos sold up Mycenae, a version Kiechle dismisses without enough argument, and good manuscripts of Thucydides i, 113, 1 say Tolmides enslaved Chaeronea, and Phormio’s enslavement of the Ambracians in Amphilochian Argos (Thuc. ii, 68, 7–9), could fall inside this period. As Volkmann notes, some towns were thoroughly sacked by Diadochi even though their citizens were spared, and one may add that the victims of such mercy may even have wished for enslavement; Diodorus (xxvi, 20, (2)) may not be quite unrealistic when he says Syracusans, spared but plundered by Marcellus, sold themselves as slaves to escape starvation. Pallantion and Pallene may indeed have been threatened with enslavement, as Volkmann believes they were. In answer to Kiechle, Ducrey reminds us that Eumenes and Agathocles massacred or sold up towns outside Mainland Greece, and one may add Ptolemy I’s enslavement of Mallos, which, Arrian shows, had a Greek element. Ducrey could usefully have pointed out that captives in the field were still enslaved.

For Aratus sold athletes bound for the Nemean Games, and the Aetolians

17. Pp. 135ff.
20. P. 17.
22. Ducrey pp. 135–6; e.g. Segesta, Diodorus xx, 71 (2–5) and Croton, id. xxi, 4.
23. Diodorus xix, 79 (6); Arrian *Anab.* ii, 5 (9).
enslaved Perioeci by tens of thousands in Laconia\(^{24}\). In his anxiety to draw attention to the brighter parts of our picture of Greek warfare, Kiechle must not forget how obscure or black much of it is.

Besides some criticism of Kiechle’s position, Volkmann contributes a very useful and almost complete list of towns enslaved by Greeks in Mediterranean lands and the East from various points in the fourth century onwards\(^{25}\). He shows how useful a weapon the threat of enslavement was to generals like Philip II; (his views on sale and on restraint by conquerors will be discussed below, in Sections 6 and 8). But this is only part of a study of all enslavements, largely from Hellenistic times to the sixth century A.D., in a mere 122 pages. He thus has almost no space for the detailed study of individual cases which Ducrey has room for and often does well\(^{26}\), although two important criticisms of Ducrey must be made.

First, he does not always give economic and political or military motives for enslavement, due weight. Certainly Hyccara seems to have been sold mainly to fill the Athenian war chest\(^{27}\), but he omits the strategic gains, the warning to other Sicans, and the valuable Segestan cavalry further secured by the removal of bad neighbours and the gift of their land. Certainly Alexander had military and political reasons for selling Thebes (pp. 167ff.), but one must remember how useful the proceeds, 440 talents, would be when funds for invading Asia were vital and scarce\(^{28}\). This financial motive is overlooked elsewhere too\(^{29}\).

Secondly, even Ducrey, like Kiechle, properly reacting against older over-gloomy views of Greek warfare, goes too far the other way. Of 100 conquered towns collected for the needs of his research, a very large sample, he says, 25 suffered massacre, 34 enslavement, while the other 41 surrendered on terms\(^{30}\). Hence Greek warfare seems less inhumane than if one considers only towns stormed (p. 110ff.). Now first, samples can mislead, and at least 15 towns that suffered enslavement, sometimes also massacre, can be named

---

24. Plutarch, *Aratus* 28 (4) and *Cleomenes* 18 (3). Cf. notes 7 above and 81 below.
25. On pp. 18–19, Pausanias’ statement (II, 9 (2)) that Sestos was enslaved, is not discussed. Pp. 62–63 do not try to sort out the confusion in the sources on which Indian towns Alexander enslaved.
27. P. 133; Thuc. VI, 62.
29. E.g. on Dionysius I and Philip II, pp. 133–5. The brief generalisation on p. 131 is insufficient.
which he seems nowhere to mention. Further, even if 40% of all sieges by Greeks ended in negotiation in actual fact, Ducrey’s own account of surrender terms shows that, often, the citizens were cast out with one or two garments and perhaps a little travelling money. More consideration of what refugees always suffer might have led him to feel that division into massacre and enslavement (inhumane), and surrenders (less so), is too simple. The same reluctance to admit the darker side leads to the statement on pp. 196–7 that an alternative was always open to a besieged town, negotiation. Would the people of Scione and Hyccara, for example, have agreed?

Our picture, then, of the fate of towns still needs some adjustment, but these three writers contribute much towards it. (For Lonis’ contribution on towns, see Section 7 below).

4. RAIDERS AND THEIR C APTIVES

States sometimes used various private raiders to harry and kidnap their enemies in war and even in peace. Ducrey rightly includes these, calling them “corsaires” (Ch. v). Unhappily he also brings in the independent random operators, calling them “pirates,” simply because (p. 172) “la piraterie” played too important

31. Some of these are mentioned, but not their fate:--

Crissa; Aeschines iii, 107–9
Arisba; Herodotus i, 151 (2)
Sicilian Megara and Euboea; Herodotus vii, 156 (2–3)
Caryae; Vitruvius i, i (5). Cf. G. Huxley, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies viii, 1967, i, pp. 29ff.
Trinacria; Diodorus xii, 29 (4)
Amphilochian Argos; Thuc. ii, 68 (7–9)
Pharsalus; Diodorus xiv, 82 (5–6)
Pellana; id. xv, 67 (2)
Scotussa; id. xv, 75 (1)
Gryneion; id. xvi, 7 (9)
Mallos; id. xix, 79 (6)
Megalopolis; Plutarch, Cleomenes 24
Scellia; Pausanias ii, 9 (2)
Cercinum; Livy xxxi, 41 (3)

32. P. 112; if one supposes his sample is representative.

33. Pp. 140–144. It was no thanks to the victor if chance philanthropic neutrals chose to shelter the refugees. Kiechle p. 133 shows how severe dispersal was felt to be. In Xenophon Hell. ii, 2 (3), it seems equated in harshness with massacre and enslavement.

34. Cf. Thuc. iv, 122 (6) and vi, 62.

35. This term may not be quite right, as the reviewer hopes to show elsewhere. Surprisingly, Ducrey takes Plato, Laws 823B and Aristotle, Pol. 1256a 35ff. as signs that raiders enjoyed a certain esteem in the fourth century (pp. 171–2). What, then, does he make of Laws 823E and Eth. Nicom. 1122a 7–8, 1134a 17–19?
a role in the capture of and trade in human beings, to be passed over. But not only does he not assess this role, he also tackles all these kidnappers, along with brigands and the treatment of shipwrecked sailors (3 pages each), in a mere 23 pages. Even some not actually known to have kidnapped anyone, and Illyrians raiding Italian ships (p. 179), are included. Ducrey thus has room only to list some “corsaires” and “pirates”, jumbled together, in the bald Ziebarthian manner, with scant discussion. In the later chapters of analysis, these gentry and their wretched victims get short shrift. Ducrey should have either treated them as fully as they deserve, or have given the “corsaires” (on sea and their land equivalent) a fair hearing, pushing the others ruthlessly overboard.

5. METHODS OF EXECUTION AND IMPRISONMENT

These are more successfully handled by Ducrey in Ch. vi. Cruel atrocities seem rare (pp. 206ff.). Yet he says crucifixions were “assez nombreux” (p. 213), citing only 8 cases, and these not differentiated clearly enough. Three were of individuals, one of a small group, and four of larger numbers. Surely these four were exceptional and conspicuous mass terrorism, not “un supplice auquel les Grecs n’hésitèrent pas à recourir” (p. 214)? But this is to back his conclusion on atrocities.

He surveys mines and prisons briefly, in more detail ways of securing captives, illustrated in the 12 Plates (it does not matter that three are of non-

36. Thuc, iii. 85, (2); id. iv, 41 (2–3), on p. 175; no doubt they did capture somebody, but they are irrelevant in a discussion of treatment of captives.
37. On p. 171 he accepts without hesitation tales of Polycrates’ raiding; cf. A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants, London 1956, p. 119; on p. 178 it could be asked whether Alexander’s suppression of “pirates” was just a police operation or something more.
38. On p. 236ff., markets, see Section 6 below; pp. 240, 250 and 287, ransoming mentioned but the implications for the role of raiders in slave-supply are not explored (cf. M. I. Finley, Klio 40, 1962, pp. 57–58); p. 256, with n. 6, he accepts that repairs to Cretan shrines were financed by Cretan raiding. But no direct evidence seems to back this conclusion, important if true, for otherwise such random raiders venture no offerings to the gods, a significant point for their moral standing. On pp. 266–7, discussing the raids lâez of I. Cret. iii, 3, Hierapytna no. 4, lines 53–58, he himself argues against the interpretation implying dedication of booty from “la piraticer”. Pp. 302–3, Illyrians murder a Roman envoy among other examples. But, pp. 307ff., he correctly follows Placelière (Les Aitoliens à Delphes, Bibl. des Éc. d’Athènes etc., fasc. 143, Paris 1937, pp. 213–5), on Aetolian use of reprisals as a pretext, in a well-documented discussion which does not, however, exhaust the subject and hardly touches the kidnapper’s standing in morality, custom and public opinion.
39. The four are Diodorus xiv, 53, (4); xvii, 46, (4); xx, 54, (2)f; xx, 103, (5–6).
Greek objects, one may allow). More might have been said on feeding, but he well remarks on the degrading character of fetters for free men; this is a valuable chapter.

6. SHARING, SALE, AND RANSOM OF CAPTIVES

On these, in Ch. vii, Ducrey sometimes leaves captives in the background. On sharing between troops and state (pp. 233–4), he says little. Yet much evidence suggests that sometimes, perhaps by a convention, captives (citizens at least), went to the state, and the rest to the troops. So simple a system would reduce disputes, if neither side cheated. Further, it would mean the state usually came off best. For (a more important point which Ducrey seems not to notice), captives were the commonest valuable sort of booty likely to be taken. They were worth more each than the numerous farm animals (and could be ransomed, as animals could not, and for large sums). Yet they were probably more often met with than real valuables like gold and silver plate, in town and country.

But on sharing between allies (pp. 258–67), Ducrey discusses many texts well. He convincingly suggests that, in Gortyn’s treaty with an unknown ally, the reason why whoever calls the other to help gets all booty won by both together, is because the host was to pay the guest’s expenses. He rightly follows Aymard on the treaty of Rome and Aetolia, whereby Rome got all captives and booty, while Aetolia got towns conquered. But he departs from Aymard unhappily on one point. The inscription giving a version of this treaty, says that booty from towns stormed jointly is to belong to both in common (SEG XIII, 382, lines 14–15, xοινῷ[ν] [ἀ]μφοτέρῳ ν ἔστω). This means, he thinks (p. 259), that Rome gets at least half. This is not as obvious as he

40. This includes cases where the state spared or killed its captives or where they were what the men stole:—Thuc. vii, 85 (2–3) mentioned p. 230 but not in this connection; Xenophon Hell. 1, 6 (14) and 11, 1, (19); Diodorus xiv, 15 (2–3) and 53 and 75 (9); xvi, 80–81, (cf. Plutarch, Timoleon 29); xvii, 13ff. (cf. Plutarch, Alexander 11–12); xix, 79 (6); Polyb. iv, 72 and v, 111, (6); Livy xlviii, 56 (10) and xlviii, 19 (12). To suggest that a convention might have been working, or ignored, on some of these occasions, is not to say that it was necessarily widespread, let alone universal.


42. P. 266. Thuc. v, 47, (6) supports Ducrey.

he supposes. In general on these divisions, he might have considered the captives being shared out. Not only would families be split up, but sometimes, which ally a captive went to could make the difference between life and death, ransom or slavery, slavery near home and friends or hundreds of miles away.

Discussing the sale of captives, Volkmann well remarks (pp. 105f.) that Philip II used to preside over these, doubtless to encourage high prices, and that he allegedly used valuers, and informers to find the rich captives; as Ducrey says (p. 238), this would make sure they were not sold cheap, but paid a high ransom. Both writers point out that a sale in the wilds might not bring worthwhile prices, though as they say, slavedealers might follow the flag. But Ducrey seems too easily to assume that armies were mainly interested in getting acceptable prices, when he says (p. 235), that it was essential to find a good market. Philip V did not necessarily sell captives at towns across the borders of Elis, Triphylia or Laconia because they were good markets. Rather, it could be that these were the first places he could get any money at all; any price might be acceptable to free his army of the encumbering captives.

Ducrey also mentions briefly some kidnappers’ markets, Thasos and Melos (attested as harbourers, certainly), Aegina (early fourth century), and Delos (later third century). He says “meme Delos” and does not mention its later importance as the Cilician kidnappers’ principal market, although might Delos not have been something of a regular centre before, if more modestly? Surprise may be the wrong reaction. It would be worth saying that we know some other

44. Nor is it certain (p. 262) that shares were equal in the divisions of Xenophon Hell. vii. 4, 27 and Diodorus xvi. 63 (5).
45. Diodorus xvi. 63 (5); Plutarch Cimon, 9; Plutarch Aratus 45 (4). (For Lonis on division, see note 67 below).
46. Volkmann, p. 107-8; Ducrey, pp. 235-7. Agesilaus would have sold at Ephesus, not in Phrygia, had he wanted better prices rather than to be rid of the encumbrance (Xenophon Agesilaus i. 18-19).
47. Ducrey, p. 236 on Polyb. iv. 77 (5) and 86 (4) and v. 24 (10). His view that Philip V sold at Leucas (Polyb. v. 16 (5)), because Peloponnesian buyers were now saturated, is extremely unfortunate. The booty came from Aetolia, Leucas was the first handy market, and Philip had to unload before the swoop on the Peloponnesian began, to gain speed and surprise, advantages that sale later, e.g. in Dyme or Corinth, would lose him (cf. Polyb. v 17 (8) to 18 (10)). Nor were Peloponnesian buyers saturated if, as is likely, they helped to purchase his very next catch, from Laconia, sold at Tegea (Polyb. v. 24 (10)). As Walbank convincingly suggests (Commentary on Polybius, Vol. i. p. 552), Philip’s hasty sale at Leucas reflects his empty treasury. Armies on campaign might need cash so urgently that they could not spend time getting the best prices. See also n. 50 below.
49. Cf. Strabo 668, xiv. 5 (2)ff. Kidnappers there before the Cilicians, as enemies, R. Vallois, ‘Apol, BCH 38 (1914) p. 250f., and as friends, besides ig xi. 4, 1054a, Syll. 3, 582 lines 12ff; also, significantly, Aetolian ἀφελεία ix3, part 1, no. 185.
places where captives were sold, were at times centres of the slave trade; one
reason for selling there, perhaps 50.

Ducrey and Volkmann mention some of the difficult evidence on prices got
for captives in bulk (always below those known for slaves sold singly in peacetime) 51. Ducrey believes such gluts lowered prices of slaves at the time they
occurred, to an unassessable degree (a wise qualification, for how far the
miscellaneous catches of an army, their health and character unknown, would
compete with the wares of regular reliable slave-dealers, cannot be said) 52.
Volkmann (p. 121) thinks mass enslavements supplied the market only sporadically,
supplementing kidnapping in barbarian lands and breeding at home. There
will never be the statistics to tell. Perhaps the many mass catches between
the 430's and Alexander's death could have meant Greek warfare was then, at
least, of some importance 53. But ransoming might reduce its contribution 54.

In a useful account of ransom, Ducrey follows Westermann that the efforts at
ransom we know of are only the successful ones, and Ducrey believes the majority
were not ransomed 55. This would be convincing if we knew more about who
usually got ransomed. Was it just the rich, who could pay, if no wealthy philan-
thropist appeared to buy off the poorer captives? Yet we know hoplites were
ransomed (Herodotus v, 77 (3) and vi, 79 (1)), and rowers also, surely poor
men, and these on credit (Xenophon Hell. vi, 2 (36)).

50. Leucas and neighbourhood- Demosth. lvii, 18; Plautus, Poemenius, 83ff. and 896ff.
and Polyb. v, 16 (5); cf. the inscription published by Habicht, Hermes 85, 1957,
pp. 88-9 lines 31ff. This need not have been Philip's main reason for sale here,
however. Ephesus-Xenophon Agesil. 1, 28; Plautus, Mil. Glor. 114ff; cf. Herodotus viii,
105 (1); Plutarch Lysander 3 and later, Varro, de Ling. Lat. viii, 21.
51. Volkmann, pp. 110ff.; Ducrey, pp. 246ff. (not a lucid account). Ducrey despairs of his
plausible guess that Hyccara produced over 7000 slaves (cf. M. I. Finley, Klio 40, 1962,
p. 58), on the surprising grounds that Lamachus and all his men would not have dared
attack so large a town (p. 252).
52. P. 251. His statement that the glut of Athenian slaves in Sicily led to "la suspension
de toutes les transactions pour une durée prolongée", goes beyond the evidence.
53. For this period, see Ducrey, pp. 88, 132-5, and 161-9; Volkmann, pp. 14-17, 38,
and 61-63; and the relevant passages in these notes, nn. 12, 31, and 40, on catches in
this period. This is not to say that Greek warfare was or was not important in other
periods.
54. Volkmann's evidence for increased slave ownership through Alexander's captures
(p. 63; (Aristotle) Econ. 11 34b), holds only for his army. M. I. Finley, art. cit. in n. 51
above, p. 58, feels armies were in general important here, but that ransom would reduce
raiders' contributions. H. T. Wallinga, reviewing Volkmann in Mnemosyne Ser. iv no. 17,
1964, pp. 103-4, not implausibly suggests inconspicuous private ransoming reduced
armies' supply.
55. Pp. 238-246; Westermann in PWRE Suppl. vi col. 929 and Slave Systems of Greek
and Roman Antiquity, Philadelphia 1955, p. 29. Ducrey's treatment of ransom costs,
p. 249f., could have distinguished rather more clearly between those for individuals and
those when thousands were ransomed at once.
Ducrey also rightly mentions (pp. 255ff.) that sale-money and ransoms were spent on war, public works, and victory monuments. (One may add, a lesser outgoing, on bribes and diplomacy)\textsuperscript{56}. But here again his emphasis seems oddly placed. Though he has already given some examples here and there\textsuperscript{57}, the few lines he now writes on the financing of war through sale and ransom, seem to minimise the importance of the need for money as a controlling factor of treatment; it could stop massacre, even the bloodbath at Motya, for example\textsuperscript{58}. Again, one example of spending on public works seems a little ungenerous\textsuperscript{59}. Further, if he were right that victory monuments (which get two pages), generally were tithes, \textit{δέξασται}, and if that really meant, as is assumed on p. 256 by "le dixième", that they cost one tenth of the winnings, then they represent only 10% of expenditure\textsuperscript{60}.

Thus on this whole topic of shares, sale and ransom, Ducrey's discussion is useful, if not always well balanced.

7. GREEKS AND BARBARIANS

Whether any Greek soldiers in practice displayed the hatred and contempt for barbarians shown by some writers from the fifth century onwards, is a topic touched on by Kiechle, and discussed by Ducrey and (at most length) Lonis. Kiechle's belief that the Pentekontaëtia, conscious of Greek unity, enslaved none but barbarian towns, may be too optimistic\textsuperscript{61} (cf. Section 3 above). But still there is a difference between the enslavement of barbarian Eion and the reduction of Greek Naxos to tributary status, for example. Ducrey notes this (pp. 272–3), but feels Cimon's readiness to ransom barbarians from Sestos and Byzantium (Plutarch, \textit{Cimon} 9), means he was not especially harsh towards non-Greeks. Yet the Naxians did not lose personal liberty, and were not exploited directly by ransom or sale, as were the barbarians mentioned. Might there not sometimes have been a degree of "racial discrimination" now, calculating or sentimental?

Kiechle also notes Agesilaus' orders to his men in Phrygia, to stop punishing

\textsuperscript{56}. E.g. Diodorus \textit{xvi}, 53 (3).
\textsuperscript{57}. Referred to in his n.l. to p. 255.
\textsuperscript{58}. Diodorus \textit{xiv}, 53 (2).
\textsuperscript{59}. Cf. Pausanius \textit{ii}, 9, 6; Plutarch, \textit{Philopoemen} \textit{16} (4).
\textsuperscript{60}. The only certain case is Thuc. \textit{iii}, 50 (2), a tenth of land. The reviewer plans to discuss this problem elsewhere. Not all monuments were \textit{δέξασται}; Ducrey could have referred to W. H. D. Rouse, \textit{Greek Votive Offerings}, Cambridge 1902, on this. The \textit{δέξασται} of Athenian exiles raiding Attica from Deceleia (Demosth. \textit{xxiv}, 128; Ducrey p. 256, nn. 4–5), could be sheer rhetorical fiction, which deceived the scholiast.
\textsuperscript{61}. P. 137.
their captives like criminals and to guard them δις ἀνθρώπων ὄντας (Xenophon Agesil. 1, 21)\(^{62}\). Kiechle admits this was to encourage the peasants not to hide but to grow food for Agesilaus' men, but feels his clemency shows a wish to make war even against barbarians more humane. But as Ducrey says (pp. 275–6), Agesilaus could appeal to his men's sense of physical superiority to flabby barbarians in order to increase their martial ardour, and as Lonis well remarks (p. 48), he would humiliate barbarians by exposing them for sale unclothed (cf. Xenophon ibid. 1, 28 and Herodotus 1, 10, 3). One concludes, then, that if his humaneness really existed at all, it had narrow limits, and that his men could well have been moved by more than the casual cruelty of bored, nervous or vengeful troops; a complex situation not unparalleled today.

Ducrey gives a thoughtful sketch of the problem\(^{63}\), concluding that despite all the signs of Greek fear and hatred of barbarians, racial motives did not always lead to harsher treatment of such captives. He sees hatred of Persia in the Athenian massacre of Persian soldiers at Notium (Thuc. III, 34), and believes the Cedreians' mixed blood helped to decide Lysander to sell them up (Xenophon Hell. II, 1, 15). This is plausible. But Lysander also massacred 800 Greek Iasians, and made slaves of their families\(^{64}\). Thus Xenophon's comment on Cedreiai, ἐὰν δὲ μὲν ὡς ἄρρητες ὤντες, could be his apology for Lysander, not what influenced the latter himself. But it seems true that Dionysius I's treatment of Motya had a racial motive; (one might mention here, as Lonis does, pp. 37–40, Carthaginian cruelty in 409, Dionysius' propaganda, and the pogroms this inspired against Carthaginians in Sicily)\(^{65}\). Alexander is plausibly seen as sometimes harsh to Persians, till with Greece and Asia secure, his victories allowed him to be more magnanimous. It is a pity Ducrey has no more space for this theme; Lonis, with a monograph on the years from the Persian Wars to the mid fourth century, has more elbow-room.

Lonis' view is, briefly, that despite contempt or hatred for them from Aeschylus on, soldiers did not treat barbarians more harshly than Greeks were treated, except in Sicily from 400 onwards, a major cause being that Greek soldiers were so often mercenaries, more interested in loot than in cruelty. There is much truth in this, but the picture is incomplete and too simple. For example, it is not true that no Asian towns suffered massacre in the fifth century, nor that only one barbarian captive in Asia was killed in cold blood (Lonis, p. 37 and p. 45; cf. Diodorus xii, 82 and Thuc. III, 34). He knows about Agesilaus'

\( ^{62} \) P. 144.

\( ^{63} \) Pp. 271–283; pp. 283–8 on differences in treatment of freeborn and slave by captors, are also valuable.

\( ^{64} \) Ducrey pp. 274–5; Diodorus xiii, 104 (7).

\( ^{65} \) Diodorus xiii, 55–63 and xiv, 45–46. See also Section 6 with n. 58 above, on Motya, and the power of the need for money.
men’s cruelty to Phrygians (p. 48), but were not many mercenaries. Motives are not considered sufficiently, Cedreiai not being investigated, for example; the assumption seems sometimes to be that if any particular sort of harshness was inflicted on Greeks as well as on barbarians, that is the end of the matter. Hyccara and its implications are not discussed; but were Greek towns enslaved so casually or was this reserved for barbarians? Thoroughness is also lacking elsewhere. But despite these weaknesses, Lonis contributes something. More work is needed on the topic.

8. TRADITIONAL LIMITS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THEIR EFFECT

On this large and complex subject, all four authors say something, especially Ducrey in Chs. ix and x.

Since there was no real written code of Greek international law on war, statements by orators and historians about οἱ τὸν πολέμου νόμον or similar entities, and what they entitled or forbade belligerents to do, must be considered warily. Not all such statements would necessarily have met with universal agreement. The only “court” so to speak, that could condemn a belligerent, was that of public opinion. But public opinion can sometimes be unable to reach a unanimous verdict.

But certain customary limits, especially those somehow re-inforced by religion, were, although transgressed, virtually unquestioned. Heralds were generally admitted to be immune, and were rarely attacked (cf. Lonis, pp. 63–65 on Herodotus vii, 133ff.). Suppliants, whose treatment Ducrey well discusses (pp. 295–300), priests, and some others under divine protection, seem generally recognised as immune from attack. As Ducrey says, some Hellenistic towns acquired this recognition from many states on religious grounds, although as he admits, referring to Holleaux on Teos, this immunity was not always

67. E.g. pp. 52ff., Lonis compares ransom rates for ordinary Greeks in bulk, with rates for rich barbarians ransomed singly, instead of comparing like with like, e.g. (Dem.) xii, 3, nine talents for a Macedonian envoy. He concludes that Greeks were charged less than barbarians (which, so far as rich individuals are concerned, indeed seems likely). But Lonis uses this deduction not at all. Was it racial discrimination (which he argues in general did not affect treatment)? Or was it just because rich barbarians were richer than wealthy Greeks? The latter is probable, and he could have said so. On p. 91 he says citizen troops got no shares of booty; Diodorus xi, 82 (5), to name but one text, demolishes this. On p. 78 he asserts quaintly that Dionysius I sacked Delphi, and addsuces Diodorus xv, 13 (1), a bizarre libel of that writer, who does not say this.
68. Ducrey, pp. 292ff., references and bibliography.
respected. (Ducrey is brief on these ἄνυλακτα; Schlesinger remains essential 70). He believes envoys were usually immune in war, but does not face all the problems here 71; Lonis has a better discussion (pp. 66-70). But Ducrey compellingly argues that to kill captives in cold blood attained the rank of an act against generally admitted custom 72. But this may not have been universally disapproved of under any circumstances (see below). Custom did not protect all captives as such.

Not international, but nearer to law, was the oath of the Delphic Amphictyons (Aeschines ii, 115), who swore, among other things, not to destroy each others' cities. To this Kiechle naturally points (pp. 134-5). Certainly it shows the belief that one's associates, in a religious organisation, deserve relative mildness. But as Kiechle admits, it applied to members only. One recalls what the Amphictyons did to Crisa 73, and that, interestingly, the penalty for breaking the oath was itself the destruction, by the rest, of the offender's cities. Destruction was still sometimes justifiable.

By the fifth century, at least some sections of public opinion had come to condemn the massacre and enslavement of Greeks, and this had some effect on practice, a process Kiechle and Ducrey trace 74. But it seems fair to say that they could have given much more space to the contradictions and lack of unanimity that existed in Greek public opinion. R. Schlaifer, for example, well recognises these, and sets them in the wider context of slavery in Greek society, which none of these four authors do 75. Kiechle, like Schlaifer, well suggests that the conflict with Persia made it seem wrong for Greek to treat Greek harshly in war, though as we have seen, he may exaggerate the effect this feeling actually had after the Persian wars. He and Ducrey see the Mytilene affair as significant, when a majority of the Athenians thought it cruel to destroy a whole city for the offence of a few (Thuc. iii, 36, 4-5) 76. But the vote was a

70. E. Schlesinger, Die griechische Asylie, Diss. Giessen 1933.
71. P. 301, mentioning Thuc. iv, 118 (6), but not Demosth. xix, 163, Polyb. iv, 72 (3), or Polyb. xxi, 16 (13), (1-4), which could suggest that envoys without herald or safe-conduct were not immune from enemy attack, as Lonis, pp. 66-7 on Demosth. xix, 163, believes. Cf. also L.-M. Wery, L'Antiquité Classique, 35, 1966, pp. 468ff, esp. n. 45.
72. Pp. 289ff.  315ff. Lonis p. 36 may not be entirely wrong that a captor, sufficiently provoked, would massacre "sans mauvaise conscience".
73. Aeschines iii, 107-9.
74. Kiechle pp. 137ff. Ducrey, Ch. x. Also more briefly Volkmann, pp. 73ff. on Panhellenic feeling, and pp. 80ff.
75. R. Schlaifer, Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 47, 1936, pp. 165ff., useful in linking up Greek attitudes to barbarians, enslavement in war, and to slavery as such, for which see also M. I. Finley, Historia viii, 1959, pp. 162-3 with nn. 61 and 62. Also Westermann, Slave Systems, p. 26 (cf. n. 55 above).
76. Kiechle, pp. 139ff., 153n. 3; Ducrey, pp. 315ff.
near thing in the end (ibid. 49, 1). Some Athenian, perhaps some neutral opinion, then, felt the whole rebel city deserved massacre and enslavement. Calliocrates may have refused to sell Greeks (Xenophon Hell. 1, 6 (14), Kiechle p. 138), but his allies were prepared to do so. Neither author gives enough attention to the strident assertions by the Dissoi Logoi, Xenophon, and those Aristotle mentions, that cities (Greek cities, it is implied), could be fairly enslaved.\footnote{77}

But they may well be right that only Alexander's supporters backed the treatment of Thebes. Volkmann's picture of a split in opinion (p. 17), seems less convincing.\footnote{78} However, Volkmann's analysis of why the Diadochi and later rulers heeded opinion and (so far as we know), spared cities in Greece, for propaganda reasons (p. 81) and because ruined cities are little good to a conqueror (p. 76; cf. Tarn and Griffith, loc. cit. in n. 18 above), answers a question that Kiechle and Ducrey pass by. One may observe, too, that some could afford now to spare cities, thanks to their revenues, and others found if unpopular, less violent, ways of financing war (cf. Polyb. iv, 7 (1) and Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, Oxford 1941, pp. 137–140). Volkmann also answers Kiechle's attempt, pp. 150ff., to interpret Polyb. v, 11 (3) as other than a statement that enslavement is fair play in war. One wonders, too, why Polybius, when he has the argument of retaliation for massacre, to justify Aratus' and Doson's enslavement of Mantinea, also uses the argument that enemies as such may be so treated \textit{κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους} (11, 58 (10)). If in Phylarchus' time most would have disagreed (cf. Ducrey, pp. 292 and 325 with notes), would Polybius have said this unless some, in his day, could accept it? As Volkmann says (pp. 7–8) treaties were still made in Hellenistic times envisaging the sharing of booty taken from Greek cities, slaves included. One may add that in second century Crete, allies say piously "If by heaven's will we take something from the enemy..."\footnote{79} and why should this not mean slaves? Attalus could offer Athena firstfruits from Aegina in 210, many of whose citizens were probably enslaved.\footnote{80} Kiechle and Ducrey must not ignore the complexity of Greek opinion.

\footnotetext{77}{Diels-Kranz, Fragm. d. Vorschr. ii, p. 410, no. 90, 3 (5); Xenophon Mem. ii, 2 (2) and iv, 2 (19); Aristotle Pol. 1, 6 (1).}
\footnotetext{78}{Kiechle seems right that Aeschines III, 133 is ironic. No other contemporary evidence suggests approval.}
\footnotetext{79}{Cf. Walbank, Commentary on Polybius, Vol. i, on ii, 56 (6).}
\footnotetext{80}{Inscr. Cret. iii, 3 Hierapynta, 3B, 7–8 and 4, 53ff.}
\footnotetext{81}{OGIS 281; Polybius xxvi, 8 (9) need not be pure rhetoric. If enslaving of captives in the field was protested at, this has left no trace; perhaps cities mattered most.}
9. CONCLUSION: FUTURE WORK

The main criticism, then, of Kiechle, Ducrey and Lonis, seems to be that the pictures they paint of how captives were treated, are in places too bright or too simple, and sometimes incomplete or dependant on silence in the sources; while if Volkmann’s work were on a larger scale, more could have been discussed and explored. But despite this, all in various ways assist the study of the whole subject.

They raise, or revive, many questions which future work may usefully try to answer, facing *inter alia* the problems of terms, motives, and the value of sources. Such questions include the roles of war and of raiders in supplying slaves from Archaic times onwards (including captives in the field); treatment of barbarians before and after Lonis’ period (though gleaning in the field where he has harvested would be profitable); how the spirit of retaliation affected treatment of prisoners; the release of captives free (Ducrey’s coverage is sporadic and the theme needs unified discussion); other questions not bearing only on captives, such as sale of booty, and the victory monuments (not just ἀξιαραι) also need more work.

These four authors, then, contribute usefully to a large field of study.

*University of Manchester*  
*History Department*

---

83. E.g. Aeschines ii, 115; Xenophon, *Hell.* i, 2 (13–14), 11, 2 (3).
84. In his thesis, now being prepared for publication, the reviewer will discuss sale, war-finance from booty, raiders, and some aspects of slave-supply and victory monuments. These last need collection in a *Corpus*; cf. Ducrey, p. 255, who calls for this.