IMMANES RAETI*

A hundred years of Roman defensive policy in the Alps and Voralpenland

J.A. WAASDORP
THE HAGUE

CONTENTS

I. Raetia: the country and the inhabitants
   1. The country
   2. The inhabitants

II. Raetia from its conquest to the year of the four emperors
   1. Introduction: Roman Alpine politics
   2. The conquest: the classical tradition
   3. The conquest: the archaeological data
   4. The second phase: consolidation
   5. The third phase: the start of the limes

III. The year of the four emperors
   1. The war in Helvetia: Tacitus' account
   2. The repercussions in Raetia: the archaeological traces

IV. Raetia under Vespasian
   1. Introduction
   2. The native militia and the Raetian cohorts
   3. The rebuilding
   4. The extension of the Danube 'limes
   5. The Black Forest expedition
   6. The Vallis Poenina
   7. Aventicum

V. Conclusions

Appendix
Maps
List of works cited
List of abbreviations

* Translated by Manon van der Laaken
RAETIA: THE COUNTRY AND ITS INHABITANTS

1. The country

This paper will deal with the military history of the province of Raetia in the first century of its occupation by the Romans. It seems logical to start with a description of the character and the geographical position of the area, because these factors helped to determine its history.

In the Claudian era, Raetia's borders were formed, roughly, by the Danube in the North, the Inn in the East, the peaks of the Alps in the South and in the West by the line Lake of Geneva – Lake of Constance – Danube (see map 1).

The area is characterized by great contrasts in the landscape. The North should be seen as the river area, and is comparatively flat. As we go south, the area becomes more mountainous. The highest mountains are found along the southern border: the peaks of the Alps.

In the southern part of the province lay the important passes through the Alps, which gave direct access to the Italian peninsula. Going from West to East we find: the Great St. Bernard, the Furka, the Simplon, the Julier, the Septimer, the Reschen-Scheideck and lastly the Brenner Pass. We add that only the most important passes have been mentioned. Thus, Raetia was the northern gateway to Italy. This is a very important fact.

Raetia, however, was not only vital for North-South communications; it also occupied a key position in the East-West communications. Raetia formed the link between the Rhine-provinces in the West and the Danube-provinces in the East; the road connecting the two territories ran through Raetia. Raetia was, in fact, a crossroads of a number of vital highways. This determined the fate of the country as a whole.

2. The inhabitants

The province of Raetia et Vindelicia owes its name to the two peoples that inhabited the area: the Raeti and the Vindelici. About the latter nothing is known, except that they lived in the Northern part of the province; about the Raeti, the inhabitants
of the mountains, we know a bit more, although the information we get from the classical authors remains scanty.

Raeti is a collective term. It is the name the Romans gave to a part of the peoples who inhabited the Alps. The Roman authors, however, were not quite clear about which of the many mountain tribes should be considered Raeti. Strabo (IV, 6.8), for instance, includes the Leponti among the Raeti; a few pages earlier, in IV, 6.6, he says just the opposite. The Rucantii and the Cotuantii are called Raeti by Strabo (IV, 6.8) but the Tropaeum Alpium¹, cited by Plinius Maior (N.H. III, 136 - 137), regards them as Vindelici.²

Also the tribal names themselves appear to have presented a lot of problems for the Romans. The tribe that Strabo calls the Kotuantiooi is called Cosuanetes by Pliny (N.H. III, 137) and Koonsuantai by Ptolemy (Geographica II, 12.4).³ Another tribe, called the Vennones by Strabo (IV, 6.8), appears as the Vennioi in Cassius Dio (LIV 20.1), the Vennonenses and the Vennonetes in Pliny (III 135 & 136) and finally the Vennontes in Ptolemy (II 12.2). The fact that Pliny uses two different names is an illustration of the lack of knowledge the classical geographers had about the Alps.⁴

The information that the classical authors give us about the Raeti, is decidedly negative. The Raeti are described as a barbarian, warlike people, who regularly raided the territories at the

1. CIL V 7817. The Tropaeum Alpium is a monument to the victory over the Alpine peoples. It was erected near La Turbie in 7/6 B.C. The text mentions all the Alpine tribes that were conquered by the army.

2. . . . Vindelicorum gentes quattuor, Cosuanetes, Rucinates, Licates, Catenates . . . (N.H. III, 137). Heuberger (1932: p. 2) interprets Vindelicorum gentes quattuor as four tribes, not mentioned by name. However, it seems unlikely that the Romans did not know the names of these tribes, which they had conquered such a short time before. Heuberger is the only one who interprets the text in this way.

3. With all these variations on the name, it is hardly surprising that they have been interpreted to refer to more than one tribe. Meyer (1970: p. 122) concludes from Strabo that there were Vennones both north and south of the Alpine crests. The northern branch is identified with the Vennonetes and the Vennonenses; the southern branch with the Vennioi and Vennonetes. Because of the great similarity between the names, however, it seems more probable that it was only one tribe. It must be kept in mind that the Tropaeum mentions only the Vennonetes; it is hardly to be expected that another tribe with a similar name would have been forgotten or left out.
foot of the mountains (Strabo IV, 6,8; Cassius Dio LIV 22). Neither Strabo nor Dio refrained from horrible details in their descriptions of these raids: the male inhabitants of a conquered village were executed, together with those women who were expecting male babies. It has been suggested that this is a case of propaganda, justifying the conquest of the Alpine area (e.g. Meyer 1970: p. 125). Van Berghem (1962: p. 233) gives the outlines of a propaganda campaign preceding the eventual conquest:

*L'asservissement des Rhêtes fut précédé ... d'une campagne d'accusation dont Strabon ... nous rapporte l'écho.*

Of course the question remains to what extent it was necessary for the Roman rulers to justify a conquest. In any case, the propaganda campaign outlined by Van Berghem seems to be characteristic for our own era, rather than for Roman times, and therefore anachronistic. It is a fact, however, that Cassius Dio sees a direct link between the conquest of the Alpine area and the Raetian raids in Italy (LIV 22). This is, in fact, not accurate: Kraft (1957: p. 90 ff.) has convincingly shown that the conquest of the Alps was a necessary preparation for the attack on Germany.4

This does not necessarily mean that we should immediately dismiss the Raetian raids as fictitious. These incursions had been taking place for a long time. Strabo (V, 1,6) tells us that the city of Como was promoted to the status of colonia after such a raid. This took place in the year 89 B.C. Ewins (1955: p. 80) supposes that the same thing happened to Verona. Thus the two cities guarded the two main exit routes from the Alps.

4. The question that now arises is why neither Dio nor Strabo (IV, 6,9) mentions the most important reason for the Alpine campaign. Dio wrote his work in the third century, so he must have taken his material from earlier writers. We must therefore concentrate on Strabo, whose work was published around A.D. 19. The date of the publication itself may be important: a few years earlier the Roman policy vis-à-vis Germany had undergone drastic changes. The attempt to extend the border of the empire to the Elbe had failed and had been abandoned. Possibly this is why the true reason for the Alpine campaign, which had been carried out so successfully by Tiberius, was not mentioned: it would have drawn attention to the fact that the policy vis-à-vis Germany had failed in the end, and defeats and victories directly influenced the prestige of the imperial house. Suetonius (Aug. 23) for example tells us that Augustus sent out the Praetorian guard to put down riots immediately after Varus' disastrous defeat had become known. It is quite thinkable that Strabo censored his own work in this case.
The inscriptions, too, mention the Raeti: the epitaph of Munatius Plancus, Julius Caesar's right hand and the founder of the colonies of Lugdunum and Raurica, mentions a victory over the Raeti as one of his successes.\(^5\) It is generally thought that the colony of Raurica was meant to stop the Raeti from invading Gaul.

Data from the later history of Raetia indicate that they were a warlike people in whom the fighting spirit lived on for quite a long time. This is illustrated, a.o., by the disproportionately large number of Raetian cohorts that were conscripted into the Roman army: there was at least one levy of eight cohorts.\(^6\) It is also striking that there were a number of Raetian numeri in the third century.\(^7\)

The Raeti, in short, can be characterized as bellicose tribes, who regularly came down from the mountains to sack and plunder the inhabitants of the lower regions, possibly because their own land did not yield enough to live on. Strabo (IV, 6,9) suggests this possibility by describing their country as poor and infertile. I cannot resist mentioning the excavation on the site of the Gasfabrik near Basel. A late-Celtic oppidum was excavated here, which had been laid waste in the second half of the first century B.C. The destruction of this stronghold is sometimes associated with the Raetian raids in this area (Meyer 1962: p. 146; Wells 1972: p. 46). One of the most important indications that the settlement came to a violent end was a large heap of horribly mutilated skeletons. One of the finds was the skeleton of a woman, with on her pelvis, the fragile bones of her unborn baby (Wiedemer 1963: p. 270). It is unwarranted to draw far-reaching conclusions from this find, but involuntarily it makes us think of the passage about the Raeti in Strabo:

\(^5\) CIL X 6087: L. Munatius L. n L. pron / Plancus Cos Cens Imp iter vir/ epulon triumph ex Raetis aedem Saturni / fecit de manibus agros divisit in Italia/ beneventi in Gallias colonias deduxit / Lugudunum et Rauricam

\(^6\) The problem of this levy of cohorts is dealt with extensively in chapter IV, section 2.

\(^7\) Numeri, army units in which the native ways of fighting were given full scope, were recruited mainly from the barbarian peoples living at the edges of the Roman empire. That the Raetians were recruited for these units in this period, two centuries after their subjection, says a lot about their fighting abilities and the small degree in which they were romanised.
and that they did not stop (i.e. after killing the men), but even killed pregnant women, in so far as the magicians said that they were expecting male babies.8

II

RAETIA FROM ITS CONQUEST TO THE YEAR OF THE FOUR EMPERORS

1. Introduction: Roman Alpine politics

The Romans had always considered the Alps an important line of defence, protecting Italy against attacks. The mountain tribes, who controlled the passes, were an additional protection. Hannibal, for example, was harassed by them during his march across the Alps (Livy XXI, 33 - 38).

However, the Romans had the same problems when they themselves wanted to cross the Alps. The matter became urgent when the Romans began to control areas beyond the Alps. We must therefore make a distinction between on the one hand acts of war in this area that are punitive expeditions undertaken by the Romans to keep the raids we mentioned in Chapter I under control, and on the other hand wars of conquest which had the aim to clear and control the mountain passes they needed. We shall go into this matter more deeply.

It appears that there were more reasons possible to mount a punitive expedition than just the desire to restore order in the area concerned: Decimus Brutus writes to Cicero (Ep. ad Fam. XI, 4) that he wanted to give his men some good battle training. Van Royen (1973: p. 56) says that L. Antonius stayed in the Alps to be able to lay formal claim to a triumph. Octavianus' first expeditions against the Salassi (35 B.C.) were also partly meant to give his soldiers some battle experience (v. Royen 1973: p. 57). In short: this type of expedition was rather unorganized and superficial in character.

8. Strabo IV.6.8:
... καὶ μὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα καυχομένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐγκυόν υναίκας, κτείνοντας δοσας φαίεν οἱ λάντεις ἀρρενοκυνεῖν.
Wars of conquest looked completely different. There was a well-defined goal, the fighting was often prepared quite thoroughly, and in most cases was continued until the goal was reached. A first example is the war of the Romans against the tribes in the Southern part of the Alpes Maritimae. Here the opening of a safe land route to Spain was at stake. Although not much is known about this war, it is certain that the aim was reached around 154 B.C. The war took about a quarter of a century. It is also significant that after this, no more conquests were made in the Western Alps.

A second example is the attempt, ordered by Caesar, which second-in-command Servius Sulpicius Galba made to open up the Great St. Bernard pass in 57 B.C. (Caesar B.G. III 1 - 6). This pass formed the shortest connection between Italy and the areas that Caesar had just conquered in Gaul (Strabo IV, 6, 7). In this case there had been hardly any preparation at all, nor was it possible to continue fighting for a longer period of time: so this campaign ended in failure. Thirty-two years later Octavian succeeded where Galba failed. The character of this campaign differed completely from that of his first expeditions against the Salassi; the fighting continued until the victory was complete. That the aim here was the possession of the pass is obvious from the fact that practically the entire male population of the Salassi were sold as slaves upon their subjection (Strabo IV, 6, 7). It was too much of a risk to allow this warlike tribe to continue to exist as a cultural unit near the pass they had controlled up till then. To be on the safe side a colony for veterans was founded nearby: Augusta Praetoria.9

The conquest of the Central Alps should be seen in the light of the above.

2. The conquest: the classical tradition

The war of conquest which brought the Central Alps under Roman control took place in 15 B.C., under the command of Drusus and Tiberius. The year before, two Alpine tribes, the

9. The veterans who were placed in this colony came from the cohortes praetoriae, elite troops. Another piece of evidence that the protection of this passway, which also opened the way into the territory of the Helvetians, had a high priority (Van Royen 1973: p. 66).
Camunni and the Vennii, had been subjugated by Publius Silius Nerva, the proconsul of Illyricum (Cassius Dio LIV 20, 1). The Camunni lived in the Val Camonica; there are no differences of opinion about this. About the Vennii, however, there has been a lot of disagreement in connection with the many variations on their name and the fact that the classical geographers are not clear about where they lived.\(^9\) If the Vennii are identified with the other tribes starting with Venn-, this means that Nerva's expedition crossed the Alps, because then the Vennii are to be situated North of the Alps (v. Berghem 1968: p. 6ff.; Wells 1972: p. 63f.).\(^11\) This means that Nerva pacified the Julier and Septimer pass area in 16 B.C. It is logical to regard this as a preparation for the attack Drusus and Tiberius began one year later.

The historical information about the campaign we get from Cassius Dio (LIV 22) and Velleius Paterculus (II 95).\(^2\) Cassius Dio reports that the Romans attacked from many directions, led by Drusus and Tiberius themselves, but also by their inferiors. Drusus' army invaded the area from the South, probably via the Brenner and the Reschen-Scheideck passes and possibly via the Bündner passes, which had been cleared the year before. Tiberius'

10. For this problem see note 3.

11. On the grounds of a different interpretation of the problem of the Venn-tribes, Howald and Meyer (1940: p. 361) place the Vennii in the Veltlin; Heuberger (1932: p. 227f.) on the other hand, equates the Vennii with the Venostes, which means that they have to be placed in the Val Venosta. Because the Val Venosta and the Val Camonica are rather far apart, he is forced to turn it into a split expedition: two army units conquering a valley each.

Overbeck's recent interpretation (1976: p. 666) is different again. He says that there is no direct connection between the Val Camonica and the area in which Wells and Van Berghem locate the Vennii. This in itself is true. Nevertheless his interpretation, which locates the Vennii near Venice, suffers from the same objection.

12. Livius (Per. 137) and Strabo (IV, 6,9) mention the conquest without further details or information. Horatius celebrates the campaign in an ode (IV 4,17; IV 14,6), but doesn't give any information that is relevant. We add that the word with which Horatius qualifies the Raetians, immanes (= fierce, terrible), is seen by Van Berghem (1968: p. 1) as further proof of the propaganda campaign he postulates. This appears rather presumptuous, if we take into account that these are the expressive words of a poem.

13. Howald and Meyer (1940: p. 365) argue against this theory. They think that Tiberius, like Drusus, invaded the area from Italy. Their proof is the passage in Horatius where Tiberius conquers the Raetians (IV,14,6). This is indeed somewhat more difficult if he invaded the territory of the Vindelicians from Gaul. Wells (1972: p. 67) has Tiberius invade the Upper
base is generally thought to have been in Gaul.\textsuperscript{13} From there his troops marched into the target area via various routes.\textsuperscript{14}

The expedition went well because of the careful planning and the many-sided attack. An additional helpful factor was that the Alpine tribes fought independently, and did not form a united front (Cassius Dio LIV 22, 4). This splintering of the enemy forces was advantageous for the Romans, who had better equipment and far outnumbered them anyway. Nevertheless Velleius Paterculus reports some fierce fighting (II 95).

Immediately after their subjugation the greater part of the male population was deported (Cassius Dio LIV 22), possibly into slavery, although a part of them was probably conscripted into newly formed cohorts. We see that the policy was the same as the one followed with the Salassi; for the expedition of 15 B.C., too, the main goal was the clearing of the Alpine passes. Should any doubts remain: the fact that Augustus improved the roads in this area immediately after the conquest (Strabo IV, 6,9) leads to the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{15} The conquest of the Alpine passes is easiest understood when the policy vis-à-vis Germany is kept in mind: it was a necessary preparation for the conquest of this area which had been planned (Kraft 1957: p. 90f.).

The precise course of the campaign cannot be distilled from the classical sources. That it has been tried occasionally, is due to an interpretation of the Trophaeum Alpium. Various authors (e.g. Heuberger 1932: p. 62ff.; Meyer 1970: p. 122) take the order in which the tribes are mentioned on the monument to be the order in which they were conquered. However, this presents some problems: Heuberger, for instance, has Tiberius march around the Brixentenses without doing battle because this tribe is mentioned almost at the bottom of the list on the monument. Tiberius then has to return to deal with them. Meyer regards the victory over the Ambisontes as a "Seitenunternehmung", because

---

13. It must in any case have been the route via Basle and the Bodensee; we repeat that Wells thinks of the Walensee route also (see the next section).
14. We can deduce from inscriptions CIL V 8002 and 8003 that Drusus had a road built across the Reschen-Scheideckpass after the expedition:

\ldots viam Claudiam Augustam/ quam Drusus pater Alpibus/ bello patefactis derexserat \ldots \ (CIL V 8003).
their place on the Tropaeum cannot easily be fitted into the campaign.\textsuperscript{16}

It ought to be clear that no such conclusions can be based on the Tropaeum Alpium. It seems more reasonable to regard it simply as a rather crude geographical enumeration (Wells 1972: p. 59f.; v. Royen 1973: p. 70).

3. The conquest: the archaeological data

Looking for archaeological material that can be related to the conquest of the Alps we outlined above, we meet with some surprises. The Augustan finds are concentrated in the Helvetian area, whereas much less material is found in Raetia.

Helvetia gives us the following picture: Basle, Zürich and Oberwinterthur yield early Augustan material, which, according to present-day interpretations, signifies military occupation. In Vindonissa, too, an early Augustan level has recently been found. Thus it has become most likely that there was a military station from the same period there, a forerunner of the castra. We should also mention the stone watch-towers along the Walensee which, the few finds indicate, were occupied for a short period in Augustan times.\textsuperscript{17}

What was later to be the province of Raetia yields Augustan material in Augsburg-Oberhausen and on the Lorenzberg near Epfach (vide map II).\textsuperscript{18} Here we are dealing with a castra and a small fort respectively.

The pottery, esp. the Arretine ware, enables us to date the sites more precisely. Service type I, of which, according to Vogt’s typology (1948: p. 150), type Ia is the oldest, is important. Ia occurs relatively often in Basle and Zürich, and Oberwinterthur and Vindonissa have also yielded some fragments of this early service. In Oberhausen and the Lorenzberg, however, no Ia was found, which is especially significant in the case of Oberhau-

\textsuperscript{16} Howald and Meyer (1940: p. 361) talk about a “Seitenunternehmung” in connection with the Focunates, however...

\textsuperscript{17} The Basle excavation was published by R. Fellmann (1955); Zürich was described by E. Vogt (1948). The Walensee towers were published by Legler-Staub and Laur-Belart (1960). The find of the early-Augustan layer in Vindonissa is mentioned as a Fundbericht in JbSGU 62 (1979) p. 153, Oberwinterthur in Wells 1972: p. 57.

\textsuperscript{18} The finds are published by Ulbert 1960 and 1965.
sen, because of the gigantic numbers of finds there. The conclusion is that the Helvetic sites are certainly older than the Raetian sites. Oberaden, where la-fragments were still sporadically found, can be placed in sequence between the Helvetic and the Raetian sites. At the moment, the beginning of Oberaden is dated to about 12 B.C. The surprising conclusion then must be that Oberhausen cannot have been built directly following the campaign of 15 B.C., but must have been built a few years later. The same applies to the Lorenzberg. The beginnings of both are now dated to about 10 B.C.

The Helvetic sites are more difficult to date precisely. A possible key to this problem is the interpretation of the watch-towers along the Walensee. There are several possibilities. If the occupation of the Helvetic area is regarded as part of the Alpine campaign (e.g. Meyer 1968/69: p. 78; Roegli 1972a: p. 75), then the towers must have been meant to guard the road to Zürich and the Aare-valley via the Septimer pass after the conquest had been completed (e.g. Legler-Staub & Laur-Belart 1960: p. 14). This is a possibility, but it does not explain why there were so many Roman bases in Helvetia, and none at all in Raetia, in 15 B.C.

A second possibility is put forward by Van Berghem (1968: p. 8). He regards the watch-towers as a direct result of Nerva's expedition of 16 B.C., which, he thinks, was meant to connect the Rhine legions and the legions of Cisalpine Gaul. The short duration of the expedition made permanent pacification impossible; so the watch-towers were built, only to be abandoned again after the conquest of the next year. But watch-towers make no sense, unless they are linked with a larger military base, from which reinforcements can be sent if need be. Although Van Berghem does not include it in his argument, Zürich, which was reasonably close by, was the obvious place for such a base. Pottery finds have proved Zürich to be contemporary with Basle and

19. They are stone towers measuring about 10 x 10 meters (Strahlegg and Biberlikopf) and about 12 x 14 meters (Filzbach). Their small size indicates that only a small number of soldiers will have been detailed to them, in any case too few to be able to intervene successfully in the case of a rebellion. No ditch was found, but in Filzbach a hemispherical wall was discovered, which, however, was open at one side. They are within sight of each other, which makes it more probable that they were watchtowers, ready to signal to each other by means of lightsignals, for instance, in case of danger. A mother-base is then, of course, essential.
Oberwinterthur. We can hardly assume that Nerva’s expedition pacified the whole of Helvetia as well. So it seems that Van Berghem’s theory tacitly assumes that the Helvetian area was already under Roman control when Nerva started his campaign.

If we assume this, however, there is no need at all to link the Walensee towers with Nerva’s expedition. The pottery dates do not argue against the occupation of Helvetia before the Alpine campaign of 15 B.C.: service Ia is dated to the second decade of the first century B.C.\textsuperscript{20} Although there is no direct evidence for this hypothesis either, it does give a much better explanation of the concentration of sites in Helvetia. For then we are dealing with an area that borders on territory that has not yet been occupied. One look at the map (see map II) shows us that the Augustan sites are located along roads that lead either directly into the Alpine area, or into the Voralpenland. The watch-towers along the Walensee can now be interpreted as look-out-posts for Raetian raids: the road they control leads straight into the Alps (Wells 1972: p. 55f.). Oberwinterthur, too, could be considered an outpost guarding the road coming from the Voralpenland. However, we have to make a proviso here, because the camp itself has not yet been found.\textsuperscript{21}

In the light of the hypothesis outlined above it is worthwhile to analyse a passage in Cassius Dio more closely:

\begin{quote}
The Raeti ... invaded large parts of Gaul bordering on their territory and raided Italy ... When they kept on invading Gaul after they had been chased out of Italy, he (Augustus) sent Tiberius there too (sc. for the attack) ... \end{quote}

Only Helvetia can be meant with parts of Gaul bordering on Raetian territory. In itself this is not surprising: Strabo, too, mentions raids on the Helvetii (IV, 6, 8). That is why the second passage is of special interest. If the plundering of Helvetian territory was a reason for the Romans to retaliate, this leads us to

\textsuperscript{20} Wells (1972: p. 42) writes that some authors even date the service to the third decade of the last century B.C.

\textsuperscript{21} The sigillata finds make it possible that there was a fort here (Wells 1972: p. 57).

\textsuperscript{22} Cassius Dio LIV 22:
suppose that this area had already been brought under Roman control. Above, it has been shown that the Raetian raids were not the main motive for the conquest of the Alps. It has, however, nowhere been argued that these raids never took place. This passage in Dio may be seen as an indication that Helvetia had been brought under Roman rule before the campaign of 15 B.C.\textsuperscript{23}

If the Romans had occupied Helvetia before the Alpine campaign, of course the question arises when this took place. It is impossible to give an exact date because of the lack of information about this in the sources. The opening of the Great St. Bernard pass by means of the victory over the Salassi in 25 B.C. did provide the Romans with a new road into this area. Vidy near Lausanne has yielded the early terra sigillata known to us from Basle and Zürich. The many finds here could indicate a trading post which possibly helped provision the military posts in the North (Wells 1972: p. 44). Wells dates the Helvetian sites to about 20 B.C. He interprets them as preparation for the Alpine campaign. Although it is possible, it does not seem all that probable, if we keep the date at 20 B.C.: five years of preparation does seem a bit excessive. It may be more logical to interpret them as part of the preparations for the conquest of Germany.\textsuperscript{24}

Another problem remains: the datings of the known camps in the Alpenvorland. For we can hardly assume that the area had no substantial occupying forces in the five years following the conquest. Although a hiatus in the finds could be responsible, this should not be taken for granted for the time being, the less so because archaeological research in West Germany is on a very high level. The question that must be asked is whether in the campaign of 15 B.C. the Voralpenland was conquered and occupied completely or whether the main concern that year was to

\textsuperscript{23} There's another interesting aspect to this text. It concerns the fact that the Helvetian territory is called Gaul in a third century source. This indicates that this area was considered a part of Gaul in the said century. This would be of some use in the discussion that has been raging for decades about the question whether this territory was part of Gallia Belgica or of Germania Superior after Domitianus. For a summary of this discussion see G. Walser (1967: pp. 11 - 22).

\textsuperscript{24} Possibly the newly found legionary camp at Dangstetten along the Rhine may shed some light on this problem. I have consciously left this new find out of consideration when I discussed the other sites, because the excavation has not been published yet, and so far no more can be said about the camp than that it was Augustan. Until we have solid facts it is dangerous to speculate about the function of this legionary camp.
occupy the Alps and thus the important passes through it. Up till now it has generally been assumed that the campaign involved
the entire Voralpenland, because the Romans marched against
the Raeti and the Vindelici (Velleius Paterculus II 95). However,
Strabo (IV, 6, 8) calls the Vindelici mountain dwellers; the Tro-
paeum Alpium, too (Plinius III 37: Vindelicorum gentes quattuor),
mentions the Vindelici among the conquered Alpine tribes. It
should be clear, then, that the Vindelici cannot simply be equat-
ed with the inhabitants of the Voralpenland; neither does their
subjugation automatically indicate that the entire Voralpenland
was conquered.

If we assume that the campaign of 15 B.C., was directed against
those who hold the vital Alpine passes, it is to be expected that
the first concentration of Roman forts was located there. How-
ever, in comparison with other areas, there has been very little
archaeological research here. 25

The above brings us to the following reconstruction: after the
mountains had been conquered, first the roads through the passes
were improved. Only then, when these roads were extended
further to the North, did the military posts along them get built.
This may have taken several years and would explain the fact
that Augsburg-Oberhausen and Epfach are a little younger.

It should be kept in mind that there is no tangible evidence for
this reconstruction. However, it is not contrary to the evidence
that has so far been collected, so it is worthy of our considera-
tion.

Summing up, we get the following picture: Helvetia was pro-
bably occupied by the Romans before 15 B.C. We do not know if
this came about peacefully or by force of arms. 26 This occupation
may have been a part of the preparation for the conquest of Ger-
many and the Alpine area. The area was guarded by military

25. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that precisely densely popu-
lated areas have yielded a lot of archaeological material in recent decades,
because of the many building activities. Laur-Belart (1937: p. 99) mentions
Augustan material from the Septimer pass, however. The finds include early-
Roman terra sigillata. As far as I know these finds have not been published
yet. The last excavation near the Julier pass took place in 1939; the Maloja
pass has never even been investigated (Koenig 1979: p. 83).

26. Wiedemer (1963) tries to prove that this may have been done with
violence, but himself admits that his theory lacks solid facts.
camps and advanced watch-towers. The Alpine area was attacked and conquered from this area and Cisalpine Gaul. Because of the late dates of the castra at Augsburg-Oberhausen and the military camp at Epfach we must take into account the possibility that first the Alpine ranges were pacified and given roads, after which a possibly bit-by-bit occupation of the Voralpenland followed. It is not yet known what form of government the newly conquered territories had.

4. The second phase: consolidation

Raetia entered into a new phase of its military history in the second decade of the first century A.D. In the beginning of the reign of Tiberius the policy that was aimed at the conquest of Germany and the extension of the borders of the Empire towards the Elbe was given up: a more conservative policy took its place. The consequences of this change can be seen in the archaeological data. The Augsburg-Oberhausen camp, whose location was strategically well chosen for an attack (Ulbert 1959: p. 80; Kellner 1972: p. 28), was abandoned around the middle of this decade; at the same time the Vindonissa castra was built in Helvetia. The location of this camp, at a junction of natural communications, was essentially defensive (Ulbert 1959: p. 81; Wells 1972: p. 49 a.o.). It was located at the end of the acute angle formed by the Rhine and the Danube; it controlled the roads that led to the hinterland and the main Alpine passes. Along one of these roads, viz. the road running through Raetia roughly from the West to the East, a number of small forts appeared: Bregenz, Kempten, Auerberg and Gauting. Between the last two the Lo-

27. It is to be expected that these towers were abandoned not long after the conquest of the area. The extreme scarcity of finds points in this direction (Wells 1970: p. 56).

28. The Oberhausen castra has never been found, but is assumed, because of the abundance of finds. Although Wells (1970) opposes this theory, for the moment it seems most likely that Oberhausen was a castra; for it is hardly probable that Raetia did entirely without a legionary fort.

29. The supposition that C. Vibius Pansa (CIL V 4910) was given the area to govern as legatus pro praetore directly following 15 B.C. (Winkler 1971) was refuted convincingly by Chantraine (1973). New data are required to solve this problem.

30. Kraft (1950/51) suggests A.D. 16/17, because of the coin finds; Ulbert (1960) agrees because of the pottery.
renzberg was located, which kept its garrison during Tiberius' reign. The only one of these forts for which the military context has been proved beyond doubt is Bregenz, because here the ditch of the castellum has been found (Hild 1953: p. 257); in the other places military objects have been found, which makes it likely that detachments have been stationed there, too. It is clear, however, that they formed a unit with its centre in Vindonissa, from which the various forts were manned (see map III). We see that the East-West communications in Raetia were being made secure; the same probably goes for the North-South communications. This is certainly true for the Reschen-Scheideck pass-way, since the fort on the Lorenzberg continued to exist. A comparable post is assumed for Chur, because of the Bündner passes. We should mention here that Chur was directly linked with Vindonissa as well, viz. via the Walensee route.

For Helvetia, the data are rather less clear. Zürich has only been occupied for a short time (Vogt 1948: p. 32), and was abandoned probably not long after the conquest of the Alps, just like the Walensee watch-towers which were linked with it. Basle, too, was abandoned, but occupied again in Tiberius' reign. Oberwinterthur is assumed to have been occupied in early-Tibetan times (Meyer 1968/69: p. 80). The connection with Vindonissa is again abundantly clear (see map III); it is obvious that this casta played a vital part both in Helvetia and in the Voralpenland.

5. The third phase: the start of the limes

During Claudius' reign, Raetia underwent a number of important changes. Administratively the area changed in that it became an official province; on the military level, too, changes took place.

The line of forts we described above, which ran from one end of Raetia to the other, was abandoned. The civilian settlements which had sprung up in their vicinity in the course of the years, had developed enough means of subsistence to be able to survive without the presence of the army.

31. For a general overview of these excavations see Ulbert (1959: pp. 77 - 88) and Wells (1972: pp. 59 - 89).
32. Wells (1972: p. 79) expects this. Von Gonzenbach (1963: p. 128, n. 271) mentions that in Chur probably Tiberian Arretine ware has been found.
A new line of castella was built along the Danube. In the course of Claudius’ reign the following forts appeared: Hüfingen, Tuttlingen, Ennetach, Emerkingen, Risstissen, Unterkirchberg, Günzburg, Aislingen, Burghöfe, Neuburg and Oberstimm (see map III). Organisation and supreme command remained in Vindonissa (Schönberger 1962: p. 126). In spite of some possible exceptions this line of forts is to be seen as a unit. It can be regarded as the beginning of a somewhat more permanent frontier defence system, and indicates that Claudius was not planning any offensive wars in this part of the Roman empire. The construction of the Via Claudia Augusta, which linked Italy and Augsburg via the Reschen-Scheideck pass, made the area more accessible.

What is striking about the line of forts is that it stops at Oberstimm. The next Danube castellum is Linz, which is in Noricum, 230 kilometers away from Oberstimm (Alföldy 1974: p. 104). We cannot blame this on a hiatus in the finds: stray coins are found mostly west of the Lech; east of the Lech no coins are found except in a narrow strip close to the mountains. The Danube territory in this part of the area yields practically nothing (Christ 1957: p. 422).

33. A general overview of the excavations and the results of the investigations can be found in Schönberger 1969 and Filtzinger a.o. 1976.

34. These exceptions are:

1. Aislingen. This fort probably dates from late-Tiberian times (Ulbert 1959: p. 83f.). The reason for its foundation is unknown. It is an (at that time) isolated castellum along the Danube, and therefore it has nothing to do with the foundation of the Claudian forts, which meant the beginning of a more fixed defense system into which Aislingen was incorporated. It must have had a more specific function (the protection of a Danube crossing?)

2. Günzburg. Dating is a problem in the case of this fort. Walke (1959: p. 90) and Ulbert (1959: p. 87) think it is a Flavian castellum; Schönberger (1969: p. 134) prefers to think that it is late-Claudian. Central to the argument is the Vollmer 196 inscription, which is dated to A.D. 77/78. It can be read as an inscription marking the foundation, or alternatively the reconstruction of the fort. But Günzburg, like the Claudian castella, has a burnt layer, covering both the castellum and the vicus. In Walke’s time this burnt layer was still being linked with the Chattian war; now the fire is mostly thought to be linked with the year of the four emperors. This would argue in favour of a Claudian date for Günzburg. Filtzinger (1957: p. 193) mentions Claudian finds from this castellum.

35. Obviously this was an improvement of the road that had already been built by Drusus (CIL V 8002 and 8003).
If Oberstimm was indeed the last Danube fort, one would expect patrols to have been sent into the unguarded area from it. The disproportionately large fabrica (i.e. workshop supplying the soldiers) the Claudian fort had is an indication (Schönberger 1972: p. 36).

For the time being, however, the reason for the absence of an effective frontier defence in this area remains unclear. It has been associated (Ulbert 1959: p. 85) with the fact that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus moved the friendly Hermunduri into the territory of the Marcomanni in A.D. 3 (Cassius Dio LV 10, 2). Tacitus (Germania 41) says the Hermunduri lived near the Danube, and mentions lively trade between them and Augsburg. This would be an adequate explanation, if the area in question, north of the Danube, had yielded Germanic finds. This lack of finds may on the contrary be an indication that there was no substantial population in this area.

In Helvetia nothing much changed. Because of the distribution of tiles with the stamp of the XXIst legion a network of guardposts near the important highways is assumed (Von Gonzenbach 1963). This would be an extension of a system that already existed under Tiberius. The data about Claudian-Neronic times are abundant enough to make the network Von Gonzenbach proposes very likely. The fact that the tile-stamps are of a legion that was stationed in Vindonissa, indicates that in Claudian times this castra had not lost in importance for the protection of this territory.

The situation we saw in Claudian times remained stable until the turbulent years A.D. 69/70. What happened then had far-reaching consequences for the defence system.

36. Coins, too, are only found more to the West of the area North of the Danube (Christ 1957: p. 422). This is significant, because a friendly buffer-tribe trading with the Roman Empire may be expected to have had the beginnings of a monetary economy.
THE YEAR OF THE FOUR EMPERORS

1. The war in Helvetia: Tacitus’ account

The year 69 was disastrous for the Roman world.\(^{37}\) In spite of themselves, the Helvetians, too, got involved in the events, and they paid a heavy price for this at first. Our source of information isTacitus (Hist. I, 67 - 69), who appears to have got his information from the elder Pliny, who was in the area at the time (Stähelin 1948: p. 188; Walser 1954: p. 260). So Tacitus’ rendering of the events may be considered quite reliable.

The immediate cause of the bloody conflict between the Helvetii and the Roman general Caecina was the confiscation by legionaries of the 21st legion of a money transport which was meant for a military post that was manned and paid for by the Helvetii.\(^{38}\) The Helvetii reacted by capturing some military messengers carrying letters to the legions in Pannonia. Although Tacitus does not mention what was in these letters, it may be assumed that they were an invitation to join Vitellius, the claimant to the throne put forward by the Rhine legions.

Following the latter incident, war broke out, also because the

\(^{37}\) General monographs about this period are Greenhalgh (1975) and Wellesley (1975) a.o. But they do not contribute to a better understanding of what happened in Helvetia because they do not add anything to Tacitus’ story.

\(^{38}\) Walser (1954) links the conflict with the Vindex-insurrection of the year before. The rebellion was crushed by the XXIst legion, a.o., but Galba rewarded the rebels and punished the legions that had marched against Vindex. Walser thinks it is possible the Helvetii had supported the insurrection, which would explain the tension between them and the XXIst. However, there is no indication that the Helvetii supported Vindex, nor is this support necessary to explain the controversy in the Helvetian territory. The legion was punished anyway: no donatives were given (Walser 1954: p. 268). The raiding of the money-transport may also have been caused by the soldiers’ frustration at having had to wait for their money for so long, and then to see that the Helvetian militia, who weren’t even Roman citizens, did get paid.

For the possible location of the fort that was manned by this militia, see the Appendix.
Helvetians "did not know that Galba had been murdered and rejected Vitellius' rule." 39 This piece of information from Tacitus is important, because it renders the Helvetian rebellion legitimate: they were faithful to the lawful authorities and offered resistance to a usurper.

Caecina marched into Helvetian territory with his legions, destroyed the crops and sacked the spa of Baden. He also sent word to the Raetian auxiliaries, ordering them to attack the Helvetians in the rear. These auxiliaries didn't come alone:

... on the other side the Raetian alae and cohorts, and the fightingmen of the Raetians themselves, well-used to weapons and trained in warfare. 40 A more or less standing militia had come with the auxiliaries, undoubtedly attracted by the prospect of being able to deal a blow to their old enemy. "Altem Stammenhass Luft machend" Stähelin (1948; p. 251) calls it. Another reason that the auxiliaries that were encamped in Raetia immediately hastened to Caecina's assistance was the fact that Porcius Septimius, the Raetian procurator, supported Vitellius' claims to power (Tac. Hist. III, 5).

Further resistance by the Helvetii became senseless then. Moreover, Tacitus describes their military prowess as well-meant — and so all the more fatal — dilettantism. His characterization of the Helvetii is telling in this respect:

A Gaulish people, in the past renowned for their feats of arms and their brave men, later because of the memory of their fame ... 41

After about a century of peace, the Helvetians had forgotten how to wage war. The Raetians, however, had lost nothing of their old fighting spirit and came running down the mountains for the first time in years. When the Helvetians were surrounded, with the Raetian auxilia and the Raetian militia at their rear, and Caecina's legions in front (with also a good many Raetians there, because the 21st legion had the 6th and 7th cohorts Raetorum at its disposal as auxilia), they panicked completely: the ordered

39. Hist I 67:
... de caede Galba ignari et Vitellii imperium abnuentes.
40. Hist I 68:
... inde Raeticae alae cohortesque et ipsorum Raetorum juventus, sueta armis et more militiae exercita.
41. Hist I 69:
... Gallica gens olim armis virisque, mox memoria nominis clara ...
battle array — if there ever was one — was abandoned, and they sought safety in chaotic flight, throwing away their weapons because they slowed them down. Thus they became an easy prey for the soldiers who pursued them; they could kill them one by one.

After this crushing defeat the road to Aventicum, the capital of the Helvetic civitas, was open. The town was completely unprotected, because there was no wall around it then. Therefore capitulation was offered immediately. Although Caecina accepted it, a special embassy had to be sent to Vitellius to ensure that Aventicum would not be sacked (Tac. Hist. I, 69).

One can wonder in how far Caecina was justified in acting as harshly in this conflict as he did. Tacitus blames it on his blood-thirsty nature (Hist. I, 67), but this can hardly be called a satisfactory explanation for his behaviour. Strategical motives must have played an important part. For the Helvetii controlled the Aare valley, through which ran the vital through-road between the Rhine and Italy. It was, of course, vitally important that this supply line was not endangered by the tribes living near it. Caecina's harshness may be interpreted as a policy to safeguard it. Sparing Aventicum fits in this policy, because its destruction could have given rise to new acts of rebellion (Walser 1954: p. 266). Now only the Helvetic army had been destroyed, as a warning of what would happen to Aventicum if any new rebellion should occur.

Having thus secured the lines of communication, Caecina's troops marched on in the direction of the Great St. Bernard pass. It can be safely assumed that the Raetian militia, who had proved themselves such useful allies against the Helvetii, continued to accompany the army (Ulbert 1959: p. 86; Nuber 1967: p. 92; Kellner 1972: p. 39). This army defeated Otho's legions near Bedriacum and in this way secured the empire for Vitellius.

2. The repercussions in Raetia: the archaeological traces

The victory mentioned above did not mean the return of peace in the Empire. For Titus Flavius Vespasianus, the supreme commander of the Judaean army, also entered the struggle for power and marched to Italy, with the support of the Danube-legions, to dispute Vitellius' rule. To prevent attacks on the flank of Vespasian's army from the enemy province of Raetia, the procurator of Noricum, Sextilius Felix, stationed a number of auxilia along
the eastern border of this province (Tac. Hist. III, 5). The first thing the vanguard of Vespasian's army did upon reaching Italy, was to occupy Verona. This act, too, must be regarded as a defence against a possible attack from Raetia: to occupy Verona was to control the road across the Brenner pass (Tac. Hist. III, 8). It is once more apparent that Raetia was strategically very important. The safety-measures we mentioned above have undoubtedly helped Vespasianus to win the final battle, which was fought, once again, at Bedriacum.

When we look at the archaeological traces in Raetia that can be dated to this period, the first thing that strikes us is a burnt layer that is found in almost all the sites, both the military and the civilian ones. The military sites are the castella along the Danube. A burnt layer was found in Hüfingen (Filtzinger 1957: p. 194), Risstissen (Mildenberger 1961: p. 87), Unterkirchberg (Filtzinger 1957: p. 173), Günzburg (Walke 1959: p. 91), Aislingen and Burghöfe (Ubert 1959: p. 23). A few castella (Tuttlingen, Ennetach, Emerkingen, Neuburg) do not occur in this enumeration because the excavations there have so far not yielded enough material to warrant any conclusions. Oberstimm does not appear in the list either, but that is because this castellum does not have such a burnt layer (Schönberger 1969: p. 155; 1972: p. 37).

Two explanations present themselves. It is thinkable that the auxiliaries set fire to their camps themselves at their departure (they went with Caecina). Flavius Josephus describes such a procedure (B.J. III 5, 4). We must keep in mind, however, that, although Josephus describes it as standard practice to set fire to a camp upon abandoning it, he can only have observed this in Judaea. But Judaea was always rebellious and difficult to pacify, so there it was necessary to reckon with bands that could make use of an abandoned camp. The situation in Raetia was completely different. This province was well pacified, and had been quiet for years. Furthermore, Josephus gives the impression that the camps were temporary (he mentions tents, for instance). This, too, was different in Raetia. Neither does this explain the fact that Oberstimm was spared.

There is another possibility. Tacitus (Hist. IV, 70) mentions

42. The date of this burnt layer is still a matter of debate. See note 34.
that Sextilius Felix and his troops marched straight through Raetia on their way to Civilis' rebels. Assuming that only small detachments had stayed behind to guard the castella along the Danube — as may have happened in Oberstimm (Schönberger 1972: p. 37) — it is quite thinkable that Felix eliminated the last followers of Vitellius on the way to Civilis (Ulbert 1959: p. 87; Kellner 1972: p. 40; Overbeck 1976: p. 674; Filtzinger a.o. 1976: p. 47). The advantage of this hypothesis is that it gives a better explanation for the fact that Oberstimm was not burnt. This castellum was located east of the Lech, and the road along the Danube ended there more or less. Sextilius Felix undoubtedly entered Raetia at a point further to the South, marched to the Danube via Augsburg and then up the river to the various castella along the Danube. Oberstimm was too far from this route and may have escaped destruction because of its isolated position.

It is clear that this hypothesis cannot yet be proved. The systematic excavation of what is surmised to be a castellum near Neuburg could be important, because this is also situated east of the Lech.

Raetia's most important civilian settlements also show traces of fire and destruction. Augsburg, the capital, for instance, in many places shows signs of a conflagration. Bregenz has seen such traces, which the excavator, Hild (1953: p. 259), links with the year of the four emperors. We know most about Cambodunum (Kempten), because of the extensive and systematic excavations there. There are hardly any traces of fire here, though, but a lot of signs of destruction. All over the town debris has been found, which was used to lev. the ground. This debris undoubtedly comes from the forum, because a large number of fragments of frescoes and bronze ornaments have been found.

43. Mildenberger (1961: p. 87) says that the archaeological data suggest the possibility of a temporarily small garrison in Risstissen too:
   Dabei könnte die verhältnismässig geringe Anzahl von Funden dafür sprechen, dass die Besatzung zur Zeit der Zerstörung tatsächlich zum grossen Teil abwesend war.

44. Felix's troops had been detached along the border of the Inn in the year of the four emperors, probably especially at places where the river could be crossed, e.g. near the road from Augsburg to Salzburg.

45. The excavator, Ohlenroth (1954: p. 83) mentions traces of a fire in the first century A.D., not giving a more precise date. Ulbert (1959: p. 87), Schleiermacher (1972: p. 16) and Kellner (1972: p. 40) mention these traces in connection with the year of the four emperors.
The splintering of these objects indicates that they were purposely destroyed. One of the excavated houses that was built on the forum debris is central to the dating of the whole. This house, called house number 3 in the account of the excavation (Kramer 1953: p. 122), is dated to Vespasianic times; this makes it more than probable that the forum was destroyed in the year of the four emperors. Schleiermacher (1972: p. 15) says about this: "Die Provinzialen wurden wegen ihre Partenahme für Vitellius hart gestraft". Nor do the archaeological data leave us any other choice: everything indicates that Raetia was almost completely destroyed in A.D. 70. Sextilius Felix and his men can be held responsible for the destruction of the civilian settlements and of the military camps. Vespasian’s reign did not have an auspicious start for Raetia.

**IV**

**RAETIA UNDER VESPASIAN**

1. Introduction

As we explained in the first chapter, Raetia was very important for strategic reasons because of its position in the centre of a network of vital highways, and because there were several important Alpine passes within its borders. Apart from all this Raetia was the only barrier in this part of the Empire that separated Italy from Germany, which had not been conquered. That is why Raetia merited extra attention security-wise. In the preceding period, which was characterized by peace and quiet, the need for this had not really made itself felt; the year of the four emperors had made this need abundantly clear, however, also because the people who lived in the province had proved themselves an uncertain factor.

The signs of destruction we discussed in the preceding chapter can be accounted for by the emotions and the feelings of revenge which always accompany the horrors of civil war; this has nothing to do with long-term politics. The question if what happened in A.D. 69 occasioned a different strategy to be employed for
keeping the province of Raetia secure is quite a different matter. The considerations mentioned above would certainly lead us to expect this, but there are no data to support this in the classical written sources. It is much harder to distil such a change in policy from the archaeological and epigraphical material from this period that we can use for the area. Nevertheless it is certainly worthwhile to study these data with this hypothesis in mind.

2. The native militia and the Raetian cohorts

The "iuvventus Raetorum" probably marched to Italy with Caccina's army, after their useful action in the Helvetian rebellion. We do not know what happened to them eventually. Considering the above, we may expect them to have ceased to exist as independent units after the finale defeat of Vitellius at Bedriacum, but we have no way to be certain about this, because we have no data on the subject.

Starting from this hypothesis, Nuber (1967) proposed that the native militia were absorbed into a levy of eight Raetian cohorts. He opposes Stein (1932: p. 204) in this, who placed this levy in 15 B.C., after the subjection of the Raeti. For so large a formation of auxilia suggests a punitive measure after an insurrection, or a security measure after the conquest of an area.\(^{46}\) The difference in opinion has been occasioned by the fact that the epigraphical sources mention both numbered and unnumbered Raetian cohorts, the latter being older (CIL XIII 6240, 7047 & 7684). Stein does not distinguish the two types and blames the difference on the early custom of not mentioning the numbers of the cohorts. According to him there was only one levy, which he then, quite logically, places in 15 B.C., directly following the Roman conquest of the area. Nuber (1967: p. 91), however, points out that this custom had already been largely abandoned in Claudian times, to which the "unnumbered" inscriptions are dated (Kraft 1951: p. 183), especially with levies of this size. Therefore Nuber separates the numbered and the unnumbered cohorts into two different levies. The earlier one he, too, places just after the conquest; the second levy, which consisted of at

\(^{46}\) Cf. the 8 cohortes Breucorum and the 7 cohortes Dalmatorum that were levied after the Pannonian rebellion of A.D. 9 (Stein 1932: pp. 173 and 185). There must have been a levy of (at least) 8 Raetian cohorts because there was a cohortes VIII Raetorum (CIL III p. 854).
least eight cohorts, cannot have occurred earlier than the year of the four emperors. For the size of the levy points to a punitive measure; no rebellion can have occurred in the preceding period, because in that case the Romans would certainly not have tolerated the existence of a native militia. The eight cohorts, then, may have been levied from the native militia who had marched with Vitellius.

Although Nuber's hypothesis is very convincing on a theoretical level, it lacks corroborating evidence. There is counter-evidence, though, which Nuber mentions in a note (p. 93, n. 30). The problem is caused by a number of tile-stamps of the 6th and 7th cohors Raetorum, which have been found in and around Vindonissa (CIL XIII 12456 - 12458). It is generally accepted that these two cohorts were stationed here as auxilia to Legio XXI Rapax in Claudian times, because the successor of the 21st, Legio XI Claudia, did not have auxiliaries at its disposal. Nuber points out that one tile-stamp of the cohors VI Raetorum has been found in a layer of debris dated to about A.D. 70. Because after the defeat at Bedriacum the 21st legion and its auxilia spent a short time in Vindonissa before they were sent north to quell the Batavian revolt, Nuber suggests "eine kurze, aber intensive Ziegeltätigkeit..., möglicherweise auf Vorrat" (p. 93, n. 30). This seems highly improbable. In Vindonissa three tile-stamps of the two Raetian cohorts have been found; that is rather a lot if these auxilia spent only a few months in this camp. If they were not levied till A.D. 70, other cohorts must have been stationed in Vindonissa in Claudian-Neronic times. However, only one tilestamp of the cohors XXVI Voluntariorum Civium Romanorum has been found in this fort (CIL XIII 12491). If we assume that this cohors had been there since Claudian times, then a most peculiar situation arises with regard to the proportion in which the different types of tile-stamps occur, if we accept Nuber's proposal. It is much more likely that the two Raetian cohorts, too, had been detailed to the 21st legion as auxilia since Claudian times. The stamp in the layer of debris can easily be accounted

47. In this discussion I have confined myself to the tile-stamps that have been found in Vindonissa itself. Of the cohors VII Raetorum one stamp has been found in Tenedo-Zurzach (CIL XIII 12458), and one in Cobienz (together with a number of stamps of the 21st legion: Von Gonzenbach 1963: p. 107). Another stamp of the cohors XXVI C.V.R. has been found near Schaffhausen (Ager Transrhenanum Helvetiorum) (CIL XIII 12492).
for by the fact that the 11th legion, which did not have auxiliaries at its disposal, tore down the barracks to make room for a number of warehouses (Meyer 1968/69: p. 85).

However, there are more indications that the levy of cohorts should be dated to pre-Flavian times. The epitaph of a praefect of the cohors VI Raetorum (CIL XIII 5382) is one. The stone was found in Besançon; in A.D. 68 the Vindex insurrection was quelled there by a.o. the 21st legion and its auxilia. It is quite possible that the praefect was killed in this battle. Another indication is the epitaph of a soldier of the cohors II Raetorum (CIL XIII 7246). Kraft (1951: p. 183) dates this inscription to pre-Flavian times.

The data we have on the numbered Raetian cohorts suggest they were levied before the year of the four emperors, for which reason Nuber's theory must be rejected. The levy is unlikely to have taken place in the period between the conquest of Raetia and A.D. 70. The only likely time for such a large formation of cohorts is still the period directly following the conquest and pacification of the area. This in spite of Nuber's objections. 48

Stein (1932: p. 205) sees a connection between what happened in A.D. 69 and another levy, which, according to him, consist-

48. In my opinion his objections are not insuperable. Studying the inscriptions, the first thing that strikes us is that the unnumbered cohorts occur in various places: in Worms (CIL XIII 6240), in Mainz (CIL XIII 7047) and in Andernach (CIL XIII 7684). In addition an unnumbered cohors Raetorum et Vindelicorum is mentioned both in Worms (CIL XIII 6242) and in Mainz (CIL XIII 7048; XXVII BerGK 114 and 114a). The fact that they are all dated to Claudian times (Kraft 1951: p. 183/184), makes it quite likely that they are, in fact, different cohorts. It is remarkable that in Mainz, too, an inscription of the cohors II Raetorum was found (CIL XIII 7246), which Kraft (1951: p. 183) dates to pre-Flavian times, because of the mention of a peregrine veteran. This may be a reflection of the transition from unnumbered to numbered Raetian cohorts in the inscriptions. We lack the evidence to be able to tell whether it became fashionable to mention in the inscriptions numbers that already existed, or whether the sudden occurrence of these numbers is a reflection of a reorganisation in the army, which supplied the unnumbered Raetian auxilia with numbers. For our purposes this is not important. What we see, in any case, is that unnumbered Raetian cohorts no longer occur in post-Claudian inscriptions, while numbered cohorts are starting to occur in the epigraphic material from Claudian times onwards. It appears that this transition took place in the Claudian period.
ed of at least four cohorts.\textsuperscript{49} This because of the fact that there must have been two different 4th cohorts Raetorum (Cichorius 1901: p. 327).\textsuperscript{50} It is certainly possible, but not more than that: there are as yet no positive indications for this connection. If the native Raetian militia were indeed absorbed into the regular Roman army, however, it does not follow automatically that they were put into Raetian cohorts: it is just as likely that they were distributed over other ones.

Starting from our hypothesis it could be assumed that the cohorts that had been encamped in Raetia and had crossed the Alps with Caecina did not return to their camps, but were replaced by other units. There is no evidence for this assumption either. We do not know which auxilia manned the Raetian castella before A.D. 69, neither do we know this for Vespasianic times. The earliest military diploma from Raetia dates from A.D. 107, which is too late for our project.\textsuperscript{51} The only indication for the replacement of these cohorts is possibly to be found in the Risstissen castellum: the area of this fort, which was quickly rebuilt after its destruction, was 1.9 hectares in Vespasianic times; the area of its predecessor was 1.65 hectares (Kellner 1971: p. 209). This could be a reflection of the fact that a different unit was stationed there after A.D. 69. However, this remains the only indication we have, which is too little evidence to form the basis for a theory of total replacement.\textsuperscript{52}

We must conclude, therefore, that, although our hypotheses about the disappearance of the native militia and a reorganization

\textsuperscript{49} Nuber, who argues that this levy consisted of 2 in stead of 4 cohorts (p. 91, n. 17), dates it to late-Flavian times, possibly in the reign of Domitian (p. 93).

\textsuperscript{50} It is likely that there were also two 1st and two 2nd cohorts Raetorum (Stein 1932: p. 205 ff.).

\textsuperscript{51} See Kellner's survey (1968) for this.

\textsuperscript{52} In Helvetic territory, however, there are facts which prove this replacement: legio XXI Rapax left Vindonissa together with the auxilia that were encamped there, and were replaced by the 11th legion. The 21st was detailed to Bonn; the auxilia went their several ways. The cohorts VII Raetorum does not occur in the German diploma's, so it was either sent east (Stein 1932: p. 208) or it simply vanished, which is quite possible after the defeat at Bedriacum; the cohorts VII Raetorum may have been transferred to Weisenau (Stein 1932: p. 209), while the cohorts XXVI V.C.R. is known to have been in Baden-Baden in Flavian times (Stein 1932: p. 231; the cohorts VII Raetorum spent some time there too, as a matter of fact).
of the Raetian cohorts can certainly be defended as probable, there is as yet too little evidence to prove them. Therefore the above can hardly be used to substantiate the claim that there was a change in policy as regards Raetia in the reign of Vespasian. We have to turn to the settlement-archaeology to achieve this.

3. The rebuilding

The year of the four emperors had left Raetia in ashes. It is worthwhile to investigate the process of reconstruction, which naturally followed upon the stabilization of the new government, more closely.

The only civilian site where this process can be observed is Cambodunum-Kempten, because of the systematic excavations here. There are as yet no relevant data for Augsburg and Bregenz. “House 3”, which we mentioned before, appears again to be vital for our study. The house, which was built on a layer of debris, did not have a long life. After it had been demolished, the ground was levelled again, and in this layer a Titus coin was found (Schleiermacher 1972: p. 16). This means that the house was pulled down in the early eighties of the 1st century A.D. at the earliest. The layer with which the ground was levelled again consists of debris from the forum. Because this layer is much thicker than the earlier one, one gets the impression that this time the forum was cleared, undoubtedly to make it possible to build there again (Schleiermacher 1972: p. 16). So it seems that the most important part of the settlement, the forum, lay in ruins for at least 10 years, while the people lived on in simple wooden houses of the type of “house 3”.53

By contrast, the castella along the Danube did get repaired quickly. Hüfingen (Filtzinger e.a. 1976: p. 303), Risstissen (Mildenberger 1961: p. 87), Unterkirchberg (Filtzinger e.a. 1976: p. 541) and Burghöfe (Ulbert 1959: p. 23) were rebuilt in Vespasian’s reign in any case; it is of course difficult to give a more precise date. Mildenberger says that Risstissen was rebuilt probably only a few years after its destruction, while Filtzinger (1976: p. 466) dates the reconstruction even to A.D. 70/71.

53. Precisely because this is the most important part of the town, it is hardly to be expected that this was rebuilt last. We can not be certain about this, however, because we have no data on the other buildings.
However, it is not certain if Aislingen was re-occupied; Ulbert (1959: p. 87) doubts it. Another problem is Günzburg, because of the interpretation of the building inscription from A.D. 77/78.54 In spite of this, the overall picture is clear: the castella were quickly rebuilt.

The contrast is just as clear: whereas the military camps in Raetia were quickly repaired, the town of Kempten continued to lie in ruins. This contrast becomes all the more remarkable when we look at the neighbouring Helvetican and Raurican territories: here a lot of building was done in the towns in Vespasianic times. In Augst, for instance, the theatre was pulled down, and an amphitheatre was put in its place (Laur-Belart 1978: p. 61); Aventicum, which was made a colony in this period, was surrounded by a monumental wall (Meyer 1962: p. 152), while in the centre the artisan’s quarters were replaced with (stone) houses (Boegli 1972b: p. 180).

Schleiermacher (1972: p. 16) blames the fact that Kempten stayed in ruins for so long on the lack of money of the Raetians; it is, however, hardly to be expected that Helvetia, a large part of which was destroyed by Caecina, did not have similar problems. The beautification of the towns in this area can only have been brought about with the help of the imperial Treasury (this is of course also indicated by the fact that Aventicum was made a colony). Apparently such a compensation was not in store for the Raetian town of Kempten. For the first time we get an indication of Vespasian’s policy vis-à-vis this province: the reconstruction and the expansion of the military organisation was a first priority here. There was a lot going on in this field in Raetia.

4. The extension of the Danube-limes

The building activities were not confined to the reconstruction of the forts that had been destroyed in A.D. 70: there were also activities east of Oberstimm. Three new castella along the Danube belong to the Vespasianic era: Straubing (Walke 1965), Regensburg-Kümpfmühl (Ulbert 1955) and Moos (Schönberger 1959: p. 131) (see map IV). The castellum at Eining, between

54. Unfortunately this inscription is not accessible, because it has only been published in F. Vollmer’s "Inscriptions Bavariae Romanae", which is not available from any Dutch library, as far as I know. For the discussion on the dating of this castellum, see note 34.
Oberstimm and Regensburg, may still be late-Vespasianic, but it may also be early-Domitianic: in any case it is later than the forts we mentioned above (Schönberger 1969: p. 157).

It is remarkable that there were so few castella being built east of Oberstimm, especially because of the short intervals between the Claudian castella west of Oberstimm, which were built roughly simultaneously. In the latter case what we are confronted with is the systematical construction of a line of forts, which was made into one whole by the limes-road that connected them. East of Oberstimm the situation was perhaps reversed: the construction of a road to Noricum, which was protected by castella in a few strategic places. Regensburg e.g. was located at a crossing of the Danube (Ulbert 1955: p. 67); Moos was located at a junction with an important road to Augsburg (Schönberger 1959: p. 31).

Es muss jedenfalls mit der Möglichkeit gerechnet werden dass man ... vielleicht in den letzten Jahren Kaiser Vespasians, die Donausüdstrasse ausbaute und die Abzweigungen der ins Provinzinnere führende wichtige Strassen durch Stationen sperre (Schönberger 1962: p. 129).

So it seems that in the case of the activities east of Oberstimm the road had first priority, not the castella. This is also suggested by the fact that only later did new camps get built between the guard-posts we mentioned: the gaps were filled as it were. Again we catch a glimpse of the new military-strategic policy vis-à-vis Raetia. Communications with the troops that were stationed along the Danube in Noricum were greatly improved by the construction of this road. It should be kept in mind that a few years before Sextilius Felix’s troops had probably been forced to enter

55. We mentioned Eining already; Kösching, on the northern bank of the Danube, is dated to A.D. 80 by an inscription commemorating the construction. Further to the East we find Alkofen, Steinkirchen and Künzing, which were probably not built before A.D. 90 (Schönberger 1969: p. 157). The location of Kösching is remarkable. This fort served as protection for a road which crossed the Danube off Neuburg and then followed the northern bank of the Danube to Eining. It is not quite clear why the road follows this route. A simple explanation may be found in the difficulty of the terrain along the southern bank of the Danube (Schönberger 1969: p. 157). This could explain the fact that no Claudian castella have been found east of Oberstimm, which was located precisely in this area. It can be imagined that it was not deemed necessary in those days — because of the political quiet in the entire area — to surmount the difficulties in the terrain.
Raetia via a more southern route because there was no road along the Danube. In a word, Raetia was made more accessible to the military units that were stationed to the east of the province.

5. The Black Forest expedition

At first sight it appears that the same thing happened in the territory to the west of Raetia, the Black Forest. A mile-stone found in Offenburg mentions the construction of a road through the area (CIL XIII 9082):

(imp Vespasiano . . . et imp Tito et)/ caesar(e aug f Domitia)no/ cos /Cn Cor(nelio Clemens)te/ leg (aug pro pr)/ iter de(rectum ab Arge)ntorate/ in R(aetiam)/ ab

This then is a road from Argentorate (Strasbourg) to Raetia, constructed by the legatus Gnaeus Cornelius (Pinarius) Clemens. However, the problem is more complex. The said Clemens is also known from another inscription (CIL XI 5271):

Cn Pinarius L f Cor(nelius Clemens . . .)/ legat propr exercitus qu(i est in Germania sup cur aedium/ sacrarum locorumq publ(icum . . .)/ triumphalibus ornament(is honoratus . . . ob res)/ in Germa(nia prospere gestas)

This text proves that Cornelius Clemens was given the triumphalia ornamenta, a pre-eminently military decoration, for successful exploits in Germany.

This fact, together with the fact that the road that is mentioned in the other inscription leads through territory that had not been occupied until then, has convinced many scholars that the building of that road must have been preceded by a successful war of conquest from Strassbourg led by Clemens in A.D. 73/74 (e.g. Stähelin 1948: p. 210; Kellner 1972: p. 46).

We will start to investigate this campaign, for it has received the most attention in the literature, and has caused the construction of the road to recede into the background. The fact that this expedition has grown larger and larger, because all the military finds in the area have been thought to be linked with it, has only strengthened this tendency.

Felix Stähelin (1948) especially has contributed to this. We will give some examples. The inscriptions CIL VI 3538 and XIII 6212 show that Legio VII Gemina Felix, a legion that had been levied by Galba and that was stationed in Spain, spent a short
time in Germany. This brought the number of legions that were stationed there to five. Stähelin (p. 210) interpreted this temporary increase as an indication of the intensity of the fighting in the Black Forest.56

The most important settlement along the Black Forest road was Rottweil-Arae Flaviae. Here there was also a crossroads with a road to the castra at Vindonissa. Stähelin deduced from this that a second attack had been launched from Vindonissa (p. 212) and so introduced the term ”Zangenangriff” in connection with this area.

A building inscription found in Augst (CIL XIII 11542) mentions vexillationes of the 1st and 7th legion. Their presence has logically been connected with building activities which took place in this colony in Flavian times: a road with a width of 14 meters, running towards a crossing in the Rhine, and the conversion of the theatre into a large amphitheatre.57 Stähelin connected these activities, too, with the Black Forest expedition: the road, according to him, was meant to create a third route for the attack (p. 216); because of the nature of the performances staged in it, the amphitheatre indicated that soldiers were stationed in Augst in connection with the campaign (p. 220).58

Stähelin gleaned one last argument in support of the campaign theory from Fredegar, a chronicler of the 7th century (Brunhölzl 1975: p. 140). Fredegar mentions the quelling of an insurrection and the foundation of the colony of Aventicum in the same year.59 Stähelin equated this insurrection with the expedition of Clemens (p. 209).

We have given an extensive exposition of Stähelin’s arguments in favour of the campaign-hypothesis. This was not done because the hypothesis is probable, but rather because Stähelin is partly

56. Ritterling (1925: p. 1632) even allows for the possibility that this legion got its nickname Felix from this fight.
57. According to Stähelin, the quality of the construction is rather poor. This may suggest that the building was done by soldiers.
58. Stähelin further mentions a cylindrical building on an island in the river Ergolz (p. 217); this is supposed to have been a monument to the victory of Clemens. This is a good example of Stähelin's speculative way of thinking: this building was washed away a long time ago, so that it has never been studied.
59. "Germanus revellantis superat et Aventicum civitatem aedificare praeceptit" (Frei 1969: p. 102).
to blame for the fact that many scholars have accepted the Black Forest expedition as an established fact. Von Gonzenbach (1959: p. 261) writes, e.g.:

Dass Truppen des P. Clemens auch von Augst aus den Rhein überschritten, ist durch verschiedene, auch epigraphische Funden belegt.

It seems that the force of the evidence is rather overestimated here, but it does show how firmly the campaign is established in the minds of the experts.\(^6\) In fact, other theories are based on the campaign-hypothesis: Van Berghem (1955: p. 155), for instance, thinks that one of the reasons for establishing the colony of Aventicum was the need to protect important supply lines during the expedition.

Nevertheless it must be stressed, that as yet there is no conclusive evidence to prove that the campaign actually took place; it remains something that has been inferred from a connection between the two inscriptions mentioned above. The combination may be attractive, but it is certainly not the only possibility. First of all it needs to be pointed out that, in the period of Clemens' German command, the Romans were also active in the Wetterau-area, which lies much further to the north (Stein 1932: p. 102). Secondly, it needs to be kept in mind that the ornamenta were no longer given only for military achievements.\(^1\) Therefore it would be equally justifiable to propose that Clemens got his decorations because of a number of measures and undertakings, the construction of the road through the Black Forest being one of them (Cf. Schönberger 1969: p. 156).

\(^6\) We see it once again in Laur-Belart (1978: p. 11f.): an inscription that was discovered in the wall of the 4th century castellum of Kaiseraugst (Lieb 1968) is linked almost automatically with the Black Forest expedition because it mentions military units. This conclusion is premature and not very likely. The ala Moesica Felix Torquata, which we are dealing with here, must be allotted to the standing army of Germania Inferior in Vespasianic times, on the grounds of a military diploma of A.D. 78 (CIL XVI, 23). It may have stayed there until A.D. 90 (Simon & Baatz 1968: p. 206), when it left to occupy a post in the Wetterau area in Germania Superior. Hans Lieb (1968: p. 132) thinks it is possible that this ala (together with an ala Hispanorum, the other unit the inscription mentions) was near Augst before the middle of the first century, but he adds that there is absolutely not enough evidence. There is no reason at all to date this inscription to Vespasianic times.

\(^1\) "... für Verdienste bei der Erfüllung rein wirtschaftlicher oder kultureller Aufgaben..." (Stein 1932: p. 27).
The area itself does not give much support to the campaign-theory either. Tacitus does not mention it at all in his description of the area in the Germania (caput 29). This is remarkable: one would expect such an important victory over an "Angstgegner" like the Germans to have been enlarged upon in the literature, especially because this campaign took place only a short time back for Tacitus. All the more remarkable is the fact that the area in question was practically uninhabited in the 1st century A.D. (Kraft 1962: p. 152; Nierhaus 1967: p. 120). This does not argue for a large-scale campaign and a resounding victory, either.62

The size of the "conquered" area raises more doubts about the campaign. The discovery of the castellum near Riegel (Filtzinger e.a. 1976: p. 462) has made it probable that already in Claudian times the territory the Romans had occupied bordered on the line running from Riegel to Hüfingen, and not, as had until then been assumed, from Hüfingen southwards to the Rhine.63 Consequently, the right bank of the Rhine must have been in Roman hands from the middle of the 1st century A.D. onwards.64


A look at the map tells us that the conquest of the Black Forest hardly constituted an expansion then (see map IV).

The fact that the area was uninhabited and the fact that the conquest would have constituted only a minor territorial expansion, make it most unlikely that the expedition Stähelin hypothe-

62. Nesselhauf (1960: p. 160) acknowledges the thin population, but holds to the campaign-theory. In connection with this he talks about an army that was "viel größer als die Sache erforderte", once again proof of the fact that the Black Forest expedition was taken for granted.

63. Filtzinger (1957) reached this conclusion much earlier and assumed the existence of a castellum near Riegel 25 years ago. He met with a lot of opposition on this point (e.g. Nesselhauf 1960: p. 161, n. 15; Nierhaus 1967: p. 134). Nierhaus rejected the idea because no finds were made along the road that Filtzinger suggested. If we assume that it was a narrow lane through the forest this is hardly surprising; finds are the result of the frequent use of the road by civilians mostly. This road was probably mainly used by soldiers (couriers, etc.).

64. Laur-Belart (1966: p. 242f.) mentions Roman villas in the area, the finds of which can be dated to Claudian, in some cases even to pre-Claudian times.
sized ever took place. His other arguments can also be easily refuted. It is a fact that the 7th legion stayed in Germania Superior for a while; there is, however, no evidence at all supporting their possible presence in the Black Forest. The province in question had suffered severe damage from the events of A.D. 69/70; even the castra in Strasbourg shows a burnt layer from that time (Hatt 1953: p. 238). It is quite possible that the Rhine-army requisitioned extra men, in view of the extensive building operations and repairs that had to be carried out (Kraft 1962: p. 153; Decker & Selzer 1976: p. 483).

In the same way the events in Augst can be satisfactorily explained. Vexillations carrying out non-military tasks were a not infrequent phenomenon in Vespasianic times: the inscriptions CIL XIII 4623 - 4625 mention detachments from various legions working in the limestone quarries near Metz (Stein 1932: p. 34; Saxer 1967: p. 77f.). Apart from this, Stähelin’s interpretation of the road and the amphitheatre is hardly tenable when studied more closely, even if we take the campaign for granted.

The road to the bridge across the Rhine is, even for a military road, exceptionally wide (14 m). If this road was built especially for the Black Forest expedition, this width indicates a very intensive movement of troops, far more than the two vexillationes. No sign of a corresponding concentration of troops has ever been found near Augst, however. The discovery of the castellum near Riegel makes it likely that Augst lay rather far into the hinterland at the time of the expedition; this, too, makes the town unsuited to be the base for an attack. Furthermore, a continuation of the road north of the Rhine has never been found.

Laur-Belart (1966) reached a similar conclusion, and links the road with the growing trade in Augst in that period. 65 Considering Augst’s position on an important crossroads and the apparent prosperity of the town (as evidenced by the many important buildings), this interpretation is to be preferred to Stähelin’s questionable military explanation.

Stähelin also connected the building of the amphitheatre with the stationing of soldiers here, because of the nature of the performances staged in it. We have shown above that it is unlikely that such a stationing ever took place, but even if we assume the

65. He does not argue against the Black Forest expedition, however: he sees the vexillationes as a rearguard and protection for the bridge (1966: p. 242).
presence of troops, it is difficult to imagine that such elaborate provisions were made for a temporary stay. This apart from the question whether they could impose their will on the local population, which consisted for a large part of Roman citizens. It is much more logical to see the construction of the amphitheatre as a wish of the population itself. It can be deduced from the fact that similar theatres have been found in Bern and Aventicum that not just soldiers were interested in the performances. In short, the fact that the amphitheatre of Augst and the wide road were possibly built by soldiers is in no way to be seen as evidence that a campaign took place dozens of miles to the north.

Fredegan – we have now reached Stähelin’s final argument – mentions a rebellion in Germany in the same year that Aventicum was made a colony. A rebellion in the uninhabited Black Forest, however, is difficult to imagine; the Batavian rising is a much more serious candidate (Frei 1969: p. 104). The crushing of this rebellion and the foundation of the colony both took place in the early years of Vespasian’s reign. The somewhat inaccurate chronology of Fredegan is hardly surprising, considering that he recorded the events six centuries after they had happened.

Thus the last argument in favour of the great Black Forest expedition has been refuted. In the light of our present knowledge, we cannot but conclude that it is extremely unlikely that this campaign ever took place. Nevertheless, the Offenburg milestone proves that Gnaeus Pinarius Cornelius Clemens was in command of the construction of a road through the Black Forest. This fact in itself is extremely important: we see that here, like in the east part of Raetia, the communications were improved. The road through the Black Forest, too, was protected by only a few castella: one in Waldmössingen (Planck 1976a: p. 374), and two in Rottweil, on either side of the Neckar (Rüsch 1976: p. 566f. & 571) (see map IV). The neighbouring castella in Sulz and Geislingen are of a somewhat later date: D29 terra sigillata fragments from La Graufesenque suggest a late Vespasianic/early Domitianic date (Planck 1976b: p. 409). As in the east, this may be the later perfection of the security system, after the main aim had been achieved.

The question is now how these two roads should be interpreted: were they meant to provide a short-cut between the Rhine and the Danube, thus improving communications between the legions that were stationed along these rivers (e.g. Filtzinger
e.a. 1976: p. 48), or is there a connection with the unhappy part Raetia and its inhabitants played in the year of the four emperors?

If we assume that the creation of better and shorter communications between east and west was the main aim, we may wonder why then the road was built through the Black Forest, and not further north, which would really provide a significant short-cut.\(^{66}\) The chosen route did not gain enough, compared with the route that probably already connected Hüfingen and Riegel, to be considered a significant improvement for the east-west communications.

The Offenburg-inscription mentions expressly that the road ran from Argendorate-Strasbourg to Raetia. Strasbourg was a legionary fort, which did not harbour any legions within its walls between A.D. 45 and 71; it is remarkable that this situation came to an end in Vespasianic times with the stationing of the Legio VIII Augusta here, which had to carry out extensive repairs to make the fort habitable again (Stein 1932: p. 100; Hatt 1953: p. 236). The contemporaneity makes it rather likely that there is a relation between the building of the road and the reactivation of the Strasbourg castra at the top of that road.

Given the additional fact that the 8th legion was one of Vespasian’s fiercest and most loyal fighting units in the war of A.D. 69/70, and the fact that from Strasbourg the road to Raetia via the Black Forest was indeed significantly shorter than the Riegel route, it is certainly not unlikely that there was a causal relationship between the building of a road at this point (near a castra) and the fact that Raetia supported the wrong party in the year of the four emperors. In pre-Flavian times Vindonissa had been the base from which this province was kept secure (see chapter II). The 21st legion which was stationed there at the time, had made common cause with the Raeti in A.D. 69. Almost directly following the stabilization of the new regime, this legion was replaced by the 11th, which had also chosen the Flavian side in the war. We may assume that Vindonissa retained the task of guarding Raetia; apparently Strasbourg was now allocated a similar task.

We must conclude that the construction of roads in and near

---

\(^{66}\) Kraft (1962: p. 152) even believes that in pre-Flavian times the legions crossed the Danube off Günzburg and marched towards the Rhine via the Neckar valley to shorten the distance.
Raetia was probably primarily meant to make the province more accessible. It turns out that both the newly built and the already existing roads were controlled by troops that had chosen the Flavian side. The same holds good for the eastern extension of the limes-road: there was no legion in Noricum, but here the auxilia sided with the Flavians, in A.D. 69 at any rate. In short, it is clear that special attention was paid to the improvement of the security of this province, which was strategically so important. It is equally clear that the inhabitants were not really trusted.

6. The Vallis Poenina

The inclusion of Wallis into this investigation may be surprising, for there is almost complete agreement about the time when the Vallis Poenina got seceded from Raetia: in Claudius’ reign (e.g. Meyer 1946: p. 29; Van Berghem 1962: p. 234; Kellner 1972: p. 38). So an explanation is called for.

Wallis is last mentioned as a part of Raetia in Claudian times. Not until the 3rd century do we come across the mention of the area as a separate province, then united with the Alpes Graecae, e.g. in the Notitia Dignitatum I, 108; III, 22 (Kellner 1974: p. 98, n. 35). Although the period in which the secession may have taken place evidently spans two centuries, it is placed in Claudian times. There is no real evidence for this; the only things that are known are that the inhabitants of the Octodurus-Martigny area were given the ius Latii (Pliny N.H. III 135), and that the road across the Great St. Bernard pass was improved in that period. The acquisition of a form of civil rights indicates that the population had become more Romanized, which is hardly surprising in view of the frequency with which the passway was used. It can hardly be construed as an indication for the secession of Wallis from Raetia. Furthermore most scholars assume that the province of Raitiai et Vindeliciai et Vallis Poeninai was a Claudian creation (e.g. Meyer 1968/69: p. 85; Fältzinger e.a. 1976: p. 41).

67. CIL V 3936: Q Caecilius Cisiacus Pica Caecilianus procurator Augustorum et pro legato provinciali Raitiae et Vindeliciae et Vallis Poeninai. The archaic spelling is proof in favour of a Claudian date (Meyer 1943: p. 68).
Consequently, in separating Wallis from Raetia Claudius would have revoked an earlier decision of his; this does not seem very likely. 68

Walser (1974) refers to inscription CIL XII 113 with regard to this issue. It mentions the settlement of the frontier between two Graian tribes, the Vienenses and the Ceutrones, by the legatus of the army of Germania Superior whom we know so well, Pinarus Clemens. 69 This is remarkable, because this type of terminations was usually dealt with by the governor of the area (Walser 1974: p. 175, n. 45). We must therefore assume that Clemens governed the Alpes Graeae around A.D. 74. In this area the Little St. Bernard pass was located, which, together with the Great St. Bernard in the Vallis Poenina, directly connected Italy with Upper Germany. It is therefore to be expected that Clemens also governed the Vallis Poenina (Walser 1974: p. 175).

The question is, of course, why the commander of Upper Germany also got to govern this southern area. This could be explained if we assume that in A.D. 69 Wallis was still within the jurisdiction of the procurator of Raetia. He, as we know, sided with Vitellius; it is a fact that Caecina’s legions were able to cross the Great St. Bernard without problems to speak of, in spite of the unfavourable season, which would have been less simple if anybody had opposed them. Clemens’ position in the Alps then could be the result of Vespasian’s desire to withdraw this important pass from the supervision of the Raetian procurator and to put it in trusted hands for the time being (Walser p. 175).

Although the above is pure hypothesis, it gives a good explanation for Clemens’ presence in the Alpine area, which is difficult to account for in any other way. We may once again have come across a facet of a change in policy vis-à-vis Raetia: the war of A.D. 69 had shown the risks involved in allowing all the important Alpine passes to be within a single governmental unit. The separation of Wallis and Raetia decreased the power of the governor of Raetia, and so reduced the possible risks involved.

68. Walser (1974: p. 171f.), for that matter, suggests a Caligulan date for the establishing of the province in view of the term Augustorun in the inscription CIL V 3936 (see note 67). Given the Claudian date of the inscription, Augustorun would refer to both Caligula and Claudius. It is certainly a possibility, although it does not bring a Claudian date for the separation any closer.

69. CIL XII 113: Ex auctoritate(etc) imp Caes Vespasiani Aug, pontificis max, trib potest V, cos V, desig VI, p p Cn Pinarus Cornel Clemens leg eius pro pr exercitus Germanici superioris inter Vienenses et Ceutronas terminav.
At the end of this investigation into the Vespasianic policy vis-à-vis Raetia we return once more to the Helvetian territory. In the seventies the capital of the civitas, Aventicum, was made a colony. The aim of this has been a matter of great and lasting controversy. The peculiar title of the town must be held responsible for this: Colonia Pia Flavia Constans Emerita Helvetiorum Foederata (CIL XIII 5098).

The establishment of the colony is generally interpreted as a promotion and so as a favour to the Helvetii (e.g. Stähelin 1948: p. 205ff.; Boegli 1972a: p. 78; Schillinger-Häfele 1974: p. 441). It is seen as a reflection of Vespasian's appreciation of their resistance against Caecina and their loyalty to Galba. For Vespasian, who, according to Suetonius (Vesp. 1), spent part of his youth in Helvetian territory, pretended to continue the Galba line (Gagé 1954: p. 315).

However, the term Emerita in the title of the colony usually refers to a deduction of Roman veterans (Galsterer-Kröll 1972: p. 75). It is difficult to reconcile this with the reward-theory we mentioned above. For it is hard to understand how the transplantation of a number of retired legionaries into the capital of the civitas Helvetiorum is to be construed as a favour by the original inhabitants. Many scholars have occupied themselves with this problem, except perhaps Stähelin, who believed in a reward and in a deductio of veterans, but who never expressed himself on the fact that the two theories are irreconcilable. Boegli (1972a: p. 79), for instance, speaks "von einer Art Entwicklungshilfe..., die Vespasian den Helvetiern zukommen liess" in this connection. Schillinger-Häfele (1974) suggests a similar, but much more sensible solution. She links the land that had been robbed of both owner and heir in the violence of A.D. 69 with the deductio. By giving this land, which belonged to no one, to veterans to farm, the town was saved from economic ruin. However, there is one great objection to this theory which we will return to later.

Given the contradiction between the reward-theory and the deduction-theory, it is of course possible to argue against the validity of one of them. Van Berghem (1955), e.g., saw the deduc-

70. He even suggested the veterans of the Black Forest expedition as those who settled in the new colony.

71. However, here, too, the question remains in how far the local inhabitants would have construed this as a favour.
tion as an indication of a punitive measure against the Helvetians. In his view, the background to the institution of the colony was military-strategic: the protection of the important line of communication between Germany and Italy against the Helvetians (hence the rampart), who by their rebellion of A.D. 69 had shown themselves a security risk — "un choix malheureux entre les prétendants à la succession de Nero" (Van Berghem 1955: p. 155). He also saw a link with the need to protect the supply lines for the Black Forest expedition.

However, this theory is most unlikely. The Clemens expedition has been shown to be a myth, whereas the reward-theory is quite plausible, considering the arguments set out above. Moreover, there is not a single indication in this area that the Helvetians suffered punitive measures under Vespasian. ⁷²

Given the plausibility of the reward-theory, the alternative possibility to put an end to the said contradiction is to argue against the deductio of veterans. It is in fact remarkable that this has rarely been done. Looking through the inscriptions from Aventicum one is struck by the complete absence of texts that refer to military careers etc. Even the local magistrate titled primus omnium patronus publicus (CIL XIII 5102, 5103), whose career began when the town was made a colony, has a completely civilian cursus (Reynolds 1964: p. 388). This evidence makes it quite unlikely that Roman veterans populated the colony, whether as saviours of the local economy, or in any other capacity.

However, this does not solve the problem we had with Emerita: the military connotation remains an incontestable fact. ⁷³ Reynolds (1964: p. 391) is the first to have succeeded in reconciling the contradictory data: she proposes that Emerita be linked with the native militia, as they were described by Tacitus (Hist. I 67). These had never formed part of the regular Roman army. There are several arguments that help to make this theory plausible. Apart from the fact that it explains the absence of military inscriptions, it is also in complete agreement with the term Helve-

⁷² Van Berghem himself tries to soften his punishment-theory by regarding the term Foederata in the title as a treaty concluded between Vespasian and the Helvetii, which allowed the local population to maintain a reasonable measure of autonomy for their vici as a compensation for the loss of their capital (Van Berghem 1955: p. 154).
⁷³ The term Emerita will be discussed extensively in a forthcoming paper of Dr. J.G.P. Best.
tiorum in the title, which, as Van Royen (1975) has shown, should be interpreted as a genitivus explicativus, i.e. as an explanation of the nature of the colonists, the Helvetii in this case. The castellum at Hüfingen is, in our opinion, the most likely station for the Helvetian militia (see the Appendix). The finds suggest that they were replaced by a unit of the regular army in Vespasianic times; it is most attractive to link this replacement with the placing of these militia in the new colony. Emerita could then amongst other things be seen as a reflection of the new emperor’s appreciation for the way they acted against Vitellius’ legions.

Von Gonzenbach (1963) has been able to reconstruct a network of watchposts and the like stretching all over Helvetia in Claudian-Neronic times, on the basis of the distribution of 21st legion tile-stamps. Aventicum and the area around it were also incorporated in this network. This changed in Flavian times. Once again, tile-stamps – of the 11th legion this time – are found all over Switzerland, in the same places where those of the 21st had been found, with one important exception: the new colony and the area around it. The Flavian tile-stamps are absent along the important road between the Great St. Bernard pass and the Rhine, in the part running from Aventicum to Petinesca; they are also absent from the road leading into the Alps via Bern, which runs at right angles to the former. Because on the one hand it is unlikely that these watchposts ceased to exist, especially because of the importance of the said road, and on the other hand the absence of stamps indicates that the protection of this area was no longer ordered from Vindonissa, the only remaining possibility is that the Helvetians took on this job themselves. This would also explain the term Foederata in the title, which would otherwise remain rather obscure: we are dealing with special services here, which quite possibly were arranged per foedus at the establishment of the colony.74 Perhaps, this was the new task for the militia.

74. Foederata has been taken to refer to a foedus that had been concluded between Caesar and the Helvetii in 58 B.C. (e.g. Stähelin 1948: p. 222; Howald/Meyer 1940: p. 257; Galsterer-Kröll 1972: p. 75). Best & Isaac (1977), however, showed convincingly that Caesar had nothing to do with this foedus, and that the Helvetii had certainly not been foederati from 58 B.C. onwards. Von Gonzenbach (1963: p. 116) also, but hesitantly, links the term Foederata with these services. However, she follows Van Berghem’s idea that the colony was directed against the Helvetii.
So in Vespasianic times the Helvetians got a colony of their own, and, or so it seems, the right to police their own territory. Now the question is whether these are just marks of favour. We could accept this if the role the Helvetians played in A.D. 69 had been decisive for the outcome of the war; however, there is no indication that this was so. We have not mentioned the monumental wall here, which was built around Aventicum when it was made a colony. This wall, too, is often seen as a mark of favour and as a status symbol for the new colony (e.g. Meyer 1946: p. 31; Boegli 1972a: p. 79; Schillinger-Häfele 1974: p. 441, n. 3).

However, the fact that the southern part of the wall went up the strategic heights that were available there, and that within it only the northern part was built on, so that it resembled a refuge, together with the size of the walls (height: 7.53 m; width: 2.40 m), indicate that military-strategic motives played at least as important a part in the construction as motives of prestige. This is hardly surprising; only a few years before, the then undefended town had miraculously escaped total destruction when legionaries and Raetians had completely defeated the Helvetians. It does not seem too bold to suspect at least some connection.

The above shows that the civitas Helvetiorum also had a military aspect: Helvetians carried out para-military tasks along the roads; the capital was somewhat like a refuge. One of the roads they patrolled ran straight into the Alps, i.e. into Raetian territory. This road could well be the one along which the Raetians came to attack the Helvetians in the rear in A.D. 69. Everything indicates that the Helvetii wanted to prevent a repetition of this disaster. We can be quite certain that the inborn fear of Raetian raids had returned to its accustomed height in the year of the four emperors.

It is certain that the Helvetians were granted great marks of favour, but that will not have been Vespasian's only motive: greater security was achieved by allowing the Helvetians to take part in the controlling. In pre-Flavian times the security of the area was ordered from Vindonissa only; now the responsibility was extended to Vindonissa, Strasbourg and the civitas Helvetiorum, whose hostility towards Raetia was a watertight guarantee for good guardianship. The responsibility -- and so the risk, too -- was divided: the danger that was constituted by Raetia's location and population was to a large extent neutralized by Vespasian's policy. The Helvetians were fitted into the new defense system; they got a lot in return.
CONCLUSIONS

We have reviewed a hundred years of Roman occupation of the province of Raetia. In spite of the paucity of written sources it has turned out to be possible to trace a military-political development in the area in this period by means of the archaeological and epigraphic material.

The inhabitants of the area, the Raetians, have emerged as a rather bellicose people, who regularly raided the plains at the foot of the Alps before their subjugation. After their subjection, which was inspired by the fact that the Romans needed to control the Alpine passes before they could start the conquest of Germany, their bellicosity was used to serve the conqueror through the formation of a large number of Raetian cohorts.

The conquest of 15 B.C. itself was possibly limited to the Alpine ranges. No Roman finds of earlier date than 10 B.C. are found in the Voralpenland, which forces us to take into account the possibility that this area did not come under Roman influence until after the mountains had been pacified.

The first period of the Roman occupation was still dominated by the campaign that was planned against Germany. The castra at Augsburg-Oberhausen had an "offensive" position; the north-south communications were stressed. When the idea of this campaign was abandoned in Tiberian times, the situation changed: the castra at Vindonissa replaced the one at Oberhausen, and got the task of protecting the area with a number of forts in the heart of Raetia that were put under its command. The next change took place in Claudian times when this line of forts was replaced by a system of castella along the Danube, which were located mainly in the western part of the area.

This gradual development appears to have been cut short by the dramatic events of the year of the four emperors. The Raetians made the wrong choice in this conflict by supporting Vitellius. This support was, among other things, translated into an attack against the Helvetians, who had remained loyal to Galba. The Raetians paid for this firstly through the almost complete destruction of both the military camps and the civilian settlements within their borders when Vitellius was definitely defeated at Bedriacum. Sextilius Felix, the governor of Noricum, may have been responsible for this destruction when he marched with
his troops straight through Raetia on his way to the rebels of Civilis.

Another result of Raetia's participation in this war was probably a renewed understanding by the Romans of the vital position of this province in the empire as the only buffer against Germany, and as the country that had almost all the important Alpine passes within its borders. Against this background the changes that came about here in Vespasianic times are best understood. Thus we could conclude that it is quite possible that the Vallis Poenina was not separated from Raetia in Claudian times, but in the Flavian period. One of the most important passes — the Great St. Bernard — would thus have been removed from the control of the procurator of Raetia.

Theories about great levies of troops had to be rejected, not because they are improbable — it was a method the Romans often used to bring back peace and quiet after an insurrection — but because of the total lack of evidence. However, the settlement-archaeology does yield at least strong indications for a new Roman security policy. We have seen that, whereas at least one civilian settlement, Cambodunum, was not returned in its old splendour in Vespasian's reign, there were a lot of building activities in the military sector. The castella that had been destroyed were for the major part quickly rebuilt; the province was made more easily accessible to the Roman army, both from the east and from the west. In the east this was done by extending the limes-road to Noricum; communications in the west were improved through the construction of a road through the Black Forest. We have disproved the theory that a great expedition of conquest took place here. The fact that at the head of this road, which ran straight to Raetia, a castra which had not been used for some time was reactivated at that time by a legion that was pro-Flavian, gives rise to the supposition that the road was meant to make it possible to control the Raetian territory more effectively. It is remarkable in this respect that the other legionary camp which had of old been responsible for the security of the area, at the time also received a legion that supported Vespasian within its walls.

By dividing the responsibility for the security over several units the risks also became smaller. Aventicum might also fit into this policy. This new colony, which was exclusively populated by the Helvetians themselves, and not by Roman veterans, seems to have been granted the right to guard and patrol its own area. The
guarding of the road into the Raetian Alps must have been very safe with them.

In this way the outlines of a new security system, which was meant to neutralise the potential danger that Raetia constituted because of its location and its inhabitants, are becoming visible. It is to be hoped that additional data will make these outlines clearer in the future.

APPENDIX

The location of the Helvetian castellum

The Helvetian-manned fort occurs in Tacitus (Hist I 67) in connection with a money transport on its way to this camp, which was intercepted by legionaries of the 21st legion. As we know the Helvetians took their revenge by capturing military messengers on their way from Germany to Pannonia.

Usually the Helvetian fort is assumed to have been located in Tenedo-Zurzach (e.g. Stähelin 1948: p. 192; Walser 1954: p. 263). This theory is not based on archaeological finds, but purely on the geographical position of the site (see map IV): the money transport — the Helvetians payed their own detachment themselves — would have passed Vindonissa, which would square with the legionaries’ action; the envoy that was captured would have had to pass Tenedo, if he followed the limes-road along the Rhine, which would tally with the Helvetian reaction.

Nevertheless there are objections. The fort, which has not yet been excavated by the way, was located near an important Rhine crossing and at the crossroads of a number of important high-roads. In short, it was a keypoint in the defense of the area, and we may wonder if the Romans dared to have the Helvetians man such a post. Furthermore, the fact that a number of tile-stamps of the 21st legion were found close by (v. Gonzenbach 1963: p. 107) indicates a strong connection with Vindonissa. This, too, seems to contradict the apparent independence of the fort.

In the past another castellum was suggested to be the one Tacitus meant: Hüfingen-Brigobanne (Revellio 1937: p. 28; Filtzinger 1957: p. 207ff.). Its location makes it just as eligible as Tenedo: it lies north of Tenedo, but on the same road, which means that in
this case, too, the money transport would have passed Vindonissa. The finding of the Riegel castellum (Filtzinger e.a. 1976: p. 462) has made it likely that there was a road connecting it with Hüfingen. Although it was probably only an unpaved track, we must take the possibility into account that the envoy to Pannonia chose this route to avoid the detour caused by the bend in the Rhine. In that case the journey would have taken them past Hüfingen.

The castellum itself has some remarkable characteristics. The lay-out is un-Roman, among the finds are a large number of Celtic coins and late-LaTène pottery, apart from the usual Roman finds. The typology of the non-Roman material has established that it dates partly to Roman times, which leads the excavator Revellio (1937: p. 28) to surmise

... dass das Spätlatène material eben die Hinterlassenschaft einer Helvetischen Miliztruppe ist, die unter römischem Kommando in Claudischer Zeit im Kastell lag.

It is interesting to note in this connection that no tile-stamps of the 21st legion have been found in Hüfingen, as opposed to Tenedo. This, too, argues in favour of the hypothesis that the Helvetian castellum was located here.

As we know, Vespasian took the reorganization of the army in hand immediately after his accession. It is generally assumed that the native militia were abolished. It may be expected that in this connection the Helvetian detachment of Hüfingen, if there ever was one, was replaced by a unit of the regular Roman army. This tallies beautifully with the archaeological material. In the castellum tile-stamps of the 11th legion have been found, which could indicate that the relation between Hüfingen and Vindonissa (where the 11th legion was stationed in Flavian times) had changed. The vicus that now came into being near the fort was, as the pottery finds indicate, inhabited by Raurici and Helvetii (Nierhaus 1956: p. 155ff.).

The above is, of course, highly speculative and hardly capable of being proved. Nevertheless it can be stated that, if we have a choice between Hüfingen and Tenedo, the former is much to be preferred as the possible base of the Helvetian militia.
MAP I: ROADS AND PASSSES IN RAETIA

G.St.B. = Great St. Bernard pass
F. = Furka pass
S. = Septimer pass
R.S. = Reschen-Scheideck pass
B. = Brennerpass
--- = border
----- = roads
MAP II: AUGUSTAN SITES

1. Basle
2. Vindonissa
3. Oberwinterthur
4. Zürich
5. Biberlikopf-Strahlegg-Filzbach (watch-towers)
6. Augsburg-Oberhausen
7. Lorenzberg near Epfach

- = Helvetian sites
○ = Raetian sites
--- = roads
|| = passes
MAP III: TIBERIAN/CLAUDIAN FORTS IN RAETIA AND HELVETIA

1. Vindonissa
2. Basle
3. Oberwinterthur
4. Chur
5. Bregenz
6. Kempten
7. Auerberg

8. Epfach
9. Gauting
10. Hüfingen
11. Tuttlingen
12. Ennetach
13. Emerkingen
14. Risstissen
15. Unterkirchberg
16. Günzburg
17. Aislingen
18. Burghöfe
19. Neuburg
20. Oberstimm
MAP IV:
EXISTING FORTS AND NEW FORTS IN EARLY FLAVIAN TIMES

7. Ennetach  15. Oberstimm

○ ○ = existing forts
● = new forts
# LIST OF WORKS CITED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berghem, D. van</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Aspects de la domination romaine en Suisse, SZG 5, pp. 145 - 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berghem, D. van</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Du portage au péage, MH 13, pp. 199 - 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berghem, D. van</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Zur römischen Kolonisation in der Schweiz, JbSGU 46, pp. 13 - 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berghem, D. van</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Conquête et organisation par Rome des districts Alpins, REL 40, pp. 228 - 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berghem, D. van</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>La conquête de la Rhetie, MH 25, pp. 1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boegli, H.</td>
<td>1972a</td>
<td>Die Schweiz zur Römerzeit. Bern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boegli, H.</td>
<td>1972b</td>
<td>Aventicum. Zum Stand der Forschung, BJ 172, pp. 175 - 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunhölzl, F.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters. Band I. München</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chantraine, H.</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Zu den neuen Fasten der rätslichen Statthalter, BVBI 38, pp. 111 - 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ, K.</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Die Militärgeschichte der Schweiz in römischer Zeit, SZG 5, pp. 452 - 493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ, K.</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Zur römischen Okkupation der Zentralalpen und des Alpenvorlandes, Historia 6, pp. 416 - 428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cichorius, C.</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Cohors, RE IV, pp. 231 - 356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewins, U.</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>The enfranchisement of Cisalpine Gaul, PBSR 23, pp. 73 - 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellmann, R.</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Basel in römischer Zeit. Basle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filtzinger, Ph.</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Bemerkungen zur römischen Okkupa-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gagé, J. (1952) Vespasien et la mémoire de Galba, REA 54, pp. 290 - 315
Gonzenbach, V. von (1963) Die Verbreitung der gestempelten Ziegel der im 1. Jahrhundert nach Chr. in Vindonissa liegenden römischen Truppen, BJ 163, pp. 76 - 150
Hatt, J.J. (1953) Les résultats historiques des fouilles de Strasbourg, Historia 2, pp. 234 - 241
Heuberger, R. (1932) Rätien im Altertum und Frühmittelalter, Band 1. Innsbruck
Howald, E. & E. Meyer (1940) Die römische Schweiz. Zürich
Hübener, W. (1968) Römische Wehranlagen an Rhein und Donau als militärgeschichtliche Quelle, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2, pp. 7 - 34
Kellner, H.J. (1968) Zwei neue rätische Militärdiplome, BVBl 33, pp. 92 - 99
Kraft, K. (1950/51) Zu den Schlagmarken des Tiberius und Germanicus: ein Beitrag zur Datierung
Kraft, K. (1951) Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau. Bern
Kraft, K. (1957) Die Rolle der Colonia Julia Equestris und die römische Auxiliarrekrutierung, JbRGZM 4, pp. 81 - 107
Laur-Belart, R. (1937) Römische Zeit (Fundberichte), JbSGU 29, pp. 78 - 99
Meyer, E. (1943) Zur Geschichte des Wallis in römischer Zeit, BZG 42, pp. 59 - 78
Meyer, E. (1968/69) Neure Forschungsergebnisse zur Geschichte der Schweiz in römischer Zeit, JbSGU 54, pp. 73 - 97
Nesselhauf, H. (1937) Neue Inschriften aus dem römischen Germanien und den angrenzenden Gebieten, XXVII BerRGK, pp. 51 - 134

Overbeck, B. (1976) Raetien zur Prinzipatszeit, ANRW II 5,1; pp. 658 - 688


Planck, D. (1976b) Neue Forschungen zum obergermanischen und raetischen Limes, ANRW II 5,1; pp. 404 - 456

Prieur, J. (1976) L’histoire des regions alpestres sous le haut empire romain, ANRW II 5,2; pp. 630 - 656


Revellio, P. (1937) Das Kastell Hüfingen, ORL B, Strecke V 2, nr 62a, Berlin

Reynolds, J. (1964) La colonie flavienne d’Avenches, SZG 14, pp. 387 - 391

Ritterling, E. (1925) Legio, RE XII, pp. 1186 - 1829

Royen, R.A. van (1973) Colonia Augusta Praetoria and Augustus’ cohortes praetoriae, Talanta 5, pp. 48 - 71

Royen, R.A. van (1975) Some observations on the Latin concept of “colonia”, Talanta 6, pp. 30 - 36


Schleiermacher, W. (1955a) Flavische Okkupationslinien in Raetien, JbRGZM 2, pp. 245 - 252


Schönberger, H. (1972) Das Römerkastell Oberstimm, BVBl 37, pp. 31 - 37
Stein, E. (1932) Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörpers im römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat. Vienna
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BerRGK</td>
<td>Berichte der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF</td>
<td>Badische Fundberichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJ</td>
<td>Bonner Jahrbücher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVB1</td>
<td>Bayerische Vorgeschichtsblätter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZG</td>
<td>Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL</td>
<td>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JbRGZM</td>
<td>Jahrbuch des Römisch Germanisches Zentralmuseums Mainz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JbSGU</td>
<td>Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Ur- und Frühgeschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNG</td>
<td>Jahrbuch für numismatische Geschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>Museum Helveticum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORL</td>
<td>Obergermanische Raetische Limes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSR</td>
<td>Publications of the British School at Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Real Enzyklopädie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue d'études Anciennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Revue d'études Latines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ</td>
<td>Saalburg Jahrbuch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZG</td>
<td>Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Ur Schweiz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>